Indo-US Defence cooperation-Part 2

 India-US Defence Cooperation

Nuances and Vicissitudes-Part 2

For readers, who could not access Part 1 of this piece, a summary of Geo-Political realities of the 1960s to early 1990s along with events that pushed India to expand her defence relations with the USA formed the backdrop to this piece. What then are the pros and cons of India signing agreements on Logistics Supply(LSA), Communication interoperability and security(CISMOA) Basic exchange and cooperation for geospatial agreements(BECA)

LSA is a subject much discussed over the last decade, both in and out of Parliament. The objections raised by various participants broadly covered the following areas:

·       That it would provide unfettered access to Indian military bases.

·       It would not be a mutually beneficial and cost effective arrangement to accept US terms of settling payments for logistics for the use of our facilities.

·       USA would have greater familiarity with our equipment and preparedness.

·       It would affect our sovereignty

·       It would adversely impact the independence of our foreign policy.

Since 1993, joint exercises have proved to be quite rewarding for both the participants. All three services have participated in highly advanced and specially designed exercises in each other's military establishments. Much has been written about the value of "Exercise Malabar" between the two navies as also" exercise Red Flag" between the two Air forces. The Army has been exposed to special and Commando operations while the American Army has experienced the highly specialised environs for jungle operations in our facility.

Joint patrolling of energy routes in the Malacca straits and to thwart transnational crimes at sea have provided invaluable operational opportunities.

LSA provides cover for transportation, airlift, refuelling and storage services for not only military exercises but also for disaster relief cooperation. There have been cost savings due to reciprocal arrangements. Published reports indicate that in Exercise Red Flag alone saving of Dollars 20 Million accrued to India.

The fact that for close to two decades, both the Militaries have graduated from basic exercises to very advanced ones and have managed to progress without providing unfettered access to each other's military facilities, proves that we are capable of safeguarding our individual national interests. Exposure to the globalised environment has enriched our abilities to deal with unregulated activities at sea, as also to use appropriate technologies to counter them.

While the Parliament and the experts debate on ensuring that our sovereignty remains unchallenged and that we retain our independence in crafting our foreign policy, the global environment has significantly changed. The old formulations of non-alignment which served us well in the early part of our independence need refinement. The recent debate in 2013 on Non-alignment two generated vibrant discussions. Prof Sen (Pune) went on to state that the version 2"reduced Indian thinking to irrelevancy".

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's Look East policy appears to have found serious consideration and recognition beyond our shores. Much after India attempted to operationalise the concept, USA shifted its focus from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific ocean. The Modi Govt has made relations with Japan and Australia its strategic priority. Joint statements no longer hide our real concerns on China usurping  maritime zones not authorised by UNCLOS. Freedom of navigation rights as per international norms are being endorsed in joint statements. We no longer sit on a fence.

The Indian Navy has clearly articulated its Maritime security strategy in a publication recently released by the RM. Primary areas of maritime interests, interalia, include the Persian gulf, gulf of Oman, gulf of Aden, Red sea and the littoral regions, east coast of Africa, Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok and the Cape of Good Hope.

The secondary areas include South East Indian Ocean, South and East China seas, Western Pacific ocean and other areas based on the Indian Diaspora, overseas investments and political relations. Thus, even as we debate, we are preparing to meet uncertain future contingencies.

If national interests continue to be clearly unarticulated and remain vague, changing geopolitical realities would impose several demands on India that would necessitate changes in the traditional concepts of its interpretation.

It is in the above backdrop that the other two agreements which may have legislative and legal ramifications prior to the release of cutting-edge technologies from the USA to India, need to be examined. CISMOA and BECA, the latter which has geospatial intelligence sharing clauses need to be considered from a position of strength and maturity rather than with deep suspicion and lack of confidence in our ability to protect our national interests. These documents are not cast in stone. They can be amended or revoked if required.

If however, the hereto vague concepts of national interests continue to hinder progress both in the USA and in India, perhaps circumstances may force us to find other paths of convergence to survive in a highly unpredictable world.

We are at cross roads-change or become irrelevant.

http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/12/23/india-us-defence-cooperation-lets-no-longer-sit-on-the-fence#.Vnp0orBjsnw.facebook

India-US Defence Dialogue http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/12/22/india-us-military-agreement-a-logical-corollary-to-evolving-ties#.Vnk6N1Y1C20.facebook

India-US Defence Dialogue

Nuances and Vicissitudes

For nearly two decades and a bit more, India and the USA have been discussing several enabling mechanisms to embellish their cooperation between the two Armed Forces. A headline in a leading daily on 21 Dec, regarding Parrikar's visit to USA-  "India and US to talk on giving access to each other's Military bases and ports"- must have raised many eyebrows. Experts may even attribute it to 'questionable Government policy, on a sensitive issue concerning national interest of India.'  This is not a sudden development in our relations with the USA. Agreements on Logistics support(LSA), Communications, interoperability and security(CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and cooperation(BECA) have been on the agenda of the Indo-US defence dialogue for many years.

Indeed, this had also figured prominently in Parliament, when the then External affairs minister, Sri Pranab Mukherji, had to clarify that this agreement,"does not envisage providing military facilities to US forces. Neither does it provide for unqualified Indian support to the US in any armed conflict to which India is not a party." Despite such assurances left wing parties (critical allies) continued to oppose this agreement.

It is necessary to understand the purpose and content of such agreements which are in existence with about 80 countries including Pakistan(expired in 2012 and is under discussion now). Since LSA is considered to be an important ingredient for joint military exercises and disaster relief operations, some pros and cons of signing this agreement from an Indian perspective  may be of value to understand the significance of the debate. That will be covered in the concluding part of this article. A historic perspective on events leading to high-level engagement with the US Military is necessary to appreciate the second part of the article.

From 1965, when military acquisitions from the erstwhile Soviet Union commenced, up to the breakup of  the Soviet Union, India was a major  recipient of military hardware. Yet, there were no joint exercises or operations between the two militaries. In 1971, an Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation   was signed. This timely treaty which assisted India in the Indo-Pak war had placed India squarely in the Soviet camp.

That President Nixon disliked Mrs Gandhi and Kissinger was equally hostile to India, have been well documented. In turn, it led to a generation of US politicians, military and civil servants who were hostile to India. During this period, the Military of Pakistan continued to build on its close relations with Pentagon which began during the CENTO days and flourished during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, the Indian Military  barring those who attended courses in USA and UK were denied the opportunity to be familiar with American operational doctrines and the manner in which congressmen lobbied for military assistance to friendly countries. 

In short, while there was a fair understanding of the Soviet system and training methodologies, little was known of the American system of checks and balances, legislative and executive controls and the White House-Congress interface.

During the same period, in India, anti-American sentiments ran high for numerous reasons. US patch- up with the Chinese through senior politicians of Pakistan and stage managed by Henry Kissinger, the Vietnam war, USS Enterprise incident in 1971, sanctions on India in 1974 and 1998 and many  such actions  did not help the deteriorating relationship. Distrust of US intentions and manipulations were fuelled by the deep-rooted philosophy of non-alignment and left leaning ideologies both at the political and bureaucratic levels. Consequently efforts to normalise relations and enhance military to military contacts received little or no support at all levels of governance in both countries.

Liberalization and globalization began the process of political and military engagement with the USA. As expected every move was carefully weighed both in the context of sovereignty and non-alignment. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only disrupted the regular supply of spares thus resulting in low operational readiness of military assets but, more importantly, the newly formed Russia was unable to provide training facilities for warships on order, as the Russian military personnel were neither paid nor compensated by the state. Many Russian officers survived on driving cabs after working hours. India had to diversify her source of supply of military equipment or face the proverbial "all eggs in the same basket" analogy.

Indo-US military cooperation and dialogue commenced a new phase of an operational trend in 1993. By the turn of the century, an incremental process was adopted at a slow pace to enable both parties to adjust to a new paradigm shift. Two examples of successful and mutually beneficial engagement that resulted in quality agreements were the June 2005 India-US new defence framework agreement with a roadmap for operational, joint military exercises, training and services exchange and the March 2006 Indo-US  Maritime cooperation framework. The former resulted in a maximum number of military exercises of a highly advanced level and the latter in joint patrolling of energy trade routes to combat piracy and transnational crimes at sea.

The concluding part of this article will contain details of our apprehensions and ground realities with respect to the long-pending agreements such as LSA, CISMOA and  BECA.

ISIS -PARIS MASSACRE VIEWED FROM HUNTINGTON'S LENS

"Clash of Civilisation" And The Paris Massacre
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/11/19/isis-menace-military-approach-to-civilisational-crisis-wont-work

I was first exposed to the writings of Samuel Huntington four decades ago. The soldier and the state was the first book on Civil-Military relations written by the author in 1955. The author went on to serve on the faculty of Harvard for 54 years before his death on  Christmas eve of 2008.

So, it was with some trepidation that I requested for a meeting with Huntington in the autumn of 2000 when I was privileged to attend a course at the John F Kennedy School at Harvard. He graciously received me at his apartment and patiently heard my queries on anomalies in civil-military relations. Having completed a full session of discussions, I sought his clarification on the controversial  points raised in his seminal work on "Clash of Civilization."

Samuel's book on "The Clash of Civilization?" was widely read and debated since1993. It was a bold attempt to encapsulate the emerging trends in post cold war politics and how he envisioned conflict between civilizations to be the new evolving global phenomenon. He explained how the fundamental sources of global conflict would neither be ideological nor primarily economic.

While outlining the reasons for the relative decline of the Western Civilisation, he commented on the Western domination of the UN Security Council-a point now  repeatedly made by India in support of reforms of UN. In regard to the "West Versus the Rest" debate ,he dwelled on the fundamental differences between the west and the rest. Paradoxes in the concepts of western democracies when viewed from  the non-western civilisations whether Confucian,  Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist,Islamic or orthodox cultures as outlined in his book were reasserted.

The Paris Massacre-Friday the 13th

Vibrant debates in the wake of the Paris massacre ,cover a wide spectrum of possibilities of addressing issues related to ISIS. In summer of 1993, while first publishing his article in Foreign Affairs, Samuel had addressed two specific issues which he alluded to during our discussions. The first was a reference to "band-wagoning" a term used in international relations to describe non western nation states adopting the western or American brand of polity.  He quotes Boris Yeltsin, ,as one who was attempting to Westernise a reluctant  Russian elite and the people as a whole. The news that France and Russia have already agreed to conduct joint air strikes, possibly  more, may well be the first signs of increasing cooperation and collaboration  between the West and the orthodox Russians who are trying to adopt western goals and objectives.

The other issue which remained incomplete in our discussions on the memorable autumn evening in 2000, was the subject of Confucian-Islamic military and political alignment. The clash of civilization also includes possible alignment in the goals and objectives of Chinese and Islamic states. The China-Pakistan model of all weather friendship is an example in South Asia. However even in this seasoned relationship, the Chinese have harshly opposed attempts by their Muslim citizens to propagate their model of achieving religious goals. In this context China would be closely watched for their material, logistics and military support to ISIS and /or any off shoots of extreme fundamentalist forces opposed to Western dominance.

Current Dilemmas

 Samuel Huntington had alluded to the possibility of India becoming a Hindu State mainly due to the paradoxes inherent in the Western Civilizations and the dangers of blindly westernising the Indian approach to development and progress.  The only successful model of a Nation adopting western goals while retaining its cultural and civilizational strengths is Japan. The Japanese have remained with the West without compromising their cultural affiliations. He, therefore, recommended that the West must learn to understand the cultural and civilizational roots of those that wish to work with them.

India and the Western powers, it is hoped, have learnt to cooperate  without necessarily  accepting Western concepts being thrust on an old civilization rich in its resilience, tolerance and traditions.

The same applies to the obsession of the West to impose their form of democracy on Islamic states which are ruled by methods unique to their culture. Iraq and Libya are but two examples of this fallacious approach. Militarily crushing an immediate threat is and will remain a temporary solution to a complex religious, ideological  and civilizational crisis.

Fouad Ajami and Kishore  Mahbubani  had critiqued Samuel's assertions by September 1993. It would be interesting if they were to comment on the happenings since then in World Politics. I have based my observations as a layman who followed the debate and had the good fortune to meet the author of a magnum opus. Keep smiling Samuel! You may still be proved right.

Pakistan Threatens to use Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan claims to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neutralize a rapid Indian thrust. Is it kakistocracy at work?

 It is well known that the Indian Nuclear Weapons programme was steered by a close-knit group of scientists referred to as "The strategic enclave" which involved specialists from the Armed Forces to operationalize the weapon while control was exercised by the former. The barren civil-military relations was the root cause of keeping the Service headquarters out of the loop. In contrast, due to the dominance of the Military in the polity of Pakistan, the opposite model continues to prevail. 

Recent statement emanating from authoritative Pakistani sources indicate that tactical nuclear weapons have been cleared for use to neutralize any rapid advances made by the Indian Military. Given that the statement has been timed with the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the USA, quite obviously it is meant to leverage Pakistan's bid for nuclear parity with India. However, while deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may appear to be an effective counter to Indian moves, the cold war experience may hold some sobering lessons to the kakistrocratic government in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, NATO forces had carried out extensive studies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent numerically superior land forces of USSR and the Warsaw pact from invading Western Europe. Gaming, simulation and field studies indicated that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional force increased the possibility of a strategic nuclear war rather than decrease it. Simply put, use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario escalates the engagement to a full -fledged nuclear war. Weapons such as nuclear-tipped missiles, artillery shells, neutron bomb or the reduced radioactivity(RRR) bomb of the tactical warfare component, ended up escalating the threshold. 

Second, unlike the use of centralised Command and Control facilities for strategic nuclear weapons, decentralisation is a necessity for tactical use of such weapons. It imposes an enormous burden on the officers in the field while also imposing astronomical costs on equipping the entire force with NBCD gear.

 Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management would become mandatory. Hence, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons has the potential to invite the wrath of a strategic response by India, following factors bear scrutiny; 
• use of nuclear weapons is the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war which can at best result in a pyrrhic victory.
 • the non-first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability. Pakistan could well be wiped out. 

There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in the decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.

In the South Asian context, the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Institutional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities.

 The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation and drills in peace time. 

 We cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM through RM. Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of the operational effectiveness of our assets. 

The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.

(Also published by The Quint on 22 Oct 15)

INDO-US EXERCISE MALABAR

Evolution of US-INDIA Maritime Cooperation.

In the early 1990s,  our entry into the liberalised and globalised world also witnessed a quantum jump in the arena of maritime cooperation between USA and India. A very modest beginning was made off the coast of Goa when an exercise code-named 'Malabar' was conducted in 1992. Not even General Kicklighter, who, as Cin C US Army Pacific Command, brought along a series of proposals to institutionalise cooperation among all wings of the two Militaries, would have expected exercise Malabar to sustain and grow in the manner it has. It would be fair to state that arrangements to institutionalise this effort to promote constructive maritime cooperation have now come of age.

Given that the Indian Navy now operates with navies of Brazil, France, Oman, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, UK, and recently with Japan and Australia, it would be instructive to analyse the progress made in Exercise Malabar, the latest of which is set to kick off between 14th to 19th October.

A realistic assessment would indicate that Exercise Malabar has progressed to be one of the most advanced international naval exercises conducted by India and USA. In this, some analysts who have projected the current Malabar, in the Bay of Bengal, as a ‘slump’ in relation to the high of Modi-Obama agreements are off the mark. Malabar has, in fact, become a high point of Indo-US defence cooperation at the operational level, and with high strategic significance. The fact that advanced operational manoeuvres, ranging across all dimensions at sea, are being regularly undertaken by the participating ships, aircraft and submarines (which keep changing each year), is indicative of the high degree of interoperability that has been achieved between the two navies.

The Chinese objections to multilateral exercises, as opposed to bilateral ones, may be seen in this perspective. 2005 and 2007 reflect the strategic dimensions of Malabar. 2005 saw Carriers of both navies operating together for the first time. In 2007, there were two sessions of Malabar. The first off Japan where India, USA and Japan participated. The second in the Bay of Bengal, when Australia and Singapore too joined. There were as many as three Carriers, a total of 26 ships and a number of shore based strike aircraft. Given the nascent stages of Carrier operations of the Chinese navy, which was focused on training and learning basic flying operations at sea, a display of Carrier and Anti-Submarine Warfare operations of an advanced nature between the leading navies in the region, probably unnerved China, prompting it to seek explanations.

Almost in response to the Chinese,  both India and Australia, pulled out of a suggested Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with USA and Japan, owing to political and economic considerations respectively. The Chinese had achieved their aim in round one.

That, Japan has joined the ongoing exercise, signals a new phase in the saga. The Modi-Obama  and the Modi-Abe relations have played a significant role in deciding the approach to the Chinese hullabaloo.  The declining China -Japan relations with Xi and Abe in power, the Chinese aggressive thrust in the disputed waters of South China Sea, which openly challenges freedom of navigation agreed to by signatories of UNCLOS and the all-weather relations between China and Pakistan resulting in nuclear and maritime cooperation, not forgetting the evolving silk route through   a disputed territory, are factors that cannot be overlooked.

Some experts have commented on a perceived dilution of intensity in Exercise Malabar, asking why India’s Carrier could not be made available and why it cannot commit more ships. Firstly, it is important to understand that it is not the numbers but the contents that define the quality of exercises. The exercise schedule and operational canvas of Malabar-2015 are at a multi-dimensional level, consistent with the higher standards developed over the past decade.

Second, the participation of Japan, albeit with one ship, is operationally and strategically significant. And, third, the participation of Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft in recent years, including the TU-142 and now P8I from India, and P3C by US, indicate the wide range of operational scenarios being exercised.   

Apropos the Carrier debate, the US Navy is a vast force with 10 large and nine medium-size Aircraft Carriers, which regularly deploy to various parts of the globe. On the other hand, India, which plans to have a three carrier task force in the future, currently operates two medium/small-size Carriers, with Viraat to be retired shortly. Vikramaditya, the primary Carrier, has to complete its scheduled maintenance and operational consolidation with the Fleet in the Arabian Sea, before deployment to the Bay of Bengal for the forthcoming International Fleet Review. Hence, the inclusion of an Indian Carrier for Malabar cannot be done merely on theoretical considerations.

However, what stands out is that Malabar has become a regular and key feature of Indo-US maritime cooperation, with a high degree of operational gains and levels of interoperability achieved.

What has gone unnoticed in the profile of the Indian Navy is that the Eastern Fleet which is tasked to operate across the Malacca straits has been bolstered with new induction ships, which is in keeping with the political objective of our look east policy.

While political blips  may appear from time to time on the radar scan, it would be wise to view them over a historical timeframe rather than year on year.

(Published by The Quint on 14OCT 2015)

Do not byte-chase a soldier dear journo

 Irresponsible Journalism

For well over two centuries, the topic of Civil-Military relations has been found to be an evolving process. This process is also contingent upon the ideologies followed by the political leadership of a country. The German and Japanese experience in the early 19th century prompted experts to classify them as "militaristic" nations. Military men assuming political roles, attempts to exercise civilian control over the military and the Nazi experience of unheeded military warnings which led to catastrophic results, have all been well documented.

The profession of the military is "management/containment of violence." Consequently, the primary function of the military is successful armed combat. This being a highly complex and technology intensive activity, the entire process of selection, training and career progression is very unique to the Military. Hence, the military profession is considered to be as valuable if not more than other top professions.  This is one of the reasons why the military commands the respect of the society.

Since management of violence can and must only be practised for socially approved purposes, the State would necessarily have to enjoy the total monopoly over the military profession. Thus, the relation between the State and the Military assumes a sacred dimension.

Such a powerful tool in the hands of any Government can only be used if regulations, customs and traditions are strictly followed. There is no scope for irreverence or interpretation of military orders. The soldier on entry surrenders some of his constitutional rights such as free speech, travel abroad, unauthorised association with the media and many more. He signs a virtual agreement to lay down his life when required. No other profession is required to do so.

It is in this context that the recent efforts made by the media to coerce a serving soldier( a generic term used for navy and air force personnel too) to appear before a camera becomes an irresponsible act. In the case in point, a highly traumatised soldier was asked to comment on the political and social dimensions of a personal tragedy. This is not synonymous with an act of bravery or yeoman service rendered during natural calamities when a mike is thrust at the face of a soldier

Any responsible journalist knows that there are clear orders that prohibit serving soldiers from expressing their political opinions because the military is required to be loyal to the elected Government of the day irrespective of its ideology. Worldwide, discussions on politics are discouraged in militaries of democratically elected Governments. They are required to remain apolitical until they shed their uniforms. This does not prevent a soldier from exercising his franchise in favour of individuals of his choice.

In the event, the soldier in question displayed maturity and grace well beyond his age. His statements reflected the discipline and patriotic fervour of military minds which are focused on combat duties and service to the nation. If his message was directed both to the journalists and politicians, they did not seem to apply to either, much like the water on the ducks back.

For a moment imagine the damage that could have resulted had the highly traumatised soldier given vent to his distress. He would have accentuated communal tensions not only in his village but much further beyond. The Indian Military known to be apolitical and secular would also, perhaps, have been pushed to take damage control measures to retain equanimity in the face of provocative and irresponsible behaviour of lumpen elements of our civil society.

To the TRP driven 24/7 news channels which conduct shouting matches without fail, it has to be said that having 'experienced anchors 'and some research staff who produce immaculate records of who said what and when, do not make the news channel news worthy or instructive, in a nation filled with impatient and partially informed audience. Anchors are not so well informed and knowledgeable as some believe.

 If mere possession of information is knowledge and wisdom is not even a peripheral desired objective, kindly spare the Military which has a clear-cut role to perform against many odds. Also, note that men in uniform who appear on media without approval are subject to rules and regulations specific to this theme. Failure to act upon such indiscretion may be taken as a precedence for future violation.

 An indisciplined Military is as good as not having one.

Published by The Quint on 07 Oct.

INS Kochi looks formidable-More needs to be done

Kolkotta and now Kochi with Chennai to follow-the Indian Navy ships look formidable

(courtesy The Quint,    see   http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/30/kolkata-and-now-kochi-indian-navy-ships-look-formidable#.VgwPtMgYXyg.facebook)

There is an old tradition that the Indian Navy has scrupulously followed. New Ships are named after their illustrious predecessors with an unforgettable legacy, names of weapons, hill ranges, rivers and capital/metropolitan cities of our states. Hence we have Vikrant under construction at Kochi, to replace the first aircraft carrier which was recently scrapped, Mysore and Delhi have replaced the old cruisers that carried the same names, tankers Deepak and Shakti and a host of other platforms are  some examples of this tradition.

Kolkotta, Kochi and Chennai are names that did not exist in the past as they were better known as Calcutta, Cochin and Madras. When ships of project 15A, as they were designated for design and construction purposes, was entrusted to the Mazagaon Docks at Mumbai for construction in 2001 little did we pause to comprehend the phenomenal advances made in indigenous warship building and the sheer quality of the end products that would carry the new names Kolkotta, Kochi and Chennai.

INS Kochi the second ship of this class, was commissioned today at Mumbai  by Defence Minister Parrikar . It would be interesting and instructive to examine the profile of this ship in terms of the challenges yet to be addressed to fulfil the  objectives of "Make in India"  as opposed to "Made in India"

The Indian Navy placed great emphasis on indigenous construction of warships in as early as 1960s. Concurrently a full- fledged warship design team was created as an in-house asset, reporting to the CNS through the VCNS. From building the British designed Leander class Frigates at Mazagaon Docks ,the first of which, INS Nilgiri entered service in 1972, the Navy has successfully designed and produced Aircraft Carriers, Destroyers, Frigates, Missile and anti-submarine corvettes, Tankers, amphibious  vessels, nuclear and conventional submarines and a number of offshore patrol vessels and fast attack craft. The building capacity has been shared by Defence Public sector yards on both coasts.

INS Kochi and her sister ships  fall under the category of large Destroyers with state of the art multipurpose capabilities to tackle threats in all three dimensi ons,i.e. surface, air and underwater. Most notably, the Brahmos surface to surface missile which is a standard fit in front line ships is a supersonic missile with unmatched strike capability. The jointly developed Barak 8 surface to air missile is a product of Israeli ingenuity and Indian talent to interphase complex technology to suit Indian conditions.

In order to transit from 'Made in India" to "Make in India" we need to create domestic design and manufacturing facilities for  ship propulsion systems and selected sensor and  weapon systems.

We presently have 42 ships and submarines on order in various yards in the country. To progressively equip them with indigenously produced propulsion packages and futuristic sensor weapon packages we need to overcome some grave challenges. These need both organisational and infrastructural paradigm shifts.

Private sector involvement in R&D  , design and production activities has the potential to considerably enhance our ability to arrest time and cost overruns. Aircraft engine manufacturing facility in India, which also has much in common with ship propulsion systems, is an activity which appears to have gained traction recently. If progressed it may open a new window to indigenize the 'move' component of our war ships.

The first challenge of organisational reforms  involves not only changes in the current work ethos of the parent ministry but structural realignments by professionalising and expediting decision-making. This includes replacing generalists with specialists as is done in economic management of the country.

If the Kochi can be designed , built, manned and operated in today's context why cannot we continue the existing process until we find answers to indigenizing the whole process?

Firstly the current system of decision making is laboriously slow and expensive. There is little accountability for delayed decisions. The term opportunity costs figures only in audit reports which rest in parliament after proforma examination of guilt. Consequently, the build time in public sector yards is unacceptably long. The cost of ship building can be considerably reduced if time over runs are minimised. If left unaddressed ships would become unaffordable in the near future.

Secondly, if we continue to rely on foreign suppliers for propulsion and sensors /weapons the ability of our ships to move and fight can be held to ransom during critical periods of preparedness. The friendly supplier of today can turn hostile tomorrow.

Thirdly, it is not often in the history of a developing country  that economic, ,industrial, commercial and proficiency in science and technology of its populace  achieve critical mass and coagulate under a liberal regime in under a century. We are perhaps at the take off stage if enabling mechanisms are put in place. Now is the time to act.

Let the entry of INS Kochi herald the change that we are aspiring for. ISRO has set an example that we ought to follow.

Aim for excellence.

Lessons from the bonus army march on Washington DC

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSC1lbfXfRQ

The story of the infamous bonus army march is well documented at the above site on you tube. We should learn some lessons from it before the current OROP agitation goes out of hand. Disciplined as it has been to date, there is a very thin dividing line between a peaceful and orderly agitation and a violent one. It takes only a small spark to ignite the agitation. The above clip clearly shows that even war veterans like Gen Mac Arthur, could make the grave error of leading a charge against the veterans of WW1.

It is a combination of neglect of the veterans demand,an ill informed and insensitive political leadership, a rare natural disaster and the occurrence of WW2  which enabled the resolution of the veterans demand through a legislation. Public sympathy for veterans finally forced the political leadership to act decisively. By then many more lives had been lost.

Civil-Military relations in a democracy is a constantly evolving equation which is tempered and  shaped by both external and internal dynamics. It has taken centuries of war experience including the civil war for the American public opinion to play a supporting  role for the cause of the veteran. What is often seen today as deep concern and respect for the veteran community of USA is a result of upheavals caused in the past and loss of millions of lives in service of Motherland. Such public sympathy,respect and support are not likely to be witnessed in a young nation of just short of seven decades of independence from a colonial power.

Bringing the soldier closer to the society through well orchestrated publicity campaigns and educational programmes on martyrs is a must. Either compulsory NCC training in schools and/or colleges and exposure to military service short of conscription may be necessary to generate awareness about the Armed Forces of India.

Australia-India Exercise AUSINDEX-15

A LONG AWAITED STRATEGIC OUTREACH-AUSINDEX-15

Those of us who have been involved in planning and nurturing maritime relations with the navies of USA, UK, Russia and France over the last two to three decades, have often wondered why Japan and Australia did not receive the same recognition that they deserved in the Narasimha Rao led look- east policy drive. There were and are many constraints within our closed loop decision and policy making structures. They are not obliged to articulate India's strategic vision in terms of a white paper; as is often done in other defence establishments. Common maritime challenges and interests in the Asia -Pacific region are however, tackled on a bilateral, need- driven basis rather than any long term  vision. Multi-lateral engagements at sea have been frowned upon by the political leadership, as those that may offend the sensitivities of certain countries in the region. Hence annual/biennial exercise programmes like Malabar with the USN, Indra with Russia, and Konkan with UK are  limited to bilateral rather than multi-lateral exercises-with one recent exception.

It is in this backdrop that the visit to Australia in last November  by the Indian PM, after a lapse of three decades and the resulting joint statements and communications thereof, came as a pleasant surprise to the strategic community.

Australian and Indian convergence of interests in IOR has been under discussion for a few years. The Indian Navy's initiative of convening an Indian Ocean Naval Symposium did harmonise and encourage engagement and interaction with all the navies of the region. It would be fair to state that the Australian cooperation in the maritime affairs of the Indian ocean region brought the two navies together. Equally the lack of enthusiasm from our MOD and MEA to support a fruitful venture such as IONS retarded its progress.

Two meetings in quick succession, Abbot in India in September last and Modi in Australia in November the same year changed the atmospherics to a large extent.

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 "India and Australia have a great economic synergy. There are huge opportunities for partnership in every area we can think of – agriculture, agro-processing, resources, energy, finance, infrastructure, education, and science and technology." said the PM at the media interaction on 18 Nov 2014; but what needs to be noted is that   the     strategic dimensions of the relationship were carefully calibrated at the appropriate levels of dialogue/address, both to the media and the joint session of Parliamentarians.

Visit to the Australian War memorial and elaboration on the battle of Gallipoli were perhaps orchestrated to enhance the optics of the concerned event. Stress on underlying strategic interest in areas of civil-nuclear cooperation, maritime security etc, were discretely handled by both parties. For instance ,legislative and legal impediments to deliver on strategic needs of uranium to India as reflected in the agreement reached by the two Prime Ministers, is an example of the complexities that need to be taken note of.

As a result of the impetus received from discussions,  the long awaited Australia-India naval exercises (AUSINDEX) has already commenced at/off the port of Vishakhapatnam and is scheduled to be completed on 19 Sep15. An analysis on the structure of this biennial exercise would be instructive to comprehend the genuine desire for strategic engagement between the two countries.

Firstly, discussions on the need for maritime cooperation commenced a while ago and was emphasised again during Anthony's visit to Australia. However in the absence of conducive apex level discussions, it remained on paper till the strategic objectives were shaped recently. The meetings between the two Prime Ministers in quick succession ,i.e. Abbot's visit to India followed by Modi's to Australia contributed to its  expeditious execution. 

Secondly, the composition and quality of warships and aircraft on both sides indicate that the two navies are willing to jump from elementary exercises  to very advanced tactical exercises. Anti Submarine exercises are considered to be the most advanced level of engagement between any two navies.

Thirdly, that the Indian crew is not only conversant with English but is familiar with procedures adopted by NATO forces outlined in the Allied Tactical Publications(ATP) and Allied Exercise Programmes(AXP), make it extremely convenient for communications and tactical level discussions and preparations. It would not be the case while exercising with Russian or Chinese navies. By itself this is a force multiplier and a tailor made situation for cooperation and compatibility.

Fourthly, the Collins class submarine operated by the Australians is a worthy under water opponent. This exercise would provide both navies with invaluable experience in underwater warfare in tropical conditions.

Fifthly, while surface ships on both sides are capable of deploying integral helicopters for prosecuting underwater threats, the inclusion of P3C Maritime patrol aircraft from Australia and our own P81 Boeing would add a dimension that is the envy of any navy worth its salt.

AUSINDEX-15 has set a high threshold of expectations and experience which would be mutually rewarding and satisfying. It augurs well for pursuing the strategic objectives set by Abbot and Modi, but more importantly for a long and sustained relationship between Australia and India.

http://www.thequint.com/india/2015/09/15/australia-india-naval-exercise-a-long-awaited-strategic-outreach    (The Quint -15 Sep 15  )   

OROP- THE SYMPTOM OF A DISEASE

Politico-Military relations-lessons from the OROP episode

Courtesy The Quint see http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/09/if-only-the-orop-episode-was-not-turned-into-a-political-spectacle

In an earlier article on OROP, I had averred that the agitation for OROP which unfortunately overflowed on to Jantar Mantar in Delhi, was merely the symptoms of a disease. The disease per se has been eating into the vitals of Civil- military relations since independence.

In 1951-52, the newly elected Government and the parliament had very little time to gain knowledge of the Military and its interface with the Government. The enormous burden of handling partition, the gruesome riots, consolidating and assimilating the Princely states with the Indian Union, the J&K conundrum, addressing issues related to abject poverty, illiteracy and health care, creating infrastructure and industries along with academic institutions of excellence were some of the challenges faced by the competent people, who participated in nation building. Their competence and stature can be gauged by the notings on files in which political leaders wrote copious notes while recording their decisions on myriad vexed issues. In comparison the discussions on files  in the past four decades pale into insignificance and reflect a lack of authority and direction not only from the political leadership but also the bureaucracy. 

Checks and balances adapted from the white hall system of office management were either deliberately diluted, circumvented or defaced so that accountability of the politico-bureaucratic edifice was mired in ambiguity and ambivalence.

The Military had also to face numerous hurdles, which, interalia, included adjusting to the post war reorganisation of leftover but divided military personnel, equipment and infrastructure and most of all adapting to a leadership which was wary of coups; consequent to a number of military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood. Given that there was insufficient documentation or studies related to civil-military relations until the seminal work on the subject by Samuel Huntington in 1956, there were no models to follow other than the British and the American experience. The former had no written constitution and the latter had a Presidential system with somewhat vague guidelines on civilian control of the Military. In retrospect therefore, as regards making the military in India integral to the decision making process, it was a case of the blind leading the blind.

Suppression of the Military, was perhaps a deliberate unarticulated political mandate or at best a fortuitous outcome of a confused politico-bureaucratic nexus. Consequently, keeping the Military out of all decision making structures, reduction of pay, allowances and pension, neglect of modernisation , non-provision of essential equipment and ordnance and a host of other issues continued to torment the Military. The poor choice of RMs in many cases accentuated the crisis. In brief, the Military had neither a voice in Parliament, nor the ears of the RM and PM. That the morale of the Military was sustained to win battles both with the enemies of India and enemies within, speaks well of the Military leadership.

There were at least three opportunities to comprehensively address the overall neglect of the Military in India. The first was the Chinese intrusion in 1962 ,the second was a combination of 1965 and 1971 wars and the last was after the Kargil conflict, when the entire gamut of National security was seriously reviewed. In the event, competing politics of two major national parties, conspired to barter national security issues at the altar of National politics.

When the present Government came to power there were indications for the first time after a decade, that issues that tormented the Military in India would be substantially addressed. The leadership appeared to be aware of the need to first address issues related to the IZZAT of a soldier which would lead to amelioration of the negative effects of dragging the affairs of the soldier to tribunals and courts of India.

The OROP episode enabled the fractured community of ESM to get their act together for the first time, while the Govt failed to engage them in a dialogue or a negotiation which would lead to a joint resolution through discussions and transparency. The country was hence a witness to a theatrical performance of the absurd. Retired soldiers on fast unto death, television cameras in search of TRPs and the civil society a passive and indifferent observer. Contrast it to the lakhs who supported the IAC  movement and more recently the spectacle at Ahmedabad. The Soldier in angst had little support from the civil society.

Letters written by retired Chiefs, perhaps did not receive even a routine acknowledgement from the office of the ironically titled Supreme Commander, who has no executive powers to help his anguished soldiers.

After making a mess of the optics at Jantar Mantar, the Govt decided to leak their decisions to the media a day before the final announcement.  To cap it all, at the final session, the RM bowled a googly of VRS. If the RM had been misled or the Chiefs in company of the Minister were not consulted about the faux pas, a few heads ought to roll . Thus a moment  of glory and historical importance was reduced to a sad spectacle of a bumbling Government-through serendipity- nudging the long overdue Prime Minister's intervention. A display of less than desirable cohesion, coherence and  transparency in decision making.

Surely India deserves better.

If any Govt wishes to correct the mistakes of the past and strengthen the  much desired Politico-Military interface, the first action is to bring the Military into the decision making structure,  so that the Military too would be accountable to the people of India, through Parliamentary oversight.

There are perfectly good integrated models to follow today, than those that existed in 1947.

 What is missing until now, is the will to execute institutional reforms. Tempus Fugit.  

OROP

FIGHT FOR OROP IS ONLY THE SYMPTOM OF A DISEASE

Nitin Pai, in a recent article carried by Business Standard, suggested that the armed forces should use economic reasoning while pursuing their quest for OROP. Earlier he had suggested that land available with cantonments should be surrendered for better facilities that are likely to be available  20kms away from 20 cities of India which are likely to become smart cities. This according to him will be a win-win situation for all concerned.

If good  economics were the only solution to solve complex social, national security and environmental problems of a country we would not be faced with paradoxes and dilemmas that need more than economy led solutions. To put it succinctly, imagine the surrender of green spaces of Bengaluru cantonment  to grey monsters and the resulting chaos caused by pressure on water, power, clean air, a host of other environmental issues including exploding traffic and most of all, the mafia-politician nexus to make a killing. Nitin may argue that he says so at the end of the article. That begs the question.

The suggestion that economic reasoning is preferred to emotional appeal for OROP has some merit, but  if there is indeed an agreement on economics of the military, or the famous guns versus butter debate, we would have found one by now. Soldiers, while better equipped to understand the economics of national security due to constant up gradation of their knowledge during mid career and senior level courses culminating at the National Defence College(NDC), are not meant to justify their existence. It is the duty of the Government with all its integral and out sourced expertise that should decide how much is enough for national security.

If Jawaharlal Nehru was alive today he would have admitted that a NDC course in late 1950's, produced a study that China would attack India if our strategic imperatives are not realigned. Krishna Menon who did not think that we ought to have a Military, pooh-poohed it. It is after 1962 that Nehru urgently sought a copy of this study.

 It is not that Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals do not understand the economics of governing a country, it is that they are not given the opportunity to be a part of decision/strategy making in India.

The present  apparent lassitude and grief seen on the faces of ex servicemen is not due to lack of trying all available sources of redress of grievance on a number of issues pertaining to their status, pay, allowances ,neglected widows, gallantry award winners, neglected war casualties and handicapped personnel. It has taken decades for the Supreme Court to rule in their favour only to be left un implemented by successive Governments.      

OROP is  but the last straw that broke the camel's back. A sensitive and sensible government would never fight its own soldiers, on  paper, in courts of law ,in Parliament and now on the streets. Even the most under developed  but civilized country would have engaged them in productive discussion and apologized for treating them with contempt. We are of course better known globally for cutting our nose to spite our face.

If Governments are not sensitive and caring, who in a democracy lends the veterans a helping hand. It is the civil society which elects the Government. Were the civil society to  join the agitation for justice as in the case of India Against Corruption, Jantar Mantar would have been an active volcano.

 How does the civil society punish the Government for disregarding the welfare of the soldier? By voting the errant Government out of power.

If the civil society  truly adores the soldier, it has to lead the agitation. It is not the soldier who should be fighting his own cause but the civil society that acknowledges his role in defending the frontiers of its country- which ought to be fronting such a struggle.

This is not a political battle with one party fighting the other.  There is a need for all parties to join the cause of the soldier without hurting him more. There has to be a national outcry without politicising this worthy cause. That is sorely missing today.

Mere lip service by media or occasional, random statements by leaders of civil society is insufficient for the government to expeditiously address a genuine grievance. The reason for this tepid response is because the soldier has not touched the lives of our citizen as it has in some other countries which have lost millions of lives in long drawn out wars. 

Does that mean that we will recognise the worth of a soldier only when he fights a war?  There are means to bring the soldier closer to every citizen. That can be the subject of another debate. For now let us join hands to help the soldier in distress.

"Many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices."

courtesy the quint   http://www.thequint.com/india/2015/08/18/in-fight-for-orop-civil-society-must-take-up-soldiers-cause#.VdMR38KhVMU.facebook

If you miss this opportunity it will take a generation or more to raise a professional force which remains apolitical and effective. What good is an economically or commercially strong nation if it cannot have a first rate Military which by definition includes the veteran?

Ode to Kalam the eternal Guru

If you believe in destiny, perhaps you could explain how men and women enter your life for specific purposes. I was completely stumped by a chance visit to a Nadi Muni who interprets ones destiny from writings on a palm leaf,recorded many centuries ago  He, without any information about me except a thumb print,   told me not only my profession but the names of my parents as recorded on the palm leaf.. Among ancients astrologers, Brighu who wrote his predictions on those destined to read them and Agasthya are known entities of  Hindu Mythology.

Having had this stunning exposure to predictions, my mind goes back to the many chance and unscheduled interactions with late Dr Abdul Kalam during my career in the navy. This article is an attempt to rationalize, if possible, my association with Dr Kalam or Professor Kalam as he preferred to be called after relinquishing his presidential assignment.

Although I had first met him in the late 80s, regular interaction began in the early 90s and lasted till I retired in 2006. My first few meetings on serious professional matters ended in disappointment. I could not relate to his simplistic approach to resolving complex weapon-sensor related R&D work. Each session left me dissatisfied and angry. Perhaps he was treating me as a novice, I thought. Yet , I was drawn to him like a moth to a candle.  Every opportunity to discuss matters of maritime perspectives seen from progress on key DRDO projects, brought me to his door. This included a few Sundays when he reluctantly stayed back in Delhi. Every week end when most of South block remained closed. Dr Kalam proceeded to a laboratory of interest to him.

As our interaction grew so did the number of unanswered questions, mainly on delayed projects of critical importance. The missile man who was steering Prithvi and Agni was clearly unable to deliver on Trishul. Had I known that his life was shaped by his mentor Prof Satish Dhawan who set a personal example of leadership by shielding  Dr Kalam during the failure of launch vehicle and later entirely crediting him for the success of the programme, I would have understood  why he was phlegmatic on certain issues. He was clearly protecting the interest of a project which did not deliver.Not because he desired merely to protect failures but he knew that the success of such projects are critical for India's future.

But then he had another quality;there was no negative thought that his mind would accept. Every statement was loaded with optimism and positivity.  He felt that there was enough  negativity and pessimism to drown all the positive strength of his organisation and the nation as a whole.
This was an enduring trait that I imbibed from this relationship.Think positive and do not give up on your dreams.

My interaction continued to the critical programmes of strategic interest and beyond. It was not surprising when I was inducted into the Self Reliance Implementation Committee(SRIC) at South Block. There were many disagreements during the proceedings of this committee. That is when I discovered how firm he could be without being impolite. This is a quality that I failed to imbibe. Such qualities separate the great from the rest of us. A Guru who refused to be angry and a patient teacher who encouraged dissent and neutralized it with subdued panache.

When I was made an honorary ADC to the President in 2006 when I was Cin C of the Southern Naval Command, I wrote to him to say that this honorifical  appointment did  not mean much to the organisation as it carried no executive function. When he met me at a conference he whispered in my years "My funny man". I did not know whether it was an affectionate comment or a rebuke from the Supreme Commander.

A few months hence when I was about to swallow the anchor(a term used for retirement) he spent an hour with me at his study in Rashtrapathi Bhavan. " What will you do in Pune Bangara?" he asked. Without a thought I replied "I will teach Sir-I will be a little lamp which will do its best". He waved his hand and in came a photographer who clicked this picture. The picture was brought back in minutes and he asked for his special autograph pen with indelible ink and signed it with relish.

It is not the ink Sir, you have left an indelible impression which will carry me to my coffin.

Au revoir my President.

(Courtesy the quint dated 31 July 2015)

Civil-Military relations

(COURTESY FAUJI INDIA JULY EDITION)


Civil-Military
Relations:
Some Myths
and Realities

(Vice Admiral Suresh Bangara(Retd)


It was early in my career that a Commanding officer thought it appropriate to present me a book titled, "The Soldier and the State. The theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" authored by Samuel Huntington (first published in 1957). Little did he realize while pursuing the sacred objective of grooming, that this book would guide me for the rest of my life. It took me decades of reading in installments, as and when doubts arose in my mind, to slowly but surely understand the 'politics' of civil-military relation in our context.

In 1970, I returned from the erstwhile Soviet Union after a very perplexing exposure to a communist/socialist regime and its interface with its Military, fought the 1971 war and a few years later,  landed at the Royal Naval staff college at Greenwich, London. Maggie Thatcher had begun to revitalize the UK and specially its armed forces. Apolitical as their Military was, the excitement and expectations of good governance was palpable even among the stiff -upper lipped Brits. I was tasked to profile her leadership in the context of civil-military relations (three years later she fought the Falk Land war eight thousand miles away from her shores, based on the assurance of her First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach).

Given that Samuel's book, was my constant companion, I was better equipped to complete my first project entirely to my satisfaction.

A few years later, I was posted as the Naval Adviser to our mission in Islamabad. This was the Zia era and I spent three years watching and studying the Military Dictatorship at work. Samuel's book prompted me to record my thoughts on what I saw in Pakistan.

Years later, after routine exposure to naval appointments, of which many significant ones brought me in close proximity with senior civil servants and Ministers, visits abroad and more confusion on the Indian model of civil-military relations; in 1992, I entered the portals of the National Defence College(NDC) .

It afforded me the opportunity to study the Indian scene and cover the whole spectrum of socio-political, economy, science and technology, industry etc finally culminating in strategic
environment and national security. The participants drawn from the services, civil services, police and a number of senior officers from friendly foreign countries from the East and the West did share their experiences and thoughts. It is here that one's understandings of the Indian context are fully realized. The yawning gap in civil-military relations with all its ramifications could now be juxtaposed with Samuel's seminal work on the subject.

Finally, in 2000, I was packed off to the John F Kennedy School of Public Policy and governance at Harvard. I came face to face with Samuel Huntington who sat me down and clarified my doubts. Destiny had played a role in my quest to put the civil-military relations in context of post independent India. Looking back, it took me all of three decades to start a debate on what little, I now know.
The symptoms of the disease

The symptoms of poor civil-military relations occasionally alluded to in the media, pertain to neglected servicemen, surrender of medals to the supreme commander, hunger strikes by former military personnel, unimplemented supreme court rulings in their favour, unfulfilled government promises, fratricide and indiscipline among soldiers, neglect of war widows and war heroes. This list is by no means exhaustive. But what are the causes of the disease?

The first question that arises is, whether India is unique among other established and acknowledged democracies of the world. If so why? If not, what is common among such democracies? Memories being short, we tend to forget many grave instances including the poor civil-military relations which led to unsavoury  behaviour of American Military personnel in the Korean war and later during and after the Vietnam war. Those of us who did not have televisions were able to see the resentment against the US Government in movies made later based on true stories. Demonstrations on streets of New York and Washington and the sheer neglect of rehabilitating battle casualties back home were scenes that cannot be forgotten.

This, despite a long history of war, starting with the civil war, through the world wars and numerous operations thereafter which enabled them to fine tune their civil-military equations. The open respect displayed today to American soldiers in uniform or war casualties brought back to be buried with military honours, have evolved over centuries of waging war, some, far away from their shores. The range and scale of this experience willy-nilly involved the civil society as a whole. We on the other hand, are just approaching the seventh decade of our independence; hence comparisons with USA or UK may well be incongruous.

Similar episodes with respect to other democracies with long history in Europe indicate that civil-military relations is a process of continuous evolution and that no single nation can claim to have found the right formula to attain satisfaction of both parties. There are numerous pushes and pulls in the Presidential system in America. Those who care to read Samuel's book can also trace how the system evolved through ideologies, confusion and contradictions.

The Political Dilemma
Much has been written about the circumstances under which the post-independence Indian Political leadership was ill equipped to deal with the Military. Both internal and external factors played a significant role in exacerbating this critical relationship. While unstable environment caused by Pakistani action soon after independence kept the military busy, numerous military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood soon after decolonization, gave credence to the rumours that India too may be subjected to military rule.

Inter alia, such a possibility may have been nullified by introducing structural changes in higher defence management, reducing the potential powers of Cs-in-C , by creating Chief of Staff of the three services, eliminating the military from pre independence decision making bodies of higher defence management, reducing the stature of military officers in protocol, pay and allowance, perks, creating a large cadre of central police forces under the Home ministry and a host of other actions which also included having a common pay commission with no direct participation of the armed forces of India.

At that point in our history, there was neither literature on civil-military relations nor examples of constitutional approach to address the emerging controversies in Indian model of governance.
The point to note is that even the American Constitution had only a subjective approach to civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington states, civilian control of the armed forces emerged "despite rather than because of constitutional provisions". India adopted many of the provisions of the American constitution and since Britain had no written constitution, traditions and customs of Britain was considered for incorporation in our own document.

Samuel Huntington was the first author who researched the subject of civil-military relations the contents of which were not available to us till well after 1960.

In India, neither the politician nor the military clearly understood the term "Civilian control". Civilian control would be maximised if the military were limited in scope and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head" wrote Samuel, while adding that the reverse was also recorded under the military clause of their constitution, which divided civilian responsibility of military affairs and fostered the direct access of the military authorities to the highest level of Government. Remember, at that time, all three services in USA, operated independently until the integration was forced upon them by the Gold water Nichols act in the late 80's.

While the evolution of the American system progressed on predicted lines, since they have the Presidential system of government, our dilemma was, perhaps, which civilian head of the Government would control the Indian Armed forces. The President is just a titular head although given the title of the supreme commander. It had to be the Prime Minister through the RM. It was not surprising that Nehru made himself available to the armed forces for consultations when required. He personally knew many officers of the rank of Brigadier and above as recorded by late General Inderjit Rikhye, who was handpicked by PM to precede to the UN headquarters. The infamous Gen Kaul episode in 1962 however, brought home the dangers of politicisation of the Armed forces as opposed to exercising civilian control over the Military.

This was followed by Indira Gandhi who established a personal equation, though turbulent at times, with Sam Manekshaw and lastly, Rajiv Gandhi who interacted with his Chiefs along with his RRM, Arun Singh and hence often did not have to rely only on the bureaucracy to advice him. Both the Sri Lanka operation and Operation Brass Tacks, which caused tensions between India and Pakistan are often quoted by skeptics as examples of bad experiments of civil-military interaction at the apex level, during the Rajiv Gandhi era. These were in fact personalized leadership traits which had all the trappings of an evolving relationship which needed refinements but not rejection.
The momentum maintained in the 50's and 60's in clipping the wings of the Armed forces had done irreparable damage to the work ethos of MoD. Allocation of business rules and transaction of business rules of MoD first published in 1961 (duly approved by the President) and still in vogue with minor amendments, makes the Defence Secretary responsible for the defence of India. There is no role assigned to the Chiefs since service headquarters were attached offices of MoD.

The Committee of Defence Management headed by Arun Singh in the wake of Kargil conflict had clearly outlined the anomalies in the system and had suggested solutions. The most critical of them remains unimplemented till date, ostensibly, due to lack of political consensus. Apart from remedying existing anomalies and assigning responsibility and accountability to the military, it would have addressed one of the major weaknesses in the civil-military relations in India i.e. lack of a single point military advise to the head of political leadership and participation in strategic decision making process on matters pertaining to national security.

In brief, in the absence of a clear authority-responsibility-accountability matrix, the civil-military equation at the apex level continues to be vague and nebulous. The military quite clearly cannot and should not function under a civilian bureaucrat, but only under the highest political authority. In our case it has to be the PM through RM.

What of the military?
With neither the constitution to support nor clarity to perform, except as an extension of the MoD, the services were left to fend for themselves. Every proposal, every plan and every communication even to other ministries such as MEA had to be processed through MoD and it needed the concurrence of the Def Sec. Neither the politician, save a few, nor the bureaucrats at various levels of MoD have the domain expertise or knowledge to respond to scores of proposals originating from the three services.
Most bureaucrats may not draft a single speech to be made by their Minister due to lack of domain knowledge. Every document on National security originated from service headquarters. So, we wrote and heard our own drafts being read out to us during various meetings and seminars. 15 year plans for modernisation and up gradation remained confined to files.

At the field level, officers are trained to be high caliber professionals. Their profession is management of violence. This being a unique profession, the training is such that it prepares him/her for successful combat operation. No parallel entry is possible, for, unless you have acquired the skill and practiced them for a length of time you cannot be successful in combat. A commercial Pilot for instance, cannot replace a fighter pilot unless he acquires combat skills. A fighter pilot can however fly a commercial aircraft if the certification process is completed. Hence an officer of the armed forces is irreplaceable by another professional from outside the forces.

The soldier is trained to be a specialist in application of violence. That is his trade and not a profession. Hence there is a clear dividing line between the manager and the tradesman.
The armed forces are, as a rule, monopolized by the state. More importantly the profession of management of violence can be practiced only for socially approved purposes. Regulations, customs and traditions, hence become an indispensable part of a soldier's life. Consequently the relations between the state and the soldier are a sacred one. There is much to be done so
that a soldier is not equated to Policemen, a blunder which has serious repercussions on maintaining the 'IZZAT' of the Soldier. Here is where the civil society is required to step in.


Role of the civil society
Success of all democracies depends mainly on the quality of their civil societies. They too evolve over time. A well informed educated and mature civil society ensures that it elects the right political leadership. Both the Soldier and the politician emanate from the same civil society. It is also true that "Our God and soldier we alike adore even at the brink of danger, not before, after deliverance both alike requited, our God is forgotten and our soldier slighted" This comes from an author, Francis Quaries who belongs to a country which has seen great sacrifices by the soldier. Why is it a truism? The civil society has short memories. It is not the duty of a soldier to repeatedly point out the sacrifices made by him. It is the duty of the civil society to fight for the rights of the soldier. The society is expected to fight with the politician so that the soldier is cared for while in service and in retirement.

The onus on erecting a war memorial does not rest on a soldier, it is the civil society which should push its political leadership to remember and honour our dead soldiers. The civil society also has the power to punish the politician who fails to honour the soldier.

According to Yasmin Khan a historian, about 2.3 Million Indian soldiers fought during World War 2 and “89,000 laid down their lives in Military service.” Given the size of our population then, it touched the lives of many Indian families. There was awareness about sacrifices created by the unfortunate circumstances of war. 400,000 Americans and 388,000 Britishers died in the war. Civil societies tend to remember losses when it impacts them.

During periods of peace the intelligentsia which controls the media often questions investments in National security. Pressing debates on socio-economic issues keep the soldier out of sight.

Some Options
In the Indian context, it is essential to continuously educate the civil society on trials and tribulations of our soldier. Compulsory military training or making NCC compulsory in schools and colleges and constant engagement with civil society through well structured films, plays and street shows are options that need to be exercised.
In my view, it is essential to induct ex servicemen of repute into our political structure so that the voice of the soldier is heard in the parliament. We need more of Jaswant Singhs, Khanduris and Shankar Roychowdhurys.

Thousands of ex-servicemen entered politics, industry and other professions in USA soon after WW2. Many rose to be Presidents and successful congressmen. Industries too benefited from the focus brought to bear by military personnel.
Soldiers must enter all possible walks of life after retirement to be able to mobilize the good will of the society, which in turn could make the politician accountable to evolve a new equilibrium in civil-military relations of a young India. ______________________________________________________________________________