NAVY DAY 2011

MODERNISATION AND INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY

“LINKS OF A STRONG CHAIN”

 The third Indian built Leander class frigate INS Udaygiri was despatched on a 14 nation cruise enroute to the Queen’s Coronation Fleet review, at Spit Head (UK), in 1977. As is the practise among many navies of the world, the ship was thrown open to visitors. Hundreds came on board in all the European ports to see an indigenously built frigate of the Indian Navy. It is said that a warship is a mirror of the technological and industrial capability of a country. It is a floating city with power generation facility often, enough to provide electricity to a whole township and all other essential features to house, feed the crew and fight a modern adversary. That the visitors were suitably impressed with what Mazagaon Docks had achieved in this very first venture was obvious from the glowing tributes in the media.

As young officers, who were fortunate to be a part of the commissioning crew, it was a rewarding experience and raised our expectations of what was to follow in the decades ahead. Indeed some of us held planning assignments as we grew. The navy had taken a conscious decision as early as in 1954, to create an in house cadre of naval architects to design and build warships for the navy. This single step provided the necessary impetus to our planners to confidently conceive a modern Fleet and even aim for an indigenous Carrier capability.

So, how have our efforts to modernise, matched our vision of a balanced force to counter challenges posed by the entire spectrum of maritime warfare? No navy of any calibre can plan without the ability to indigenise. The Indian navy had to contend with many limitations while planning a balanced force structure. Resource limitation was the first. The often unpredictable defence budget had a disproportionately small percentage allotted to the navy( from less than 10% to 17 % in recent years. The navy needs 20% of the pie to grow on a sustained basis). The man power intensive Army coupled with our paranoia related to continental threats ensured that the share of the navy in the limited defence budgets of the 1970s and 80’s remained woefully inadequate for any worthwhile planning. For more than a decade, orders for ships to offset the depleted force levels were just not placed. Submarine construction of German design with contemporary technology was terminated due to extraneous considerations. Our reliance on Soviet industries grew perilously, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union and with that the collapse of the supply chain so critical for war ship building, created a new challenge.

The Navy learnt to innovate. While planning and structuring the future navy was  within its charter, the execution of the plans after necessary approvals, was totally a MOD function. The ‘attached office’ status of service headquarters within the MOD denied the participation of professional naval officers in the decision making processes of the Govt. Under these circumstances, the Navy opted to maintain a healthy ratio between its revenue budget and its capital element. Nearly 50% of its meagre budget was put away for capital commitments of ship building and infrastructure creation. Hence began a sustained campaign to tighten our belts by keeping man power induction to the very minimum and placing heavy limitations on the use of the revenue element of the budget. Thus the most critical period of financial crisis was weathered before the post liberalisation/globalisation phase began to show positive signs in the GDP growth of India. With the sustained growth of GDP, Defence budgets were restructured and the navy’s share began to register an upward trend. The ships under construction in Defence PSU’s began to roll out.

From the Leanders to the Shivaliks  and soon to the indigenous Carrier being built at Kochi, is a journey filled with uncertainties, systemic infirmities , delays in DRDO projects, infrastructure inadequacies of our yards, serious time and cost over runs in production and policy flip flops in subsidies for the ship building industry as a whole.

Despite the short comings listed above, the navy has consistently pushed for a combination of war ship construction at home and abroad so as to maintain a balance between depleting force levels and combat effectiveness..

Could we have jumped many of these steps by an integrated approach to addressing issues that plague the ship building industry as a whole? Economic stability of the country is a precursor to many of the reforms that need urgent attention. While the navy has made progress in ship building and weapon-sensor development and integration, some critical weapons are still to be designed and produced in India. All the missiles and critical weapon systems are still imported. R&D in frontier and cutting edge technologies is very inadequate. While countries working with alliance partners can afford to share the burden of R&D and hope to achieve economy in scales due to volumes thus generated, India has very little scope to generate such volumes unless an export option is made viable. The Brahmos missile, a joint venture between Russia and India appears to be showing some potential in this direction. The Chinese cut the development cycle by reverse engineering and mass producing Russian weapons and sensors consequent to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian scientists of high calibre were found peddling their high grade design and research material on the streets and offering to work in countries which could accept them. That China made full use of this opportunity is evident from the war ship characteristics on display today. Joint venture with strategic partners is one way of cutting development cycles and costs.

Shifting focus to ship building, exploring modern building techniques providing subsidies to the industry, adopting PPP and JV models through integrated approach between Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Shipping (MOS), creating a larger pool of naval architects, reducing time and cost over runs and finally making the best use of the new off set policy for defence procurement (Estimated at US$ 1 Billion for the navy alone) are some of the measures under consideration. The private sector understandably will continue to show disinterest if volumes remain unattractive and export options are not relaxed.

30 months is taken to produce a frigate in the west, it takes 72 months in India with a cost overrun of 300 %-a luxury we can no longer afford. And yet fault lines apart, the Navy can legitimately take pride in the quality of ships built over the years. Modern features such as stealth, integration of propulsion packages, improvements in Heat, ventilation and Air-conditioning (HVAC) are being incorporated in new designs for ships and submarines- both conventional and nuclear. A whole new range of ships from Patrol boats to Aircraft Carriers are now built in India. Entrepreneurs and small enterprises have benefitted as much as those who sail in them.

An edited version of this piece was carried by Indian express in the navy day pull out dec 2011

Structural Infirmities

STRUCTURAL INFIRMITIES OF CWG 2010

AND

LESSONS FOR HIGHER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

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The information overload caused by the ill managed event of CWG 2010 provides great insights into the structural deficiencies, lack of good management practices and a host of other facts. Did we not pull off CWG 1952, Asian Games 1982 and the more recent Youth games and Military games? Don’t we regularly hold Republic day parades at Delhi, manage religious events of gargantuan proportions where logistics are mind boggling and even win kudos for a first ever International Fleet Review at the busiest port of Mumbai? Yes we do

What was common in all these successful events was the creation of an empowered structure with responsibility and accountability. The PM himself overseeing CWG 1952, an empowered group with Rajiv Gandhi to ensure good coordination of the successful Asian Games in 1982, are cases in point. This CWG failed due an absence of a centralised command structure. Responsibilities were not demarcated, there were too many “Indians “and no chiefs and what is more everyone had an excuse not to own up responsibility.

13 November 2003 was the date on which the Commonwealth Games Federation resolved to hand over the games to Delhi. In accordance with article 10 A the host city contract was inked by Government of India (GOI), Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi(GNCTD) IOA and CGF.The organisation of the entire event was allotted to OC CWG.

 The key delivery partners listed on the web site are CGF, IOA, OC CWG, GNCTD and GOI in that order. It also states that several ministries of GOI and several organisations under GNCTD and others would be involved in execution.

 Even a prima facie analysis of this structure would point to the fact that the coordination of such a complex body cannot be vested with a committee which has no authority over the key delivery partners. In the Indian context, hierarchy and individual egos play a vital role in the smooth functioning of the organisation. At times, collective organisational goals are sacrificed to appease individual aspirations. Presumably these considerations caused undue delays of about two years before the Organisation Committee came into existence on 10 February 2005- a faulty and toothless structure from day one. Although representatives of all the delivery partners were constituted on the committee, raising alarms at the CWG meetings,  when deadline after dead line failed to be met by their parent organisation is not a practical proposition. Having taken full responsibility to stage the best ever game, as outlined on the web, the Organising Committee, perhaps, continued at best, as a mute spectator to inter- ministerial red tape and embarrassing delays in execution.

What is needed in the globalized, highly competitive and demanding environment is to professionalise our decision making structures to include experts in negotiations and project management and other niche areas.

A look at the Ministry which manages the Armed Forces of India in the above context would be instructive. This Ministry has the responsibility to handle the rapidly increasing defence budget which is more than twice the amount allotted to CWG but on a yearly basis. Is it structured to meet all the requirements of the Armed Forces of India?

Firstly, since 1952, the three Chiefs along with their Headquarters were removed from the decision making structure of the Government of India. They were designated as the “attached offices” of the Ministry. In effect all communications from the Armed forces were to be addressed only to the Ministry and no decision making powers and executive powers were to reside with the Chiefs, save those related to operations. Not even the revenue budget could be operated by the Chief to merely run the service as it existed. The Chiefs could send their recommendations and plans for modernisation which effectively rested at the table of some functionary without even an acknowledgement. The Ministry continued to be manned by generalist- civil servants who often learnt about the Armed Forces after they were placed in the chair.

While the authority to take decisions with the concurrence of the Minister was vested with the Ministry, there were no provisions for accountability. Having been removed from the chain, the Chiefs could only make proposals and could not be held accountable. The procurement of Advanced Jet Trainers(AJT) for the Air Force took over two decades, by which time costs had escalated by 500%.The decision to induct Goroshkov took over a decade, by which time the deteriorating cables of the ship warranted doubling of the original cost. Many thousand crores are surrendered unspent year after year despite the urgent operational needs of the Army. There are no clear cut penalties for procrastination and opportunity costs incurred thereof. Are these not the ills of CWG as well?.

Secondly, integration of the Ministry with the Armed Forces by placing uniformed professionals at appropriate desks of the Ministry is a successful model practised by other democracies. Similar structures were recommended by the Committee on Defence Management after the Kargil war. Cosmetic changes in nomenclature with no corresponding powers were the only action taken to show compliance.

Thirdly, the Kargil Review Committee, did recommend the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single point advisor to the RM on all matters of planning, acquisition etc.This has been stalled by statusquoists within and without the Armed Forces. The result is the continuation of a toothless Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was first recommended in 1924 and which is still in existence only in India. Almost all Armed Forces of countries that matter have opted for a fully integrated structure with accountability, while we continue to live in denial of a serious structural infirmity.

CWG 2010 has brought disrepute to the country due to delays in implementation despite seven years to prepare. We can live with it, for, soon it will be forgotten. However continued denial of structural weaknesses in the Defence department, has the potential to lay our country in the dust. Until then incapability to modernise, lack of timely decision coupled with conflicting demands of the three services can only be offset by the ability of our officers and soldiers to lay down their lives- even if it is to achieve a pyrrhic victory.

The quote that follows perhaps sums up our predicament, “We the unwilling, led by the unqualified ,have been doing the unbelievable for so long with so little that we now attempt the impossible with nothing”

An edited version of this article appeared in the Business Standard soon after the CWG. Today it needs to be also viewed in the context of efficient management of Formula one in Delhi. Faulty management structures and lack of accountability are the root cause of time and cost over runs.

Political Accountability

COST TO COMPANY

Cost to company is a terminology which is well understood in the private sector. ‘Canons of financial propriety’ was a terminology which was equally drilled into those vested with the onerous responsibility of spending tax payer’s money. Audits and reviews were carefully crafted into organisations that dealt with public money. The bottom line was that the tax payer’s money was not to be splurged or casually handled. What has happened over the years is that institutions which were nurtured and built have been destroyed by ignorant, self serving, greedy and unenlightened leadership.. More and more criminals were elected by default because you and I did not vote. We said that we have no worthwhile candidate to vote for and hence why vote?

We got the parliamentarians we deserve and consequently the govt we deserve. Here in full public gaze, we had our MPs justifying the generous pay and perks that they granted to themselves. Should there not be an independent authority/commission with no conflict of interest that decides such matters? Look at the timing of their demand. Political unrest in the North, north west and parts of south, thousands of war veterans resorting to desperate measures of returning their medals even as the Supreme court ruled in their favour for One –rank-one pay and the Govt continued to deny them their constitutional rights. High inflation and cost of living which affects all middle class citizens and below. Floods ravaging northern parts of India and farmers unable to make both ends meet. How can we expect our MPs to be so sensitive to the needs of the citizens when the elections are not imminent? What about the ever increasing number of Crorepatis in our parliament. Will they voluntarily forfeit the new salary-some have said so!

Ironically, a recent report in the media states that the Ministry of Civil Aviation has decided to reward all the past Secretaries with perks that would make a very successful airline blush. It is Air India that we are talking about which is surviving on bailout packages offered by the Govt.Whose money is it? Yours and mine of course. What if the railways and shipping ministries follow suit? Are secretaries to the Govt of India the only civil servants serving the nation?  They have taken a cue from our enlightened parliamentarians who were willing to stop all proceedings if their demands were not met. Don’t you think we need to put the right people in the parliament so that a top- down cleaning up process can commence at least in 2014. Vote for professionals-vote PPI.

Jointness

TO INTEGRATE OR NOT THE POLITICAL-MILITARY DILEMMA OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES.

I was at the Royal Naval Staff College (Greenwich) in 1979, when the seeds for integration of the British Armed Forces were sown. Doubting Thomas’s were the same in their forces as there are in ours, even today. A few years later Gold water Nichols act was ‘thrust upon’ the American Armed forces and the process of operational and logistics integration commenced in earnest. The British followed suit as the basic logic of integrating the services cannot be over emphasized. The creations of a single operational head and integrating the much duplicated operational and logistics functions were thus enforced with strong political will-the prime focus being national interest. No one is immune to turf war and so there were murmurs and strong biases displayed by old war horses and their politically driven masters. Today it would be naive or perhaps stupid to fight a war with each service claiming it’s pre-eminence. There are no Manekshaws to charismatically coordinate the Tri-service operations, while also obtaining equal, albeit grudging support of the political leadership as well. His firm advice to the then Prime Minister to allow the armed forces to select the window of campaign is well known. Do we continue to hope that an equally competent coordination would occur in a system which does not empower any single authority to be accountable for the outcome of operations? Would Service Chiefs continue to man their respective Operations rooms during war? More importantly who would ensure the entire process of priorities of weapon/sensor acquisitions and preparing for war, based on a common threat perception? In other words peace time preparations including joint communication/training processes play a vital role to ensure success in war. It would be appropriate to note that a series of operational failures occurred in the pre integrated forces of the USA. One service could not communicate with the other due to incompatibilities in equipment and operating procedures.

Kargill was like the Chinese invasion of 1962 in so far as jostling us from our slumber is concerned. We woke up to the harsh realities of inadequate resources leading to perfunctory actions by those who are required to keep vigil. Had there been a theatre command integrated with appropriate aviation/space surveillance assets would the incursions and build up at Kargil have gone unnoticed?

The Govt swung into action and appointed the Subramaniam Committee, with very eminent people leading their respective sub-committees. Out came an exhaustive study with clear recommendations for implementation across the board. No, we could not make the whole report public as there were State secrets to be guarded-just as the Henderson Committee report on the Chinese incursion/invasion of 1962 is still kept closely guarded. Given our gross negligence to create a technologically contemporary archive for posterity and our callous approach to historical record keeping, all the lessons from the past would be of little or no use, if and when they are made public.

In this case let us look at the crucial aspect of integrating operations of the three services and the implications of dragging our feet to do so.

When the Kargil review committee was formed, an extremely well read and perhaps the most competent expert was assigned the task of reviewing the Management of Defence. The report when being compiled and later when submitted was continuously under the scrutiny of the Chiefs Of Staff Committee and the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps for the first time in Independent India, a Committee report after obtaining the approval of the cabinet was monitored for implementation with such efficiency that a vast majority of recommendations were actually realized on the ground, save a few crucially important ones. With the change of the Govt even the mode of monitoring took a back seat and with change of personalities who were witnesses to all the discussions on the subject the commitment too vanished. Soon status-quo prevailed.

 I am compelled to comment on this mainly because, had the integration of operational and intelligence resources been completed on time, the Mumbai attack may not have succeeded, as the Joint mechanism for Coastal patrol and communication as well as intelligence would have matured in its functional and operational roles. Principally two segments of experts continue to oppose the well thought-through recommendations of the Committee report. The first, civilian defence analysts/civil servants who represented the pre integration models of running the security affairs of the country. The second, officers both in and out of uniform who felt insecure and /or were representing the perceived interests of a particular service of the Indian Armed Forces. These were exactly the same combination of people who opposed integration in every western democracy. There was one bogey yet to be resolved in India due to her relatively young democracy and that was the preposterous myth of the Indian Armed forces conspiring to take over the country from the democratically elected representatives. A bogey often used to confuse the insecure politician. It is difficult to think of a more apolitical military than the Indian forces in contemporary military or political-military history. Since there is a lobby that continues to oppose integration, it would be instructive to examine the existing system which hopes to meet all challenges to national security. That we manage to meet immediate threats at great sacrifice of human cost is a tribute to our fighting forces-not the system. An analogy that readily comes to mind is the upcoming Common Wealth games which are likely to be pulled off at the last moment with little or no attention paid to the unprofessional organisation behind it. We will of course  partake in the euphoria of its success. We need to focus on the systemic changes needed to improve our performance to fight the next war and not the last. Since the existing system of COSC is sometimes quoted to be an efficient model it would be instructive to visit the background to this model.

The existing system of COSC was first created in 1924 in the UK. A similar system was also replicated in India. The COSC with CGS, Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN) and AOC, however reported to the C-IN-C who was the single operational head of the Armed forces.

When Lord Mountbatten was asked after the war as to what was the single most valuable lesson of the Second World War, he seemed to indicate the vital need to integrate the three services from womb to tomb. Hence the thrust given to forming the first ever combined tri service training academy in the world-The National Defence Academy in Khadakvasla.The seeds of integration were sown in Independent India as early as 1949 when none in the world had an integrated ab-initio training facility. Even the British took, time to integrate but when they did, all common operational/ training facilities were set up with alacrity. Other than training facilities unique to each service, complete integration of the services and the MOD has been achieved.

In Independent India, since jointness was not on the horizon, DSSC Wellington, later CDM and NDC(which is placed directly under MOD) were created as combined training facilities. Operational integration was never a priority assigned to the staff college. Every effort to create jointness in operations was resisted by individual services and more emphatically by the Govt in power. Often we are told that it is a sensitive subject, as a single Operational commander would pose a threat to Democracy. No opportunity is lost to quote instances when such coups could have been a reality. It would appear that clinging to such myths even after 62 years of a successful experiment with Democracy is more important than functionally enabling the Armed forces.

In May 1952, the then Def sec circulated a draft document titled “Organisation, Functions, Powers and Procedure of Defence Headquarters” where the Attached office status of the Def hqrs was discussed. It must be noted that it was the same Gentleman who resisted all efforts to provide the Chiefs direct access to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. It is my belief that this was the start point of the destruction of a developing POL-MIL relationship which thrives in Western Democracies. On the flip side given that almost all countries surrounding India had gone through military take over’s, (at this point in time) the reluctance on the part of the political leadership to engage the military in major planning processes was somewhat understandable. Equally, to drag this analogy to the 21^st century is shameful and the political leadership of all shades need to introspect on the vital requirement of integrating the senior military leadership into the decision making process.

In 1955 the service chiefs until then called Cs –in-Cs was redesignated as Chief of staff of their respective service. While my efforts have not produced authentic documents on what led the Govt to make this announcement in Parliament, or whether the Armed forces were even consulted, this decision has adversely impacted the services even today. Many may not be aware of these facts and perhaps do not know that the term Chief of staff does not assign an operational role to the chief and that operations had to be handed over to a C-in-C. The civil servant was not too well versed with operational implications but was implementing the wishes of his political masters. Quite naturally the service chiefs assigned operational roles to themselves and continue to do so even today. Had the operational integration gone ahead, theatre commands and a joint chiefs of staff may well have been in postion.However the concept was new and had not been tested anywhere when this was implemented in India.

Prior to and post the implementation of integration in the West, attempts were made, albeit sporadically, more with the intention of improving logistics, training and financial management of the Indian Armed forces. Noteworthy among such efforts were the Estimates Committee report of 1958, Administrative reforms commission of 1967, Committee of Defence planning (CDP) and The Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) which for the first time looked at a new system to replace the toothless COSC.

Those of us who have had long exposure to the workings of COSC and its interface with the Govt through the Def Sec, know only too well that such a system if left unchanged would result in disaster when we meet with a more sophisticated adversary than Pakistan. The country cited above has had to live with crises unthinkable in our country and thus had little to show in efficiency superior to ours. China would be a different kettle of fish and I for one would not want to be proved right in my assessment if and when the balloon goes up.

So what is the solution? To start with, re-visit the full report of the Subramaniam Committee with special attention to the chapter on management of defence. If all of it or most of it is irrefutable, not from a single service perspective but from the national interest, examine possible solutions to the structure of higher defence management.

One of the stated objectives of creating tri service commands ie The Andaman and Nicobar Command and The Strategic Forces Command was to gain experience to form theatre commands of the future. That there should be theatre commands to optimise the fighting potential of any force is now a well established fact and that the combined might of a theatre command would be a force multiplier is common sense.

To those who feel that command in rotation destroys the ethos of the dominant service I would recommend a visit and appraisal of the performance of existing Indian models at NDA, NDC and CDM. If anything the rotation has brought about refreshing changes particularly to the service other than the parent service of the Commandant. Checks and balances are built into the structure. In Operational Commands the C-in-C and the deputy are never from the same service and advice to the Commander is available from senior staff of all the services. Same is the experience in all integrated commands in the West.

It is a matter for concern and equally for debate that the few Armed forces (of significance) of the world who are yet to integrate have “diplomatically” concluded that the Indian Model is “interesting”. It has delivered so far despite the system. Mercifully the Strategic Force command which is the most recent addition is fully integrated with a clear mandate and an operational chain of command.  Accountability is thus ensured.

The question is do we need another crisis for yet another distinguished Committee to tell us what we already know?

  This piece was carried in the Manas Defence Year BOOK 2010/11

War Memorial

WAR MEMORIAL-“HOIST WITH ONE’S OWN PETARD?”

A military historian of repute, writing in the context of responsibilities of the State to the Soldier in a democracy, first defined the role of the Civil Society. While the soldier makes the ultimate sacrifice when the need arisis, members of the civil society ensure that he is well cared for. Remembering every soldier who makes the ultimate sacrifice is a part of investing in the future security of a nation. Caring for him after retirement is a gesture which acts as a force multiplier in respect of morale of a serving soldier. He does not have the time or the resources to secure his future while he gifts his youth and comfort for those who are busy building the future of their near and dear ones.

While the retired soldiers have been crying hoarse for their rightful dues granted by the pay commission and supported by the highest courts of law, Governments have failed to honour their own promises. In our brief independent history, by our actions alone we have willy nilly succeeded in depriving those that serve the country with passion. But passion alone does not bring succour to the soldier in his old age.

The other truism of remembering the dead and reminding generations to come of their sacrifice through creation of war memorials is the subject of this discussion. As the reader will notice, there are inextricable linkages in what the civil society can do for the Soldier. Admittedly, a War memorial to remember the soldier is a recent phenomenon, i.e post WW1 and WW2. Earlier they were erected to symbolize victory after wars. The emphasis shifted to the soldier when democracies and civil societies realised the need for future investments for national security. How do you motivate the young and also keep the flame of liberty alive in the minds of the people?. Hence, not surprisingly War memorials have become proud symbols of nation states. A must visit destination for visitors from both within and without. Grand Memorials at Stalingrad/Volgagrad, El Alamein west of Alexandria, Korean war Memorial in the US (1986), Arc de Triumph on Champs Elysees and Tugu Negara in Malaysia are some examples.

Civil societies in frontier states of India were quick to erect memorials limited to their sectors of war. Many Armed forces establishments created dedicated memorials to keep the passion of their troops alive. Motivate, they did, as is evident from visitors moved to tears during the solemn ceremony conducted once or twice a year. Their locations are such that not many civilians have access to the solemn structure as they lie in restricted areas of military establishments. Parallely, began the attempt to create a national war memorial in Delhi. It would be an imposing structure, as many are, around the world. It would list in golden letters the names of those who made the supreme sacrifice after India gained her independence. But then the project was mired in bureaucratic mumbo jumbo.” Why a war memorial in a peace loving country? We do not celebrate victories in war” Why erect another in the Lutyens Delhi? We do have one in the form of India Gate don’t we? The civil society remained ignorant of the consequences of such banter. Twenty years or more were spent in locating and preparing designs even as specious arguments filled noting on files of many ministries.

Then came the news that Srilanka had built an elegant memorial right next to their own, in the beautiful surroundings of their new Capital, to commemorate the sacrifices made by the Indian Armed Forces  during IPKF operations in that Country. It was reportedly built after suggestions made by Indian delegations which visited Srilanka for high level interaction. It is also true that an inscription made to mark the occasion of inauguration of the IPKF memorial by the Indian Prime Minister had to be hurriedly covered, due to sensitivity associated to a coalition partner of the Government of India. The Srilankans have shown us the way and we responded by saying “Where there is a ‘will’ there is also a ‘won’t’ “

Viewed from the soldier’s perspective, there is considerable delay in deciding or executing plans/programmes related to the Military of India. Integration of the Armed forces, anamolies in pay and allowances, actions for much needed up gradations and other related issues. Expeditiously siting a war memorial may be the event which will help to reverse this trend.  .After all the Soldier should not be fighting for a war Memorial, it is the Civil Society which should be ensuring that one is built. That indeed is an investment for national security.

Locating the War memorial in the vicinity of Raj Ghat may just be the icing on the cake.

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An edited version of this article under the title, "An Ode To The Soldier" was carried by India today in july 2011

My PPI Hat

“GOOD TO GREAT” AND “BUILT TO LAST

Many professionals like you and I may have read the above two books. Yes, these are the titles of two very successful books, which influenced a number of professionals round the world. Being the professional’s party of India, we too hope to use established practices of good governance when members of our party reach the parliament, commencing 2014. We want to accelerate our pace of activity to achieve a profile of Good intentions to a Great Party- not as seen by us but perceived to be so by all those who come in contact with us.

Pessimism and cynicism are not hallmarks of Winners. “Winners do not quit and quitters don’t win”, so goes an old saying. We believe that all of you who are willing to contribute your precious time and resources are our greatest assets. We have a long way to go and we need to rapidly increase our visibility and reach.

At the last Core group+ meeting held at Pune, we outlined some practical steps that need to be initiated. We wanted to prove to ourselves and later to others that these are indeed doable provided there is a will. And so we did. We took the first few steps. The Peepli Live first show was a grand success. Nothing but good teamwork and application of management practices that we expect from our elected representatives were on display. The fist few steps to create a Foundation for Professional Governance were initiated. This gives us the freedom to operate where a political party cannot.

Thus emerged a spit free campaign with student participation, a teaser, and a street play all culminating in the final flag hoist on 15 August.

In quick succession came the Common Man- a play base on the six decades of political satire- based cartoons of RK Laxman. Did we know that the play would turn out to be the best advertisement for PPI? Not in our wildest dreams did we imagine. The impact of our 3-minute movie on PPI followed by a short speech on PPi was an ideal introduction to the mono act which received a standing ovation. A few tears did run down the cheeks of the audience, which comprised of large number of college students too-when the common man with a bewildered look summed up the fears caused by 60 years of poor governance and neglect and the prospects of anarchy and chaos.

This provided the right environment to schedule a convention on 16 September with the active participation of well-known social activists and mass participation of students drawn from leading Management schools of Pune.

What began as a drizzle has already become a shower and we await the floods to sweep away the unenlightened people in politics from the main stage.

“We can” are words not the sole property of Barak Obama. We too can.

What about our leaders in Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, New Delhi/Gurgaon/NOIDA etc? We need to identify our constituency heads that will fight the election for which they now have FOUR years. We want winners to lead all our constituencies even as the quitters fade away. Let us join hands. Let us reach out and win friends. Then and only then can we proclaim that we are indeed “Built To Last”

REMINISCENCE

VLADIVOSTOK - THE SUMMER/AUTUMN  OF 69: A KILLER’S REMINISCENCE

The submariners and the Petya crew were already on the remote island of Vladivostok. The ‘AK Boat’ crew, eight sets of them, along with the Technical Position personnel were selected some time in 1969 and put through a Russian language course at INS Angre. It was a motley crowd of old and young, thin and fat, but a very lovable lot. So lovable, I must admit, that the pretty, suave daughter of a diplomat who was sent from Delhi to teach us elementary Russian had a rough time deciding who loved her more - eligible bachelors like myself in the queue to date her over a weekend or the semi-married  officers  who  without fail remembered to supply her with her stock of duty-free cigarettes. Looking back, the tensionless atmosphere that existed then certainly cannot be imagined today.

So, after all of three months of basic Russian language, we found ourselves on two Air India Boeings headed for Moscow in the summer of 1969. The three months, of language course, we thought, would equip us with basic conversational skills and take us through on arrival. I need to remind you that this was 1969, when it was a rarity to meet an English speaking Russian even in Moscow, let alone in the remote corner of Vladivostok. But  all  that  our language training did, was to make us gape at the Immigration Officer with utter disbelief and wide open jaws, partly due to the opulence of the airport and partly since we tried to desperately cling to the questions he fired at us like the rounds from a machine gun - they had not a single word that was in our vocabulary! Would you believe it - not one word!! This pattern was to follow us later.

At this stage, I should educate the reader about the kitting up process we went through to meet the winter conditions  of  about  minus 32 degrees.C.   Before   we   left Bombay, we were casually briefed about the rather unfriendly weather we would encounter in Vostok. Communication between those that had preceded us to the Soviet Union and ourselves had somehow ended, of all the places at the NHQ, which strictly observed the principle of sharing information on a `need to know’ basis. Every letter concerning our acquisition was classified Secret and above. If we had become paranoid, the Russians were even more so. How could they trust personnel from a non–aligned country whose foundation for training originated in the West? Most of our senior officers were indeed ex-British Royal Navy trained. Communication on matters of basic necessity was also obfuscated in an environment filled with suspicion!! This was also the time when our navy insulated itself from exercises with other more advanced navies. Consequently, the Indian Navy did not find it necessary to kit people with quality winter clothing items such as service overcoats, leather gloves, smart civilian jackets and more than anything else, good warm under clothing. In this case these items were not required for style but for sheer survival in Vladivostok. Some members of the team had lived in the UK and were somewhat prepared, but even they had not seen conditions anything like this.

So what was the staff solution? Buy clothes from the famous upmarket shops of the Chor Bazar in Mohammad Ali Road. That we managed to pick up some smart looking jackets is another matter. Woolen socks and Parkha with Shapka were borrowed by the naval stores from the Indian Army, which had partly learnt useful lessons after soldiers in shorts and PT shoes were sent to fight the Chinese in 1962. We had to return each piece of borrowed clothing, no matter how soiled it was. The finance section was very particular about such procedures. The then Defence Minister had probably not hit upon the novel idea of sending a couple of our Babus to the North Pole or even Vladivostok!! I may add here that conditions were such that some Russians in Vladivostok may have been happier to travel to the North Pole.

It was thus not surprising to see the most ill-kitted sailors and officers presenting Guards of Honour on Russian soil when smartly attired sailors on the other side stared at us as if an Indian circus had arrived with its famous bag of Indian tricks, for nobody seemed to be collapsing in the 30 knot ice cold wind that would pierce through anything one wore. A miracle indeed!

Anyway, carrying our pots and pans et al, we embarked two large but old commercial planes of the TU vintage to reach Vladivostok, with stern looking Mamas firmly in station in the garb of air hostesses. The gold capped dentures of these Mamas (remember James Bond who was stalked by one such monster) soon dissuaded the adventurous few amongst us from any attempts to communicate. This journey, we were told, would take longer than our inward one to Moscow, with one refueling stop enroute. The Indians, of course, were not cleared to go beyond the tarmac to even shake a leg. Perhaps the Ruskiis had only heard about the Indian inclination towards watering plants with cold impunity in full view of Mother Nature and who cares who else! They did not cater for a highly trained group equipped fully with up-to-date social skills.

We finally arrived at the closed and secret city of Vladivostok. Since administratively it would be convenient to house all Indians together (and keep them out of trouble), we were shepherded to the infamous Ruskii Ostrof (Russian Island). The island was closest to the famous stories one hears about banishment. It had little or no connectivity except in the form of a controlled boat routine allowed by the Base Commander. We arrived much to the joy of our colleagues from the submarine and Petya crew; joy because more faces to share thoughts with, arrival of mail bags after months of wait, new stocks of canteen stores and Indian yummies, even tooth paste, which was in short supply in Russian shops and when rarely available, were found unusable due to the very peculiar taste compared to our own brands. Their joy had another hidden agenda. Being the largest contingent and somewhat top heavy, the AK project could take over the unending and often frustrating battle with the local Russian Commander, whose penchant for depriving Indians of anything that would cost the Soviet Union money was only matched by the uncanny ability of the Indians to come up with new lists of requests each day. Thus began a healthy exchange of words of confrontation that lasted for rest of our stay.

I could write volumes on the events that occurred from the human interest point of view. I was made the Captain’s Secretary and worked directly under Commander Koppikar who was the CSO to K-25. This meant that the two of us worked right through the afternoon when the rest of the detachment was entitled to a siesta. Receiving and sorting out official mail from India, responding to unending questions from our mission in Moscow and distributing the private mail to the huge contingent were some of our tasks. The goodwill I earned from the team in Vladivostok doing all this helped me almost throughout my career.

Many aspects of our life there tickled us pink and gave us the much needed opportunity to bond. A notable one was that the Soviets never lost an opportunity to sell their ideology to us through long speeches and somewhat disguised attempts at brain washing. We in turn resisted their attempts through counter propaganda and sometimes through open resistance that bordered on contempt. This was a regular feature and rarely a day went by without a note of caution from the Base Commander to rein in some of our officers - not just young ones as you might imagine, but some very senior ones too. There was a threat of withdrawal from the course and immediate repatriation to India.

It was under these circumstances that the following episode took place.

Liberty ashore to the city was limited to weekends and the last boat was the only way to return to the Island. Some exceptions were made on happy occasions such as commissioning ceremonies of Petyas, etc. So it was that a rather inebriated tall and handsome Indian young Sub Lieutenant missed the last boat on a cold night when winter was about to set in. Just as well, as there would have been no story to tell had it been a wintry night! Having made valiant attempts to communicate with all and sundry with his rather limited vocabulary of the Russian language, he took upon himself the onerous task of waking up the local Commander who lived in a rather comfortable appointment house in the city. This step, needless to say, was not a recommended one even in India, let alone in the rigid and highly insulated hierarchical set up in the erstwhile Soviet Union. But no one could have restrained this determined young officer, whose sheer size could easily discourage the average Indian from taking him on. Without the dose of vodka in him you may not have met a kinder soul. The magic potion, though, made him verbose and valiant. So when the sleepy Commander stepped out into the chilly night, he encountered the chillier sight of a young Indian officer demanding a boat right then to take him to the Island. All this needed an interpreter since our man broke into some unparliamentary English epithets accompanied by equally unparliamentary gestures. Not all of what he said to the Commander was interpreted, as most words were beyond the comprehension of even the interpreter, who had not perhaps lived in some parts of London, especially the garrulous pubs. During this very nasty diplomatic exchange of words, our man decided after careful consideration, to use the word, `bull shit’. The perplexed Commander asked his interpreter what this new word meant. The equally perplexed interpreter in turn asked our man to explain in simple Russian the possible meaning of the word.  Now, this was the most challenging task that the Sub Lieutenant had been assigned since his arrival in Russia. After much thinking, he tried to figure out the synonym for the word `bull’. Since he knew the word `moloko’, for a commodity he consumed every morning, i.e. milk, he made gestures of milking a cow. This brought instant reaction from the Russians. Now he had to go to the word `bull’. He devised the most innovative combination of words in Russian that meant `the husband of the cow (moosh korova)., There was a spontaneous outburst by the Russians, “Bull, bull, da da”. After a brief silence, the Commander wanted to know the meaning of the next word. In turn, the hapless interpreter looked at our man. The vodka finally having got the better of him, our young, dashing, sub lt turned, showed his posterior to the Commander... and we are not sure what transpired thereafter. Some say he dropped his pants and accompanied it with some weird sounds that resembled minor explosions, and others say he merely gesticulated in a rather inelegant manner. Whatever it was, it carried home the message instantly. Our man was given a boat along with some unprintable words of advise. The Commander, it is said, did not sleep that night. He was busy scripting the details of the erudite conversation leading, according to him, to the insult to the officer corps of the mighty Soviet Union and, in general, an insult to Mother Russia.

            Damage control measures were put in place by the authorities the next morning while our man, having risen with no memories of the previous night, was tucking in a hearty breakfast. That is perhaps the nicest thing about vodka - no headache, no hangover!!

Eventually two or three officers were identified by the Russians for immediate repatriation. They were given a hero’s send off from Vladivostok by the contingent with slogans such as Bharat Mata ki Jai. That was not all. Within a week, these very officers were returned from Moscow after some deft diplomatic intervention by our mission.  Needless to say, they arrived to a tumultuous welcome at the jetty and with some victory signs thrown at the unhappy Soviets that were present.

Those were happy, carefree and memorable days. In the summer/autumn of ‘ 69. 

                        MYTHS AND REALITIES

In all our discussions on the relative military strengths of India and China, we forget the contribution of the erstwhile Soviet Union, now Russia. This unique relationship merits closer scrutiny and, more importantly, debate.

Both China and India were heavily dependent on Soviet equipment and platforms. China acquired large quantities of Soviet products in the 50s. India followed suit in late 60s and up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. To operationalize these assets and to absorb technology, large numbers of military personnel were deputed by India and China for training in the Soviet Union. Since knowledge of the Russian language was a precondition to training, the first six months to a year was set aside to learn the language.

Ironically, this period was not merely set aside for language proficiency but was effectively used to acquaint the trainees with the Soviet ideology and culture. This was particularly relevant to the Indians, as they were perceived to have been brought up on a western “diet”. The Indians who were trained in UK mainly and partly in Europe were kept under close observation and not allowed to mix freely with the common man on the streets.

The Chinese on the other hand were natural allies at that point in time, with strong ideological convergence of thoughts and were completely insulated from western influences. Consequently there were constant conflict of interests between Indian military officers and the Soviet instructors. This was exacerbated by efforts to isolate Indian men from their officers and to subvert the authority of the officer who was accused of practising colonial methods of leadership.

Before the relations with the Soviets began to sour, the Chinese in the mid ‘50’s busied themselves in imbibing all the strategic doctrines, tactical publications and procedures. In any case they had no access to any other source to provide them with these inputs. To this day Chinese strategic articulations including syntaxes bear a striking resemblance to that of the Soviets. Transfer of technology and indigenization was accorded high priority and the Chinese military-industrial complex was born. In the event the decades spent in isolation from the erstwhile Soviet Union turned out to be a blessing in disguise in that it accelerated the indigenous growth of the Chinese Military Industrial Complex.

The Indian Military personnel had a distinct advantage. They were reasonably conversant with western technology, mainly British and European. They had access to the Allied tactical publications, which were the cornerstone of NATO operations. Given the fluency in English, an Indian was able to, with ease, establish relative merits and demerits of complex tactical and strategic issues. Having had the exposure to both the east and the west he could, if he was so inclined, get a rare insight into the Western strategic concepts and the Soviet response to them during the cold war. Predictably, a whole generation of Indian officers grew up either supporting the Soviet philosophy or challenging it .It helped to put things into perspective and to evolve suitable changes to our own operational and strategic doctrines. Modification of equipment to suit Indian conditions soon followed.

Today China and India still rely on Russian equipment; both have opted to induct western origin systems when necessary. We have similar ships and aircraft. But Russia and China. Share a common threat and hence have begun to evolve common strategies. China has the economic clout and capacity to keep Russia constructively engaged for the foreseeable future. Their national interests are converging. Where does India fit in?

……….Is it a mere coincidence that the latest Chinese ships built in China resemble the Indian ‘Talwar’ class ships built in Russia in accordance with Indian Navy Staff Requirements?

……….Why are Indian orders for frigates, the nuclear submarine on lease and the now the infamous Gorshkov being delayed inordinately with huge cost overruns?

……How is it that the SCRAPPED HULL of an aircraft carrier bought by the Chinese ostensibly to convert her into a floating hotel is now taking shape as an operational Aircraft Carrier?

All this was difficult, if not impossible, without the direct participation of Russian technologists and artisans who have got to be present in large numbers in China. Thus stripped of vital key manpower in her own shipbuilding yards in order to earn even more vital foreign exchange elsewhere, is Russia really such a difficult puzzle to solve---the puzzle of inexplicable delays and cost overruns in respect of Indian naval projects on order in Russia?!

Is a little out-of-the-box thinking in order here, at least for a ‘reality’ check?!

Talk about national interests being 'uber alles': here is a good example!

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The author was the former Commandant of the National Defence Academy and C-in-C of the Southern Naval Command, Indian Navy.

MARITIME CHALLENGES

MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES

Security analysts and international strategists, including our own eminent ones, have, for many years, out lined the paradigm shift in the security environment in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). It would be futile on my part to repeat the clichéd versions of the post-cold war and post-9/11 developments. As scholars and academics you would perhaps prefer if I were to superimpose a worm’s eye view to the plethora of written material on this subject. I use the term worm’s eye view for two reasons. Firstly, I was at the receiving end albeit as a practitioner of all the strategic thoughts for very nearly four decades and secondly I retired four years ago and have been associated with the bird’s eye view comments which very often do not reflect the ground realities. What I am about to offer is what I believe in and is based on what I saw whilst in white uniform. I am aware that this audience consists of a wide variety of scholars, pedagogues and academics and perhaps some of you have also spent time at the delivery end of the spectrum. The challenge for me, therefore, is to bridge the gap and lead you to a free flowing interaction.

You would all agree that in the recent past the focus of maritime interests has shifted to the Indian Ocean region and the Asia Pacific zone. Indian Ocean is India’s back yard and we do not have to be apologetic to call it India’s ocean, especially to the Chinese who appear to resent this term. There was indeed a very good reason for ancient Mariners to call it ‘The Indian Ocean’. And let it be so-indeed it is our responsibility to ensure it remains so. I am sure the Chinese would not want a change of name of “South China Sea”. So you should not be surprised if Indian Maritime Strategy underlines our area of interest to be a vast area which includes the Indian Ocean. Anything short of it would diminish India’s long term goals and what is more diminish us in our own eyes. I am reminded of the famous quote, “A thousand years scarce serve to form a state. An hour may lay it in the dust. And when can man its shattered splendour renovate and recall its virtues back and vanquish time and fate?”

So what are the implications of this shift of maritime centre of gravity? Well, radical terrorism, energy security, sea borne trade and its protection, narco-terrorism, piracy and problems caused by demographic pressures- in short the health of any economy now seems to depend on the stability of this region. How we shape our destiny-depends on the actions we initiate today, if not yesterday. A word of[i] caution. Having recognised the need to liberalise and globalise we are now trying to consolidate our efforts in this direction. In the process we seem to have got ourselves inextricably inter twined in the geo-politics and geo-economics of the ‘haves’. All developing economies both in the Eastern and western hemisphere have followed the western model as their road map. We however, need to adopt the route of inclusive growth which may not have role models at this point in time. Balancing growth with alleviation of poverty, modernity with our cultural ethos even as we bridge the gap in technology and science will pose a tremendous challenge. The guns versus butter debate will rage and we may not have adequate resources to put all our well intended plans into motion. Do we slow down on catering to our security imperatives or find a way to ensure that we have guns and butter?

Coming to the heart of my theme, let me very briefly out line some basic assumptions that I have made. The most powerful country despite all that has happened in the recent economic down turn; will continue to dominate global politics. While economic power could be multi-polar in definition, military power remains unipolar as there is no other country remotely comparable with USA. In terms of trans-national relations, as aptly stated by Robert Nye[ii], power is widely dispersed. Even so there is no country which can challenge the supremacy of USA. So what? We need to factor that whatever actions USA would take would solely be in her National Interest, whether they are right or not in our perspective. We should learn to act on our own to establish our national interest. I believe it will happen. Why do I believe that we are getting there? Let me give you an example of a benign operation. The Tsunami of Dec 2004 saw India providing expeditious relief assistance to almost all countries affected by the Tsunami. Faster than the most powerful and widely deployed navy in the region. Grief stricken people of Galle harbour of Sri lanka saw an Indian Naval ship at first light, not only clearing the harbour and operationalising it but also setting up mobile hospitals and distributing food and water. As reported by Chidanand Rajghatta in an article titled “India Rides Tsunami, Shows Its Sphere Of Influence”(TOI, Mumbai, 06 January 2005) Mr Ronen Sen, our Ambassador was asked to brief three US Presidents i.e. George Bush, Bush Senior and Clinton on India’s swift response. They raised their eye brows when told that the Southern tip of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was only 90 nm away from Indonesia. Even as countries with more global reach were contemplating the nature of assistance, India had responded with alacrity. When we want to move we are there in a flash. Another recent example was the evacuation of people not only of Indian origin, from the war zone of Beirut in July 2006. Four Indian warships entered Beirut and shifted the effected people to Cyprus, while a number of other warships merely anchored off Beirut, preferring not to enter. Another example of reach being put to use along with rapidity of action.

Role of the Indian Navy

Professor Geoffrey Till, a renowned strategist, once commented, “Sea power is essentially a relative and not an absolute concept. It is about how one country can, by its maritime policy, influence the behaviour of others more than others can influence it”[iii]. As you would be aware, the IOR has always been a vortex of global activity. The most important trade routes and outlets for oil to various destinations across the world pass through this region. The IOR, therefore, provides interested parties the potential to influence the movement of strategic cargo to and from various parts of the globe. Understandably, major extra-regional powers have maintained presence in the region in some form or the other, to safe guard their own interests.

A question that is logical is “Would such political and economic contests result in clashes of interest among regional and extra regional players?” What then are the significant changes that define the strategic context of the IOR today?

First, the significance of the region has increased after the end of the cold war. Trade and energy security continue to dominate the scene.

Second, the security environment has changed post 9/11. The nature and source of threats faced by leading democracies are different. Most of them emanate from and reside in the IOR.

Third, the role and relevance of military forces have changed the world over. Leading Maritime powers maintain a constant and credible presence in the IOR. This changes the operational dynamics for the Indian Navy.

Fourth, the role and relevance of the Indian navy also needs to underscore maintaining regional stability and an increased emphasis on Maritime diplomacy.

I shall endeavour to discuss these very changes and the often felt need to highlight the increasing relevance of Maritime powers to the security of a country. In our context, the expanding role of our navy as an instrument of state policy and the increasing relevance of Maritime diplomacy needs special mention.

In passing, please also note two maritime maxims which would enable us to better appreciate our role as a viable maritime entity. Firstly, technologies that produce the challenge, in due course produce the solution. Secondly precise and decisive weapons do not necessarily produce precise and decisive results.

WHAT CONSTITUTES MARITIME SECURITY?

Quite simply as a rapidly developing economy, India must surely use economic security as its corner stone with defence against physical threat to the country as the sine qua non of our policy formulation.

Energy Security

Our dependence on the Gulf for our energy needs is likely to be 80% in the coming decades. Our linkages with the Middle East and in particular Saudi Arabia will be critical to our survival.

Trade Security

15 years ago, India’s overseas trade was only 5% of the economy. It has increased since and is expected to touch a Trillion dollars in a couple of decades. Some even estimate the overseas trade to cross 40% of our economy. Most of this will have to move across the seas.

EEZ/Continental Shelf

India has an EEZ of over 2.02 million sq kms. This figure is set to increase shortly due to our revised claims. This means we have enormous potential for economic, oceanographic and scientific activities. The Coast guard in particular will be required to grow to meet challenges as never before.

How can the Indian Navy meet these challenges? Most of you may not know that as a routine measure, right through peace time, surveillance is maintained on our trade routes and ships are tasked to carry out SLOC monitoring. Economic interests of the country are accorded highest priority in our peace and war time activities.

Asymmetric Threats

The predominant threat these days is very much non-traditional in nature. Terrorism, religious extremism, piracy, narcotic and contraband trade, gun running and landing explosives-all of these threaten our security. Many of such activities are enabled by the freedom of navigation assured by the laws of the seas or supported by sympathisers from across the seas. Do not forget that globalisation has also resulted in globalisation of criminal activities. Again the surveillance and reach of the Indian Navy acts as a deterrence which is crucial to our security.

I would like to remind all of you that the only Pirated ship to be apprehended at sea by any navy of the world was the Alandro Rainbow, a Japanese ship hi jacked off Indonesia but captured by our maritime forces off our west coast of India. For those who want action this was a very loud statement that was made by India.

Instrument of State Policy

Stability in the IOR is of great consequence to our economic growth and prosperity. Our bi-lateral trade in the whole region including most parts of west Asia is set to explode. Trade agreements with countries of South East Asia and our Look –East policy are contributing factors. India has a direct interest in the stability of the whole region and of course the stability of our immediate neighbourhood of South Asia.

What can the Navy do to contribute towards regional stability? Operations carried out in support of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and benign operations as stated earlier signal intent to maintain stability. Military assistance can also be provided as and when directed by the Govt. We have also gifted Patrol vessels to Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius. We have even provided short range surveillance air craft to Myanmar

Potential For Instability

Western analysts view the IOR as a potential hub of instability and a source of terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Illegal immigration and ethno-religious clashes have been a consequence of unequal development pattern and demographic inconsistencies.

The Navy caters for presence in such areas and is ready for quick response. In a way this capability acts as an insurance against forces that promote instability.

Presence of extra-regional forces at our door step does impinge on our freedom of operations. They also have ramification for regional politics in the future. What happened in post-Saddam Iraq and what is likely to happen in Afghanistan and Iran are cases in point.

We need therefore to build capabilities to deter multi-national forces from interfering in our national domestic activities. Constant engagement and regular interaction by our presence in such areas would assist us to assess the situation. Our deployment by not being a part of a multinational force gives us the choice of evolving a foreign policy free from pressures. This by itself fulfils a very important military and diplomatic role. Notice our resolve to carry out stand alone operations against Pirates in Somalia when a substantial multi-national force has been deployed by leading navies of the world. Reflect on our insistence of operating independently in the Malacca straits during the Gulf war to assist safe passage of multi- national forces, that too after we obtained the concurrence of all the littoral countries bordering the Malacca straits. The unilateralism practised by the US forces until recently perhaps has been reshaped by the Obama administration in May this year after the experience gained with countries like India.

The Changing Nature Of Maritime Diplomacy

Traditional means of practising Maritime diplomacy which includes Gun Boat diplomacy at one end of the spectrum, have been used to send calibrated messages to a Government, particularly in the early stages of a crisis. Some changes in form are now visible and encompass activities which were not so prevalent in the cold war period. Some of these have found mention in our own Maritime doctrine published from time to time. Pro active engagement of extra-regional maritime forces is a welcome addition. Gone are the days when we shunned interaction with other navies. I dare say the experience gained by the navy has emboldened the administration to approve such interactions for the Indian Air force and the Indian Army. Our combined experience of constant and calibrated exercises with muti-national forces will in my view result in a versatile Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces. Furthermore as and when the CDS or an equivalent structure is created (please note I am saying as and when and NOT if and when) our efforts to further hone our skills in this respect will get a boost.

Interoperability with other forces is a necessary precondition should we decide to partake in UN led operations. MOU’s signed with friendly countries in regard to defence cooperation and joint patrols of Malacca straits, as well as Fleet Reviews and Milans of regional navies at Port Blair are all examples of our intent. Building confidence, dispelling fear and joint efforts to tackle low intensity threats need to be an integral and routine function of the Indian Navy in the coming decades.

TRAINING

One of the least discussed activities, is the training we provide to friendly countries in the region. At any given time we have over 200 trainees in our establishments which are gaining international reputation. About 20 different countries have availed training facilities that we have nurtured over the years. This not only helps to create good will but more importantly it projects our competence. Before the Indian economy gathered momentum, we were extremely limited by budgetary constraints and in relative terms our living conditions failed to meet the high demands of quality of life that we could offer to prospective trainees. Many countries which had achieved economic booms began to bypass India and seek greener pastures in the West. That has begun to change with increased budgetary allocations and active support of the MEA which offers financial packages for foreign trainees. We need to expand our horizons and aggressively market our spare capacities readily available with us. The dividends should we succeed, are enormous.

What Needs To Be Done?

To achieve our objectives we need to base our strategy on twin characteristics of Credibility and Capability. The former needs clarity of purpose that reflects Political Will and Intent to deploy forces to protect our National Interests. Deploying a warship 24/7 to thwart the designs of the Pirates off Somalia is an example.

The latter, is all about pursuing deterrence and providing reassurance when the need arises. The ability to sustain operations for prolonged durations in our area of interest and the ability to project power when necessary are vital components of capability. This needs C4I2, fire power, logistics and integral Air Power. As our nation grows politically and economically, our navy will have to grow in strength. In fact the converse is equally true. As our navy grows stronger, so will our country gain, both economically and politically?

Concluding Comments

As you know, the last decade has seen some interesting developments. With our economy showing signs of resilience, we have started to assert ourselves. Today we engage major players on an equal footing.

Our growing economy needs assurance of uninterrupted trade and energy from across the seas. Policy without capability makes bad diplomacy. An assertive foreign policy needs a strong navy. I was indeed surprised to see an entry in the visitors book of one of our ships which took part in the Tsunami operations in Srilanka.Mr Lakshman Kadirgamar the then minister of foreign affairs who was later assassinated by LTTE, had this to say, “The mapping of the bed of the Colombo harbour, completed so swiftly and efficiently by the Indian Navy, is yet another manifestation of the  enormous good will that the Government of India bears towards the Govt and the people of Sri Lanka.This exercise shows that the modern Indian Navy has the reach and the capability to be ranked among the foremost navies of the world” This is an onerous responsibility that rests on us. The world expects us to assume greater responsibility in our area of influence. It is up to us to rise to the occasion.

I am honoured to be in your presence on this momentous occasion. May the University of Goa continue to be a shining beacon of knowledge and may you grow from strength to strength.

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[i]

[ii] The new Rome meets the new barbarians-The Economist 23 mar 2002

[iii] Times of India