Admiral Pereira
Memorial lecture Delivered 0n 15 Feb
2020 At Bengaluru
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
-
SOME MYTHS AND
REALITIES
At my farewell speech when I swallowed
the anchor almost 14 years ago, I narrated a story about Adm Pereira. The true
story underlines an aphorism, maxim, axiom or adage whatever you wish to call
it-I leave it to the connoisseur of the English language. The story exemplifies
or illustrates the fact that the special relationships that we nurture while in
service do not end with the demise of individuals. Indeed, they go far beyond.
On this very special day, let me very briefly narrate a true story of my
association with RLP. Having remained in touch with the Admiral and his
gracious wife, affectionately called Ma Phyllis, much after his retirement from
‘At last’, the house he built here and to ‘Broadsides’ later in Cunnoor, I had
this yearning to be there for the last march. When he breathed his last at the
Airforce hospital on 14 Oct 1993, I had just taken over as NA to CNS. Even before
I rushed to inform CNS that I wish to be with my role model, he asked me to
requisition the Airforce Boeing so that the maximum number of officers from Delhi
could pay their last respects. My prayer was answered.
In the middle of winter that year I approached the Editor of Readers Digest to
consider a story on Ronnie P. My request was duly drafted and on that cold
wintry night, I was heading home. Just passed the Jesus and Mary college, I saw
a car on fire and people on the street throwing mud on it to douse the fire. To
my horror, it was my old fiat driven by my dear wife. She had been pulled out of
the car. The charred front remained and it was a cold night. Having despatched
Gita home in my staff car I was contemplating on how to tow it to my house at
SP Marg. Out of the cold foggy night appeared a man who called out, “ Commodore
Sir, don’t ruin your uniform let me get into the front seat and you ask your
driver to tow.” On reaching home I asked him how he recognized my rank in
winter uniform which most Delhiites would have failed to do. “Oh,” he replied, “I
am Gomes and I used to drive Adm Pereira.” “What a surprise “I retorted, “I am
late as I was drafting a request for RLP to be brought into the Readers digest.
Do come up and have a drink with me. “He politely declined my offer and mumbled
some other day or so. A few days later I called up CO INDIA and asked him to
trace Gomes so that I could send him a gift to express my gratitude. He did not
revert for a couple of days and when reminded he said, “You must have got it , wrong Sir, because Gomes died a few months ago”.
Goose
bumps all over. The first thought to cross my mind was how Ronnie hated to see a
uniformed officer pushing a car. I didn’t that night. I kept this story to
myself so that no one would suspect my mental stability. If you think that this
was the denouement, the story did not end there.
Fast
forward 22 years later, an Ltcdr Anup Thomas called me to request me to assist
him to write Ronnie’s biography. "Why me?' was my response. He explained that he
had researched The Admiral’s life and some articles on him carry my name. “I think
you are the leader of the ROPAS Group,” he said. Thus, began a journey of
meticulous research for the book- from birth to death. The book was published
by CELABS at Kochi in 2017. It was released on Navy day in the presence of the
President of India. It is now available on Amazon. The author worked till 3AM
every day and often ensured I did too. Now, every cadet at NAVAC gets a copy of
this book. I had done my bit at NDA, when I was the Commandant to build a stone
ship with a ship handling simulator. at the lake and I made a mild suggestion
that it be named after Ronnie. Wonder of wonders they did name it after Ronnie
much after I had left.
As
the book was being printed, one fine day a cassette fell into my hand from an
old cupboard. It was a recording of a speech delivered by Adm Pereira at Kochi,
at a leadership capsule in 1990. That was digitized and is now available on youtube for all of you to see. Again, it was Cdr Thomas who did the groundwork.
This morning I laid a wreath at the Admirals grave, as I have many times in the
past. From now every memorial on Ronnie, I am assured, would be preceded by a
wreath-laying. I guess that is the advantage of owning a piece of real estate
when you are gone.
I
now stand before you because the speaker scheduled to have addressed you in Dec
2019, Adm Sushil Kumar, a former Chief, passed away quite unexpectedly. A twist
in the tale.
Adm
Pereira led by example. Having observed his conduct in and out of service, I learnt
that Machiavellism, manipulative behavior and pussy footing and pusillanimity
are not good leadership traits for the Military. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, if
you do not like my talk today, blame Adm Pereira who continues to reside in my
subconscious mind. But then, that is
the sort of impact good leaders leave behind. Just remember that his centenary
year is around the corner. 2023 it is.
Coming
to the subject for the evening, Civil-Military relations myths and realities.
let me first narrate how, if at all, I am qualified to talk on the subject. It is
strange but true that as you grow in service you are willy- nilly put through a
series of appointments depending on the needs of the service at that specific
point in time. No officer planning your appointments- no matter how prescient
he is, can predict how you perform. And yet all of you in this room can look
back at what you did and what you learnt and chose to pursue during and after your
career. So, you have in this very audience, credible authors like Jitty Franklin
and successful entrepreneurs, corporate heads, etc. Obviously, we all pursued
our objectives based on the experience gained from the appointments we were
channeled through.
Before
televisions, cell phones, and the social media intruded into our lives, commanding
officers of ships, units, and air squadrons had sufficient time to nurture and
groom young officers. I was a beneficiary of the old system of grooming. It was
on one such occasion that a Commanding officer thought it appropriate to
present me, a young Lt, the book titled, "The Soldier and the State. The
theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" authored by Samuel Huntington
(first published in 1957). Thus began my journey on this subject. It took me decades
of reading in installments, as and when doubts arose in my mind, to slowly but
surely understand the 'politics' of civil-military relations in our context. In
my case, it was a fortuitous exposure to the subject, the import of which
needed decades of experience to contextualise Samuel Huntington's research. So,
this is how it unfolded in my life.
In
1970, I had just returned from the erstwhile Soviet Union after a very confusing
exposure to a communist/socialist regime, fought the 1971 war and in due course
landed at the Royal Naval staff college at Greenwich, London. Maggie Thatcher had begun to revitalize The UK and especially its armed forces. Apolitical as their Military was, the
excitement and expectations of good governance were palpable even among the
stiff -upper lipped Brits. I was tasked to profile her leadership in the
context of civil-military relations (three years later she fought the Falk Land
war eight thousand miles away from her shores, based on the assurance of her
First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach. By some sheer coincidence, I with my
late wife Gita, was nominated by Adm Pereira the then Chief, to escort Adm Sir
Henry and Lady Leach around India. Those of you who are familiar with the IAF
Avro, would know that it took seven and a half hours to reach Kochi from Delhi.
My views of Maggie Thatcher and her intervention in civil-military relations of The UK was more than substantiated by Sir Henry during these long travels. Thus, I
began to understand and interpret the contents of Samuel ‘s book, which described
ideological, political, societal and other factors that determine whether
Civilian control of the Military is objective or subjective. More of it later.
A few years later, I was posted as the Naval Adviser to our mission in Islamabad.
This was the Zia era and I spent three years watching and studying the Military
Dictatorship at work. Another project that Samuel's book prompted me to
undertake. I dare say, without this background, I could not have attempted a
paper called the Psyche of a Pakistani. I was able to fine-tune my paper after
numerous interactions with service and civilian audiences when I spoke on it on
my return to India. Years later, after routine
exposure to naval appointments, of which many significant ones that brought me
in close proximity with senior civil servants and Ministers, visits abroad and
more confusion on the Indian model of civil-military relations; in 1992, I entered
the portals of the National Defence College (NDC). It afforded me the opportunity to study the
Indian scene and cover the whole spectrum of Socio-political, economy, science
and technology, industry etc finally culminating in strategic environment and
national security. The participants drawn from the services, civil services,
police and a number of senior officers from friendly foreign countries from the
East and the West, did share their experiences and thoughts. It is here that one's understanding of the Indian
context is fully realized. The yawning gap in civil-military relations with
all its ramifications could now be juxtaposed with Samuel's seminal work on the
subject. So, you see being an officer of average intelligence, I had to wait to
understand some of the complex issues surrounding Samuels’ theoretical
constructs.
Finally,
in 2000, I was packed off by the COSC to the John F Kennedy School of public policy
and governance at Harvard. Surprise- surprise, I came face to face with who,
but Samuel Huntington. That he sat me down on a memorable evening and
clarified my doubts was a testimony to his humility. Agree or not, destiny had
played a role in my quest to put the civil-military relations in the context of
post-independent India. Looking back, it took me all of 25 years to start a debate on what little, I now know.
As they say” the more you read the less you know”.
In very simple terms, I will discuss the subject under the following headings. The
symptoms of the disease-related to CMR, our political dilemma, the Military
conundrum and the role of civil society.
The
symptoms of the disease
Let
me commence with a telling statement in Samuel’s book. I quote, “The real world is one of blends,
irrationalities, and incongruities; actual personalities, institutions, and
beliefs, do not fit into neat logical categories.” Unquote. We in the Military
are indeed trained to see all things in black or white, right or wrong. The
entire civilian world and in particular the politician operates in the grey
zone. The theory of CMR in the United States, for instance, was a confused and
unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the premises of American
liberalism. The UK even without constitutional underpinnings, you know that
they have no written constitution, had to contend with CMR based on the global
deployment of the Navy in particular. They resorted to traditions and practices
to develop their model of CMR.
The
symptoms of poor civil-military relations alluded to in the Indian media,
pertain to neglected servicemen, the surrender of medals to the supreme commander,
hunger strikes by former military personnel, unimplemented supreme court rulings
in their favour, unfulfilled government promises, fratricide, and indiscipline
among soldiers, neglect of war widows and war heroes. This list is by no means exhaustive.
But what are the causes of the disease?
The first question that arises is, whether India is unique among other established
and acknowledged democracies of the world. If so why? If not, what is common
among such democracies? Memories being short, we tend to forget many grave instances
including the poor civil-military relations in the United States which led to the unsavory behavior of American Military personnel in the Korean war and later
during and after the Vietnam war. Those of us who did not have televisions were
able to see the resentment of the soldier against the US Government, in movies made
later based on true stories. Demonstrations by veterans on the streets of Washington,
a YouTube or Google story on the Bonus Army is one that tells it all.
During
the first world war, the US Congress had agreed to compensate the soldiers with
a bonus of over a Dollar a day spent in the battlefields. That promise was
never kept until thousands of soldiers were rendered jobless and homeless
during the great depression of the 1930s. Close to 40000 soldiers and their
families decided to protest by moving and occupying the streets of Washington. The
senate continued to vote against the settlement. The President, in a desperate
move orders the Army to clear the streets of Washington by using force as
necessary. What followed was a cavalry charge led by Gen Mc Arthur and Patton.
The short documentary available on YouTube may shock you all. In that
clip you see the likes of Gen MacArthur and Patton, charging the peaceful
protesters of veterans on the streets of Washington. In fact, Gen Mc Arthur
decides to exceed the mandate assigned to him by the President. His views were
that Military operations recognize only the winners.
Clashes
between the President and the senior Military Commanders have been documented
from the Civil war, right through the great wars and more recently in Iraq and
Afghanistan as well.
My
favourite case study is about Gen Mc Arthur who after retiring as the Chief was
recalled and tasked to head the operations against the Japanese in the Eastern
theatre. After the war, he is chosen to head the occupation forces in Japan-no
less than a Governor-General. Having tasted power, he defies the US President
repeatedly until he is sacked during the Korean war for noncompliance with orders
from Washington. That he had got away in 1932 during the Bonus Army episode is
a point to note.
Mac
returns to USA after years in the field to a rousing reception of people who
simply adored him. To cut the long story short, Mc Arthur, the darling of the
people and an exceptional Military hero fades away into history books but not
before addressing a joint session of the Congress. This case study offers many
interesting challenges for CMR. The role of the soldier and the role of the
Civilian head of a democracy are laid bare for scrutiny.
The
sheer neglect of rehabilitating battle casualties of Vietnam that caused deep
resentment were scenes that cannot be forgotten. This, despite a long history
of war, starting with the civil war, through the world wars and numerous
international military operations. Each of those enabled them to fine-tune
their civil-military relations. The Military performed the role of Governing
occupied territories. It was Gen McArthur who Governed Japan after the
surrender of the Japanese. Samuel dedicates a whole chapter to describe the Alchemy
of Power and CMR in total war.
The
open respect displayed today to American soldiers in uniform or war casualties
brought back to be buried with military honours, have evolved over centuries of
waging war, many, far away from their shores. The range and scale of this
experience willy-nilly involved civil society as a whole. We, on the other hand, are just in the seventh
decade of our independence, hence comparisons with the USA or UK may well be
incongruous.
Similar
episodes with respect to other democracies with a long history in Europe indicate
that civil-military relations are a process of continuous evolution and that no
single nation can claim to have found the right formula to afford the satisfaction
of both parties. There are numerous pushes and pulls in the Presidential system
in America. Those who care to read Samuel's book can also trace how the system
evolved through ideologies, confusion, and contradictions.
Our
Political Dilemma.
Much
has been written about the circumstances under which the post-independence Indian
Political leadership was ill-equipped to deal with the Military. Neither was
the Military better equipped. Both internal and external factors played a
significant role in exacerbating this critical relationship. While unstable
environment caused by Pakistani action soon after independence kept the military
busy, numerous military takeovers in the immediate neighbourhood soon after
decolonization gave credence to the rumours that India too may be subjected to
military rule. It is likely that such a possibility was neutralised by
introducing structural changes in higher defence management, reducing the
potential powers of Cs-in-Cs by creating
Chief of staff of the three services, eliminating the military from pre
independence decision making bodies of higher
defence management, reducing the stature of military officers in protocol, pay
and allowance, perks, creating a large cadre of central police forces under the
Home ministry and a host of other actions which also included having a common
pay commission with no direct participation of the armed forces of India.
At
that point in our history, there was neither credible literature on
civil-military relations nor examples of a constitutional approach to address the
emerging controversies in the Indian model of governance.
Artha
Shastra is often quoted in our ramblings but the fledgling post world war
Military of India did not have the luxury of falling back on established
processes other than the British postulations. I advisedly use the term
postulations as the British do not have a written constitution.
The
point to note is that even the American Constitution had only a subjective
approach to civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington states, civilian
control of the armed forces emerged "despite rather than because of
constitutional provisions". India adopted many of the provisions of the
American constitution and since Britain had no written constitution, traditions
and customs of Britain were considered for incorporation in our own document.
In India, neither the politician nor the military clearly understood
the term "Civilian control"." Civilian control would
be maximised if the military were limited in scope and relegated to a
subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian
head" wrote Samuel, while adding that the reverse was also recorded under
the military clause of their constitution, which divided civilian
responsibility of military affairs and fostered the direct access of the
military authorities to the highest level of Government. Hence it was the
highest level of political leadership and not the bureaucrats who were to
exercise control over the Armed forces.
Let
us first understand the scope of Subjective and Objective Military control.
What is meant by civilian control?
The word civilian covers a very large section
of people of varied character, conflicting interest, political leanings and
what have you. Ergo, the term maximising civilian control would mean the power
assigned to some civilian group.
In
the 17th and 18th centuries, in the West, Military forces
were generally under the control of the Crown. That was also true of the 550 Indian
states ruled by Monarchs. The term Civilian control as I understand was
adopted when the Parliamentary system began to function. The term was meant to
increase the power of the elected members' vis a vis the Crown. But the King was
more often than not a civilian. To this day the US Congress and the US
President engages in a comparable struggle. Let us briefly examine that struggle
to put our dilemma into perspective.
The
US Congress is too large a body to exercise control over the Military.
Ironically, members of Congress are closer to the people as compared to the
President. The President can become a prisoner of his Military advisors. Remember the connect between Rajiv Gandhi and
Gen Sunderji and Sri Lanka operations. There are numerous such instances in the
US history when the best-briefed leader in the world took all the wrong
decisions. Yet it would be dangerous for us to generalise our findings when we
have no access to reports of any of our Wars.
While
I was studying the pattern of guidance if any provided by our political
leadership since independence, I did see evidence of a threat of military take over
often discussed consequent to almost all countries surrounding us and in Africa
going under Military rule. Jairam Ramesh’s recent book on Krishna Menon reveals
some more evidence of tensions between the politicians and the Military. We can
discuss that during the Q&A session. The great unease between the top
Military leadership and the RM/PM, and an Army Chief contributing articles to a
well-known Newspaper whilst in the chair are all part of the confusion- confounded
as Confucius would have put it.
Simply
put, the fundamental concern in any democracy should be the distribution of the power between the executive and the legislative rather than between Civil and
Military.
Due
to paucity of time let me state that objective control of the Military becomes
productive due to the increasing professionalism of the Military. Objective
control is all about maximizing Military professionalism. I could cover this in
the Q&A.
While
the evolution of the American system progressed on unpredicted lines, since
they have the Presidential system of government, our dilemma was, perhaps,
which civilian head of the Government would control the Indian Armed forces.
The President is just a titular head although given the title of the supreme
commander. In our system, It had to be the Prime Minister through the RM. It was
not surprising that Pandit Nehru made himself available to the armed forces for
consultations when required. He personally knew many officers of the rank of
Brigadier and above, as recorded by late General Inderjit Rikhye, who was
handpicked by PM to proceed to the UN headquarters as security adviser to the
Secretary-General. The infamous Gen Kaul episode in 1962 however, brought home
the dangers of politicization of the Armed forces. Such episodes are very much a
part of the learning curve in any large democracy.
Each
passing year declassification of material, particularly in the UK throws up facts
which tend to surprise us.
Indira
Gandhi who established a personal equation, though turbulent at times, with Sam
Manekshaw and, Rajiv Gandhi who interacted with his Chiefs along with his RRM,
Arun Singh often did not have to rely only on the bureaucracy to advise them.
Both the Sri Lanka operation and Operation Brass Tacks, which caused tensions
between India and Pakistan are often quoted by
skeptics as examples of bad experiments of civil-military interaction at the
apex level. These were, in fact, personalized leadership traits which had all the
trappings of an evolving relationship which needed refinements but not
rejection.
The
momentum maintained in the '50s and '60s in clipping the wings of the Armed
forces had done irreparable damage to the work ethos of MOD. Allocation of
business rules and transaction of business rules of MOD first published in 1961
(duly approved by the President) and still in vogue with minor amendments,
makes the Defence Secretary responsible for the defence of India. There is no role assigned to the Chiefs since service
headquarters were attached offices of MOD. The latest creation of DMA
needs to be watched before we comment on its efficacy.
The
Committee of Defence Management headed by Arun Singh in the wake of Kargil had clearly outlined the anomalies in the system and had suggested
solutions. The most critical of them remained unimplemented until recently,
ostensibly, due to a lack of political consensus. Apart from remedying existing
anomalies and assigning responsibility and accountability to the military, it
is meant to address one of the major weaknesses in the civil-military relations
in India i.e. lack of a single point, military advisor to the head of political leadership
and participation in the strategic decision-making process on matters pertaining to
national security.
In
brief, in the absence of a clear authority-responsibility-accountability
matrix, the civil-military equation at the apex level is critical to the safety
and security of India. The military quite clearly
cannot and should not function under a civilian bureaucrat, but only under the
highest political authority. In our case, it has to be the PM through RM. I
would like to believe that a good beginning has been made with the introduction
of CDS and DMA.
The Military Conundrum
With neither the constitution to support nor clarity to
perform, except as an extension of the MOD, the services were left to fend for
themselves. Every proposal, every plan, and every communication even to other
ministries such as MEA had to be processed through MOD and it needed the
concurrence of the Def Sec. Neither the politician, save a few, nor the bureaucrats
at various levels of MOD have the domain expertise or knowledge to respond to scores
of proposals originating from the three services. Most bureaucrats do not draft
a single speech to be made by their Minister due to a lack of domain knowledge.
Every document on National security originated from service headquarters. So, we
wrote and heard our own drafts being read out to us during various meetings and
seminars. 15-year plans for
modernisation and up-gradation remained confined to files.
At the field level,
officers are trained to be high calibre professionals. Their profession is the management
of violence. This being a unique profession, the training is such that it
prepares him/her for a successful combat operation. No parallel entry is
possible, for, unless you have acquired the skill and practiced them for a
length of time you cannot be successful in combat. A commercial Pilot, for
instance, cannot replace a fighter pilot unless he acquires combat skills. A
fighter pilot can, however, fly a commercial aircraft if the certification
process is completed. Hence an officer of the armed forces is irreplaceable by
another professional outside the forces.
The soldier is trained to be a specialist in the application of
violence. That is his trade and not a profession. Hence there is a clear
dividing line between the manager and the tradesman. Consequently, the entire
process of induction and training of a soldier is unique to the officer and the
other ranks. A soldier cannot become an officer except under certain conditions.
The armed forces are as a rule monopolized by the state. More
importantly, the profession of management of violence can be practiced only for
socially approved purposes. Regulations, customs, and traditions, curtailment of
certain privileges including fundamental rights become an indispensable part of a soldier's
life. Consequently, the relations between the state and the soldier is a sacred
one. There is much to be done so that a soldier is not
equated to a Policemen, a blunder which has serious repercussions in maintaining
the 'izzat' of the Soldier. Here is where the civil society steps in.
Role
of the civil society
The success of all democracies depends mainly on the quality
of their civil societies. They too evolve over time. A well informed educated
and mature civil society ensures that it elects the right political leadership.
Both the Soldier and the politician emanate from the same civil society. It is
also true that "Our God and soldier
we alike adore even at the brink of danger, not before, after deliverance both
alike requited, our God is forgotten and our soldier slighted" This comes
from an author, Francis Quaries who belongs to a country which has seen great
sacrifices by the soldier. Why is it a truism? The civil society has short memories.
It is not the duty of a soldier to repeatedly point out the sacrifices made by
him. It is the duty of civil society to fight for the rights of the
soldier. The society is expected to fight with the politician so that the
soldier is cared for while in service and in retirement. Precisely what
Kautilya recommended to his King.
Creating a war memorial is not the
concern of a soldier but it is the civil society that pushes its political
leadership to remember and honour our dead soldiers. The civil society also has
the power to punish the politician who fails to honour the soldier.
According to Yasmin Khan
a historian, about 2.3 Million Indian
soldiers fought during World War 2 and "89000 laid down their lives in
Military service." Given our population then, it touched the lives of many
Indian families. There was awareness about sacrifices created by the
unfortunate circumstances of war. 400000 Americans and 388000 Britishers died in the war. Civil societies tend to
remember losses when it impacts them. During periods of peace, the intelligentsia
which controls the media often question investments in National security.
Pressing debates on socio-economic issues keep the soldier out of sight.
In the Indian context, it is essential to continuously educate
the civil society on trials and tribulations of our soldiers. Compulsory
military training or making NCC compulsory in schools and colleges and constant
engagement with civil society through well-structured films, plays, and street
shows are options that need to be exercised.
In my view, it is essential to induct ex-servicemen of repute
into our political structure so that the voice of the soldier is heard in the
parliament. We need more of Jaswant Singhs, Khanduris and Shankar Roy
Choudhry's.
Thousands of ex-servicemen entered politics, industry and
other professions in the USA soon after WW2. Many rose to be Presidents and
successful congressmen. Industries benefitted from the focus brought to bear by
military personnel.
The soldier must enter all possible walks of life after retirement
to be able to mobilize the goodwill of the society, which in turn could make
the politician accountable to evolve a new equilibrium in civil-military
relations of a young India.
Thank
you for your patience. Jai Hind.
