OROP- THE SYMPTOM OF A DISEASE

Politico-Military relations-lessons from the OROP episode

Courtesy The Quint see http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/09/if-only-the-orop-episode-was-not-turned-into-a-political-spectacle

In an earlier article on OROP, I had averred that the agitation for OROP which unfortunately overflowed on to Jantar Mantar in Delhi, was merely the symptoms of a disease. The disease per se has been eating into the vitals of Civil- military relations since independence.

In 1951-52, the newly elected Government and the parliament had very little time to gain knowledge of the Military and its interface with the Government. The enormous burden of handling partition, the gruesome riots, consolidating and assimilating the Princely states with the Indian Union, the J&K conundrum, addressing issues related to abject poverty, illiteracy and health care, creating infrastructure and industries along with academic institutions of excellence were some of the challenges faced by the competent people, who participated in nation building. Their competence and stature can be gauged by the notings on files in which political leaders wrote copious notes while recording their decisions on myriad vexed issues. In comparison the discussions on files  in the past four decades pale into insignificance and reflect a lack of authority and direction not only from the political leadership but also the bureaucracy. 

Checks and balances adapted from the white hall system of office management were either deliberately diluted, circumvented or defaced so that accountability of the politico-bureaucratic edifice was mired in ambiguity and ambivalence.

The Military had also to face numerous hurdles, which, interalia, included adjusting to the post war reorganisation of leftover but divided military personnel, equipment and infrastructure and most of all adapting to a leadership which was wary of coups; consequent to a number of military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood. Given that there was insufficient documentation or studies related to civil-military relations until the seminal work on the subject by Samuel Huntington in 1956, there were no models to follow other than the British and the American experience. The former had no written constitution and the latter had a Presidential system with somewhat vague guidelines on civilian control of the Military. In retrospect therefore, as regards making the military in India integral to the decision making process, it was a case of the blind leading the blind.

Suppression of the Military, was perhaps a deliberate unarticulated political mandate or at best a fortuitous outcome of a confused politico-bureaucratic nexus. Consequently, keeping the Military out of all decision making structures, reduction of pay, allowances and pension, neglect of modernisation , non-provision of essential equipment and ordnance and a host of other issues continued to torment the Military. The poor choice of RMs in many cases accentuated the crisis. In brief, the Military had neither a voice in Parliament, nor the ears of the RM and PM. That the morale of the Military was sustained to win battles both with the enemies of India and enemies within, speaks well of the Military leadership.

There were at least three opportunities to comprehensively address the overall neglect of the Military in India. The first was the Chinese intrusion in 1962 ,the second was a combination of 1965 and 1971 wars and the last was after the Kargil conflict, when the entire gamut of National security was seriously reviewed. In the event, competing politics of two major national parties, conspired to barter national security issues at the altar of National politics.

When the present Government came to power there were indications for the first time after a decade, that issues that tormented the Military in India would be substantially addressed. The leadership appeared to be aware of the need to first address issues related to the IZZAT of a soldier which would lead to amelioration of the negative effects of dragging the affairs of the soldier to tribunals and courts of India.

The OROP episode enabled the fractured community of ESM to get their act together for the first time, while the Govt failed to engage them in a dialogue or a negotiation which would lead to a joint resolution through discussions and transparency. The country was hence a witness to a theatrical performance of the absurd. Retired soldiers on fast unto death, television cameras in search of TRPs and the civil society a passive and indifferent observer. Contrast it to the lakhs who supported the IAC  movement and more recently the spectacle at Ahmedabad. The Soldier in angst had little support from the civil society.

Letters written by retired Chiefs, perhaps did not receive even a routine acknowledgement from the office of the ironically titled Supreme Commander, who has no executive powers to help his anguished soldiers.

After making a mess of the optics at Jantar Mantar, the Govt decided to leak their decisions to the media a day before the final announcement.  To cap it all, at the final session, the RM bowled a googly of VRS. If the RM had been misled or the Chiefs in company of the Minister were not consulted about the faux pas, a few heads ought to roll . Thus a moment  of glory and historical importance was reduced to a sad spectacle of a bumbling Government-through serendipity- nudging the long overdue Prime Minister's intervention. A display of less than desirable cohesion, coherence and  transparency in decision making.

Surely India deserves better.

If any Govt wishes to correct the mistakes of the past and strengthen the  much desired Politico-Military interface, the first action is to bring the Military into the decision making structure,  so that the Military too would be accountable to the people of India, through Parliamentary oversight.

There are perfectly good integrated models to follow today, than those that existed in 1947.

 What is missing until now, is the will to execute institutional reforms. Tempus Fugit.