Much has been said about Arms Gate of India. Periodically, scams hit the headlines and TV anchors scream their heads off, virtually carrying out a media trial,without understanding the process of acquisition and the damage done to our forces by further delaying the modernization process.
The damage done to the reputation of those accused based on preliminary reports is another matter. CBI has rarely proved the guilt of those accused by the media but decades pass without any justice to the accused. Yet no one has filed for compensation either from the media or from those involved in the investigation and unproven charge sheets. The accused rarely have the energy or the resources to fight a system.
That there is corruption in arms deals is an accepted fact. An erstwhile Secretary of MOD has written a frank and objective piece on just this aspect in the OP-ED page of Indian Express dated 21 Feb. He has asked for systemic reforms in the process of acquisition. What he has left un said is that knowledgeable Politicians should occupy the chair of RM. This is not a portfolio up for grabs owing to loyalty to a party or the clean image a person enjoys. There is definitely a need for above average leadership qualities of the RM. No other Minister has to face the day to day challenges of running a large force of trained soldiers who are increasingly better informed and better connected with facts. This is a new era which demands understanding of service conditions, technical complexities and above all articulation of the strategic objectives of the Govt of the day.
In many years of my service in Delhi, I have had the privilege or the misfortune of dealing with both senior politicians and bureaucrats of MOD. It would be fair to say that I felt less privileged, as misfortune was the order of the day. . Barring one RM (unfortunately he held this portfolio in addition to his primary task-that too for a short while) not a single Politician was comfortable to deal with Senior officers of the Armed forces. The powerful presentations that are made to the PM and the whole hierarchy every six months, by no less than the Chief of the three services invariably results in substantiating the proverbial 'water on the duck's back' syndrome. These were the occasions when a large audience from the senior hierarchy of the Armed forces witnesses the deficiencies being brought to the direct attention of the PM and his Cabinet colleagues. Some Chiefs are known to be blunt while others, more diplomatic. In either case, no Prime Minister and least of all the RM, can claim to be ignorant of the crying needs of the Armed forces.
How then can a RM use the threat to cancel an acquisition, which takes five to ten years before it materializes,and having failed repeatedly to remedy the systemic weaknesses in the Ministry that he oversees?
Those of you who care to read the Defence Aquisition procedures will soon realize that the Armed forces have direct control only on stipulating the technical contents and on evaluating a new platform/ system. The rest is totally and unambiguously under the Ministry of Defence. If Amitabha Pande, in the article quoted above, is right-and I have no reason to believe otherwise-it is not the quality of the system recommended by the services which is in doubt, but it is the subsequent process which need to be followed under the supervision of MOD.
No one has questioned the capability of Bofors, HDW submarines,SU 30 or Barak anti missile system. They were truly the top of the line systems/platforms. If money has changed hands it must be to expedite the procurement and so it is advisable to look within the Ministry, in the first instance.
The damage done to the reputation of those accused based on preliminary reports is another matter. CBI has rarely proved the guilt of those accused by the media but decades pass without any justice to the accused. Yet no one has filed for compensation either from the media or from those involved in the investigation and unproven charge sheets. The accused rarely have the energy or the resources to fight a system.
That there is corruption in arms deals is an accepted fact. An erstwhile Secretary of MOD has written a frank and objective piece on just this aspect in the OP-ED page of Indian Express dated 21 Feb. He has asked for systemic reforms in the process of acquisition. What he has left un said is that knowledgeable Politicians should occupy the chair of RM. This is not a portfolio up for grabs owing to loyalty to a party or the clean image a person enjoys. There is definitely a need for above average leadership qualities of the RM. No other Minister has to face the day to day challenges of running a large force of trained soldiers who are increasingly better informed and better connected with facts. This is a new era which demands understanding of service conditions, technical complexities and above all articulation of the strategic objectives of the Govt of the day.
In many years of my service in Delhi, I have had the privilege or the misfortune of dealing with both senior politicians and bureaucrats of MOD. It would be fair to say that I felt less privileged, as misfortune was the order of the day. . Barring one RM (unfortunately he held this portfolio in addition to his primary task-that too for a short while) not a single Politician was comfortable to deal with Senior officers of the Armed forces. The powerful presentations that are made to the PM and the whole hierarchy every six months, by no less than the Chief of the three services invariably results in substantiating the proverbial 'water on the duck's back' syndrome. These were the occasions when a large audience from the senior hierarchy of the Armed forces witnesses the deficiencies being brought to the direct attention of the PM and his Cabinet colleagues. Some Chiefs are known to be blunt while others, more diplomatic. In either case, no Prime Minister and least of all the RM, can claim to be ignorant of the crying needs of the Armed forces.
How then can a RM use the threat to cancel an acquisition, which takes five to ten years before it materializes,and having failed repeatedly to remedy the systemic weaknesses in the Ministry that he oversees?
Those of you who care to read the Defence Aquisition procedures will soon realize that the Armed forces have direct control only on stipulating the technical contents and on evaluating a new platform/ system. The rest is totally and unambiguously under the Ministry of Defence. If Amitabha Pande, in the article quoted above, is right-and I have no reason to believe otherwise-it is not the quality of the system recommended by the services which is in doubt, but it is the subsequent process which need to be followed under the supervision of MOD.
No one has questioned the capability of Bofors, HDW submarines,SU 30 or Barak anti missile system. They were truly the top of the line systems/platforms. If money has changed hands it must be to expedite the procurement and so it is advisable to look within the Ministry, in the first instance.
