Culmination of Ideas and
Dreams
Myths and Realities of
Modernisation
What a remarkable
achievement, one might say. When most navies of the world are stagnating or
drawing-down due to scant resources, i.e .financial, material and human, the
Indian Navy has commissioned a whole range of potent platforms that would make any modern Navy proud. Arihant and Chakra,
both nuclear powered Submarines, the former indigenous and the latter leased; P8I Boeing, the much needed maritime surveillance
aircraft; Vikramaditya, the long awaited aircraft carrier; and the first
indigenously launched communication and satellite are a few worthy of mention.
Add to these two extremely ambitious shore facilities - the new naval base at
Karwar and the Naval Academy at Ezhimala – and the Navy's growth seems even
more impressive.
Myths on
modernization may suggest that the Government of the day or those at the helm
of affairs have pulled off a miracle. The reality is that no acquisition in
India is possible unless the case has been examined for decades. All the above
listed platforms have been conceived, discussed and processed for decades. For
instance the first proposal for Vikramaditya was made in 1994. The deal was signed a decade
later, after many levels of scrutiny by experts from the Navy, MOD and Finance.
The ship was handed over in 2013. The
reality is also that there is no accountability with the Government for inordinate
delays caused by repeated interventions and scrutiny. The opportunity costs of
such delays do not fall within the purview of any of our auditing mechanisms,
nor are they viewed with concern for their impact on budgetary escalation.
Advantage Indian
Navy
Being a small
service, the navy enjoys some unique advantages. Firstly, perspective plans and
budget management fall under a common head who
reports to the Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The Future Navy is the sole
responsibility of the senior most Principal Staff Officer of the navy. It is not
so in the other two services owing to their size and historical imperatives.
Secondly, being a
small service with a disproportionately large responsibility of guarding the
maritime frontiers of a sub-continent, the Navy had to learn to consistently
pursue long term plans which are refined with the passage of time. The very
first plan for the modernization of our Navy soon after independence, contained
references to a three-carrier fleet. It has taken more than six decades to
partially realize the dream.
Conceptualizing the
design and building a destroyer takes up to a decade. Build time in our
shipyards are notoriously high due to lack of modern and contemporary
facilities. After they are addressed, we could perhaps reduce it by half, to be
at par with established navies of the West.
Thirdly, the Navy
was quick to support ship building in India in Defence Public Sector yards and
a few privately-owned Indian ship-builders. This
impetus has paid rich dividends, right from the commissioning of the British
designed Leander class frigate Nilgiri in 1972. We now build Fast Attack Craft,
Corvettes, Frigates, Destroyers, Landing Ships, Tankers and Aircraft Carriers.
Remarkable, but modest, in terms of future needs of high quality platforms.
There are some unsuccessful stories too which are covered later in this piece.
Fourthly, we were
quick to embrace indigenization and place confidence in DRDO supported
laboratories. While the growing DRDO capabilities were unable to produce
weapons to keep pace with the build cycle of the ship, (despite that being a
prolonged process) Sonars to hunt submarines and EW systems did pass the test.
Many of our frontline platforms are fitted with these systems. Also, radars,
communication and EW systems have been supplied by BEL and other PSU labs in
India.
Fifthly, indigenous
ship building gave birth to thousands of small and medium scale industries that
supplied auxiliary equipment, power generation and air conditioning systems,
cabling and thousands of other sub-systems that go into a building and
sustaining a modern warship. There are well known large scale industries that
supply generators, as also shafts for propulsion of ships. The stringent
quality-standards applied to clear them for acceptance have enabled most of them to become internationally certified and
known. This is a classical spinoff of defence related activities. The private
sector thus has a significant stake in warship building
Lastly, among many
such success stories, a couple that do not find
mention often enough are the navy's own design department based on whose
stellar work indigenous warships are built, and the Navy's own group of
specialists that continue to do pioneering work in the development of
state-of-the-art Combat Management Systems and a slew of cyber security
products and networking solutions for the Indian Navy. Such capabilities hold strategic potential
and are essential components to establish self-sufficiency.
Looking Back to
see the future
In the last six
decades, scores of committed individuals have skillfully led the Navy's
planning initiatives, often innovatively. They have been ably supported by a
leadership that saw in these efforts the means to leap-frog the Navy into a
potent blue water force.
A myth that found
favour with overseas experts, and some of our own in the 1970s and 80s, was the
description of the Indian Navy as a brown water force aspiring for blue water
status. The rear view suggests otherwise. Even as early as the 1950s, Indian Navy ships were deployed
for flag showing as far as the Australian waters. In fact, when I had the
opportunity to meet Mr Wolfenson, former President of World Bank in Washington
in 1997, he greeted me by narrating his experience of boarding the old Cruiser
INS Delhi at Melbourne in 1954. Warships do leave indelible impressions on
those who visit them. Even the old Indian Navy was never a brown water force.
There was however a
brief interregnum when the ships acquired from the Soviet Union imposed
limitations on engine hours of their gas turbines, which in turn significantly
reduced blue water deployments.
When ageing British
ships, which formed the mainstay of our Fleet, were to be replaced and the
first submarine acquisition programme was approved, the U-turn performed by the
UK in denying India the supply of submarines is well-documented. The consequent
large acquisition programme from the Soviet Union enabled us to tide over gaps
in force levels until our own programmes began to fructify.
The Soviet
platforms however, gave us insights into relatively modern weapons and sensors,
and more importantly, into missiles and torpedoes. Surface-to-surface missiles
were positively a force-multiplier and when ably supported by surface-to-air
missiles, they provided the Fleet with punch
enough to deter any adversary.
The submarine arm
too received the much-needed upgrade when both German designed submarines and
the Soviet designed EKM submarines were inducted in quick succession.
At this stage,
naval planners were busy pushing for indigenous construction of a variety of
platforms. First they focused on the successors of the Leander class ships by
indigenously modifying their design, which not only enabled a frigate to carry
a 10-ton multirole helicopter for operations at sea, but also led to the induction
of the Godavari class frigates that skillfully integrated Soviet missile
systems with a host of indigenous systems and equipment accessed from multiple
sources abroad. Simultaneously, new design for Corvettes, Tanker and Destroyers
evolved over time. The only occasions we were forced to seek foreign
shipbuilding assistance was for six Talwar class ships from Russia and Tankers
from Italy, both owing to inadequate capacity in our own yards due to over
loading.
Some Lessons
One of the
unfulfilled programmes of a rapidly modernizing force relates to the inability
of the Navy and the Government to build submarines to offset depleting force
levels. A number of factors have led to the present imbroglio. The optimally
designed German SSK submarine inducted into the Navy were also built at
Mazagaon Docks in Mumbai. The build-facility was set up at a great cost and
technicians were trained to use state-of-the-art build technology. The project
was soon abandoned after two boats were built due to alleged kickbacks and
corruption. Consequently, the entire set up along with trained manpower of the
yard was allowed to dissipate and be wasted.
The Scorpene
submarine to be built with French assistance has been inordinately delayed. The
second line of construction remains to be concluded. Thus, the Navy is yet
grappling with the declining force levels of conventional submarines.
As regards
budgetary allocation for the navy, constant interaction with MOD has seen an
increase from 11% of the defence budget to almost 18% in recent years. However,
the target of 20 % has to be achieved in the near future, if we are to accept
the new challenges posed by the global strategic focus to the Asia Pacific
region.
In so far as
defence acquisition procedures are concerned, they continue to stifle and
throttle efficient and time bound programmes. Unless procedural and systemic
changes are brought about by professionalizing and integrating the
decision-making structure of MOD as recommended by the Committee on Defence
Management chaired by Arun Singh, there is little hope of optimizing the
process.
Finally, whenever
there is resource crunch, as in late 1980s to mid-1990s and now in 2013, the
armed forces are advised to tighten their belts and review acquisitions in the
pipeline. Nothing could be more disastrous than this approach. Each year lost
in reduced budget allocation results in depletion of combat capabilities. The
cumulative shortages can never be remedied by nominal increase in budget
subsequently, due to systemic limitations and minimum acquisition time cycle
needed to complete the task. Combat capability and adequate reserves to fight a
limited war cannot be compromised under any circumstances, unless the nation is
prepared to accept defeat in war as an option. Victory in 1971 has not erased
the memories of 1962 - the latter was caused by neglect, inadequate knowledge
of military needs and insufficient political interaction with military
leadership.
Paradoxically, six
decades later, we continue to grapple with the basic issues of national
politico-military interface.
Vice Admiral Suresh
Bangara (retd) former C-in-C of Southern Naval Command. He has had the unique
opportunity of heading the Policy and Plans, and later Naval Operations
divisions of the Indian Navy.
