Pakistan claims to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neutralize a rapid Indian thrust. Is it kakistocracy at work?
It is well known that the Indian Nuclear Weapons programme was steered by a close-knit group of scientists referred to as "The strategic enclave" which involved specialists from the Armed Forces to operationalize the weapon while control was exercised by the former. The barren civil-military relations was the root cause of keeping the Service headquarters out of the loop. In contrast, due to the dominance of the Military in the polity of Pakistan, the opposite model continues to prevail.
Recent statement emanating from authoritative Pakistani sources indicate that tactical nuclear weapons have been cleared for use to neutralize any rapid advances made by the Indian Military. Given that the statement has been timed with the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the USA, quite obviously it is meant to leverage Pakistan's bid for nuclear parity with India. However, while deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may appear to be an effective counter to Indian moves, the cold war experience may hold some sobering lessons to the kakistrocratic government in Pakistan.
During the Cold War, NATO forces had carried out extensive studies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent numerically superior land forces of USSR and the Warsaw pact from invading Western Europe. Gaming, simulation and field studies indicated that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional force increased the possibility of a strategic nuclear war rather than decrease it. Simply put, use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario escalates the engagement to a full -fledged nuclear war. Weapons such as nuclear-tipped missiles, artillery shells, neutron bomb or the reduced radioactivity(RRR) bomb of the tactical warfare component, ended up escalating the threshold.
Second, unlike the use of centralised Command and Control facilities for strategic nuclear weapons, decentralisation is a necessity for tactical use of such weapons. It imposes an enormous burden on the officers in the field while also imposing astronomical costs on equipping the entire force with NBCD gear.
Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management would become mandatory. Hence, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons has the potential to invite the wrath of a strategic response by India, following factors bear scrutiny;
• use of nuclear weapons is the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war which can at best result in a pyrrhic victory.
• the non-first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability. Pakistan could well be wiped out.
There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in the decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.
In the South Asian context, the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Institutional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities.
The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation and drills in peace time.
We cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM through RM. Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of the operational effectiveness of our assets.
The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.
(Also published by The Quint on 22 Oct 15)
It is well known that the Indian Nuclear Weapons programme was steered by a close-knit group of scientists referred to as "The strategic enclave" which involved specialists from the Armed Forces to operationalize the weapon while control was exercised by the former. The barren civil-military relations was the root cause of keeping the Service headquarters out of the loop. In contrast, due to the dominance of the Military in the polity of Pakistan, the opposite model continues to prevail.
Recent statement emanating from authoritative Pakistani sources indicate that tactical nuclear weapons have been cleared for use to neutralize any rapid advances made by the Indian Military. Given that the statement has been timed with the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the USA, quite obviously it is meant to leverage Pakistan's bid for nuclear parity with India. However, while deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may appear to be an effective counter to Indian moves, the cold war experience may hold some sobering lessons to the kakistrocratic government in Pakistan.
During the Cold War, NATO forces had carried out extensive studies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent numerically superior land forces of USSR and the Warsaw pact from invading Western Europe. Gaming, simulation and field studies indicated that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional force increased the possibility of a strategic nuclear war rather than decrease it. Simply put, use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario escalates the engagement to a full -fledged nuclear war. Weapons such as nuclear-tipped missiles, artillery shells, neutron bomb or the reduced radioactivity(RRR) bomb of the tactical warfare component, ended up escalating the threshold.
Second, unlike the use of centralised Command and Control facilities for strategic nuclear weapons, decentralisation is a necessity for tactical use of such weapons. It imposes an enormous burden on the officers in the field while also imposing astronomical costs on equipping the entire force with NBCD gear.
Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management would become mandatory. Hence, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons has the potential to invite the wrath of a strategic response by India, following factors bear scrutiny;
• use of nuclear weapons is the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war which can at best result in a pyrrhic victory.
• the non-first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability. Pakistan could well be wiped out.
There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in the decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.
In the South Asian context, the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Institutional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities.
The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation and drills in peace time.
We cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM through RM. Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of the operational effectiveness of our assets.
The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.
(Also published by The Quint on 22 Oct 15)
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