Civil-military relations-yet to evolve?

Address deteriorating civil-military relations------------start from the top

The civil-military relations in India, instead of stabilising with experience, continue to deteriorate with little or no effort to learn from other democracies. The OROP saga was an opportunity for the elected Government to address the eroding relations and win the hearts and minds of the agitated veterans. For reasons well known to most readers, the deterioration caused by earlier Governments could not be arrested or remedied by the present leadership despite displaying a resolve to end the long pending imbroglio related to OROP.

While much has been written on the subject, let me focus on the very essence of this sacred bond among the civil society which is represented by the elected representatives, the titular head called the Supreme Commander i.e. the President and the Military as a whole. This is an important bond which when breached tends to sour relations down the line.

The civil society of India prior to independence was quite aware of the vital role played by a soldier. The awareness was primarily created by the fact that a large number of Indian soldiers fought in both the World Wars albeit under the British flag. The sheer numbers of Indian lives lost which is quite stupendous, coupled with the gruesome battles after which surviving soldiers returned to narrate their stories, played a significant role in bridging the knowledge on hardships faced by the soldier. Given that the great wars lasted for half a decade each, it ensured that the travails of wars in all their gruesome details were told and retold in every corner of India. Despite the absence of print and electronic media, the relatively smaller populace, though illiterate and abysmally poor, understood the vital role of a soldier and the need to care for him whilst in service and after retirement. However, the scene changed rapidly after independence leading to continuous erosion in the status of the soldier, which in turn has brought him on the streets to fight for his legitimate rights and dues.

Although there have been signs of neglect and indifference towards the Military at the apex level of governance over the last many decades, some recent examples are worthy of note.

First, when Field Marshal Manekshaw passed away at Coonoor, near Ooty on 27 June 2008, the Government of the day thought it relevant to stick to existing protocol and depute only the RRM to be present at the funeral. No one in MOD had cared to update the protocol for a Field Marshal, leave alone a national hero. To top it all, till the then President Dr Abdul kalam raised the issues of pending pay and allowance for the hero(a Field Marshal never retires) it was rushed to his bedside at the Military hospital prompting the Field Marshal at his death bed, in his inimical manner, to ask the bearer of the cheque, whether the cheque for a crore of rupees is likely to bounce! That was the treatment meted out to an outstanding military leader and a great son of India.

Second, when the veterans of many wars fought a running battle for their legitimate arrears which were denied for decades and even had a court ruling in their favour, there was neither a response from the civil society nor from the elected leaders. When, for the first time the veterans came on the street  in 2009 and returned their medals with signed petitions in blood, their Supreme Commander refused to meet or speak to them. This is the very office which issues a commissioning parchment to every commissioned officer of the Indian Armed Forces(no other categories of public servants are entitled to this privilege,).

Fast forward a bit and you come to the two most demeaning incidents, involving the Presidents secretariat and the PMO. When the ongoing rift on OROP despite the apparent resolution was getting uglier by the day, four former Chiefs of our Armed forces thought it necessary to write to the Supreme Commander. This is the first time in the history of Independent India that retired Service Chiefs have jointly written to the President to seek his intervention. Not only was there no response nor even an acknowledgement, but it took a veteran turned activist to initiate a  RTI    to discover the type of action taken by the staff of Rashtrapati Bhavan. After repeated reminders ...40...days later the activist was informed that the letter has been forwarded to the PM's office soon after its receipt. What role the President  played in merely passing on a letter written by distinguished Chiefs of the Armed forces to the PMO, is not known.

The least courtesy that ought to have been extended to retired Chiefs is an appointment to understand the gravity of the situation. The Supreme Commander appears to have merely expressed his inability to be even a titular head of the Armed Forces.

The Chiefs on their part did not cover themselves with glory by releasing a copy of their letter to the media. Media should have been the last resort to resolve a sensitive issue.

Soon, another set of retired chiefs released a copy of their appeal on the same subject to the Prime Minister. Nothing was heard till the same activist pursued the RTI route. After ...63...days the PMO merely stated that such a letter was never delivered to them. While some may suggest that the PMO should have acted on the media release by making enquiries from the affected parties, technically no action is warranted without a copy of a correspondence, as media reports could well be fabricated. However the letter sent from the President's office was not even acted upon on the grounds that the announcement of OROP had been made by the RM. The press conference conducted by the RM succeeded in adding fuel to the fire.

The bottom line is that the Supreme Commander and the PM failed to extend due courtesies to the affected parties. Equally, the act of releasing the letter to the media without delivering the original to the concerned office cannot be condoned.

These examples are more than adequate to summarise the present levels of indifference and apathy towards the military.

Viewed in the context of a recent media report that the three serving chiefs have jointly represented on the injustice done by the 7th pay commission, this undesirable and potentially dangerous state of affairs have to end sooner than later.

http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01/14/on-army-day-start-addressing-civil-military-relations-at-the-top

The Pathankot Attack

Pathankot is yet another ephemeral terrorists event

Observe the faces and body language of security personnel engaged in the action to eliminate the terrorists holed up inside the Pathankot Airforce Station as depicted in print and electronic media. It is surreal. Because what you see is perhaps the tertiary line of security not even the secondary. Why, because we learnt a bitter lesson during the Mumbai attack, that half-baked, little informed and self-appointed expert anchors and live commentators were driven by the desire to be closest and fastest to report. TRP was more important than eliminating the terrorists. Our own administrators and security establishment had to contend with multiple challenges of inadequate manpower, infrastructure, outdated protection gear and sensors and weapons. yet the greatest challenge was to stop the media from being judgemental and alarmists on every move of those tasked to neutralise the terrorists. The first role of the media is not to spread fear and concoct doomsday scenarios nor to speculate on conspiracy theories during hostile action. Safety considerations also dictate that the cameras are well away from the scene of action.

The above is not unique to India and the South Asian region but to most democracies who are yet to stabilise their respective economies and hence are compelled to fight with what they have due to budgetary constraints. It will be some years before India can claim to have well-equipped security personnel with the requisite gear, ordnance and training. Hence constantly comparing our reactions to those from USA or UK or Israel, would lead to erroneous conclusions and hypothetical discussions. Let us view the current action in Pathankot from this prism or perspective.

Firstly, Commandos and NSG are forces in limited numbers who are meant not to protect but to eliminate the threat once identified. Training and equipping these forces is an expensive proposition which limits their use to specific missions. We need to look at the security forces who are tasked to defend important installations. In the case of defence establishments, the DSC is charged with security of access points and periphery. It is common knowledge that they are limited by age, mobility and equipment. They were adequate to meet the old threat perceptions of occasional ingress of lightly armed anti-social elements or at best insurgents. Why can't the forces themselves undertake this task? The navy and the air force train their personnel to man ships and squadrons which carry complex war fighting machines. Sentry duties perse would add to the poor utilisation of highly trained manpower. However during heightened tension, the available resources are supplemented and augmented as required. This cannot be round the clock or round the year. Terrorist threats are unexpected and  they do not appear like a traditional enemy, as they emerge from within. Hence, each unit maintains a Quick Reaction Team to augment those employed as sentries.

  Very rarely do authorities vested with the responsibility to raise levels of readiness such as red alert, also, lower the readiness level after the threat ceases to exist. In practise, it is possible that units on paper continue to remain at high alert without physically and mentally being all there. Other than the military which has well-defined procedures to raise and lower state of readiness  other central agencies often suffer from this lacuna.

In the case of other important installations such as airports, harbours and establishments, Central Police forces like CISF are used to defend them. They are training is often limited to suit the assigned role.

The police forces are perhaps the worst prepared and yet may well be the first point of contact during a terrorist strike. Pot-bellied, obese and poorly turned out Cops with world war discarded .303 rifles or worse with just batons or sticks are the typical Cops that one encounters. States exposed to insurgency, Naxalism  and terrorism are far better equipped and ready to meet emerging threats. J&K has the ethos and culture of operating under a unified command and disseminating both intelligence and information expeditiously. Real-time communications is mandatory to meet emergency situations.

In terms of our neighbours  Military Governments have done their bit to modernise the gear and weapons of police forces.  Our borders are porous from land and the sea. Our threats emanate from these very porous borders where none can guarantee total success to prevent infiltration. Smuggling is a well-established profession with deep connections with political and business interests.

With the above ground realities, what can be done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to raise our preparedness to combat terrorism?

. At the strategic level, the PM has ensured that major players in global affairs and our South Asian neighbours, in particular, are sensitised to terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan. Terrorism has hence, taken centre stage in discussions and articulation/joint statements. Isolating non-state actors and their supporters are an important first step. Asserting the need to galvanise support at the UN for an acceptable definition for terrorism and subsequent actions to cut off material and financial support to a terrorist organisation has been well articulated by India.

At the operational level, creating and nurturing a strong Central organisation which was initiated by the previous Government after the Mumbai attack, needs to be accorded the highest priority. Round the clock operations room to expeditiously share and disseminate information and intelligence on a real time basis is an inevitable necessity for every State in India irrespective of its location.

Finally at the tactical level, States have to modernise and reform their police forces to include the need to effectively react to a terrorist threat before special forces arrive on the scene. Recent reports suggest that every traffic policeman in Delhi would be armed to meet emerging threats. This is a good beginning. Communications, mobility and firepower are essential elements. Unity of command for operations would need to be made mandatory,  so also single point briefings for the media.

No special committees or  studies are needed to implement the above suggestions. Only the will to fight terrorism is required to execute these plans.

'When the best things are not possible, the best can be made of those that are.'

(Suresh Bangara was a former Commander-in Chief of the Southern Naval Command.)
http://www.firstpost.com/india/pathankot-attack-why-most-analyses-of-the-strike-are-misguided-and-what-india-should-do-to-end-such-insurgencies-2570948.html