Post Election Dilemma- National Security Paradigm 2014
Whoever occupies the chair of PM will have to address a whole
range of inadequacies which are systemic and inherited over six decades. Even
if policy/decision making/implementation paralysis is overcome through speedy governance,
major unaddressed institutional weaknesses would continue to stymie good
intentions. While this may be applicable to all departments of the Govt,
it has special significance to National Security as a whole.
A few examples should suffice. Given that India has had no
political leader who has had in-depth knowledge
of functioning of Armed Forces and that the post independence period has seen
only short bursts of wars not exceeding a couple of weeks at a time, both the
decision maker and the citizen has little to offer in terms of worthwhile
contribution to National Security. An un informed leadership and an indifferent
citizen-many of who did not have to face the terrible consequences of a great
war lasting for years, constitute a recipe for disaster.
Who was an effective defence Minister who earned the respect of
our Forces since independence? Perhaps Indira Gandhi, while not holding defence
but providing political leadership of a high quality during the 1971 war and
later Jaswant Singh as an interim defence minister in 2001. A rank outsider who
made an impact and strived to strengthen the institution of national security
was Arun Singh. In my memory of 40 years in the navy, civil-military relations
were at their optimum best when Arun Singh was RRM and later when he headed the
study on Defence Management, after the Kargil crisis. Creation of CDS,
integrating MOD with service headquarters, creation of tri-service commands ,
delegation of financial and administrative powers to the Chief and
many more long pending reforms were steered by him personally. But he quit at a
crucial stage of implementation, the Govt changed and we slid back to the bad
old days of laissez faire.
The Armed Forces of India were structured to induct, train and
fight along well tested methods of the British experience. These were modified
when India had an intense phase of interaction with the Soviet Union. During
the cold war, not only did we send some of our bright officers to undergo
courses in UK,USA,France,Australia and Japan, we also kept our doors open to
all of them to avail of reciprocal training facilities in India. All this, even
as a very large percentage of our officers were sent for courses and
acquisition of platforms/weapons to the erstwhile Soviet Union. India was often
called a Soviet ally and those of us on training with the Western block were
isolated from operational closed door sessions.
Intermingling and interaction with the Western block and concurrently
with the Eastern block during the cold war era was an experience that few armed
forces in the world could have boasted about. What it did to our personnel is
that it exposed them to the critical deficiencies in higher level
defence management in India as compared to the closed Soviet system and a
democratic Western model . This
experience reinforced a strong desire among the thinking military leaders, to be
a part of the decision making process pertaining to National Defence. A desire
which is yet to be noted or noticed by successive governments.
While most countries had
integrated their armed forces for efficient management of resources, India
continued to follow an outdated and vacuous process based largely on the
presumed dangers of military intervention in politics of India. Bureaucratic
dominance at MOD and the convoluted process of decision making which led to
lead time of decades to acquire new systems, were a product of the neglect to
reform the system. Numerous committees have underlined the need to reform and rewrite the business rules of MOD.
What needs
to be done?
The new Govt
would need to complete the incomplete process of implementing the Kargil Review
Committee report and the decisions of the then GOM. It may be noted that most
institutional reforms implemented in
western democracies were politically thrust on the reluctant forces, who more
often than not, hold on to their turfs. But then ,those politicians who
successfully brought about reforms had a deep understanding of national
security due to their long contribution in active service and war. How do we
tackle this weakness which cannot be wished away?
One option is to reconstitute the implementation
committee of the erstwhile Defence Management, with those originally tasked to
do so. If necessary,consider including retired senior officers of known professional competence and
integrity from the three services and Foreign Service in particular. The latter
not only interact with Armed forces personnel in India but also in various
parts of the world during their service. This has to be a time bound activity
in order that the newly elected Govt is enabled to perform within its tenure.
The
Integrated Defence headquarters and tri service commands of Andaman and Nicobar
as well as Strategic Forces are already functional. The IDS which is currently
toothless as it functions under an equally toothless COSC, would finally be empowered
as the staff of CDS.
The Govt
would have a single point adviser in CDS and the integrated MOD would fulfill the long standing desire of the uniformed community to participate in decision-
making and policy- making process of the Govt. The RM would be better served
with professional advice on both counts. It will ensure close rapport at all
levels and eliminate the 'We versus them' syndrome which is all pervasive in
the Ministry.
This is just
the beginning. We need to address the interface with NSA and the role of CDS in
all policy and decision making bodies of higher level committees and Group of
ministers. Just professionalise the whole gamut of National Security.
Vice Admiral
Suresh Bangara was the former C-in-C of the Southern Naval Command and the
first Deputy Chief Of operations of IDS
headquarters
