REVIEW-ARTICLE BY SURESH BANGARA
"MANAGING
INDIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES"- VERGHESE KOITHARA (ROUTLEDGE TAYLOR AND FRANCIS
GROUP)
"What
an esoteric subject?" some would say. Most of our knowledgeable citizens
would know little about matters nuclear and even less about our Nuclear Forces. Management of such a
force is best left to the professionals, you might think. But as in all matters
of state, where tax payers money is committed, every citizen has a right to
know how his money is being spent. Moreover, since it is the combined efforts
of scientists and the users,i.e. the Military, who plan and run operations
under the overall control of the Government of the day, information on such
matters are understandably closely guarded. Nevertheless there is a definite
need to encourage the emergence of a vibrant breed of scholars and analysts who
can contribute significantly to the Nuclear debate in India. This book
eminently serves that purpose and hence is a valuable addition to the literature
on the subject.
In a vibrant
democracy, academics and specialists in this field are expected to keep the
debate on nuclear issues alive, on all aspects contained in open source
material. In a country as young as India, there is a reluctance to share
information owing to near absence of policy on declassification of information
and the acute feeling of insecurity among those who occupy high office.
The author
of this book, Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara (Retd), is a rare example of one
who was not privy to Management of Nuclear Forces. He had to first understand the
nuances of production of nuclear weapons, the delivery systems in all three
dimensions,i.e. air, surface and underwater, the Command and control facilities,
policy formulations,geo strategic and geo economic imperatives, strategic
analysis and finally the operational deployment of such weapons.
Given the
scarcity of material on such subjects and the scanty indigenous written material,
he had to seek views of experts of repute in the western hemisphere too. Thus
the uniqueness of our nuclear programme was matched, if only, by the unique
efforts of the author who has received compliments from reputed personalities.
This includes, Arun Singh, Stephen Cohen,
Ashley Tellis, Rodney W Jones and Arun
Prakash, among others. Arguably, some of his deductions are hypothetical-not
entirely based, albeit, on hard to get empirical evidence- and some inferred
from discussions with knowledgeable sources.
The Author
has opted to arrange his thoughts under 12 lucidly written chapters which
target both the nuclear community and the scholars who are desirous of noting
the perspectives of a Military mind. Notable books by Indian authors on India's
nuclear programme were written by a Raj Chengappa and Bharat Karnad. The author,
however, rightly points out that the subject of 'management of nuclear forces
has been largely avoided' till now.
The
Introductory chapter makes a few assumptions which may need deliberation. The
first pertains to the scientific community assuming all control over the
nuclear programme, owing to their association with its earlier benign avatar of
peaceful nuclear experiments. The author also implies that the 'barren
relations' between the Political leadership and the Military, post independence,
was a contributory factor for the exclusion of the Military in all policy
formulations.
Peter
Douglas Fever, in his well acknowledged book, 'Guarding the guardian' outlines
the continuous and ongoing struggle for over six decades, between the Civilians
and the Military in USA, on matters of custody and use of the nuclear bomb.
While discussing the chapter on the atomic energy act and the origin of
assertive control, he traces the inevitable contradiction on modes of control. He
establishes that the increase in the inventory of nuclear weapons and the
changing threat to US security, had led
to more and more of delegative control to their military. This was necessitated
more by operational and safety imperatives. He also infers that the battle for
assertive and delegative control would continue to be fought even in countries
with a strong, time- tested democratic polity. Technology based
safety/launch controls would eventually
play an important role in resolving the optimal mode of control of nuclear
weapons.
It is true
that our Military could have been involved from day one as was the case in Project Manhattan, which incidentally had a
team of serving officers outside the direct control of the Military. There is
little doubt that the Military has considerable experience of storage,
transportation and safety of any weapon system. The Indian model however used
the expertise of serving military officers in most activities related to weaponisation,albeit,
under the close scrutiny of Civilian scientists. In the Indian context the lack
of experience in dealing with the Military, understanding their ethos and their
fierce loyalty to the' team', as also the comfort of political leaders to work
closely with civilian scientists, largely contributed to the adoption of assertive
control. More pertinently, the Politico-Military interface in India and the
maturing of such a relationship is still under review, while the same had matured
considerably in USA, post the Civil War and the Great wars. That the whole
process of development and deployment of nuclear weapons in India, was managed
without serious mishaps is a tribute to the maturity of all concerned. Ours is
indeed a 'unique model', as the author describes it.
Perhaps the author
has flagged this controversial issue to emphasise the need to find an early
resolution to the Civil-Military anomalies that continue to sequester the Armed forces from all policy
formulations related to National security. Hopefully the creation of Strategic Forces Command(SFC),would largely,
if not entirely, fill the void. However the need to integrate the armed forces
under a single operational head, as also the MOD with the service headquarters,
is sine qua non of Managing nuclear forces. Hence the repeated thrust on the
systemic changes urgently required in India.
In order to
remain focused on the Indian context, this article examines practical issues of
force management raised in the book rather than the interpretation of the
theory of strategic consideration,deterrence,hardware etc. These have been well
covered by many an expert of NWS. The author has merely touched upon the
relevance of these topics as a backdrop to his assertions.
While commenting on the Force Management System,
the author makes three telling points. First, that the Indian Ministry of
Defence, has by default or design, or both, abdicated its role to the
'strategic enclave'. This is a term coined to describe the tight control
exercised by the scientists of the Department of Atomic Energy(DAE),Department
of Space(DOS) and Department of Defence Research and Development(DRDO).
That a 'strategic
enclave' came into existence can possibly be attributed to the two volumes of
Business Rules for Ministries, issued in
1961, under the constitutional powers vested in the President. This
document, reportedly modified on numerous occasions, failed to assign any role
to the senior hierarchy of the Armed forces of India. To this day they continue
to function as attached offices of MOD. Ironically when the decision to go
nuclear was taken, the MOD themselves remained out of the loop as no attempt
was made to amend the business rules of the Govt,owing to secrecy of the
project and the experimental nature of its development. Consequently, since DAE
and DOS and later DRDO- all run by scientists who had the ears of the PMO- did
not find the need to involve MOD. It perhaps became a functional necessity to
permit DAE,DOS and DRDO to wear multiple hats with delegated powers, so as to
expedite decision making. In hind sight, this informal arrangement contributed (until
recently) to the successful completion of space, nuclear and missile programmes
of India. It also promoted better integration and cross pollination among these
functionally intertwined departments.
The other
significant point to note is that, much like the armed forces, the members of
the strategic enclave, are professionals who remain in the department for
decades, as opposed to the staff of MOD who continue to be "Rolling
Stones". They neither have a need for long term perspective nor the
loyalty to the department they serve, due to such short stints. In any event
had the MOD been involved in this programme, every aspect related to weapon and force
configuration would have had to be referred to the three service headquarters. None
among the bureaucracy would have had the knowledge to respond to nuclear force
related issues. By functioning as a post office, MOD could not have met the
time schedules of this programme, even with best intentions. The RM, in his
individual capacity may have been in the loop from time to time.
The above
may suggest that the decision taken to keep MOD out of the loop was a
fortuitous one. This however does not augur well for the Military, who would
ultimately bear the responsibility, God forbid, to use the weapon in anger. Our
unique model thus found the next best answer,i.e. to selectively involve uniformed officers to fill the void
in operationalisation of the weapon. Indeed,
there is a high degree of probability that the programme was successful due to
the unstinted support of numerous specialists from the Armed forces of India.
They chose to remain anonymous and unrecognised to date. It is this that facilitated
the seamless operational transition to SFC, which came into being in January,2003.
Yes, ours
was a unique model which did not follow the Western example, simply because
there were no organisational structures which even remotely resembled the
established structures of the West. That we have reached an acceptable level of
operational readiness may soon lead to less emphasis on the US/Soviet model,
which has hitherto monopolised all discussion on the subject. 'Necessity being
a mother of all inventions', we could expect to see many more organisational variants among aspiring NWS, in the years ahead.
Secondly,
the author very correctly brings out
the inadequacies in Cabinet Committee on Security(CCS) and National Security
Council(NSC) both with no active participation of the Armed Forces. This is an
area of deep concern in the context of Nuclear Operations. Business rules would
need to rewritten to address the direct involvement of services in these
structures, perhaps, after implementing the pending decisions on CDS and
integration of MOD. These are prerequisites to a meaningful and effective
C&C structure. Here again we could have an Indian variation, but prudence
dictates the active participation of the custodians and end users of the
weapon, even as we are poised to deploy the third dimension of the nuclear
triad.
Third, the
author has adequately flagged the dominant role played by the PM and NSA
without the formal involvement of the Armed forces. At the apex level, without
the active involvement of serving personnel from the forces, it is well nigh
impossible to plan and coordinate deployment and launch, that too, of a second
strike. Short cuts have been resorted to by employing retired senior officers
to sustain the programme. Wearing multiple hats and following adhoc procedures,which
may be possible at the developmental stages of a project, are a recipe for
disaster in the long term. The recently alleged scam in DOS, should suffice to
underline the damage caused by a self perpetuating system, with little or no checks
and balances.
The chapter
on Nuclear strategy clearly articulates the need to debate the principles of
deterrence and the considerations for a well structured policy. The absence of
white paper and clearly spelt out and documented National security strategy has
led many to believe that we do not have a culture to strategise. In reality,
this has not been spelt out by the Government of the day, owing to inability on
the part of the MOD to write anything of substance without the help of service
headquarters. It would, however be erroneous to deduce that mere absence of a
document implies total absence of operational
plans to deliver when the chips are down. The Indian Military is more than capable of rising to the
occasion when required. However, it would be imprudent to assume that they can
deliver every time, despite continued systemic weaknesses that remain
unaddressed.
The Author
devotes a chapter to MOD. There are some comparison with Israel and UK,who also
have a Parliamentary system of governance.. A good system of Governance is
predicated on the fact that Ministers and Parliamentarians would be well educated
on matters security. Alas, that is not the case in India. It would be
unrealistic to think that this situation will improve in the near future. To
realise dreams that have taken a century or more in well established
democracies, we would at best hope to compress the time for development and
maturity to the extent possible. The political reality of our story, could have
added some weight to this chapter.
The final chapter of 'Many Faceted Challenges', raises some
exciting topics for scholars and analysts to debate. The author, juxtaposes a
view held by some, that India may rely on the nuclear protection of USA. Some
of the tacit assumptions quoted by him and the view on reliance on USA can best
be hypothetical in content. It may also be unkind to those who worked to build
an indigenous capability despite the constraints of technology denial regimes.
The
involvement of NCA in frequent sessions of war gaming and table top situations is
necessary to enable them to arrive at decisions based on analysis. This is even
more relevant to India and Pakistan, as both have assumed that the Political
leadership can deliver when required without due preparation and understanding
of the nuclear environment. Getting them into the Operations Room as often as
possible would indeed pose a challenge.
Admiral
Koithara has stirred up a hornet's nest. Nothing but good would emerge from it,
provided the academics, scholars and analysts start a much needed debate. A
student and a researcher would do well to capture the essence of Managing
Nuclear Forces-a virgin topic on offer.
Vice Admiral
SCS Bangara, Former C-in-C of Southern Naval Command, was the first Deputy
Chief (Operations) of Integrated Defence Headquarters. He was also the Chairman
of Joint Operations under COSC.
