§ Pakistan
The Quetta Experience: What Lessons Are There For
India
In the early 1980s,
a book titled On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, written by Norman F
Dixon, a psychologist by profession but with a military background at the Royal
Engineers for a few years, caught my attention for its perspicacity and audacity.
Predictably, it was the military which found the book unpalatable but it also
received glowing reviews from many who even ventured to call it a “classic”.
In the book, Dixon
looked at many of the wars fought by the British for over a century and a half,
and later the Allies, and examined them from the leadership perspective. Based
on scientific methods of critical assessment, the author was able to deduce the
factors that had led to poor ‘Generalship’ and inept leadership in wars that
were unsuccessfully fought. Essentially, the book pertained to the levelling
down of human capabilities.
It is in this
context that a recent study titled The Quetta Experience – Attitudes and Values
within Pakistan’s Army, becomes relevant to all of us. The author Col (Retd)
David O. Smith has painstakingly conducted a field research in 2013-14 based on
interviews of U.S. Army officers who attended the Pakistan Army Command and
Staff College in Quetta between 1977-2014. Primarily focussed on the attitudes
and values of the Pakistan Army, the study provides an insight into the very
course which shapes the minds of a selected few young officers of their
service.
What is unique is
that although reports rendered by officers attending foreign courses are
routinely processed by almost all countries, this is the first such report in
the public domain which covers a period of 37 years. This is long enough to
corroborate conclusions based on individual assessments.
As far as we are
concerned, some of the conclusions arrived at by Col Smith may not necessarily
coincide with our thinking on our consanguineous neighbour. We do interact with
them at UN peacekeeping operations and on courses conducted by friendly
countries. It is true that the Indian and Pakistani officers more often than not
become good friends due to factors of commonality of food, music, language and
Bollywood. Even during wars there have been instances of display of human
qualities not seen on battlegrounds elsewhere. However, that has partly been
vitiated by the recent disrespect shown to our soldiers with their mutilated,
dead bodies handed over across the border.
Coming back to the
study, a number of key issues have been covered here. I will analyse four of
them below and bring in observations based on my personal knowledge of our
neighbour. This knowledge has been collated during courses in the U.K. U.S.;
chance meetings in friendly ports; stay in Pakistan for three years during the
Zia regime; my participation in CBM related issues at sea between an Indian and
Pakistani group of maritime experts; and my recent participation at an
anti-piracy seminar at Karachi in March 2012.
First – Demographic
changes and social issues. Smith concludes that, “Fears of Islamisation
within the Pakistan Army officer corps and its susceptibility to radical
religious influence are exaggerated.”
At the outset, I
must admit that my interactions were biased towards the Navy and not so much
the Army. Given that the Army in Pakistan is all powerful, and that the other
two services play a secondary role even in the joint commands, Islamisation
would be steered by the Army, as dictated by the stereotypical
general-turned-president of the country.
Ironically,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto along with Zia, later to be his bête noire, laid the
grounds for Islamisation of the Armed Forces. Introducing special clauses in
the ACR format on imperatives based on religion, identifying those prone to
alcohol consumption and making religion the primary focus, were overseen by Zia
during his time in power. When viewed from an Indian perspective, other
critical changes such as rewriting the history of Pakistan, and thereby
detaching their past from India, ensured that the alienation of the future
generation was more or less achieved.
The impact could
immediately be seen in the military. The Pakistan Navy, I knew then, was no
different from our navy except that they had increasingly become more
Americanised in their outlook. We had moved from British, to Russian and
finally to a concatenated Indian model.
It is with this
backdrop that I was saddened to see the sailors of PN Ships in 2011, lined up
on deck looking like mullahs rather than sailors. They hurled invectives at us
followed by praises of Allah as they steamed past one of our ships. This was
over two decades after I left Islamabad. My datum on Islamisation changed even
as I witnessed the conduct of their Army at Kargil. As a result, I disagree
with Smith that Islamisation and radicalisation have been exaggerated. In fact,
it is a cause for worry, if not concern for India.
Second – Perception
of external threats. Smith alludes to a growing generational divide between
the senior and mid-level officers. He suggests that the younger generation does
not view India as a primary threat.
My observations of
university students at the Bahria college at Karachi in 2012 gave me hope. Not
a single student questioned me — the only Indian — about Kashmir or other
controversial subjects. Instead, I was bombarded with questions on reputed
colleges and institutions of India for skill development and scientific
research; medical facilities and commercial activities if and when we open our
facilities for South Asians. They were more than happy to interact with me with
little or no anger. Their careers and future were on top of their agenda.
This tallies with
Smith’s assessment, but there is a flip side which needs consideration. The
younger generation which is brought up on tinkered history and Wahhabi culture
get more of that when they enter service. Fortunately, Bollywood continues to
allure them with songs and visuals of India. Social media does the rest to keep
them up to date. Breaking of barriers of communications using WhatsApp (a
double edged tool though it may be) has its merits too.
Given that the
change of official history has completely alienated the post-Zia generation
from their roots in India, if anything, they should be more antagonistic.
Perhaps the knowledge that India has advanced well beyond their reach in
academic, economic, commercial and industrial capabilities and hence militarily
too, has sobered their current threat assessments.
Third – Attitudes
towards the State and its institutions. The most unresolved riddle for a
young Pakistani officer is democracy. That all democracies are highly flawed
but survive since there are no better alternatives, is an idea which is not
sellable in Pakistan.
When a General is
in power the military stands to gain materially and financially. The military
which runs many major commercial institutions including transportation tends to
be pampered even more. Large incomes that accrue from purely military-run
commercial ventures pay for more perks and comforts. On the contrary,
democratically elected leaders tend to be corrupt, indecisive and poor
administrators and thus contempt for civilian governments and institutions is
endemic. As a result, the military officer would any day support an Army regime
in Pakistan.
Fourth – attitude towards nuclear
issues.Two important deductions that Smith makes here are critical. First,
there is the issue about negligible material on nuclear issues in their
foundation course. Use of tactical nuclear weapons and its strategic
implications are not appreciated at Quetta. Such an attitude needs to change.
Encouragement to pen analytical material on nuclear issues, like many Indian
scholars and authors have done, is an essential pre-requisite to grow in a
nuclear environment.
Second, the safety
and security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is being repeatedly reassured
even by ill-informed students of this course. Repeated reassurances in the face
of internal threats is a bad sign and cannot be construed as a positive and
confident gesture in relation to the safety and security of their nuclear
assets.
In conclusion,
there are issues on the strengths and weaknesses of the curriculum. Militaries
all over are averse to changes. The “all is well” theme of the famous movie
Three Idiots is a culture that should be discouraged. Continuous reappraisal of
course content is often stymied by the military-bureaucracy in most
democracies. Going by Dixon’s findings, one needs to beware of the military
bureaucrat — he tends to be much worse when placed in a seat of power.
(The author is a
retired vice-admiral of the Indian Navy and former chief, Southern Naval Command.
Views expressed are personal.)
