Civil-Military relations

(COURTESY FAUJI INDIA JULY EDITION)


Civil-Military
Relations:
Some Myths
and Realities

(Vice Admiral Suresh Bangara(Retd)


It was early in my career that a Commanding officer thought it appropriate to present me a book titled, "The Soldier and the State. The theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" authored by Samuel Huntington (first published in 1957). Little did he realize while pursuing the sacred objective of grooming, that this book would guide me for the rest of my life. It took me decades of reading in installments, as and when doubts arose in my mind, to slowly but surely understand the 'politics' of civil-military relation in our context.

In 1970, I returned from the erstwhile Soviet Union after a very perplexing exposure to a communist/socialist regime and its interface with its Military, fought the 1971 war and a few years later,  landed at the Royal Naval staff college at Greenwich, London. Maggie Thatcher had begun to revitalize the UK and specially its armed forces. Apolitical as their Military was, the excitement and expectations of good governance was palpable even among the stiff -upper lipped Brits. I was tasked to profile her leadership in the context of civil-military relations (three years later she fought the Falk Land war eight thousand miles away from her shores, based on the assurance of her First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach).

Given that Samuel's book, was my constant companion, I was better equipped to complete my first project entirely to my satisfaction.

A few years later, I was posted as the Naval Adviser to our mission in Islamabad. This was the Zia era and I spent three years watching and studying the Military Dictatorship at work. Samuel's book prompted me to record my thoughts on what I saw in Pakistan.

Years later, after routine exposure to naval appointments, of which many significant ones brought me in close proximity with senior civil servants and Ministers, visits abroad and more confusion on the Indian model of civil-military relations; in 1992, I entered the portals of the National Defence College(NDC) .

It afforded me the opportunity to study the Indian scene and cover the whole spectrum of socio-political, economy, science and technology, industry etc finally culminating in strategic
environment and national security. The participants drawn from the services, civil services, police and a number of senior officers from friendly foreign countries from the East and the West did share their experiences and thoughts. It is here that one's understandings of the Indian context are fully realized. The yawning gap in civil-military relations with all its ramifications could now be juxtaposed with Samuel's seminal work on the subject.

Finally, in 2000, I was packed off to the John F Kennedy School of Public Policy and governance at Harvard. I came face to face with Samuel Huntington who sat me down and clarified my doubts. Destiny had played a role in my quest to put the civil-military relations in context of post independent India. Looking back, it took me all of three decades to start a debate on what little, I now know.
The symptoms of the disease

The symptoms of poor civil-military relations occasionally alluded to in the media, pertain to neglected servicemen, surrender of medals to the supreme commander, hunger strikes by former military personnel, unimplemented supreme court rulings in their favour, unfulfilled government promises, fratricide and indiscipline among soldiers, neglect of war widows and war heroes. This list is by no means exhaustive. But what are the causes of the disease?

The first question that arises is, whether India is unique among other established and acknowledged democracies of the world. If so why? If not, what is common among such democracies? Memories being short, we tend to forget many grave instances including the poor civil-military relations which led to unsavoury  behaviour of American Military personnel in the Korean war and later during and after the Vietnam war. Those of us who did not have televisions were able to see the resentment against the US Government in movies made later based on true stories. Demonstrations on streets of New York and Washington and the sheer neglect of rehabilitating battle casualties back home were scenes that cannot be forgotten.

This, despite a long history of war, starting with the civil war, through the world wars and numerous operations thereafter which enabled them to fine tune their civil-military equations. The open respect displayed today to American soldiers in uniform or war casualties brought back to be buried with military honours, have evolved over centuries of waging war, some, far away from their shores. The range and scale of this experience willy-nilly involved the civil society as a whole. We on the other hand, are just approaching the seventh decade of our independence; hence comparisons with USA or UK may well be incongruous.

Similar episodes with respect to other democracies with long history in Europe indicate that civil-military relations is a process of continuous evolution and that no single nation can claim to have found the right formula to attain satisfaction of both parties. There are numerous pushes and pulls in the Presidential system in America. Those who care to read Samuel's book can also trace how the system evolved through ideologies, confusion and contradictions.

The Political Dilemma
Much has been written about the circumstances under which the post-independence Indian Political leadership was ill equipped to deal with the Military. Both internal and external factors played a significant role in exacerbating this critical relationship. While unstable environment caused by Pakistani action soon after independence kept the military busy, numerous military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood soon after decolonization, gave credence to the rumours that India too may be subjected to military rule.

Inter alia, such a possibility may have been nullified by introducing structural changes in higher defence management, reducing the potential powers of Cs-in-C , by creating Chief of Staff of the three services, eliminating the military from pre independence decision making bodies of higher defence management, reducing the stature of military officers in protocol, pay and allowance, perks, creating a large cadre of central police forces under the Home ministry and a host of other actions which also included having a common pay commission with no direct participation of the armed forces of India.

At that point in our history, there was neither literature on civil-military relations nor examples of constitutional approach to address the emerging controversies in Indian model of governance.
The point to note is that even the American Constitution had only a subjective approach to civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington states, civilian control of the armed forces emerged "despite rather than because of constitutional provisions". India adopted many of the provisions of the American constitution and since Britain had no written constitution, traditions and customs of Britain was considered for incorporation in our own document.

Samuel Huntington was the first author who researched the subject of civil-military relations the contents of which were not available to us till well after 1960.

In India, neither the politician nor the military clearly understood the term "Civilian control". Civilian control would be maximised if the military were limited in scope and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head" wrote Samuel, while adding that the reverse was also recorded under the military clause of their constitution, which divided civilian responsibility of military affairs and fostered the direct access of the military authorities to the highest level of Government. Remember, at that time, all three services in USA, operated independently until the integration was forced upon them by the Gold water Nichols act in the late 80's.

While the evolution of the American system progressed on predicted lines, since they have the Presidential system of government, our dilemma was, perhaps, which civilian head of the Government would control the Indian Armed forces. The President is just a titular head although given the title of the supreme commander. It had to be the Prime Minister through the RM. It was not surprising that Nehru made himself available to the armed forces for consultations when required. He personally knew many officers of the rank of Brigadier and above as recorded by late General Inderjit Rikhye, who was handpicked by PM to precede to the UN headquarters. The infamous Gen Kaul episode in 1962 however, brought home the dangers of politicisation of the Armed forces as opposed to exercising civilian control over the Military.

This was followed by Indira Gandhi who established a personal equation, though turbulent at times, with Sam Manekshaw and lastly, Rajiv Gandhi who interacted with his Chiefs along with his RRM, Arun Singh and hence often did not have to rely only on the bureaucracy to advice him. Both the Sri Lanka operation and Operation Brass Tacks, which caused tensions between India and Pakistan are often quoted by skeptics as examples of bad experiments of civil-military interaction at the apex level, during the Rajiv Gandhi era. These were in fact personalized leadership traits which had all the trappings of an evolving relationship which needed refinements but not rejection.
The momentum maintained in the 50's and 60's in clipping the wings of the Armed forces had done irreparable damage to the work ethos of MoD. Allocation of business rules and transaction of business rules of MoD first published in 1961 (duly approved by the President) and still in vogue with minor amendments, makes the Defence Secretary responsible for the defence of India. There is no role assigned to the Chiefs since service headquarters were attached offices of MoD.

The Committee of Defence Management headed by Arun Singh in the wake of Kargil conflict had clearly outlined the anomalies in the system and had suggested solutions. The most critical of them remains unimplemented till date, ostensibly, due to lack of political consensus. Apart from remedying existing anomalies and assigning responsibility and accountability to the military, it would have addressed one of the major weaknesses in the civil-military relations in India i.e. lack of a single point military advise to the head of political leadership and participation in strategic decision making process on matters pertaining to national security.

In brief, in the absence of a clear authority-responsibility-accountability matrix, the civil-military equation at the apex level continues to be vague and nebulous. The military quite clearly cannot and should not function under a civilian bureaucrat, but only under the highest political authority. In our case it has to be the PM through RM.

What of the military?
With neither the constitution to support nor clarity to perform, except as an extension of the MoD, the services were left to fend for themselves. Every proposal, every plan and every communication even to other ministries such as MEA had to be processed through MoD and it needed the concurrence of the Def Sec. Neither the politician, save a few, nor the bureaucrats at various levels of MoD have the domain expertise or knowledge to respond to scores of proposals originating from the three services.
Most bureaucrats may not draft a single speech to be made by their Minister due to lack of domain knowledge. Every document on National security originated from service headquarters. So, we wrote and heard our own drafts being read out to us during various meetings and seminars. 15 year plans for modernisation and up gradation remained confined to files.

At the field level, officers are trained to be high caliber professionals. Their profession is management of violence. This being a unique profession, the training is such that it prepares him/her for successful combat operation. No parallel entry is possible, for, unless you have acquired the skill and practiced them for a length of time you cannot be successful in combat. A commercial Pilot for instance, cannot replace a fighter pilot unless he acquires combat skills. A fighter pilot can however fly a commercial aircraft if the certification process is completed. Hence an officer of the armed forces is irreplaceable by another professional from outside the forces.

The soldier is trained to be a specialist in application of violence. That is his trade and not a profession. Hence there is a clear dividing line between the manager and the tradesman.
The armed forces are, as a rule, monopolized by the state. More importantly the profession of management of violence can be practiced only for socially approved purposes. Regulations, customs and traditions, hence become an indispensable part of a soldier's life. Consequently the relations between the state and the soldier are a sacred one. There is much to be done so
that a soldier is not equated to Policemen, a blunder which has serious repercussions on maintaining the 'IZZAT' of the Soldier. Here is where the civil society is required to step in.


Role of the civil society
Success of all democracies depends mainly on the quality of their civil societies. They too evolve over time. A well informed educated and mature civil society ensures that it elects the right political leadership. Both the Soldier and the politician emanate from the same civil society. It is also true that "Our God and soldier we alike adore even at the brink of danger, not before, after deliverance both alike requited, our God is forgotten and our soldier slighted" This comes from an author, Francis Quaries who belongs to a country which has seen great sacrifices by the soldier. Why is it a truism? The civil society has short memories. It is not the duty of a soldier to repeatedly point out the sacrifices made by him. It is the duty of the civil society to fight for the rights of the soldier. The society is expected to fight with the politician so that the soldier is cared for while in service and in retirement.

The onus on erecting a war memorial does not rest on a soldier, it is the civil society which should push its political leadership to remember and honour our dead soldiers. The civil society also has the power to punish the politician who fails to honour the soldier.

According to Yasmin Khan a historian, about 2.3 Million Indian soldiers fought during World War 2 and “89,000 laid down their lives in Military service.” Given the size of our population then, it touched the lives of many Indian families. There was awareness about sacrifices created by the unfortunate circumstances of war. 400,000 Americans and 388,000 Britishers died in the war. Civil societies tend to remember losses when it impacts them.

During periods of peace the intelligentsia which controls the media often questions investments in National security. Pressing debates on socio-economic issues keep the soldier out of sight.

Some Options
In the Indian context, it is essential to continuously educate the civil society on trials and tribulations of our soldier. Compulsory military training or making NCC compulsory in schools and colleges and constant engagement with civil society through well structured films, plays and street shows are options that need to be exercised.
In my view, it is essential to induct ex servicemen of repute into our political structure so that the voice of the soldier is heard in the parliament. We need more of Jaswant Singhs, Khanduris and Shankar Roychowdhurys.

Thousands of ex-servicemen entered politics, industry and other professions in USA soon after WW2. Many rose to be Presidents and successful congressmen. Industries too benefited from the focus brought to bear by military personnel.
Soldiers must enter all possible walks of life after retirement to be able to mobilize the good will of the society, which in turn could make the politician accountable to evolve a new equilibrium in civil-military relations of a young India. ______________________________________________________________________________