India-US Defence Dialogue
Nuances and Vicissitudes
For nearly two decades and a bit more, India and the USA have been discussing several enabling mechanisms to embellish their cooperation between the two Armed Forces. A headline in a leading daily on 21 Dec, regarding Parrikar's visit to USA- "India and US to talk on giving access to each other's Military bases and ports"- must have raised many eyebrows. Experts may even attribute it to 'questionable Government policy, on a sensitive issue concerning national interest of India.' This is not a sudden development in our relations with the USA. Agreements on Logistics support(LSA), Communications, interoperability and security(CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and cooperation(BECA) have been on the agenda of the Indo-US defence dialogue for many years.
Indeed, this had also figured prominently in Parliament, when the then External affairs minister, Sri Pranab Mukherji, had to clarify that this agreement,"does not envisage providing military facilities to US forces. Neither does it provide for unqualified Indian support to the US in any armed conflict to which India is not a party." Despite such assurances left wing parties (critical allies) continued to oppose this agreement.
It is necessary to understand the purpose and content of such agreements which are in existence with about 80 countries including Pakistan(expired in 2012 and is under discussion now). Since LSA is considered to be an important ingredient for joint military exercises and disaster relief operations, some pros and cons of signing this agreement from an Indian perspective may be of value to understand the significance of the debate. That will be covered in the concluding part of this article. A historic perspective on events leading to high-level engagement with the US Military is necessary to appreciate the second part of the article.
From 1965, when military acquisitions from the erstwhile Soviet Union commenced, up to the breakup of the Soviet Union, India was a major recipient of military hardware. Yet, there were no joint exercises or operations between the two militaries. In 1971, an Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed. This timely treaty which assisted India in the Indo-Pak war had placed India squarely in the Soviet camp.
That President Nixon disliked Mrs Gandhi and Kissinger was equally hostile to India, have been well documented. In turn, it led to a generation of US politicians, military and civil servants who were hostile to India. During this period, the Military of Pakistan continued to build on its close relations with Pentagon which began during the CENTO days and flourished during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, the Indian Military barring those who attended courses in USA and UK were denied the opportunity to be familiar with American operational doctrines and the manner in which congressmen lobbied for military assistance to friendly countries.
In short, while there was a fair understanding of the Soviet system and training methodologies, little was known of the American system of checks and balances, legislative and executive controls and the White House-Congress interface.
During the same period, in India, anti-American sentiments ran high for numerous reasons. US patch- up with the Chinese through senior politicians of Pakistan and stage managed by Henry Kissinger, the Vietnam war, USS Enterprise incident in 1971, sanctions on India in 1974 and 1998 and many such actions did not help the deteriorating relationship. Distrust of US intentions and manipulations were fuelled by the deep-rooted philosophy of non-alignment and left leaning ideologies both at the political and bureaucratic levels. Consequently efforts to normalise relations and enhance military to military contacts received little or no support at all levels of governance in both countries.
Liberalization and globalization began the process of political and military engagement with the USA. As expected every move was carefully weighed both in the context of sovereignty and non-alignment. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only disrupted the regular supply of spares thus resulting in low operational readiness of military assets but, more importantly, the newly formed Russia was unable to provide training facilities for warships on order, as the Russian military personnel were neither paid nor compensated by the state. Many Russian officers survived on driving cabs after working hours. India had to diversify her source of supply of military equipment or face the proverbial "all eggs in the same basket" analogy.
Indo-US military cooperation and dialogue commenced a new phase of an operational trend in 1993. By the turn of the century, an incremental process was adopted at a slow pace to enable both parties to adjust to a new paradigm shift. Two examples of successful and mutually beneficial engagement that resulted in quality agreements were the June 2005 India-US new defence framework agreement with a roadmap for operational, joint military exercises, training and services exchange and the March 2006 Indo-US Maritime cooperation framework. The former resulted in a maximum number of military exercises of a highly advanced level and the latter in joint patrolling of energy trade routes to combat piracy and transnational crimes at sea.
The concluding part of this article will contain details of our apprehensions and ground realities with respect to the long-pending agreements such as LSA, CISMOA and BECA.
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