Pakistan Threatens to use Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan claims to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neutralize a rapid Indian thrust. Is it kakistocracy at work?

 It is well known that the Indian Nuclear Weapons programme was steered by a close-knit group of scientists referred to as "The strategic enclave" which involved specialists from the Armed Forces to operationalize the weapon while control was exercised by the former. The barren civil-military relations was the root cause of keeping the Service headquarters out of the loop. In contrast, due to the dominance of the Military in the polity of Pakistan, the opposite model continues to prevail. 

Recent statement emanating from authoritative Pakistani sources indicate that tactical nuclear weapons have been cleared for use to neutralize any rapid advances made by the Indian Military. Given that the statement has been timed with the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the USA, quite obviously it is meant to leverage Pakistan's bid for nuclear parity with India. However, while deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may appear to be an effective counter to Indian moves, the cold war experience may hold some sobering lessons to the kakistrocratic government in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, NATO forces had carried out extensive studies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent numerically superior land forces of USSR and the Warsaw pact from invading Western Europe. Gaming, simulation and field studies indicated that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional force increased the possibility of a strategic nuclear war rather than decrease it. Simply put, use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario escalates the engagement to a full -fledged nuclear war. Weapons such as nuclear-tipped missiles, artillery shells, neutron bomb or the reduced radioactivity(RRR) bomb of the tactical warfare component, ended up escalating the threshold. 

Second, unlike the use of centralised Command and Control facilities for strategic nuclear weapons, decentralisation is a necessity for tactical use of such weapons. It imposes an enormous burden on the officers in the field while also imposing astronomical costs on equipping the entire force with NBCD gear.

 Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management would become mandatory. Hence, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons has the potential to invite the wrath of a strategic response by India, following factors bear scrutiny; 
• use of nuclear weapons is the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war which can at best result in a pyrrhic victory.
 • the non-first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability. Pakistan could well be wiped out. 

There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in the decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.

In the South Asian context, the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Institutional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities.

 The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation and drills in peace time. 

 We cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM through RM. Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of the operational effectiveness of our assets. 

The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.

(Also published by The Quint on 22 Oct 15)

INDO-US EXERCISE MALABAR

Evolution of US-INDIA Maritime Cooperation.

In the early 1990s,  our entry into the liberalised and globalised world also witnessed a quantum jump in the arena of maritime cooperation between USA and India. A very modest beginning was made off the coast of Goa when an exercise code-named 'Malabar' was conducted in 1992. Not even General Kicklighter, who, as Cin C US Army Pacific Command, brought along a series of proposals to institutionalise cooperation among all wings of the two Militaries, would have expected exercise Malabar to sustain and grow in the manner it has. It would be fair to state that arrangements to institutionalise this effort to promote constructive maritime cooperation have now come of age.

Given that the Indian Navy now operates with navies of Brazil, France, Oman, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, UK, and recently with Japan and Australia, it would be instructive to analyse the progress made in Exercise Malabar, the latest of which is set to kick off between 14th to 19th October.

A realistic assessment would indicate that Exercise Malabar has progressed to be one of the most advanced international naval exercises conducted by India and USA. In this, some analysts who have projected the current Malabar, in the Bay of Bengal, as a ‘slump’ in relation to the high of Modi-Obama agreements are off the mark. Malabar has, in fact, become a high point of Indo-US defence cooperation at the operational level, and with high strategic significance. The fact that advanced operational manoeuvres, ranging across all dimensions at sea, are being regularly undertaken by the participating ships, aircraft and submarines (which keep changing each year), is indicative of the high degree of interoperability that has been achieved between the two navies.

The Chinese objections to multilateral exercises, as opposed to bilateral ones, may be seen in this perspective. 2005 and 2007 reflect the strategic dimensions of Malabar. 2005 saw Carriers of both navies operating together for the first time. In 2007, there were two sessions of Malabar. The first off Japan where India, USA and Japan participated. The second in the Bay of Bengal, when Australia and Singapore too joined. There were as many as three Carriers, a total of 26 ships and a number of shore based strike aircraft. Given the nascent stages of Carrier operations of the Chinese navy, which was focused on training and learning basic flying operations at sea, a display of Carrier and Anti-Submarine Warfare operations of an advanced nature between the leading navies in the region, probably unnerved China, prompting it to seek explanations.

Almost in response to the Chinese,  both India and Australia, pulled out of a suggested Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with USA and Japan, owing to political and economic considerations respectively. The Chinese had achieved their aim in round one.

That, Japan has joined the ongoing exercise, signals a new phase in the saga. The Modi-Obama  and the Modi-Abe relations have played a significant role in deciding the approach to the Chinese hullabaloo.  The declining China -Japan relations with Xi and Abe in power, the Chinese aggressive thrust in the disputed waters of South China Sea, which openly challenges freedom of navigation agreed to by signatories of UNCLOS and the all-weather relations between China and Pakistan resulting in nuclear and maritime cooperation, not forgetting the evolving silk route through   a disputed territory, are factors that cannot be overlooked.

Some experts have commented on a perceived dilution of intensity in Exercise Malabar, asking why India’s Carrier could not be made available and why it cannot commit more ships. Firstly, it is important to understand that it is not the numbers but the contents that define the quality of exercises. The exercise schedule and operational canvas of Malabar-2015 are at a multi-dimensional level, consistent with the higher standards developed over the past decade.

Second, the participation of Japan, albeit with one ship, is operationally and strategically significant. And, third, the participation of Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft in recent years, including the TU-142 and now P8I from India, and P3C by US, indicate the wide range of operational scenarios being exercised.   

Apropos the Carrier debate, the US Navy is a vast force with 10 large and nine medium-size Aircraft Carriers, which regularly deploy to various parts of the globe. On the other hand, India, which plans to have a three carrier task force in the future, currently operates two medium/small-size Carriers, with Viraat to be retired shortly. Vikramaditya, the primary Carrier, has to complete its scheduled maintenance and operational consolidation with the Fleet in the Arabian Sea, before deployment to the Bay of Bengal for the forthcoming International Fleet Review. Hence, the inclusion of an Indian Carrier for Malabar cannot be done merely on theoretical considerations.

However, what stands out is that Malabar has become a regular and key feature of Indo-US maritime cooperation, with a high degree of operational gains and levels of interoperability achieved.

What has gone unnoticed in the profile of the Indian Navy is that the Eastern Fleet which is tasked to operate across the Malacca straits has been bolstered with new induction ships, which is in keeping with the political objective of our look east policy.

While political blips  may appear from time to time on the radar scan, it would be wise to view them over a historical timeframe rather than year on year.

(Published by The Quint on 14OCT 2015)

Do not byte-chase a soldier dear journo

 Irresponsible Journalism

For well over two centuries, the topic of Civil-Military relations has been found to be an evolving process. This process is also contingent upon the ideologies followed by the political leadership of a country. The German and Japanese experience in the early 19th century prompted experts to classify them as "militaristic" nations. Military men assuming political roles, attempts to exercise civilian control over the military and the Nazi experience of unheeded military warnings which led to catastrophic results, have all been well documented.

The profession of the military is "management/containment of violence." Consequently, the primary function of the military is successful armed combat. This being a highly complex and technology intensive activity, the entire process of selection, training and career progression is very unique to the Military. Hence, the military profession is considered to be as valuable if not more than other top professions.  This is one of the reasons why the military commands the respect of the society.

Since management of violence can and must only be practised for socially approved purposes, the State would necessarily have to enjoy the total monopoly over the military profession. Thus, the relation between the State and the Military assumes a sacred dimension.

Such a powerful tool in the hands of any Government can only be used if regulations, customs and traditions are strictly followed. There is no scope for irreverence or interpretation of military orders. The soldier on entry surrenders some of his constitutional rights such as free speech, travel abroad, unauthorised association with the media and many more. He signs a virtual agreement to lay down his life when required. No other profession is required to do so.

It is in this context that the recent efforts made by the media to coerce a serving soldier( a generic term used for navy and air force personnel too) to appear before a camera becomes an irresponsible act. In the case in point, a highly traumatised soldier was asked to comment on the political and social dimensions of a personal tragedy. This is not synonymous with an act of bravery or yeoman service rendered during natural calamities when a mike is thrust at the face of a soldier

Any responsible journalist knows that there are clear orders that prohibit serving soldiers from expressing their political opinions because the military is required to be loyal to the elected Government of the day irrespective of its ideology. Worldwide, discussions on politics are discouraged in militaries of democratically elected Governments. They are required to remain apolitical until they shed their uniforms. This does not prevent a soldier from exercising his franchise in favour of individuals of his choice.

In the event, the soldier in question displayed maturity and grace well beyond his age. His statements reflected the discipline and patriotic fervour of military minds which are focused on combat duties and service to the nation. If his message was directed both to the journalists and politicians, they did not seem to apply to either, much like the water on the ducks back.

For a moment imagine the damage that could have resulted had the highly traumatised soldier given vent to his distress. He would have accentuated communal tensions not only in his village but much further beyond. The Indian Military known to be apolitical and secular would also, perhaps, have been pushed to take damage control measures to retain equanimity in the face of provocative and irresponsible behaviour of lumpen elements of our civil society.

To the TRP driven 24/7 news channels which conduct shouting matches without fail, it has to be said that having 'experienced anchors 'and some research staff who produce immaculate records of who said what and when, do not make the news channel news worthy or instructive, in a nation filled with impatient and partially informed audience. Anchors are not so well informed and knowledgeable as some believe.

 If mere possession of information is knowledge and wisdom is not even a peripheral desired objective, kindly spare the Military which has a clear-cut role to perform against many odds. Also, note that men in uniform who appear on media without approval are subject to rules and regulations specific to this theme. Failure to act upon such indiscretion may be taken as a precedence for future violation.

 An indisciplined Military is as good as not having one.

Published by The Quint on 07 Oct.