Indo-US Defence cooperation-Part 2

 India-US Defence Cooperation

Nuances and Vicissitudes-Part 2

For readers, who could not access Part 1 of this piece, a summary of Geo-Political realities of the 1960s to early 1990s along with events that pushed India to expand her defence relations with the USA formed the backdrop to this piece. What then are the pros and cons of India signing agreements on Logistics Supply(LSA), Communication interoperability and security(CISMOA) Basic exchange and cooperation for geospatial agreements(BECA)

LSA is a subject much discussed over the last decade, both in and out of Parliament. The objections raised by various participants broadly covered the following areas:

·       That it would provide unfettered access to Indian military bases.

·       It would not be a mutually beneficial and cost effective arrangement to accept US terms of settling payments for logistics for the use of our facilities.

·       USA would have greater familiarity with our equipment and preparedness.

·       It would affect our sovereignty

·       It would adversely impact the independence of our foreign policy.

Since 1993, joint exercises have proved to be quite rewarding for both the participants. All three services have participated in highly advanced and specially designed exercises in each other's military establishments. Much has been written about the value of "Exercise Malabar" between the two navies as also" exercise Red Flag" between the two Air forces. The Army has been exposed to special and Commando operations while the American Army has experienced the highly specialised environs for jungle operations in our facility.

Joint patrolling of energy routes in the Malacca straits and to thwart transnational crimes at sea have provided invaluable operational opportunities.

LSA provides cover for transportation, airlift, refuelling and storage services for not only military exercises but also for disaster relief cooperation. There have been cost savings due to reciprocal arrangements. Published reports indicate that in Exercise Red Flag alone saving of Dollars 20 Million accrued to India.

The fact that for close to two decades, both the Militaries have graduated from basic exercises to very advanced ones and have managed to progress without providing unfettered access to each other's military facilities, proves that we are capable of safeguarding our individual national interests. Exposure to the globalised environment has enriched our abilities to deal with unregulated activities at sea, as also to use appropriate technologies to counter them.

While the Parliament and the experts debate on ensuring that our sovereignty remains unchallenged and that we retain our independence in crafting our foreign policy, the global environment has significantly changed. The old formulations of non-alignment which served us well in the early part of our independence need refinement. The recent debate in 2013 on Non-alignment two generated vibrant discussions. Prof Sen (Pune) went on to state that the version 2"reduced Indian thinking to irrelevancy".

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's Look East policy appears to have found serious consideration and recognition beyond our shores. Much after India attempted to operationalise the concept, USA shifted its focus from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific ocean. The Modi Govt has made relations with Japan and Australia its strategic priority. Joint statements no longer hide our real concerns on China usurping  maritime zones not authorised by UNCLOS. Freedom of navigation rights as per international norms are being endorsed in joint statements. We no longer sit on a fence.

The Indian Navy has clearly articulated its Maritime security strategy in a publication recently released by the RM. Primary areas of maritime interests, interalia, include the Persian gulf, gulf of Oman, gulf of Aden, Red sea and the littoral regions, east coast of Africa, Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok and the Cape of Good Hope.

The secondary areas include South East Indian Ocean, South and East China seas, Western Pacific ocean and other areas based on the Indian Diaspora, overseas investments and political relations. Thus, even as we debate, we are preparing to meet uncertain future contingencies.

If national interests continue to be clearly unarticulated and remain vague, changing geopolitical realities would impose several demands on India that would necessitate changes in the traditional concepts of its interpretation.

It is in the above backdrop that the other two agreements which may have legislative and legal ramifications prior to the release of cutting-edge technologies from the USA to India, need to be examined. CISMOA and BECA, the latter which has geospatial intelligence sharing clauses need to be considered from a position of strength and maturity rather than with deep suspicion and lack of confidence in our ability to protect our national interests. These documents are not cast in stone. They can be amended or revoked if required.

If however, the hereto vague concepts of national interests continue to hinder progress both in the USA and in India, perhaps circumstances may force us to find other paths of convergence to survive in a highly unpredictable world.

We are at cross roads-change or become irrelevant.

http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/12/23/india-us-defence-cooperation-lets-no-longer-sit-on-the-fence#.Vnp0orBjsnw.facebook

India-US Defence Dialogue http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/12/22/india-us-military-agreement-a-logical-corollary-to-evolving-ties#.Vnk6N1Y1C20.facebook

India-US Defence Dialogue

Nuances and Vicissitudes

For nearly two decades and a bit more, India and the USA have been discussing several enabling mechanisms to embellish their cooperation between the two Armed Forces. A headline in a leading daily on 21 Dec, regarding Parrikar's visit to USA-  "India and US to talk on giving access to each other's Military bases and ports"- must have raised many eyebrows. Experts may even attribute it to 'questionable Government policy, on a sensitive issue concerning national interest of India.'  This is not a sudden development in our relations with the USA. Agreements on Logistics support(LSA), Communications, interoperability and security(CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and cooperation(BECA) have been on the agenda of the Indo-US defence dialogue for many years.

Indeed, this had also figured prominently in Parliament, when the then External affairs minister, Sri Pranab Mukherji, had to clarify that this agreement,"does not envisage providing military facilities to US forces. Neither does it provide for unqualified Indian support to the US in any armed conflict to which India is not a party." Despite such assurances left wing parties (critical allies) continued to oppose this agreement.

It is necessary to understand the purpose and content of such agreements which are in existence with about 80 countries including Pakistan(expired in 2012 and is under discussion now). Since LSA is considered to be an important ingredient for joint military exercises and disaster relief operations, some pros and cons of signing this agreement from an Indian perspective  may be of value to understand the significance of the debate. That will be covered in the concluding part of this article. A historic perspective on events leading to high-level engagement with the US Military is necessary to appreciate the second part of the article.

From 1965, when military acquisitions from the erstwhile Soviet Union commenced, up to the breakup of  the Soviet Union, India was a major  recipient of military hardware. Yet, there were no joint exercises or operations between the two militaries. In 1971, an Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation   was signed. This timely treaty which assisted India in the Indo-Pak war had placed India squarely in the Soviet camp.

That President Nixon disliked Mrs Gandhi and Kissinger was equally hostile to India, have been well documented. In turn, it led to a generation of US politicians, military and civil servants who were hostile to India. During this period, the Military of Pakistan continued to build on its close relations with Pentagon which began during the CENTO days and flourished during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, the Indian Military  barring those who attended courses in USA and UK were denied the opportunity to be familiar with American operational doctrines and the manner in which congressmen lobbied for military assistance to friendly countries. 

In short, while there was a fair understanding of the Soviet system and training methodologies, little was known of the American system of checks and balances, legislative and executive controls and the White House-Congress interface.

During the same period, in India, anti-American sentiments ran high for numerous reasons. US patch- up with the Chinese through senior politicians of Pakistan and stage managed by Henry Kissinger, the Vietnam war, USS Enterprise incident in 1971, sanctions on India in 1974 and 1998 and many  such actions  did not help the deteriorating relationship. Distrust of US intentions and manipulations were fuelled by the deep-rooted philosophy of non-alignment and left leaning ideologies both at the political and bureaucratic levels. Consequently efforts to normalise relations and enhance military to military contacts received little or no support at all levels of governance in both countries.

Liberalization and globalization began the process of political and military engagement with the USA. As expected every move was carefully weighed both in the context of sovereignty and non-alignment. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only disrupted the regular supply of spares thus resulting in low operational readiness of military assets but, more importantly, the newly formed Russia was unable to provide training facilities for warships on order, as the Russian military personnel were neither paid nor compensated by the state. Many Russian officers survived on driving cabs after working hours. India had to diversify her source of supply of military equipment or face the proverbial "all eggs in the same basket" analogy.

Indo-US military cooperation and dialogue commenced a new phase of an operational trend in 1993. By the turn of the century, an incremental process was adopted at a slow pace to enable both parties to adjust to a new paradigm shift. Two examples of successful and mutually beneficial engagement that resulted in quality agreements were the June 2005 India-US new defence framework agreement with a roadmap for operational, joint military exercises, training and services exchange and the March 2006 Indo-US  Maritime cooperation framework. The former resulted in a maximum number of military exercises of a highly advanced level and the latter in joint patrolling of energy trade routes to combat piracy and transnational crimes at sea.

The concluding part of this article will contain details of our apprehensions and ground realities with respect to the long-pending agreements such as LSA, CISMOA and  BECA.