Structural Infirmities

STRUCTURAL INFIRMITIES OF CWG 2010

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LESSONS FOR HIGHER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

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The information overload caused by the ill managed event of CWG 2010 provides great insights into the structural deficiencies, lack of good management practices and a host of other facts. Did we not pull off CWG 1952, Asian Games 1982 and the more recent Youth games and Military games? Don’t we regularly hold Republic day parades at Delhi, manage religious events of gargantuan proportions where logistics are mind boggling and even win kudos for a first ever International Fleet Review at the busiest port of Mumbai? Yes we do

What was common in all these successful events was the creation of an empowered structure with responsibility and accountability. The PM himself overseeing CWG 1952, an empowered group with Rajiv Gandhi to ensure good coordination of the successful Asian Games in 1982, are cases in point. This CWG failed due an absence of a centralised command structure. Responsibilities were not demarcated, there were too many “Indians “and no chiefs and what is more everyone had an excuse not to own up responsibility.

13 November 2003 was the date on which the Commonwealth Games Federation resolved to hand over the games to Delhi. In accordance with article 10 A the host city contract was inked by Government of India (GOI), Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi(GNCTD) IOA and CGF.The organisation of the entire event was allotted to OC CWG.

 The key delivery partners listed on the web site are CGF, IOA, OC CWG, GNCTD and GOI in that order. It also states that several ministries of GOI and several organisations under GNCTD and others would be involved in execution.

 Even a prima facie analysis of this structure would point to the fact that the coordination of such a complex body cannot be vested with a committee which has no authority over the key delivery partners. In the Indian context, hierarchy and individual egos play a vital role in the smooth functioning of the organisation. At times, collective organisational goals are sacrificed to appease individual aspirations. Presumably these considerations caused undue delays of about two years before the Organisation Committee came into existence on 10 February 2005- a faulty and toothless structure from day one. Although representatives of all the delivery partners were constituted on the committee, raising alarms at the CWG meetings,  when deadline after dead line failed to be met by their parent organisation is not a practical proposition. Having taken full responsibility to stage the best ever game, as outlined on the web, the Organising Committee, perhaps, continued at best, as a mute spectator to inter- ministerial red tape and embarrassing delays in execution.

What is needed in the globalized, highly competitive and demanding environment is to professionalise our decision making structures to include experts in negotiations and project management and other niche areas.

A look at the Ministry which manages the Armed Forces of India in the above context would be instructive. This Ministry has the responsibility to handle the rapidly increasing defence budget which is more than twice the amount allotted to CWG but on a yearly basis. Is it structured to meet all the requirements of the Armed Forces of India?

Firstly, since 1952, the three Chiefs along with their Headquarters were removed from the decision making structure of the Government of India. They were designated as the “attached offices” of the Ministry. In effect all communications from the Armed forces were to be addressed only to the Ministry and no decision making powers and executive powers were to reside with the Chiefs, save those related to operations. Not even the revenue budget could be operated by the Chief to merely run the service as it existed. The Chiefs could send their recommendations and plans for modernisation which effectively rested at the table of some functionary without even an acknowledgement. The Ministry continued to be manned by generalist- civil servants who often learnt about the Armed Forces after they were placed in the chair.

While the authority to take decisions with the concurrence of the Minister was vested with the Ministry, there were no provisions for accountability. Having been removed from the chain, the Chiefs could only make proposals and could not be held accountable. The procurement of Advanced Jet Trainers(AJT) for the Air Force took over two decades, by which time costs had escalated by 500%.The decision to induct Goroshkov took over a decade, by which time the deteriorating cables of the ship warranted doubling of the original cost. Many thousand crores are surrendered unspent year after year despite the urgent operational needs of the Army. There are no clear cut penalties for procrastination and opportunity costs incurred thereof. Are these not the ills of CWG as well?.

Secondly, integration of the Ministry with the Armed Forces by placing uniformed professionals at appropriate desks of the Ministry is a successful model practised by other democracies. Similar structures were recommended by the Committee on Defence Management after the Kargil war. Cosmetic changes in nomenclature with no corresponding powers were the only action taken to show compliance.

Thirdly, the Kargil Review Committee, did recommend the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single point advisor to the RM on all matters of planning, acquisition etc.This has been stalled by statusquoists within and without the Armed Forces. The result is the continuation of a toothless Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was first recommended in 1924 and which is still in existence only in India. Almost all Armed Forces of countries that matter have opted for a fully integrated structure with accountability, while we continue to live in denial of a serious structural infirmity.

CWG 2010 has brought disrepute to the country due to delays in implementation despite seven years to prepare. We can live with it, for, soon it will be forgotten. However continued denial of structural weaknesses in the Defence department, has the potential to lay our country in the dust. Until then incapability to modernise, lack of timely decision coupled with conflicting demands of the three services can only be offset by the ability of our officers and soldiers to lay down their lives- even if it is to achieve a pyrrhic victory.

The quote that follows perhaps sums up our predicament, “We the unwilling, led by the unqualified ,have been doing the unbelievable for so long with so little that we now attempt the impossible with nothing”

An edited version of this article appeared in the Business Standard soon after the CWG. Today it needs to be also viewed in the context of efficient management of Formula one in Delhi. Faulty management structures and lack of accountability are the root cause of time and cost over runs.