Jointness

TO INTEGRATE OR NOT THE POLITICAL-MILITARY DILEMMA OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES.

I was at the Royal Naval Staff College (Greenwich) in 1979, when the seeds for integration of the British Armed Forces were sown. Doubting Thomas’s were the same in their forces as there are in ours, even today. A few years later Gold water Nichols act was ‘thrust upon’ the American Armed forces and the process of operational and logistics integration commenced in earnest. The British followed suit as the basic logic of integrating the services cannot be over emphasized. The creations of a single operational head and integrating the much duplicated operational and logistics functions were thus enforced with strong political will-the prime focus being national interest. No one is immune to turf war and so there were murmurs and strong biases displayed by old war horses and their politically driven masters. Today it would be naive or perhaps stupid to fight a war with each service claiming it’s pre-eminence. There are no Manekshaws to charismatically coordinate the Tri-service operations, while also obtaining equal, albeit grudging support of the political leadership as well. His firm advice to the then Prime Minister to allow the armed forces to select the window of campaign is well known. Do we continue to hope that an equally competent coordination would occur in a system which does not empower any single authority to be accountable for the outcome of operations? Would Service Chiefs continue to man their respective Operations rooms during war? More importantly who would ensure the entire process of priorities of weapon/sensor acquisitions and preparing for war, based on a common threat perception? In other words peace time preparations including joint communication/training processes play a vital role to ensure success in war. It would be appropriate to note that a series of operational failures occurred in the pre integrated forces of the USA. One service could not communicate with the other due to incompatibilities in equipment and operating procedures.

Kargill was like the Chinese invasion of 1962 in so far as jostling us from our slumber is concerned. We woke up to the harsh realities of inadequate resources leading to perfunctory actions by those who are required to keep vigil. Had there been a theatre command integrated with appropriate aviation/space surveillance assets would the incursions and build up at Kargil have gone unnoticed?

The Govt swung into action and appointed the Subramaniam Committee, with very eminent people leading their respective sub-committees. Out came an exhaustive study with clear recommendations for implementation across the board. No, we could not make the whole report public as there were State secrets to be guarded-just as the Henderson Committee report on the Chinese incursion/invasion of 1962 is still kept closely guarded. Given our gross negligence to create a technologically contemporary archive for posterity and our callous approach to historical record keeping, all the lessons from the past would be of little or no use, if and when they are made public.

In this case let us look at the crucial aspect of integrating operations of the three services and the implications of dragging our feet to do so.

When the Kargil review committee was formed, an extremely well read and perhaps the most competent expert was assigned the task of reviewing the Management of Defence. The report when being compiled and later when submitted was continuously under the scrutiny of the Chiefs Of Staff Committee and the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps for the first time in Independent India, a Committee report after obtaining the approval of the cabinet was monitored for implementation with such efficiency that a vast majority of recommendations were actually realized on the ground, save a few crucially important ones. With the change of the Govt even the mode of monitoring took a back seat and with change of personalities who were witnesses to all the discussions on the subject the commitment too vanished. Soon status-quo prevailed.

 I am compelled to comment on this mainly because, had the integration of operational and intelligence resources been completed on time, the Mumbai attack may not have succeeded, as the Joint mechanism for Coastal patrol and communication as well as intelligence would have matured in its functional and operational roles. Principally two segments of experts continue to oppose the well thought-through recommendations of the Committee report. The first, civilian defence analysts/civil servants who represented the pre integration models of running the security affairs of the country. The second, officers both in and out of uniform who felt insecure and /or were representing the perceived interests of a particular service of the Indian Armed Forces. These were exactly the same combination of people who opposed integration in every western democracy. There was one bogey yet to be resolved in India due to her relatively young democracy and that was the preposterous myth of the Indian Armed forces conspiring to take over the country from the democratically elected representatives. A bogey often used to confuse the insecure politician. It is difficult to think of a more apolitical military than the Indian forces in contemporary military or political-military history. Since there is a lobby that continues to oppose integration, it would be instructive to examine the existing system which hopes to meet all challenges to national security. That we manage to meet immediate threats at great sacrifice of human cost is a tribute to our fighting forces-not the system. An analogy that readily comes to mind is the upcoming Common Wealth games which are likely to be pulled off at the last moment with little or no attention paid to the unprofessional organisation behind it. We will of course  partake in the euphoria of its success. We need to focus on the systemic changes needed to improve our performance to fight the next war and not the last. Since the existing system of COSC is sometimes quoted to be an efficient model it would be instructive to visit the background to this model.

The existing system of COSC was first created in 1924 in the UK. A similar system was also replicated in India. The COSC with CGS, Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN) and AOC, however reported to the C-IN-C who was the single operational head of the Armed forces.

When Lord Mountbatten was asked after the war as to what was the single most valuable lesson of the Second World War, he seemed to indicate the vital need to integrate the three services from womb to tomb. Hence the thrust given to forming the first ever combined tri service training academy in the world-The National Defence Academy in Khadakvasla.The seeds of integration were sown in Independent India as early as 1949 when none in the world had an integrated ab-initio training facility. Even the British took, time to integrate but when they did, all common operational/ training facilities were set up with alacrity. Other than training facilities unique to each service, complete integration of the services and the MOD has been achieved.

In Independent India, since jointness was not on the horizon, DSSC Wellington, later CDM and NDC(which is placed directly under MOD) were created as combined training facilities. Operational integration was never a priority assigned to the staff college. Every effort to create jointness in operations was resisted by individual services and more emphatically by the Govt in power. Often we are told that it is a sensitive subject, as a single Operational commander would pose a threat to Democracy. No opportunity is lost to quote instances when such coups could have been a reality. It would appear that clinging to such myths even after 62 years of a successful experiment with Democracy is more important than functionally enabling the Armed forces.

In May 1952, the then Def sec circulated a draft document titled “Organisation, Functions, Powers and Procedure of Defence Headquarters” where the Attached office status of the Def hqrs was discussed. It must be noted that it was the same Gentleman who resisted all efforts to provide the Chiefs direct access to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. It is my belief that this was the start point of the destruction of a developing POL-MIL relationship which thrives in Western Democracies. On the flip side given that almost all countries surrounding India had gone through military take over’s, (at this point in time) the reluctance on the part of the political leadership to engage the military in major planning processes was somewhat understandable. Equally, to drag this analogy to the 21^st century is shameful and the political leadership of all shades need to introspect on the vital requirement of integrating the senior military leadership into the decision making process.

In 1955 the service chiefs until then called Cs –in-Cs was redesignated as Chief of staff of their respective service. While my efforts have not produced authentic documents on what led the Govt to make this announcement in Parliament, or whether the Armed forces were even consulted, this decision has adversely impacted the services even today. Many may not be aware of these facts and perhaps do not know that the term Chief of staff does not assign an operational role to the chief and that operations had to be handed over to a C-in-C. The civil servant was not too well versed with operational implications but was implementing the wishes of his political masters. Quite naturally the service chiefs assigned operational roles to themselves and continue to do so even today. Had the operational integration gone ahead, theatre commands and a joint chiefs of staff may well have been in postion.However the concept was new and had not been tested anywhere when this was implemented in India.

Prior to and post the implementation of integration in the West, attempts were made, albeit sporadically, more with the intention of improving logistics, training and financial management of the Indian Armed forces. Noteworthy among such efforts were the Estimates Committee report of 1958, Administrative reforms commission of 1967, Committee of Defence planning (CDP) and The Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) which for the first time looked at a new system to replace the toothless COSC.

Those of us who have had long exposure to the workings of COSC and its interface with the Govt through the Def Sec, know only too well that such a system if left unchanged would result in disaster when we meet with a more sophisticated adversary than Pakistan. The country cited above has had to live with crises unthinkable in our country and thus had little to show in efficiency superior to ours. China would be a different kettle of fish and I for one would not want to be proved right in my assessment if and when the balloon goes up.

So what is the solution? To start with, re-visit the full report of the Subramaniam Committee with special attention to the chapter on management of defence. If all of it or most of it is irrefutable, not from a single service perspective but from the national interest, examine possible solutions to the structure of higher defence management.

One of the stated objectives of creating tri service commands ie The Andaman and Nicobar Command and The Strategic Forces Command was to gain experience to form theatre commands of the future. That there should be theatre commands to optimise the fighting potential of any force is now a well established fact and that the combined might of a theatre command would be a force multiplier is common sense.

To those who feel that command in rotation destroys the ethos of the dominant service I would recommend a visit and appraisal of the performance of existing Indian models at NDA, NDC and CDM. If anything the rotation has brought about refreshing changes particularly to the service other than the parent service of the Commandant. Checks and balances are built into the structure. In Operational Commands the C-in-C and the deputy are never from the same service and advice to the Commander is available from senior staff of all the services. Same is the experience in all integrated commands in the West.

It is a matter for concern and equally for debate that the few Armed forces (of significance) of the world who are yet to integrate have “diplomatically” concluded that the Indian Model is “interesting”. It has delivered so far despite the system. Mercifully the Strategic Force command which is the most recent addition is fully integrated with a clear mandate and an operational chain of command.  Accountability is thus ensured.

The question is do we need another crisis for yet another distinguished Committee to tell us what we already know?

  This piece was carried in the Manas Defence Year BOOK 2010/11