National Pride

The Inviolable Sanctity of National Pride-Address Basic Issues First

We take for granted that most Indians, if not all, can sing and understand the contents of our National Anthem. Thanks to electronic media and cable TV, those who did not have the opportunity to learn the National Anthem at  school or through audio-visual shows, have crossed the first threshold of merely singing it. Next, what about contents and meaning of the anthem; written in highly sanskritised Bengali and later translated into Hindi.

 Sanskrit itself has lost its predominant place among Indian languages.  . It was the preferred language in most schools which offered a choice of languages other than the official language of the state, until perhaps the mid 1950s. Not so today. Efforts to revive Sanskrit have now commenced, due to its reported compatibility with mathematics and computers.

Some countries such as Australia and South Africa, have made their anthem bi-lingual so as to preserve the culture and language of the aborigines/original inhabitants. That  was practical and effective as English remains their National language.

If Sanskrit in India is as neglected as is popularly believed, it becomes necessary and mandatory to translate the contents of our anthem, in all the major languages of India. Presently it is the responsibility of the citizen to understand the power of its content. There is no dearth of English and other versions of Tagore's masterpiece. A brief survey has revealed that most are happy to just sing the anthem even if the contents are not fully understood. Imagine the force multiplier effect if they also understood the spirit behind the words of the poem.

 How many of those who have just working knowledge of Hindi understand what Tagore had so lovingly conceived as salutations to India?  Those who live in deep down South and the corners of North East India need also to be inspired by the contents of the anthem. Electronic, print and social media along with smart phones make this possible today-  provided we have an accountable element of the Government which is tasked to do so. Is there a need to educate our masses on the relevance of the flag, national anthem, national flower, national bird and national animal? I would argue for it for reasons more than a score. The end of this article has an anecdotal evidence for the need to think anew.

Incidentally, Bangladesh adopted Tagore's poem "Amar Sonar Bangla" as their National Anthem. But then it was written in their National language too and hence is understood by every Bangladeshi. There is thus an emotional connect in addition to the patriotic flavour of the anthem.

How then can every Indian Citizen imbibe the spirit and intent of the anthem while singing it with pride and emotions that the occasion deserves. Is that the primary reason why most people singing the national anthem appear to be mechanical and not emotional?

 The English translation of 'Jana gana mana' was done by Margaret Cousin, which was meant for a slow rendition style. The orchestral choral adaptation was meant for ceremonial purposes. This 52 second rendition was composed by Herbert Murrill. There is also an abridged version (with the first and last lines only) for specific  ceremonial occasions.

This raises a number of practical questions. Herbert Murill composed the orchestral version keeping in mind that the National anthem should be short and inspirational as it is sung/played on solemn occasions, often in the presence of the Military.. What then are the occasions when Margaret Cousin's version may be sung? I am sure such occasions are hidden away in numerous orders on the subject which remain inaccessible to many.

Theatres too have begun to play different variants of the Anthem. In the absence of clarifications and instructions easily accessible to all, it is likely that a 'pop' variant would hit the stage soon. 

I was forced to introspect on the subject, due to a recent incident. A casual visit to a film show at a local theatre turned out to be eventful. When the National Anthem duly preceded by a request to rise was played, the entire audience stood up- save one. Here was a man a few rows ahead, who continued to text on his I- Phone while being firmly seated in his chair.  Come intermission, I walked up to him and with great restraint said, "You Sir, must be the most troubled man in India which prevented you from rising for the National Anthem" He, with nonchalance, brushed me aside and replied, "That Sir is a long story." Little did I imagine that in my life time I shall meet a young man so angry with his motherland.

So, was it ignorance ,apathy, anger, rebellion,.....?  My mind raced back to post Vietnam scenes in Washington DC when unhappy and discontented demonstrators displayed anti-national sentiments. . Is this a process of evolution which is best left unaddressed or does it reflect the need to legislate or even better, create awareness through public private partnership.

Governments are notorious for inability to reach out to the people, except during elections. This subject needs bipartisan/multi party consensus and innovative programmes cutting across party lines. Sadly,  many of the elected representatives themselves need a crash course on the subject of Patriotism.

Post Election Dilemma

Post Election Dilemma- National Security Paradigm 2014

Whoever occupies the chair of PM will have to address a whole range of inadequacies which are systemic and inherited over six decades. Even if policy/decision making/implementation paralysis is overcome through speedy governance, major unaddressed  institutional weaknesses would continue to stymie good intentions. While this may be applicable to all departments of the Govt, it has special significance to National Security as a whole.

A few examples should suffice. Given that India has had no political leader who has had in-depth  knowledge of functioning of Armed Forces and that the post independence period has seen only short bursts of wars not exceeding a couple of weeks at a time, both the decision maker and the citizen has little to offer in terms of worthwhile contribution to National Security. An un informed leadership and an indifferent citizen-many of who did not have to face the terrible consequences of a great war lasting for years, constitute  a       recipe for disaster.

Who was an effective defence Minister who earned the respect of our Forces since independence? Perhaps Indira Gandhi, while not holding defence but providing political leadership of a high quality during the 1971 war and later Jaswant Singh as an interim defence minister in 2001. A rank outsider who made an impact and strived to strengthen the institution of national security was Arun Singh. In my memory of 40 years in the navy, civil-military relations were at their optimum best when Arun Singh was RRM and later when he headed the study on Defence Management, after the Kargil crisis. Creation of CDS, integrating MOD with service headquarters, creation of tri-service commands , delegation of financial and administrative  powers to the Chief  and many more long pending reforms were steered by him personally. But he quit at a crucial stage of implementation, the Govt changed and we slid back to the bad old days of laissez faire.

The Armed Forces of India were structured to induct, train and fight along well tested methods of the British experience. These were modified when India had an intense phase of interaction with the Soviet Union. During the cold war, not only did we send some of our bright officers to undergo courses in UK,USA,France,Australia and Japan, we also kept our doors open to all of them to avail of reciprocal training facilities in India. All this, even as a very large percentage of our officers were sent for courses and acquisition of platforms/weapons to the erstwhile Soviet Union. India was often called a Soviet ally and those of us on training with the Western block were isolated from operational closed door sessions.

Intermingling and interaction with the Western block and concurrently with the Eastern block during the cold war era was an experience that few armed forces in the world could have boasted about. What it did to our personnel is that it exposed them to the critical deficiencies in higher level defence management in India as compared to the closed Soviet system and a democratic Western model  . This experience reinforced a strong desire among the thinking military leaders, to be a part of the decision making process pertaining to National Defence. A desire which is yet to be noted or noticed by successive governments.

 While most countries had integrated their armed forces for efficient management of resources, India continued to follow an outdated and vacuous process based largely on the presumed dangers of military intervention in politics of India. Bureaucratic dominance at MOD and the convoluted process of decision making which led to lead time of decades to acquire new systems, were a product of the neglect to reform the system. Numerous committees have underlined the need to reform and rewrite the business rules  of MOD.

What needs to be done?

The new Govt would need to complete the incomplete process of implementing the Kargil Review Committee report and the decisions of the then GOM. It may be noted that most institutional  reforms implemented in western democracies were politically thrust on the reluctant forces, who more often than not, hold on to their turfs. But then ,those politicians who successfully brought about reforms had a deep understanding of national security due to their long contribution in active service and war. How do we tackle this weakness which cannot be wished away?

 One option is to reconstitute the implementation committee of the erstwhile Defence Management, with those originally tasked to do so. If necessary,consider including retired senior officers of known professional competence and integrity from the three services and Foreign Service in particular. The latter not only interact with Armed forces personnel in India but also in various parts of the world during their service. This has to be a time bound activity in order  that the newly elected Govt is enabled to perform within its tenure.  

The Integrated Defence headquarters and tri service commands of Andaman and Nicobar as well as Strategic Forces are already functional. The IDS which is currently toothless as it functions under an equally toothless COSC, would finally be empowered as the staff of CDS.

The Govt would have a single point adviser in CDS and the integrated MOD would fulfill the long standing desire of the uniformed community to participate in decision- making and policy- making process of the Govt. The RM would be better served with professional advice on both counts. It will ensure close rapport at all levels and eliminate the 'We versus them' syndrome which is all pervasive in the Ministry.

This is just the beginning. We need to address the interface with NSA and the role of CDS in all policy and decision making bodies of higher level committees and Group of ministers. Just professionalise the whole gamut of National Security.

Vice Admiral Suresh Bangara was the former C-in-C of the Southern Naval Command and the first Deputy Chief Of operations of IDS  headquarters

AAP-What next?

AAP Arvind Kejriwal - Fascism and Hitler. Paradigm or Enigma?

Robert Paxton argues that fascism is "a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victim-hood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion."

Not being an academic nor a political historian, I was intrigued by similarities, albeit partial, between the subject under discussion and Hitler. AK exhibits some similar characteristics and convictions, mainly, that he alone has been ordained to solve the problems faced by the helpless people of India.

AAP and Hitler's workers Party which later was better known as Nazi Party, exhibit similar strains of fascism-exempt militancy for now. I say for now, as I did notice signs of militant behavior among the AAP senior echelons - Bharti is a good example.

When a former Ambassador, who happens to be a lady, goes public with her discomfiture with the "Militant" men of AAP- the inner circle- and their patronizing attitude, it says it all. One can reasonably assume that she has had many occasions to deal with all types of men while discharging her duties as a diplomat and that there must be good reasons to go public on her strong objections to the conduct of members of AAP. Until then she was a well-respected member of the core team of policy drafters.  Their articulation on merits of Khap may substantiate her claims.

When tens of thousands of people chant "Arvind, Arvind" and shower their affection through a show of faith, very few leaders can remain with their feet planted on Mother Earth.. It is an addiction that drives the subject of adoration to believe them. Public show of swearing-in, mass contact programmes, and frequent Media interactions for sensational revelations are all symptoms of a disease that is known to convert an ordinary well-meaning individual into a megalomaniac. Arvind would do well to note what    Ashutosh Varshney wrote recently in an OPED column, which suggested that there is a great difference between popular will and popular sentiment - sentiment can quickly change. It is the people's sentiment that needs watching.

The early days of Hitler were full of some of the above characteristics. Germans wanted a change. They thronged in large numbers to his sessions of public ranting and raving. He began to believe in them and they in him. History is replete with instances of such leaders, who from heroes became hated despots over time.

While the militant part of AAP has not been on display, an occasion that needs serious introspection is when AK threw an invitation to the Delhi Police to shed their uniform and join his agitation on Raj Path. Sedition is more serious than militant behavior. AK also threatened to disrupt the whole Republic Day parade, even as he went on to question the sentiments of Indians and the need to participate in an elitist display of marching columns. It exhibits a poor understanding of the implications of such actions and utterances. There is thus a reasonably good chance of turning a peaceful demonstration (repeatedly emphasized by Anna during a mass gathering of IAC) into a violent and destructive event.

Why would a group of fully educated and well-experienced scholars, diplomats, bureaucrats, industrialists, and others not advise and guide a relatively less experienced engineer turned bureaucrat on negotiating land mines on his path. It may well be the haste with which AAP wishes to fully capitalize, on what they perceive to be a historic window of opportunity.

 Running before learning to walk first can be an exceptional occurrence in individuals gifted to compress time-related activities. Movements and reforms need time, careful handling, nurturing, and above all selfless leadership. The Arab Spring, Libyan attempt to correct decades of misrule, and the Egyptian political experiment in haste, give us enough material to introspect.

AAP needs to consolidate, learn to govern under a given framework of law, respect laws of the land before attempting to rewrite them, and finally show the way to reform an arguably decadent system." A good leader should also be a good follower", is an axiom worth reflecting upon.

                                                 

Veterans In Politics-A solution to Civil Military Relations.

New Generation Parties and  Veterans of India-A Force Multiplier?

Thanks to a visionary Commanding Officer, who performed his duties of grooming young officers with an eye on the future, I was introduced to Samuel Huntington's book on Civil Military Relations at a very early stage of my Naval career. India then ,was too young a democracy to predict the trends in civil-military relations or to be able to steer a debate on essentials of this critical relationship in matters of good governance. Generations of Military officers grew up with a sub optimal understanding of remaining apolitical in a democracy. As I was to learn later, most senior leaders had not grappled with issues pertaining to the duties of a soldier in a democracy, more importantly when the political leadership in India, barring those who lived through World war 2, were completely at sea when it came to matters military. Isolating the Military from decision making processes of the Government was based on a mis- perceived threat of coup after independence and the reluctance of the elected representatives to learn about duties of a soldier vis-a-vis the responsibilities of the society to the soldier. After 66 years there is now a window of opportunity to correct the anomalies and injustice meted out to the Soldier of India. (The term Soldier is generic to Sailors and Airmen too and has been used to describe the military in Civil-Military relations in general) 

Since new generation parties(NGPs) such as AAP, Nav Bharat Democratic Party and Lok Satta  have declared their intentions to professionalize governance through induction of capable, clean and committed candidates into Parliament and State Assemblies,it is time to address issues that have remained clothed in secrecy for most part of our post independence history.  

Recorded history and analysis carried out on the subject of civil-Military relations has established that the Armed forces in a democracy must remain apolitical and serve the Government elected by the people. It means that while individuals in the Forces may choose to vote for a party of his/her choice, once the results are declared and a Government is formed with the assent of the President(the supreme commander of the Armed forces) it is the Government of the day which enjoys the full loyalty of the soldier.  In practice however, a vast majority of Indian Soldiers  were never given the opportunity to exercise their franchise, neither in the station they were posted nor through postal ballots. The Government of the day did not consider it necessary to treat a Soldier as a citizen first, whose right to vote cannot be denied under any circumstances. Hence, ,lacs of soldiers were deprived of their right to vote. Most politicians who were busy wooing specific vote banks were not interested in this disciplined community which was known for its obedience and integrity.The irony is that most soldiers and very senior officers were of the view that not voting was part of being apolitical.  Thus a combination of apathy from politicians and sheer ignorance of democratic rights vested in a soldier as a citizen, resulted in complete absence of discussions on the subject.

While the serving community was constrained by mis- interpretation of rights of a soldier to exercise his franchise, the retired community kept itself away from what was seen to be a dirty vocation.

Post 1970's the quality of those who increasingly got elected through money and muscle power,   continued to deteriorate rapidly, which in turn affected the image of the politician. It further dissuaded veterans from entering Politics. Compare this with the second largest democracy, which has, over the years, continued to elect Presidents and senior political leaders from the retired Military community. George Washington, Eisenhower, Grant and John F Kennedy are but a few examples.  In a democratic electoral process every retired soldier is free to enter politics and pursue his political duties with the same dedication and vigour, with which  he pursued his military duties..

 . We now have over a crore retired soldiers and families and a similar number of serving soldiers and families., Some of them have rendered yeomen service to society after they shed their uniforms. They have all the requisite administrative, organisational and professional competence to oversee good governance. Currently, they are angry, hurt and repeatedly ignored. Supreme Court decisions on legitimate pay arrears ruled in their favour, have been contested by the same Ministry which is responsible for the welfare of its veterans.   

What can NGPs do for them?

Firstly, understand and participate in  debates on National security. Ensure that the budgetary allocations are commensurate with the needs of our fighting forces.

Second, ensure that the Army is not committed on a permanent basis to solve problems related to poor governance within India.

Third, hold the Government accountable for timely modernization of weapons, equipment and platforms.

 Fourth, Implement recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee on integration of Armed forces, creation of CDS and integration of  service personnel in MOD.

 Fifth, restore the izzat of the Armed forces by upholding the status of the soldier in society.

 Finally and more importantly, care for the retired soldier by ensuring his financial and economic well being, as also his health. Recognize the role of the society in taking care of war casualties, wounded and disabled soldiers and their widows.

To be able to do this a National Security manifesto should form the guaranteed deliverable of a NGP. Currently only Nav Bharat Democratic Party has addressed  these issues. Quite clearly, Veterans of great repute for their contribution to society need to be located and encouraged to fight elections. It is they who will compensate for the lack of knowledge  in Parliament on affairs Military, the ignorance on service conditions and genuine needs of the armed forces. 

What good is development without security?

On the occasion of Navy day 2013.

Culmination of Ideas and Dreams

Myths and Realities of Modernisation

What a remarkable achievement, one might say. When most navies of the world are stagnating or drawing-down due to scant resources, i.e .financial, material and human, the Indian Navy has commissioned a whole range of potent platforms that would make any modern Navy proud. Arihant and Chakra, both nuclear powered Submarines, the former indigenous and the latter leased; P8I Boeing, the much needed maritime surveillance aircraft; Vikramaditya, the long awaited aircraft carrier; and the first indigenously launched communication and satellite are a few worthy of mention. Add to these two extremely ambitious shore facilities - the new naval base at Karwar and the Naval Academy at Ezhimala – and the Navy's growth seems even more impressive.

Myths on modernization may suggest that the Government of the day or those at the helm of affairs have pulled off a miracle. The reality is that no acquisition in India is possible unless the case has been examined for decades. All the above listed platforms have been conceived, discussed and processed for decades. For instance the first proposal for Vikramaditya was   made in 1994. The deal was signed a decade later, after many levels of scrutiny by experts from the Navy, MOD and Finance. The ship was handed over in 2013.  The reality is also that there is no accountability with the Government for inordinate delays caused by repeated interventions and scrutiny. The opportunity costs of such delays do not fall within the purview of any of our auditing mechanisms, nor are they viewed with concern for their impact on budgetary escalation.

Advantage Indian Navy

Being a small service, the navy enjoys some unique advantages. Firstly, perspective plans and budget management fall under a common head who reports to the Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The Future Navy is the sole responsibility of the senior most Principal Staff Officer of the navy. It is not so in the other two services owing to their size and historical imperatives.

Secondly, being a small service with a disproportionately large responsibility of guarding the maritime frontiers of a sub-continent, the Navy had to learn to consistently pursue long term plans which are refined with the passage of time. The very first plan for the modernization of our Navy soon after independence, contained references to a three-carrier fleet. It has taken more than six decades to partially realize the dream.

Conceptualizing the design and building a destroyer takes up to a decade. Build time in our shipyards are notoriously high due to lack of modern and contemporary facilities. After they are addressed, we could perhaps reduce it by half, to be at par with established navies of the West. 

Thirdly, the Navy was quick to support ship building in India in Defence Public Sector yards and a few privately-owned Indian ship-builders. This impetus has paid rich dividends, right from the commissioning of the British designed Leander class frigate Nilgiri in 1972. We now build Fast Attack Craft, Corvettes, Frigates, Destroyers, Landing Ships, Tankers and Aircraft Carriers. Remarkable, but modest, in terms of future needs of high quality platforms. There are some unsuccessful stories too which are covered later in this piece.

Fourthly, we were quick to embrace indigenization and place confidence in DRDO supported laboratories. While the growing DRDO capabilities were unable to produce weapons to keep pace with the build cycle of the ship, (despite that being a prolonged process) Sonars to hunt submarines and EW systems did pass the test. Many of our frontline platforms are fitted with these systems. Also, radars, communication and EW systems have been supplied by BEL and other PSU labs in India.

Fifthly, indigenous ship building gave birth to thousands of small and medium scale industries that supplied auxiliary equipment, power generation and air conditioning systems, cabling and thousands of other sub-systems that go into a building and sustaining a modern warship. There are well known large scale industries that supply generators, as also shafts for propulsion of ships. The stringent quality-standards applied to clear them for acceptance have enabled most of them to become internationally certified and known. This is a classical spinoff of defence related activities. The private sector thus has a significant stake in warship building

Lastly, among many such success stories, a couple that do not find mention often enough are the navy's own design department based on whose stellar work indigenous warships are built, and the Navy's own group of specialists that continue to do pioneering work in the development of state-of-the-art Combat Management Systems and a slew of cyber security products and networking solutions for the Indian Navy.  Such capabilities hold strategic potential and are essential components to establish self-sufficiency.

Looking Back to see the future

In the last six decades, scores of committed individuals have skillfully led the Navy's planning initiatives, often innovatively. They have been ably supported by a leadership that saw in these efforts the means to leap-frog the Navy into a potent blue water force.

A myth that found favour with overseas experts, and some of our own in the 1970s and 80s, was the description of the Indian Navy as a brown water force aspiring for blue water status. The rear view suggests otherwise. Even as early as  the 1950s, Indian Navy ships were deployed for flag showing as far as the Australian waters. In fact, when I had the opportunity to meet Mr Wolfenson, former President of World Bank in Washington in 1997, he greeted me by narrating his experience of boarding the old Cruiser INS Delhi at Melbourne in 1954. Warships do leave indelible impressions on those who visit them. Even the old Indian Navy was never a brown water force.

There was however a brief interregnum when the ships acquired from the Soviet Union imposed limitations on engine hours of their gas turbines, which in turn significantly reduced blue water deployments.

    

When ageing British ships, which formed the mainstay of our Fleet, were to be replaced and the first submarine acquisition programme was approved, the U-turn performed by the UK in denying India the supply of submarines is well-documented. The consequent large acquisition programme from the Soviet Union enabled us to tide over gaps in force levels until our own programmes began to fructify.

The Soviet platforms however, gave us insights into relatively modern weapons and sensors, and more importantly, into missiles and torpedoes. Surface-to-surface missiles were positively a force-multiplier and when ably supported by surface-to-air missiles, they provided the Fleet with punch enough to deter any adversary.

The submarine arm too received the much-needed upgrade when both German designed submarines and the Soviet designed EKM submarines were inducted in quick succession.

At this stage, naval planners were busy pushing for indigenous construction of a variety of platforms. First they focused on the successors of the Leander class ships by indigenously modifying their design, which not only enabled a frigate to carry a 10-ton multirole helicopter for operations at sea, but also led to the induction of the Godavari class frigates that skillfully integrated Soviet missile systems with a host of indigenous systems and equipment accessed from multiple sources abroad. Simultaneously, new design for Corvettes, Tanker and Destroyers evolved over time. The only occasions we were forced to seek foreign shipbuilding assistance was for six Talwar class ships from Russia and Tankers from Italy, both owing to inadequate capacity in our own yards due to over loading.

Some Lessons

One of the unfulfilled programmes of a rapidly modernizing force relates to the inability of the Navy and the Government to build submarines to offset depleting force levels. A number of factors have led to the present imbroglio. The optimally designed German SSK submarine inducted into the Navy were also built at Mazagaon Docks in Mumbai. The build-facility was set up at a great cost and technicians were trained to use state-of-the-art build technology. The project was soon abandoned after two boats were built due to alleged kickbacks and corruption. Consequently, the entire set up along with trained manpower of the yard was allowed to dissipate and be wasted.

The Scorpene submarine to be built with French assistance has been inordinately delayed. The second line of construction remains to be concluded. Thus, the Navy is yet grappling with the declining force levels of conventional submarines.

As regards budgetary allocation for the navy, constant interaction with MOD has seen an increase from 11% of the defence budget to almost 18% in recent years. However, the target of 20 % has to be achieved in the near future, if we are to accept the new challenges posed by the global strategic focus to the Asia Pacific region.

In so far as defence acquisition procedures are concerned, they continue to stifle and throttle efficient and time bound programmes. Unless procedural and systemic changes are brought about by professionalizing and integrating the decision-making structure of MOD as recommended by the Committee on Defence Management chaired by Arun Singh, there is little hope of optimizing the process.

Finally, whenever there is resource crunch, as in late 1980s to mid-1990s and now in 2013, the armed forces are advised to tighten their belts and review acquisitions in the pipeline. Nothing could be more disastrous than this approach. Each year lost in reduced budget allocation results in depletion of combat capabilities. The cumulative shortages can never be remedied by nominal increase in budget subsequently, due to systemic limitations and minimum acquisition time cycle needed to complete the task. Combat capability and adequate reserves to fight a limited war cannot be compromised under any circumstances, unless the nation is prepared to accept defeat in war as an option. Victory in 1971 has not erased the memories of 1962 - the latter was caused by neglect, inadequate knowledge of military needs and insufficient political interaction with military leadership.

Paradoxically, six decades later, we continue to grapple with the basic issues of national politico-military interface.

Vice Admiral Suresh Bangara (retd) former C-in-C of Southern Naval Command. He has had the unique opportunity of heading the Policy and Plans, and later Naval Operations divisions of the Indian Navy.

0f air bags,seat belts and crashes-The Indian Story

Motor vehicles in India today, have pleasantly surprised many of us who grew up in an era dominated by acute shortages of quality vehicles, an under developed industry,inability of most to pay for a new car and severe restrictions imposed by Governments on scarce  foreign currency for transfer of technology. The good old Ambassador of Hindustan motors, Fiat,standard Herald were common sight on the sparsely crowded roads of our country.  The changes after  liberalization however, saw quantum jump in design, quality and safety standards of  cars that continue to flood our market. From the days when a direction- indicator was a rarity,we now match the latest trends in technology and software driven applications in all our automobile products.

This is the backdrop against which I am recounting the details of a car crash which my wife and I survived recently. Given that advent of modern cars coincided with attempts to upgrade the quality of National highways and Express ways, the opportunity to exceed an average speed of 80 Kms on these newly built surfaces became a reality.  While the ability to traverse distances in comparatively shorter duration became a reality, a whole host of attendant facilities coupled with the need to educate the semi literate user on the repercussions of high speed traffic,were perhaps not pursued with equal vigour.   . Safety features in all walks of life in India, be it,construction,transportation and industry, are far from meeting well documented and mandatory features enforced by advanced countries of the West. It is thus not unusual to see inadequate sign boards/ warning signals/signs, incomplete safety barriers to prevent human and animal encroachment on high speed corridors, unauthorized traffic of two wheeler ,four wheelers and tractors in the wrong lane( often heading the wrong way) and inability to hold highway authorities accountable for dangerous diversions and unlit stretches of potentially high risk accident prone zones. Viewed from the ever increasing density of population bordering on intercity motorways and unregulated settlement of colonies, we are poised on the threshold of serious conflict of interest posed by human/animal and environmental issues.

For a country which has witnessed unprecedented growth of motor vehicles but not enough infrastructure development,strict adherence to rules of the road and close monitoring to check indiscipline, should be a very high priority activity. That it is not so, is known to all.The chances of encountering an unlicensed driver at the wheels of a truck or load carrier and vehicles with poor material state  are very high ,if not real.

With all the knowledge at my disposal, I managed to collide with a milk truck on the National Highway near Kolhapur in Maharashtra.Entirely my fault. The rather well made SUV took the brunt of the collision and voila, the air bags deployed as designed. I was in for a further surprise apart from the safety features of my SUV. The emergency road side assistance provided a flat bed and a taxi in a reasonably short span of time.Such facilities were unthinkable a few years ago. Well done Mahindra.

The sense of relief and gratitude for our very miraculous escape was marred soon thereafter, by the procedures adopted by the Cops who arrived on the scene. That is another story which needs to be analysed in the context of services provided for the common man in India.

So we thank the Almighty for sparing us rather lightly. But air bags, seat belts and a well designed firewall perhaps contributed in no small measure to our survival.

Do spend a few moments on the safety features of your new car before you select one. A cashless policy with zero depreciation is well worth the investment for those of you who intend to frequent our Highways. 

Poor Civil-Military Relations-Root Cause Of Malaise?

POOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS-ROOT CAUSE OF MALAISE TODAY

Most democracies have struggled to find a balance in their civil - military relations. Unlike India, more seasoned democracies of the West have learnt to handle frequent disharmony between the two, owing to decades and centuries of deployment of their Armed Forces in Great Wars and more importantly at distant locations away from their home land. Refinements in processes of Command and Control were thrust upon them due to extraordinary circumstances including the post World War 2 occupation of Germany and Japan. This was managed and run by Military Officers who were suitably empowered and authorized by Heads of elected Governments of their respective countries. There were also occasions such as the Truman-Mac Arthur dispute, during the Korean War, which was seen as one of the most illustrative tools of the civil-military friction in the history of USA.

The Indian scene was quite the contrary. Along with independence came a series of Coup de'tat, in many of the Countries in our region. India alone  stood as a shining example of a copy book democracy, with the Armed Forces remaining apolitical all the way. This is no mean achievement, especially given the fragility of so many of our neighbours who had to be subjected to Military intervention in their internal politics. But this 'harmonious' civil-military equation in India, came at a price. The civilian leadership right from Independence began to neglect the dire needs of both the serving and the retired Soldiers. (The term Soldier is used to encompass all three services and their men)  Modernization of weapons and sensors, service conditions and health care of serving soldiers and the care that ought to be extended to retired soldiers through reemployment opportunity and compassion towards widows of war veterans etc continued to be accorded less priority.

 The politician  was never very comfortable with the strict traditions and dress codes that gave the military a distinct identity and character.  Consequently, 

the sanctity of civil -military relations were from time to time tested.  Some of the notable events of conflict were, Nehru-Gen Thimmaya, Krishna Menon- Gen Thapar and later Indira-Gen Manekshaw. The military, however, conducted itself with dignity and discipline. Since the media was not intrusive and confidentiality of sensitive information was respected, matters of dispute remained in-house and appeared in print only when someone wrote a book, years after the event. Leakage of information outside the confines of the Defence Ministry was considered to be blasphemous acts.

 Civilian control over the military went through periods of tension without violating the basic tenets of Command and control. Errant and less informed Defence Ministers with personal agenda  did try to intervene in routine matters of administration,promotion and land acquisition/ disposal.In most cases direct access of the Chiefs to  the Prime Minister,  acted as a relief valve. Equilibrium was soon restored when needed.

The discomfort of the Politician continued to grow even as the quality of Politics and politicians deteriorated after mid 1970s'.In order to sequester  the politician  from assertive soldiers, the bureaucracy was increasingly given the responsibility to decide on most matters military. This was aggravated when some Prime Ministers also held the Defence portfolio  in addition to many other Ministries. On such occasions,  RRM's chosen to fire- fight on day to day activities, were quite incompetent and relied heavily on the bureaucracy. Consequently,the service Chiefs  had to stand in queue to meet the Prime Minister. Earlier, they had the liberty to walk in and out of the PM's office  when necessary.

After the Rajiv Gandhi era which enjoyed better civil-military relations, the country was subjected to a grave economic crisis which resulted in shelving of all major modernisation programmes for nearly a decade. Matters Military were relegated in priority till combat efficiency began to erode.

Another major factor that has had deleterious effects on civil-military relations is that Armed forces deployed to restore law and order in poorly administered and terrorism infested states of India including Kashmir, found themselves permanently deployed with no solution on the horizon. Troops so deployed are exposed to politicization owing to the nature of  the environment and firsthand knowledge of political exploitation and machinations.

 A series of events thereafter led to reduction of the status of the soldier in society: until Kargil restored some aspects of neglect, when the electronic media brought the war to the drawing rooms of our citizens.

The first serious review to study what led to Kargil was entrusted to late K Subrahmaniam, the well known expert on strategic affairs. The team formed under him consisted of experts drawn from the retired community as well as people of considerable experience in their respective domain. The then Government, ensured that the study was carefully vetted by a competent group of Ministers, who in turn formed Task forces to address the issues that would lead to successful implementation of the broad recommendations submitted by the Subrahmaniam Committee.

By a twist of fate, Tehelka expose exploded in the face of the ruling party. George Fernandes was forced to step down. The second 'coincidence' occurred at this point in time. The External Affairs Minister was given temporary charge of Defence. In a short stint, he proved that perhaps he was the most perceptive and far sighted Raksha Mantri that independent India had seen. He was an acknowledged scholar with a Military background and an author of one of the best written books on Defence of India. He had already appointed Arun Singh, former RRM in the Rajiv Gandhi Government as an advisor to EAM.

Arun Singh, was perhaps one of the few corporate honchos brought into Government, by Rajiv Gandhi, based purely on his passion for matters Military and unparalleled knowledge of how the Military and bureaucracy ought to function. The far sighted RM now holding fort for his colleague who had stepped down, promptly selected Arun Singh to head the Task Force on Higher Defence Management. Arun Singh had substantial knowledge on how the Ministry of Defence functioned and he had a rare insight into knowledge of the Military including its modernisation. Arguably, independent India had perhaps not seen a Civilian with this capability. He was also the leader of the team which  produced a document titled The Committee on Defence Expenditure(CDE), for the VP Singh Govt. The only occasion when he came out of a self imposed ban, after his abrupt departure from Rajiv's cabinet.

Having been made the leader of the Task Force on Higher Defence Management, Arun Singh left no stone unturned to bring to light a whole range of changes and reforms that would have made India a very potent and effective force to reckon with.

Based on facts and drawing from experiences gained by developed nations of the West, this report contained far reaching reforms that made the bureaucracy and some uniformed officer, both serving and retired, very nervous. As long as Arun Singh continued as an Advisor in the South Block and the EAM was holding temporary  charge of Defence, they worked as a well oiled team. Implementation of all the recommendations moved flawlessly and rather speedily. Red tape and delaying tactics at all levels were dealt with firmly and decisively. It appeared to be the turning point in Indian Military history. It was not to be.

The next episode is quite inexplicable. Prime Minister Vajpayee for reasons best known to him stopped the most important reform of all. Integrating the Armed forces under a single Chief, was stalled by him. All the progress made until then came to a dead halt.

Enter George Fernandes after he was cleared of all charges and Arun Singh quit his post as abruptly as he did, when he left Rajiv. Another coincidence? One will never know until one of the main actors writes about it one day.   

The greatest opportunity to cleanse the system of all its malaise was thus lost. Needless to say no further reforms were carried out by the new Govt. The bogey of the CDS becoming an all powerful entity reappeared. Equations and pay and allowances of Soldiers were distorted. Post Vietnam- like scenes were witnessed on the streets of Delhi. Soldiers returning medals, the age row of a Chief and now the spectacle on Television on the VK Singh episode, which makes India look like a banana republic, are all symptoms of a disease caused by Poor Civil- Military relations.

The sad part is that, all of it was caused by uninformed Ministers, a leaderless bureaucracy which is equally uninformed on matters Military and conniving Soldiers who were too parochial and petty minded to waste a golden opportunity for reforms.

No reforms of the armed forces have been successfully planned and executed by the Soldiers themselves. They have been thrust upon them, ala, Maggie Thatcher, the Iron Lady and the Gold Water Nichols act in USA.

As Arun Singh often said, "Those who have vision have no power and those in power lack vision on matters Military".

(Suresh Bangara, former C-IN-C of Southern Naval Command and presently Vice President Nav Bharat Democratic Party.)