Post Election Dilemma

Post Election Dilemma- National Security Paradigm 2014

Whoever occupies the chair of PM will have to address a whole range of inadequacies which are systemic and inherited over six decades. Even if policy/decision making/implementation paralysis is overcome through speedy governance, major unaddressed  institutional weaknesses would continue to stymie good intentions. While this may be applicable to all departments of the Govt, it has special significance to National Security as a whole.

A few examples should suffice. Given that India has had no political leader who has had in-depth  knowledge of functioning of Armed Forces and that the post independence period has seen only short bursts of wars not exceeding a couple of weeks at a time, both the decision maker and the citizen has little to offer in terms of worthwhile contribution to National Security. An un informed leadership and an indifferent citizen-many of who did not have to face the terrible consequences of a great war lasting for years, constitute  a       recipe for disaster.

Who was an effective defence Minister who earned the respect of our Forces since independence? Perhaps Indira Gandhi, while not holding defence but providing political leadership of a high quality during the 1971 war and later Jaswant Singh as an interim defence minister in 2001. A rank outsider who made an impact and strived to strengthen the institution of national security was Arun Singh. In my memory of 40 years in the navy, civil-military relations were at their optimum best when Arun Singh was RRM and later when he headed the study on Defence Management, after the Kargil crisis. Creation of CDS, integrating MOD with service headquarters, creation of tri-service commands , delegation of financial and administrative  powers to the Chief  and many more long pending reforms were steered by him personally. But he quit at a crucial stage of implementation, the Govt changed and we slid back to the bad old days of laissez faire.

The Armed Forces of India were structured to induct, train and fight along well tested methods of the British experience. These were modified when India had an intense phase of interaction with the Soviet Union. During the cold war, not only did we send some of our bright officers to undergo courses in UK,USA,France,Australia and Japan, we also kept our doors open to all of them to avail of reciprocal training facilities in India. All this, even as a very large percentage of our officers were sent for courses and acquisition of platforms/weapons to the erstwhile Soviet Union. India was often called a Soviet ally and those of us on training with the Western block were isolated from operational closed door sessions.

Intermingling and interaction with the Western block and concurrently with the Eastern block during the cold war era was an experience that few armed forces in the world could have boasted about. What it did to our personnel is that it exposed them to the critical deficiencies in higher level defence management in India as compared to the closed Soviet system and a democratic Western model  . This experience reinforced a strong desire among the thinking military leaders, to be a part of the decision making process pertaining to National Defence. A desire which is yet to be noted or noticed by successive governments.

 While most countries had integrated their armed forces for efficient management of resources, India continued to follow an outdated and vacuous process based largely on the presumed dangers of military intervention in politics of India. Bureaucratic dominance at MOD and the convoluted process of decision making which led to lead time of decades to acquire new systems, were a product of the neglect to reform the system. Numerous committees have underlined the need to reform and rewrite the business rules  of MOD.

What needs to be done?

The new Govt would need to complete the incomplete process of implementing the Kargil Review Committee report and the decisions of the then GOM. It may be noted that most institutional  reforms implemented in western democracies were politically thrust on the reluctant forces, who more often than not, hold on to their turfs. But then ,those politicians who successfully brought about reforms had a deep understanding of national security due to their long contribution in active service and war. How do we tackle this weakness which cannot be wished away?

 One option is to reconstitute the implementation committee of the erstwhile Defence Management, with those originally tasked to do so. If necessary,consider including retired senior officers of known professional competence and integrity from the three services and Foreign Service in particular. The latter not only interact with Armed forces personnel in India but also in various parts of the world during their service. This has to be a time bound activity in order  that the newly elected Govt is enabled to perform within its tenure.  

The Integrated Defence headquarters and tri service commands of Andaman and Nicobar as well as Strategic Forces are already functional. The IDS which is currently toothless as it functions under an equally toothless COSC, would finally be empowered as the staff of CDS.

The Govt would have a single point adviser in CDS and the integrated MOD would fulfill the long standing desire of the uniformed community to participate in decision- making and policy- making process of the Govt. The RM would be better served with professional advice on both counts. It will ensure close rapport at all levels and eliminate the 'We versus them' syndrome which is all pervasive in the Ministry.

This is just the beginning. We need to address the interface with NSA and the role of CDS in all policy and decision making bodies of higher level committees and Group of ministers. Just professionalise the whole gamut of National Security.

Vice Admiral Suresh Bangara was the former C-in-C of the Southern Naval Command and the first Deputy Chief Of operations of IDS  headquarters