THE AGE ROW

THE AGE ROW-AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW BEGINNING

Both the Army and the Government have cut a sorry figure, having brought in the media and the Court to solve what was essentially an in-house problem. The Army failed to remedy a mundane institutional weakness which caused two separate departments i.e. the Military Secretary who is responsible for career planning, promotions and postings of all officers and the Adjutant General who is the custodian of all records including personal data of officers at the time of induction, to clash and embarrass the whole nation. Incidentally, such a division does not exist in the Navy and Air force as the Personnel department is wholly accountable for all aspects including record keeping of their personnel.

The Media, both print and electronic participated with much enthusiasm and held kangaroo courts to condemn those involved in precipitating the age row concerning no less a person than the Chief of the Army Staff of India. .. While this saga has created much confusion within the Armed forces, the civilians are amused with the hullabaloo, over what they perceive to be a mole hill with no consequence whatsoever. All they want is to see the right general officer placed in the exalted chair of COAS.

For those of us who have spent decades on the subject of Civil-Military relations and the absence of a healthy and productive interface between the Govt and the Armed forces, it came as no surprise. The two imperatives that shape the military institution are, ‘functional’, stemming from the threat to society and ‘societal’ consisting of social forces, ideologies and institutions. In a democracy, these are evolving processes based on the experience gained during wars and the care and attention paid to the soldier to make soldiery a special and exalted profession. India has had very little of both. India has not been involved in long drawn out and debilitating wars which perforce involve the entire nation and demand the participation of all able bodied citizens in direct battle or support functions. In countries which faced hardships of great wars, a generation or more of people with knowledge of affairs Military, have made significant contributions towards preparedness for war. While those governments have utilized their expertise to plan the shape and size of the Armed forces, the Private sector has used their competence to equip the Military with appropriate weapons, sensors and ordnance.

In the Indian context, very little has been discussed on the vital need to nurture healthy civil-military relations. Most politicians do not educate themselves on the nuances of handling a highly professional and motivated Military. Some have equated the Military and the Police without realizing the professional and cultural differences between them. Politicising the Police force has been quite routine but the damaging consequences of politicising the Armed forces have not even been adequately addressed. Consequently most political leaders are uncomfortable dealing with the military and issues of National security. The natural buffer between the two is the civil servant who interprets the Military message to the politician and the political message to the Military. It was therefore most convenient for all to discourage direct contact between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs. The latter ought to be interacting with senior political leadership on all matters pertaining to management of the Armed forces without the need to interface with a layer of bureaucracy. Hence the proposal to create a Chief of defence staff, providing financial and administrative powers to the Chiefs etc have been opposed on specious grounds whenever specially constituted committees recommended this course of action.

Since the end of the Great Wars and the Cold war, many Western democracies have created better functional structures such as, more integration to fight modern wars and delegated powers with checks and balances, all to get the best bang for the buck.

In India, many eminent committees have been tasked by governments in power to find solutions to improving efficiency of the system...Among the many recommendations made by the Subrahmaniam Committee after the Kargil action (which cannot be termed as a war) some crucial ones which would have significantly enhanced the fighting potential of our Armed forces through synergy and integration were ignored by successive Governments. Integrating the Ministry of defence with the service headquarters was one, which, if it had been carefully executed, would have acted as a  multiplier in terms of efficiently administering the Armed forces. Professionals from the services would have occupied desks which need to have knowledgeable personnel to service the complex matrix of demand versus limited resources. Suitably qualified civilian experts would have supported personnel related issues and those of logistics..

The age row, as the one on show today, would not have happened simply because the ministry would have been one entity and the “us versus them” syndrome would have been a thing of the past. This is how democracies in the west function today

Finally,, why has age assumed such importance in selecting a Chief? Many modern and forward looking administrations have opted for a combination of merit and age. In the Indian context anything to do with discretionary powers to select the best officer for the assignment is fraught with danger as none would trust a political set up to be objective and impartial.. Yet, if we are to find the right man for the exalted chair, just the seniority or date of birth cannot possibly be the right methodology. We then have to create institutional mechanisms with transparent processes to recommend the right man. This will ultimately remove the less capable from the race. Bangladesh has opted for a system of contract for the Chief which provides a relatively long tenure and the powers to the Govt to terminate the contract if necessary. It is worth learning from countries that are willing to think out of the box.

India cannot afford to blunder along without correcting processes and mechanisms that are critical to its stature in the comity of nations. We have enough committee reports on almost any subject. What is required is the will to professionalise our decision making process. Here is an opportunity begging to be grabbed. Will we?

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MY SAM

SAM-OUR AFRICAN GREY AND A GIFT FROM GOD

It was in 2004 that Sam came to us at Kochi,during my last assignment in the Navy.He was a baby.The net will tell you all about the African Grey and how it has the IQ of a five year old human. In under two years, Sam not only conversed with a surprising repertoire of vocabulary but often surprised us with his interpretation of spoken words. His responses were immediate and appropriate to the situation. He had a keen sense of humour and would often reproduce the exact sound of my official car horn which would send the duty steward running to the door, even as he grabbed his cap to be properly attired in uniform. Sam would thereafter chuckle or guffaw which made the recipient of the prank rather angry.But then Sam was the Admiral's favourite and none had the guts to suggest disciplining the Parrot. Little did they know that the Admiral always wanted a pet who adored him rather than his charming wife. But then it was the lady who knew all about pets as she literally grew up  in a house full of pets-more like a zoo, as narrated by the family.

Retirement came soon and just when we were left to ourselves with the Children and Grand children not too far away, Sam filled the void. He became a constant companion at work and play. It was as if God had thought it fit to give us a child who would keep us occupied through the day. His meal timings,the shower which he adored and his insistance to be part of any conversation with or without guests became a legend among friends and acquaintances alike. The Bangara home, came to be known in the neighbourhood as "Totewala ghar"  Door bells were answered by a loud "Kon Hai" and the telephone with a cultured "Hello"

In many ways Sam was no less in his accomplishments than the famous Eienstein, the African Grey displayed  as a genious on You Tube. We however opted not to bribe Sam to display his talents but to let him do things his way and when he desired to do so.

On the morning of 03 January 2012, due to a careless act of our domestic help Sam flew away into the densely wooded and uniformly built concrete structures of our colony.Even semi literates find it difficult to identify a building in this complex without reading the number on the gate.Sam not having seen a house from the outside can never return unless God is willing to give us another chance.Will he survive in a hostile and alien environment long enough for us to get him? He did once before. It is 24 hours now and we will soon know. If Sam survives and is returned to us I shall tell you more about his love for music and dance. Until then do let us grieve in silence and hope that time will heal our wounds. 

NAVY DAY 2011

MODERNISATION AND INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY

“LINKS OF A STRONG CHAIN”

 The third Indian built Leander class frigate INS Udaygiri was despatched on a 14 nation cruise enroute to the Queen’s Coronation Fleet review, at Spit Head (UK), in 1977. As is the practise among many navies of the world, the ship was thrown open to visitors. Hundreds came on board in all the European ports to see an indigenously built frigate of the Indian Navy. It is said that a warship is a mirror of the technological and industrial capability of a country. It is a floating city with power generation facility often, enough to provide electricity to a whole township and all other essential features to house, feed the crew and fight a modern adversary. That the visitors were suitably impressed with what Mazagaon Docks had achieved in this very first venture was obvious from the glowing tributes in the media.

As young officers, who were fortunate to be a part of the commissioning crew, it was a rewarding experience and raised our expectations of what was to follow in the decades ahead. Indeed some of us held planning assignments as we grew. The navy had taken a conscious decision as early as in 1954, to create an in house cadre of naval architects to design and build warships for the navy. This single step provided the necessary impetus to our planners to confidently conceive a modern Fleet and even aim for an indigenous Carrier capability.

So, how have our efforts to modernise, matched our vision of a balanced force to counter challenges posed by the entire spectrum of maritime warfare? No navy of any calibre can plan without the ability to indigenise. The Indian navy had to contend with many limitations while planning a balanced force structure. Resource limitation was the first. The often unpredictable defence budget had a disproportionately small percentage allotted to the navy( from less than 10% to 17 % in recent years. The navy needs 20% of the pie to grow on a sustained basis). The man power intensive Army coupled with our paranoia related to continental threats ensured that the share of the navy in the limited defence budgets of the 1970s and 80’s remained woefully inadequate for any worthwhile planning. For more than a decade, orders for ships to offset the depleted force levels were just not placed. Submarine construction of German design with contemporary technology was terminated due to extraneous considerations. Our reliance on Soviet industries grew perilously, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union and with that the collapse of the supply chain so critical for war ship building, created a new challenge.

The Navy learnt to innovate. While planning and structuring the future navy was  within its charter, the execution of the plans after necessary approvals, was totally a MOD function. The ‘attached office’ status of service headquarters within the MOD denied the participation of professional naval officers in the decision making processes of the Govt. Under these circumstances, the Navy opted to maintain a healthy ratio between its revenue budget and its capital element. Nearly 50% of its meagre budget was put away for capital commitments of ship building and infrastructure creation. Hence began a sustained campaign to tighten our belts by keeping man power induction to the very minimum and placing heavy limitations on the use of the revenue element of the budget. Thus the most critical period of financial crisis was weathered before the post liberalisation/globalisation phase began to show positive signs in the GDP growth of India. With the sustained growth of GDP, Defence budgets were restructured and the navy’s share began to register an upward trend. The ships under construction in Defence PSU’s began to roll out.

From the Leanders to the Shivaliks  and soon to the indigenous Carrier being built at Kochi, is a journey filled with uncertainties, systemic infirmities , delays in DRDO projects, infrastructure inadequacies of our yards, serious time and cost over runs in production and policy flip flops in subsidies for the ship building industry as a whole.

Despite the short comings listed above, the navy has consistently pushed for a combination of war ship construction at home and abroad so as to maintain a balance between depleting force levels and combat effectiveness..

Could we have jumped many of these steps by an integrated approach to addressing issues that plague the ship building industry as a whole? Economic stability of the country is a precursor to many of the reforms that need urgent attention. While the navy has made progress in ship building and weapon-sensor development and integration, some critical weapons are still to be designed and produced in India. All the missiles and critical weapon systems are still imported. R&D in frontier and cutting edge technologies is very inadequate. While countries working with alliance partners can afford to share the burden of R&D and hope to achieve economy in scales due to volumes thus generated, India has very little scope to generate such volumes unless an export option is made viable. The Brahmos missile, a joint venture between Russia and India appears to be showing some potential in this direction. The Chinese cut the development cycle by reverse engineering and mass producing Russian weapons and sensors consequent to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian scientists of high calibre were found peddling their high grade design and research material on the streets and offering to work in countries which could accept them. That China made full use of this opportunity is evident from the war ship characteristics on display today. Joint venture with strategic partners is one way of cutting development cycles and costs.

Shifting focus to ship building, exploring modern building techniques providing subsidies to the industry, adopting PPP and JV models through integrated approach between Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Shipping (MOS), creating a larger pool of naval architects, reducing time and cost over runs and finally making the best use of the new off set policy for defence procurement (Estimated at US$ 1 Billion for the navy alone) are some of the measures under consideration. The private sector understandably will continue to show disinterest if volumes remain unattractive and export options are not relaxed.

30 months is taken to produce a frigate in the west, it takes 72 months in India with a cost overrun of 300 %-a luxury we can no longer afford. And yet fault lines apart, the Navy can legitimately take pride in the quality of ships built over the years. Modern features such as stealth, integration of propulsion packages, improvements in Heat, ventilation and Air-conditioning (HVAC) are being incorporated in new designs for ships and submarines- both conventional and nuclear. A whole new range of ships from Patrol boats to Aircraft Carriers are now built in India. Entrepreneurs and small enterprises have benefitted as much as those who sail in them.

An edited version of this piece was carried by Indian express in the navy day pull out dec 2011

Structural Infirmities

STRUCTURAL INFIRMITIES OF CWG 2010

AND

LESSONS FOR HIGHER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

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The information overload caused by the ill managed event of CWG 2010 provides great insights into the structural deficiencies, lack of good management practices and a host of other facts. Did we not pull off CWG 1952, Asian Games 1982 and the more recent Youth games and Military games? Don’t we regularly hold Republic day parades at Delhi, manage religious events of gargantuan proportions where logistics are mind boggling and even win kudos for a first ever International Fleet Review at the busiest port of Mumbai? Yes we do

What was common in all these successful events was the creation of an empowered structure with responsibility and accountability. The PM himself overseeing CWG 1952, an empowered group with Rajiv Gandhi to ensure good coordination of the successful Asian Games in 1982, are cases in point. This CWG failed due an absence of a centralised command structure. Responsibilities were not demarcated, there were too many “Indians “and no chiefs and what is more everyone had an excuse not to own up responsibility.

13 November 2003 was the date on which the Commonwealth Games Federation resolved to hand over the games to Delhi. In accordance with article 10 A the host city contract was inked by Government of India (GOI), Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi(GNCTD) IOA and CGF.The organisation of the entire event was allotted to OC CWG.

 The key delivery partners listed on the web site are CGF, IOA, OC CWG, GNCTD and GOI in that order. It also states that several ministries of GOI and several organisations under GNCTD and others would be involved in execution.

 Even a prima facie analysis of this structure would point to the fact that the coordination of such a complex body cannot be vested with a committee which has no authority over the key delivery partners. In the Indian context, hierarchy and individual egos play a vital role in the smooth functioning of the organisation. At times, collective organisational goals are sacrificed to appease individual aspirations. Presumably these considerations caused undue delays of about two years before the Organisation Committee came into existence on 10 February 2005- a faulty and toothless structure from day one. Although representatives of all the delivery partners were constituted on the committee, raising alarms at the CWG meetings,  when deadline after dead line failed to be met by their parent organisation is not a practical proposition. Having taken full responsibility to stage the best ever game, as outlined on the web, the Organising Committee, perhaps, continued at best, as a mute spectator to inter- ministerial red tape and embarrassing delays in execution.

What is needed in the globalized, highly competitive and demanding environment is to professionalise our decision making structures to include experts in negotiations and project management and other niche areas.

A look at the Ministry which manages the Armed Forces of India in the above context would be instructive. This Ministry has the responsibility to handle the rapidly increasing defence budget which is more than twice the amount allotted to CWG but on a yearly basis. Is it structured to meet all the requirements of the Armed Forces of India?

Firstly, since 1952, the three Chiefs along with their Headquarters were removed from the decision making structure of the Government of India. They were designated as the “attached offices” of the Ministry. In effect all communications from the Armed forces were to be addressed only to the Ministry and no decision making powers and executive powers were to reside with the Chiefs, save those related to operations. Not even the revenue budget could be operated by the Chief to merely run the service as it existed. The Chiefs could send their recommendations and plans for modernisation which effectively rested at the table of some functionary without even an acknowledgement. The Ministry continued to be manned by generalist- civil servants who often learnt about the Armed Forces after they were placed in the chair.

While the authority to take decisions with the concurrence of the Minister was vested with the Ministry, there were no provisions for accountability. Having been removed from the chain, the Chiefs could only make proposals and could not be held accountable. The procurement of Advanced Jet Trainers(AJT) for the Air Force took over two decades, by which time costs had escalated by 500%.The decision to induct Goroshkov took over a decade, by which time the deteriorating cables of the ship warranted doubling of the original cost. Many thousand crores are surrendered unspent year after year despite the urgent operational needs of the Army. There are no clear cut penalties for procrastination and opportunity costs incurred thereof. Are these not the ills of CWG as well?.

Secondly, integration of the Ministry with the Armed Forces by placing uniformed professionals at appropriate desks of the Ministry is a successful model practised by other democracies. Similar structures were recommended by the Committee on Defence Management after the Kargil war. Cosmetic changes in nomenclature with no corresponding powers were the only action taken to show compliance.

Thirdly, the Kargil Review Committee, did recommend the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single point advisor to the RM on all matters of planning, acquisition etc.This has been stalled by statusquoists within and without the Armed Forces. The result is the continuation of a toothless Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was first recommended in 1924 and which is still in existence only in India. Almost all Armed Forces of countries that matter have opted for a fully integrated structure with accountability, while we continue to live in denial of a serious structural infirmity.

CWG 2010 has brought disrepute to the country due to delays in implementation despite seven years to prepare. We can live with it, for, soon it will be forgotten. However continued denial of structural weaknesses in the Defence department, has the potential to lay our country in the dust. Until then incapability to modernise, lack of timely decision coupled with conflicting demands of the three services can only be offset by the ability of our officers and soldiers to lay down their lives- even if it is to achieve a pyrrhic victory.

The quote that follows perhaps sums up our predicament, “We the unwilling, led by the unqualified ,have been doing the unbelievable for so long with so little that we now attempt the impossible with nothing”

An edited version of this article appeared in the Business Standard soon after the CWG. Today it needs to be also viewed in the context of efficient management of Formula one in Delhi. Faulty management structures and lack of accountability are the root cause of time and cost over runs.

Political Accountability

COST TO COMPANY

Cost to company is a terminology which is well understood in the private sector. ‘Canons of financial propriety’ was a terminology which was equally drilled into those vested with the onerous responsibility of spending tax payer’s money. Audits and reviews were carefully crafted into organisations that dealt with public money. The bottom line was that the tax payer’s money was not to be splurged or casually handled. What has happened over the years is that institutions which were nurtured and built have been destroyed by ignorant, self serving, greedy and unenlightened leadership.. More and more criminals were elected by default because you and I did not vote. We said that we have no worthwhile candidate to vote for and hence why vote?

We got the parliamentarians we deserve and consequently the govt we deserve. Here in full public gaze, we had our MPs justifying the generous pay and perks that they granted to themselves. Should there not be an independent authority/commission with no conflict of interest that decides such matters? Look at the timing of their demand. Political unrest in the North, north west and parts of south, thousands of war veterans resorting to desperate measures of returning their medals even as the Supreme court ruled in their favour for One –rank-one pay and the Govt continued to deny them their constitutional rights. High inflation and cost of living which affects all middle class citizens and below. Floods ravaging northern parts of India and farmers unable to make both ends meet. How can we expect our MPs to be so sensitive to the needs of the citizens when the elections are not imminent? What about the ever increasing number of Crorepatis in our parliament. Will they voluntarily forfeit the new salary-some have said so!

Ironically, a recent report in the media states that the Ministry of Civil Aviation has decided to reward all the past Secretaries with perks that would make a very successful airline blush. It is Air India that we are talking about which is surviving on bailout packages offered by the Govt.Whose money is it? Yours and mine of course. What if the railways and shipping ministries follow suit? Are secretaries to the Govt of India the only civil servants serving the nation?  They have taken a cue from our enlightened parliamentarians who were willing to stop all proceedings if their demands were not met. Don’t you think we need to put the right people in the parliament so that a top- down cleaning up process can commence at least in 2014. Vote for professionals-vote PPI.

Jointness

TO INTEGRATE OR NOT THE POLITICAL-MILITARY DILEMMA OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES.

I was at the Royal Naval Staff College (Greenwich) in 1979, when the seeds for integration of the British Armed Forces were sown. Doubting Thomas’s were the same in their forces as there are in ours, even today. A few years later Gold water Nichols act was ‘thrust upon’ the American Armed forces and the process of operational and logistics integration commenced in earnest. The British followed suit as the basic logic of integrating the services cannot be over emphasized. The creations of a single operational head and integrating the much duplicated operational and logistics functions were thus enforced with strong political will-the prime focus being national interest. No one is immune to turf war and so there were murmurs and strong biases displayed by old war horses and their politically driven masters. Today it would be naive or perhaps stupid to fight a war with each service claiming it’s pre-eminence. There are no Manekshaws to charismatically coordinate the Tri-service operations, while also obtaining equal, albeit grudging support of the political leadership as well. His firm advice to the then Prime Minister to allow the armed forces to select the window of campaign is well known. Do we continue to hope that an equally competent coordination would occur in a system which does not empower any single authority to be accountable for the outcome of operations? Would Service Chiefs continue to man their respective Operations rooms during war? More importantly who would ensure the entire process of priorities of weapon/sensor acquisitions and preparing for war, based on a common threat perception? In other words peace time preparations including joint communication/training processes play a vital role to ensure success in war. It would be appropriate to note that a series of operational failures occurred in the pre integrated forces of the USA. One service could not communicate with the other due to incompatibilities in equipment and operating procedures.

Kargill was like the Chinese invasion of 1962 in so far as jostling us from our slumber is concerned. We woke up to the harsh realities of inadequate resources leading to perfunctory actions by those who are required to keep vigil. Had there been a theatre command integrated with appropriate aviation/space surveillance assets would the incursions and build up at Kargil have gone unnoticed?

The Govt swung into action and appointed the Subramaniam Committee, with very eminent people leading their respective sub-committees. Out came an exhaustive study with clear recommendations for implementation across the board. No, we could not make the whole report public as there were State secrets to be guarded-just as the Henderson Committee report on the Chinese incursion/invasion of 1962 is still kept closely guarded. Given our gross negligence to create a technologically contemporary archive for posterity and our callous approach to historical record keeping, all the lessons from the past would be of little or no use, if and when they are made public.

In this case let us look at the crucial aspect of integrating operations of the three services and the implications of dragging our feet to do so.

When the Kargil review committee was formed, an extremely well read and perhaps the most competent expert was assigned the task of reviewing the Management of Defence. The report when being compiled and later when submitted was continuously under the scrutiny of the Chiefs Of Staff Committee and the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps for the first time in Independent India, a Committee report after obtaining the approval of the cabinet was monitored for implementation with such efficiency that a vast majority of recommendations were actually realized on the ground, save a few crucially important ones. With the change of the Govt even the mode of monitoring took a back seat and with change of personalities who were witnesses to all the discussions on the subject the commitment too vanished. Soon status-quo prevailed.

 I am compelled to comment on this mainly because, had the integration of operational and intelligence resources been completed on time, the Mumbai attack may not have succeeded, as the Joint mechanism for Coastal patrol and communication as well as intelligence would have matured in its functional and operational roles. Principally two segments of experts continue to oppose the well thought-through recommendations of the Committee report. The first, civilian defence analysts/civil servants who represented the pre integration models of running the security affairs of the country. The second, officers both in and out of uniform who felt insecure and /or were representing the perceived interests of a particular service of the Indian Armed Forces. These were exactly the same combination of people who opposed integration in every western democracy. There was one bogey yet to be resolved in India due to her relatively young democracy and that was the preposterous myth of the Indian Armed forces conspiring to take over the country from the democratically elected representatives. A bogey often used to confuse the insecure politician. It is difficult to think of a more apolitical military than the Indian forces in contemporary military or political-military history. Since there is a lobby that continues to oppose integration, it would be instructive to examine the existing system which hopes to meet all challenges to national security. That we manage to meet immediate threats at great sacrifice of human cost is a tribute to our fighting forces-not the system. An analogy that readily comes to mind is the upcoming Common Wealth games which are likely to be pulled off at the last moment with little or no attention paid to the unprofessional organisation behind it. We will of course  partake in the euphoria of its success. We need to focus on the systemic changes needed to improve our performance to fight the next war and not the last. Since the existing system of COSC is sometimes quoted to be an efficient model it would be instructive to visit the background to this model.

The existing system of COSC was first created in 1924 in the UK. A similar system was also replicated in India. The COSC with CGS, Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN) and AOC, however reported to the C-IN-C who was the single operational head of the Armed forces.

When Lord Mountbatten was asked after the war as to what was the single most valuable lesson of the Second World War, he seemed to indicate the vital need to integrate the three services from womb to tomb. Hence the thrust given to forming the first ever combined tri service training academy in the world-The National Defence Academy in Khadakvasla.The seeds of integration were sown in Independent India as early as 1949 when none in the world had an integrated ab-initio training facility. Even the British took, time to integrate but when they did, all common operational/ training facilities were set up with alacrity. Other than training facilities unique to each service, complete integration of the services and the MOD has been achieved.

In Independent India, since jointness was not on the horizon, DSSC Wellington, later CDM and NDC(which is placed directly under MOD) were created as combined training facilities. Operational integration was never a priority assigned to the staff college. Every effort to create jointness in operations was resisted by individual services and more emphatically by the Govt in power. Often we are told that it is a sensitive subject, as a single Operational commander would pose a threat to Democracy. No opportunity is lost to quote instances when such coups could have been a reality. It would appear that clinging to such myths even after 62 years of a successful experiment with Democracy is more important than functionally enabling the Armed forces.

In May 1952, the then Def sec circulated a draft document titled “Organisation, Functions, Powers and Procedure of Defence Headquarters” where the Attached office status of the Def hqrs was discussed. It must be noted that it was the same Gentleman who resisted all efforts to provide the Chiefs direct access to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. It is my belief that this was the start point of the destruction of a developing POL-MIL relationship which thrives in Western Democracies. On the flip side given that almost all countries surrounding India had gone through military take over’s, (at this point in time) the reluctance on the part of the political leadership to engage the military in major planning processes was somewhat understandable. Equally, to drag this analogy to the 21^st century is shameful and the political leadership of all shades need to introspect on the vital requirement of integrating the senior military leadership into the decision making process.

In 1955 the service chiefs until then called Cs –in-Cs was redesignated as Chief of staff of their respective service. While my efforts have not produced authentic documents on what led the Govt to make this announcement in Parliament, or whether the Armed forces were even consulted, this decision has adversely impacted the services even today. Many may not be aware of these facts and perhaps do not know that the term Chief of staff does not assign an operational role to the chief and that operations had to be handed over to a C-in-C. The civil servant was not too well versed with operational implications but was implementing the wishes of his political masters. Quite naturally the service chiefs assigned operational roles to themselves and continue to do so even today. Had the operational integration gone ahead, theatre commands and a joint chiefs of staff may well have been in postion.However the concept was new and had not been tested anywhere when this was implemented in India.

Prior to and post the implementation of integration in the West, attempts were made, albeit sporadically, more with the intention of improving logistics, training and financial management of the Indian Armed forces. Noteworthy among such efforts were the Estimates Committee report of 1958, Administrative reforms commission of 1967, Committee of Defence planning (CDP) and The Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) which for the first time looked at a new system to replace the toothless COSC.

Those of us who have had long exposure to the workings of COSC and its interface with the Govt through the Def Sec, know only too well that such a system if left unchanged would result in disaster when we meet with a more sophisticated adversary than Pakistan. The country cited above has had to live with crises unthinkable in our country and thus had little to show in efficiency superior to ours. China would be a different kettle of fish and I for one would not want to be proved right in my assessment if and when the balloon goes up.

So what is the solution? To start with, re-visit the full report of the Subramaniam Committee with special attention to the chapter on management of defence. If all of it or most of it is irrefutable, not from a single service perspective but from the national interest, examine possible solutions to the structure of higher defence management.

One of the stated objectives of creating tri service commands ie The Andaman and Nicobar Command and The Strategic Forces Command was to gain experience to form theatre commands of the future. That there should be theatre commands to optimise the fighting potential of any force is now a well established fact and that the combined might of a theatre command would be a force multiplier is common sense.

To those who feel that command in rotation destroys the ethos of the dominant service I would recommend a visit and appraisal of the performance of existing Indian models at NDA, NDC and CDM. If anything the rotation has brought about refreshing changes particularly to the service other than the parent service of the Commandant. Checks and balances are built into the structure. In Operational Commands the C-in-C and the deputy are never from the same service and advice to the Commander is available from senior staff of all the services. Same is the experience in all integrated commands in the West.

It is a matter for concern and equally for debate that the few Armed forces (of significance) of the world who are yet to integrate have “diplomatically” concluded that the Indian Model is “interesting”. It has delivered so far despite the system. Mercifully the Strategic Force command which is the most recent addition is fully integrated with a clear mandate and an operational chain of command.  Accountability is thus ensured.

The question is do we need another crisis for yet another distinguished Committee to tell us what we already know?

  This piece was carried in the Manas Defence Year BOOK 2010/11