The Pathankot Attack

Pathankot is yet another ephemeral terrorists event

Observe the faces and body language of security personnel engaged in the action to eliminate the terrorists holed up inside the Pathankot Airforce Station as depicted in print and electronic media. It is surreal. Because what you see is perhaps the tertiary line of security not even the secondary. Why, because we learnt a bitter lesson during the Mumbai attack, that half-baked, little informed and self-appointed expert anchors and live commentators were driven by the desire to be closest and fastest to report. TRP was more important than eliminating the terrorists. Our own administrators and security establishment had to contend with multiple challenges of inadequate manpower, infrastructure, outdated protection gear and sensors and weapons. yet the greatest challenge was to stop the media from being judgemental and alarmists on every move of those tasked to neutralise the terrorists. The first role of the media is not to spread fear and concoct doomsday scenarios nor to speculate on conspiracy theories during hostile action. Safety considerations also dictate that the cameras are well away from the scene of action.

The above is not unique to India and the South Asian region but to most democracies who are yet to stabilise their respective economies and hence are compelled to fight with what they have due to budgetary constraints. It will be some years before India can claim to have well-equipped security personnel with the requisite gear, ordnance and training. Hence constantly comparing our reactions to those from USA or UK or Israel, would lead to erroneous conclusions and hypothetical discussions. Let us view the current action in Pathankot from this prism or perspective.

Firstly, Commandos and NSG are forces in limited numbers who are meant not to protect but to eliminate the threat once identified. Training and equipping these forces is an expensive proposition which limits their use to specific missions. We need to look at the security forces who are tasked to defend important installations. In the case of defence establishments, the DSC is charged with security of access points and periphery. It is common knowledge that they are limited by age, mobility and equipment. They were adequate to meet the old threat perceptions of occasional ingress of lightly armed anti-social elements or at best insurgents. Why can't the forces themselves undertake this task? The navy and the air force train their personnel to man ships and squadrons which carry complex war fighting machines. Sentry duties perse would add to the poor utilisation of highly trained manpower. However during heightened tension, the available resources are supplemented and augmented as required. This cannot be round the clock or round the year. Terrorist threats are unexpected and  they do not appear like a traditional enemy, as they emerge from within. Hence, each unit maintains a Quick Reaction Team to augment those employed as sentries.

  Very rarely do authorities vested with the responsibility to raise levels of readiness such as red alert, also, lower the readiness level after the threat ceases to exist. In practise, it is possible that units on paper continue to remain at high alert without physically and mentally being all there. Other than the military which has well-defined procedures to raise and lower state of readiness  other central agencies often suffer from this lacuna.

In the case of other important installations such as airports, harbours and establishments, Central Police forces like CISF are used to defend them. They are training is often limited to suit the assigned role.

The police forces are perhaps the worst prepared and yet may well be the first point of contact during a terrorist strike. Pot-bellied, obese and poorly turned out Cops with world war discarded .303 rifles or worse with just batons or sticks are the typical Cops that one encounters. States exposed to insurgency, Naxalism  and terrorism are far better equipped and ready to meet emerging threats. J&K has the ethos and culture of operating under a unified command and disseminating both intelligence and information expeditiously. Real-time communications is mandatory to meet emergency situations.

In terms of our neighbours  Military Governments have done their bit to modernise the gear and weapons of police forces.  Our borders are porous from land and the sea. Our threats emanate from these very porous borders where none can guarantee total success to prevent infiltration. Smuggling is a well-established profession with deep connections with political and business interests.

With the above ground realities, what can be done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to raise our preparedness to combat terrorism?

. At the strategic level, the PM has ensured that major players in global affairs and our South Asian neighbours, in particular, are sensitised to terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan. Terrorism has hence, taken centre stage in discussions and articulation/joint statements. Isolating non-state actors and their supporters are an important first step. Asserting the need to galvanise support at the UN for an acceptable definition for terrorism and subsequent actions to cut off material and financial support to a terrorist organisation has been well articulated by India.

At the operational level, creating and nurturing a strong Central organisation which was initiated by the previous Government after the Mumbai attack, needs to be accorded the highest priority. Round the clock operations room to expeditiously share and disseminate information and intelligence on a real time basis is an inevitable necessity for every State in India irrespective of its location.

Finally at the tactical level, States have to modernise and reform their police forces to include the need to effectively react to a terrorist threat before special forces arrive on the scene. Recent reports suggest that every traffic policeman in Delhi would be armed to meet emerging threats. This is a good beginning. Communications, mobility and firepower are essential elements. Unity of command for operations would need to be made mandatory,  so also single point briefings for the media.

No special committees or  studies are needed to implement the above suggestions. Only the will to fight terrorism is required to execute these plans.

'When the best things are not possible, the best can be made of those that are.'

(Suresh Bangara was a former Commander-in Chief of the Southern Naval Command.)
http://www.firstpost.com/india/pathankot-attack-why-most-analyses-of-the-strike-are-misguided-and-what-india-should-do-to-end-such-insurgencies-2570948.html

Indo-US Defence cooperation-Part 2

 India-US Defence Cooperation

Nuances and Vicissitudes-Part 2

For readers, who could not access Part 1 of this piece, a summary of Geo-Political realities of the 1960s to early 1990s along with events that pushed India to expand her defence relations with the USA formed the backdrop to this piece. What then are the pros and cons of India signing agreements on Logistics Supply(LSA), Communication interoperability and security(CISMOA) Basic exchange and cooperation for geospatial agreements(BECA)

LSA is a subject much discussed over the last decade, both in and out of Parliament. The objections raised by various participants broadly covered the following areas:

·       That it would provide unfettered access to Indian military bases.

·       It would not be a mutually beneficial and cost effective arrangement to accept US terms of settling payments for logistics for the use of our facilities.

·       USA would have greater familiarity with our equipment and preparedness.

·       It would affect our sovereignty

·       It would adversely impact the independence of our foreign policy.

Since 1993, joint exercises have proved to be quite rewarding for both the participants. All three services have participated in highly advanced and specially designed exercises in each other's military establishments. Much has been written about the value of "Exercise Malabar" between the two navies as also" exercise Red Flag" between the two Air forces. The Army has been exposed to special and Commando operations while the American Army has experienced the highly specialised environs for jungle operations in our facility.

Joint patrolling of energy routes in the Malacca straits and to thwart transnational crimes at sea have provided invaluable operational opportunities.

LSA provides cover for transportation, airlift, refuelling and storage services for not only military exercises but also for disaster relief cooperation. There have been cost savings due to reciprocal arrangements. Published reports indicate that in Exercise Red Flag alone saving of Dollars 20 Million accrued to India.

The fact that for close to two decades, both the Militaries have graduated from basic exercises to very advanced ones and have managed to progress without providing unfettered access to each other's military facilities, proves that we are capable of safeguarding our individual national interests. Exposure to the globalised environment has enriched our abilities to deal with unregulated activities at sea, as also to use appropriate technologies to counter them.

While the Parliament and the experts debate on ensuring that our sovereignty remains unchallenged and that we retain our independence in crafting our foreign policy, the global environment has significantly changed. The old formulations of non-alignment which served us well in the early part of our independence need refinement. The recent debate in 2013 on Non-alignment two generated vibrant discussions. Prof Sen (Pune) went on to state that the version 2"reduced Indian thinking to irrelevancy".

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's Look East policy appears to have found serious consideration and recognition beyond our shores. Much after India attempted to operationalise the concept, USA shifted its focus from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific ocean. The Modi Govt has made relations with Japan and Australia its strategic priority. Joint statements no longer hide our real concerns on China usurping  maritime zones not authorised by UNCLOS. Freedom of navigation rights as per international norms are being endorsed in joint statements. We no longer sit on a fence.

The Indian Navy has clearly articulated its Maritime security strategy in a publication recently released by the RM. Primary areas of maritime interests, interalia, include the Persian gulf, gulf of Oman, gulf of Aden, Red sea and the littoral regions, east coast of Africa, Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok and the Cape of Good Hope.

The secondary areas include South East Indian Ocean, South and East China seas, Western Pacific ocean and other areas based on the Indian Diaspora, overseas investments and political relations. Thus, even as we debate, we are preparing to meet uncertain future contingencies.

If national interests continue to be clearly unarticulated and remain vague, changing geopolitical realities would impose several demands on India that would necessitate changes in the traditional concepts of its interpretation.

It is in the above backdrop that the other two agreements which may have legislative and legal ramifications prior to the release of cutting-edge technologies from the USA to India, need to be examined. CISMOA and BECA, the latter which has geospatial intelligence sharing clauses need to be considered from a position of strength and maturity rather than with deep suspicion and lack of confidence in our ability to protect our national interests. These documents are not cast in stone. They can be amended or revoked if required.

If however, the hereto vague concepts of national interests continue to hinder progress both in the USA and in India, perhaps circumstances may force us to find other paths of convergence to survive in a highly unpredictable world.

We are at cross roads-change or become irrelevant.

http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/12/23/india-us-defence-cooperation-lets-no-longer-sit-on-the-fence#.Vnp0orBjsnw.facebook

India-US Defence Dialogue http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/12/22/india-us-military-agreement-a-logical-corollary-to-evolving-ties#.Vnk6N1Y1C20.facebook

India-US Defence Dialogue

Nuances and Vicissitudes

For nearly two decades and a bit more, India and the USA have been discussing several enabling mechanisms to embellish their cooperation between the two Armed Forces. A headline in a leading daily on 21 Dec, regarding Parrikar's visit to USA-  "India and US to talk on giving access to each other's Military bases and ports"- must have raised many eyebrows. Experts may even attribute it to 'questionable Government policy, on a sensitive issue concerning national interest of India.'  This is not a sudden development in our relations with the USA. Agreements on Logistics support(LSA), Communications, interoperability and security(CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and cooperation(BECA) have been on the agenda of the Indo-US defence dialogue for many years.

Indeed, this had also figured prominently in Parliament, when the then External affairs minister, Sri Pranab Mukherji, had to clarify that this agreement,"does not envisage providing military facilities to US forces. Neither does it provide for unqualified Indian support to the US in any armed conflict to which India is not a party." Despite such assurances left wing parties (critical allies) continued to oppose this agreement.

It is necessary to understand the purpose and content of such agreements which are in existence with about 80 countries including Pakistan(expired in 2012 and is under discussion now). Since LSA is considered to be an important ingredient for joint military exercises and disaster relief operations, some pros and cons of signing this agreement from an Indian perspective  may be of value to understand the significance of the debate. That will be covered in the concluding part of this article. A historic perspective on events leading to high-level engagement with the US Military is necessary to appreciate the second part of the article.

From 1965, when military acquisitions from the erstwhile Soviet Union commenced, up to the breakup of  the Soviet Union, India was a major  recipient of military hardware. Yet, there were no joint exercises or operations between the two militaries. In 1971, an Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation   was signed. This timely treaty which assisted India in the Indo-Pak war had placed India squarely in the Soviet camp.

That President Nixon disliked Mrs Gandhi and Kissinger was equally hostile to India, have been well documented. In turn, it led to a generation of US politicians, military and civil servants who were hostile to India. During this period, the Military of Pakistan continued to build on its close relations with Pentagon which began during the CENTO days and flourished during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, the Indian Military  barring those who attended courses in USA and UK were denied the opportunity to be familiar with American operational doctrines and the manner in which congressmen lobbied for military assistance to friendly countries. 

In short, while there was a fair understanding of the Soviet system and training methodologies, little was known of the American system of checks and balances, legislative and executive controls and the White House-Congress interface.

During the same period, in India, anti-American sentiments ran high for numerous reasons. US patch- up with the Chinese through senior politicians of Pakistan and stage managed by Henry Kissinger, the Vietnam war, USS Enterprise incident in 1971, sanctions on India in 1974 and 1998 and many  such actions  did not help the deteriorating relationship. Distrust of US intentions and manipulations were fuelled by the deep-rooted philosophy of non-alignment and left leaning ideologies both at the political and bureaucratic levels. Consequently efforts to normalise relations and enhance military to military contacts received little or no support at all levels of governance in both countries.

Liberalization and globalization began the process of political and military engagement with the USA. As expected every move was carefully weighed both in the context of sovereignty and non-alignment. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only disrupted the regular supply of spares thus resulting in low operational readiness of military assets but, more importantly, the newly formed Russia was unable to provide training facilities for warships on order, as the Russian military personnel were neither paid nor compensated by the state. Many Russian officers survived on driving cabs after working hours. India had to diversify her source of supply of military equipment or face the proverbial "all eggs in the same basket" analogy.

Indo-US military cooperation and dialogue commenced a new phase of an operational trend in 1993. By the turn of the century, an incremental process was adopted at a slow pace to enable both parties to adjust to a new paradigm shift. Two examples of successful and mutually beneficial engagement that resulted in quality agreements were the June 2005 India-US new defence framework agreement with a roadmap for operational, joint military exercises, training and services exchange and the March 2006 Indo-US  Maritime cooperation framework. The former resulted in a maximum number of military exercises of a highly advanced level and the latter in joint patrolling of energy trade routes to combat piracy and transnational crimes at sea.

The concluding part of this article will contain details of our apprehensions and ground realities with respect to the long-pending agreements such as LSA, CISMOA and  BECA.

ISIS -PARIS MASSACRE VIEWED FROM HUNTINGTON'S LENS

"Clash of Civilisation" And The Paris Massacre
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/11/19/isis-menace-military-approach-to-civilisational-crisis-wont-work

I was first exposed to the writings of Samuel Huntington four decades ago. The soldier and the state was the first book on Civil-Military relations written by the author in 1955. The author went on to serve on the faculty of Harvard for 54 years before his death on  Christmas eve of 2008.

So, it was with some trepidation that I requested for a meeting with Huntington in the autumn of 2000 when I was privileged to attend a course at the John F Kennedy School at Harvard. He graciously received me at his apartment and patiently heard my queries on anomalies in civil-military relations. Having completed a full session of discussions, I sought his clarification on the controversial  points raised in his seminal work on "Clash of Civilization."

Samuel's book on "The Clash of Civilization?" was widely read and debated since1993. It was a bold attempt to encapsulate the emerging trends in post cold war politics and how he envisioned conflict between civilizations to be the new evolving global phenomenon. He explained how the fundamental sources of global conflict would neither be ideological nor primarily economic.

While outlining the reasons for the relative decline of the Western Civilisation, he commented on the Western domination of the UN Security Council-a point now  repeatedly made by India in support of reforms of UN. In regard to the "West Versus the Rest" debate ,he dwelled on the fundamental differences between the west and the rest. Paradoxes in the concepts of western democracies when viewed from  the non-western civilisations whether Confucian,  Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist,Islamic or orthodox cultures as outlined in his book were reasserted.

The Paris Massacre-Friday the 13th

Vibrant debates in the wake of the Paris massacre ,cover a wide spectrum of possibilities of addressing issues related to ISIS. In summer of 1993, while first publishing his article in Foreign Affairs, Samuel had addressed two specific issues which he alluded to during our discussions. The first was a reference to "band-wagoning" a term used in international relations to describe non western nation states adopting the western or American brand of polity.  He quotes Boris Yeltsin, ,as one who was attempting to Westernise a reluctant  Russian elite and the people as a whole. The news that France and Russia have already agreed to conduct joint air strikes, possibly  more, may well be the first signs of increasing cooperation and collaboration  between the West and the orthodox Russians who are trying to adopt western goals and objectives.

The other issue which remained incomplete in our discussions on the memorable autumn evening in 2000, was the subject of Confucian-Islamic military and political alignment. The clash of civilization also includes possible alignment in the goals and objectives of Chinese and Islamic states. The China-Pakistan model of all weather friendship is an example in South Asia. However even in this seasoned relationship, the Chinese have harshly opposed attempts by their Muslim citizens to propagate their model of achieving religious goals. In this context China would be closely watched for their material, logistics and military support to ISIS and /or any off shoots of extreme fundamentalist forces opposed to Western dominance.

Current Dilemmas

 Samuel Huntington had alluded to the possibility of India becoming a Hindu State mainly due to the paradoxes inherent in the Western Civilizations and the dangers of blindly westernising the Indian approach to development and progress.  The only successful model of a Nation adopting western goals while retaining its cultural and civilizational strengths is Japan. The Japanese have remained with the West without compromising their cultural affiliations. He, therefore, recommended that the West must learn to understand the cultural and civilizational roots of those that wish to work with them.

India and the Western powers, it is hoped, have learnt to cooperate  without necessarily  accepting Western concepts being thrust on an old civilization rich in its resilience, tolerance and traditions.

The same applies to the obsession of the West to impose their form of democracy on Islamic states which are ruled by methods unique to their culture. Iraq and Libya are but two examples of this fallacious approach. Militarily crushing an immediate threat is and will remain a temporary solution to a complex religious, ideological  and civilizational crisis.

Fouad Ajami and Kishore  Mahbubani  had critiqued Samuel's assertions by September 1993. It would be interesting if they were to comment on the happenings since then in World Politics. I have based my observations as a layman who followed the debate and had the good fortune to meet the author of a magnum opus. Keep smiling Samuel! You may still be proved right.

Pakistan Threatens to use Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan claims to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neutralize a rapid Indian thrust. Is it kakistocracy at work?

 It is well known that the Indian Nuclear Weapons programme was steered by a close-knit group of scientists referred to as "The strategic enclave" which involved specialists from the Armed Forces to operationalize the weapon while control was exercised by the former. The barren civil-military relations was the root cause of keeping the Service headquarters out of the loop. In contrast, due to the dominance of the Military in the polity of Pakistan, the opposite model continues to prevail. 

Recent statement emanating from authoritative Pakistani sources indicate that tactical nuclear weapons have been cleared for use to neutralize any rapid advances made by the Indian Military. Given that the statement has been timed with the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the USA, quite obviously it is meant to leverage Pakistan's bid for nuclear parity with India. However, while deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may appear to be an effective counter to Indian moves, the cold war experience may hold some sobering lessons to the kakistrocratic government in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, NATO forces had carried out extensive studies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent numerically superior land forces of USSR and the Warsaw pact from invading Western Europe. Gaming, simulation and field studies indicated that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional force increased the possibility of a strategic nuclear war rather than decrease it. Simply put, use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario escalates the engagement to a full -fledged nuclear war. Weapons such as nuclear-tipped missiles, artillery shells, neutron bomb or the reduced radioactivity(RRR) bomb of the tactical warfare component, ended up escalating the threshold. 

Second, unlike the use of centralised Command and Control facilities for strategic nuclear weapons, decentralisation is a necessity for tactical use of such weapons. It imposes an enormous burden on the officers in the field while also imposing astronomical costs on equipping the entire force with NBCD gear.

 Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management would become mandatory. Hence, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons has the potential to invite the wrath of a strategic response by India, following factors bear scrutiny; 
• use of nuclear weapons is the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war which can at best result in a pyrrhic victory.
 • the non-first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability. Pakistan could well be wiped out. 

There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in the decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.

In the South Asian context, the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Institutional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities.

 The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation and drills in peace time. 

 We cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM through RM. Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of the operational effectiveness of our assets. 

The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.

(Also published by The Quint on 22 Oct 15)

INDO-US EXERCISE MALABAR

Evolution of US-INDIA Maritime Cooperation.

In the early 1990s,  our entry into the liberalised and globalised world also witnessed a quantum jump in the arena of maritime cooperation between USA and India. A very modest beginning was made off the coast of Goa when an exercise code-named 'Malabar' was conducted in 1992. Not even General Kicklighter, who, as Cin C US Army Pacific Command, brought along a series of proposals to institutionalise cooperation among all wings of the two Militaries, would have expected exercise Malabar to sustain and grow in the manner it has. It would be fair to state that arrangements to institutionalise this effort to promote constructive maritime cooperation have now come of age.

Given that the Indian Navy now operates with navies of Brazil, France, Oman, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, UK, and recently with Japan and Australia, it would be instructive to analyse the progress made in Exercise Malabar, the latest of which is set to kick off between 14th to 19th October.

A realistic assessment would indicate that Exercise Malabar has progressed to be one of the most advanced international naval exercises conducted by India and USA. In this, some analysts who have projected the current Malabar, in the Bay of Bengal, as a ‘slump’ in relation to the high of Modi-Obama agreements are off the mark. Malabar has, in fact, become a high point of Indo-US defence cooperation at the operational level, and with high strategic significance. The fact that advanced operational manoeuvres, ranging across all dimensions at sea, are being regularly undertaken by the participating ships, aircraft and submarines (which keep changing each year), is indicative of the high degree of interoperability that has been achieved between the two navies.

The Chinese objections to multilateral exercises, as opposed to bilateral ones, may be seen in this perspective. 2005 and 2007 reflect the strategic dimensions of Malabar. 2005 saw Carriers of both navies operating together for the first time. In 2007, there were two sessions of Malabar. The first off Japan where India, USA and Japan participated. The second in the Bay of Bengal, when Australia and Singapore too joined. There were as many as three Carriers, a total of 26 ships and a number of shore based strike aircraft. Given the nascent stages of Carrier operations of the Chinese navy, which was focused on training and learning basic flying operations at sea, a display of Carrier and Anti-Submarine Warfare operations of an advanced nature between the leading navies in the region, probably unnerved China, prompting it to seek explanations.

Almost in response to the Chinese,  both India and Australia, pulled out of a suggested Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with USA and Japan, owing to political and economic considerations respectively. The Chinese had achieved their aim in round one.

That, Japan has joined the ongoing exercise, signals a new phase in the saga. The Modi-Obama  and the Modi-Abe relations have played a significant role in deciding the approach to the Chinese hullabaloo.  The declining China -Japan relations with Xi and Abe in power, the Chinese aggressive thrust in the disputed waters of South China Sea, which openly challenges freedom of navigation agreed to by signatories of UNCLOS and the all-weather relations between China and Pakistan resulting in nuclear and maritime cooperation, not forgetting the evolving silk route through   a disputed territory, are factors that cannot be overlooked.

Some experts have commented on a perceived dilution of intensity in Exercise Malabar, asking why India’s Carrier could not be made available and why it cannot commit more ships. Firstly, it is important to understand that it is not the numbers but the contents that define the quality of exercises. The exercise schedule and operational canvas of Malabar-2015 are at a multi-dimensional level, consistent with the higher standards developed over the past decade.

Second, the participation of Japan, albeit with one ship, is operationally and strategically significant. And, third, the participation of Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft in recent years, including the TU-142 and now P8I from India, and P3C by US, indicate the wide range of operational scenarios being exercised.   

Apropos the Carrier debate, the US Navy is a vast force with 10 large and nine medium-size Aircraft Carriers, which regularly deploy to various parts of the globe. On the other hand, India, which plans to have a three carrier task force in the future, currently operates two medium/small-size Carriers, with Viraat to be retired shortly. Vikramaditya, the primary Carrier, has to complete its scheduled maintenance and operational consolidation with the Fleet in the Arabian Sea, before deployment to the Bay of Bengal for the forthcoming International Fleet Review. Hence, the inclusion of an Indian Carrier for Malabar cannot be done merely on theoretical considerations.

However, what stands out is that Malabar has become a regular and key feature of Indo-US maritime cooperation, with a high degree of operational gains and levels of interoperability achieved.

What has gone unnoticed in the profile of the Indian Navy is that the Eastern Fleet which is tasked to operate across the Malacca straits has been bolstered with new induction ships, which is in keeping with the political objective of our look east policy.

While political blips  may appear from time to time on the radar scan, it would be wise to view them over a historical timeframe rather than year on year.

(Published by The Quint on 14OCT 2015)

Do not byte-chase a soldier dear journo

 Irresponsible Journalism

For well over two centuries, the topic of Civil-Military relations has been found to be an evolving process. This process is also contingent upon the ideologies followed by the political leadership of a country. The German and Japanese experience in the early 19th century prompted experts to classify them as "militaristic" nations. Military men assuming political roles, attempts to exercise civilian control over the military and the Nazi experience of unheeded military warnings which led to catastrophic results, have all been well documented.

The profession of the military is "management/containment of violence." Consequently, the primary function of the military is successful armed combat. This being a highly complex and technology intensive activity, the entire process of selection, training and career progression is very unique to the Military. Hence, the military profession is considered to be as valuable if not more than other top professions.  This is one of the reasons why the military commands the respect of the society.

Since management of violence can and must only be practised for socially approved purposes, the State would necessarily have to enjoy the total monopoly over the military profession. Thus, the relation between the State and the Military assumes a sacred dimension.

Such a powerful tool in the hands of any Government can only be used if regulations, customs and traditions are strictly followed. There is no scope for irreverence or interpretation of military orders. The soldier on entry surrenders some of his constitutional rights such as free speech, travel abroad, unauthorised association with the media and many more. He signs a virtual agreement to lay down his life when required. No other profession is required to do so.

It is in this context that the recent efforts made by the media to coerce a serving soldier( a generic term used for navy and air force personnel too) to appear before a camera becomes an irresponsible act. In the case in point, a highly traumatised soldier was asked to comment on the political and social dimensions of a personal tragedy. This is not synonymous with an act of bravery or yeoman service rendered during natural calamities when a mike is thrust at the face of a soldier

Any responsible journalist knows that there are clear orders that prohibit serving soldiers from expressing their political opinions because the military is required to be loyal to the elected Government of the day irrespective of its ideology. Worldwide, discussions on politics are discouraged in militaries of democratically elected Governments. They are required to remain apolitical until they shed their uniforms. This does not prevent a soldier from exercising his franchise in favour of individuals of his choice.

In the event, the soldier in question displayed maturity and grace well beyond his age. His statements reflected the discipline and patriotic fervour of military minds which are focused on combat duties and service to the nation. If his message was directed both to the journalists and politicians, they did not seem to apply to either, much like the water on the ducks back.

For a moment imagine the damage that could have resulted had the highly traumatised soldier given vent to his distress. He would have accentuated communal tensions not only in his village but much further beyond. The Indian Military known to be apolitical and secular would also, perhaps, have been pushed to take damage control measures to retain equanimity in the face of provocative and irresponsible behaviour of lumpen elements of our civil society.

To the TRP driven 24/7 news channels which conduct shouting matches without fail, it has to be said that having 'experienced anchors 'and some research staff who produce immaculate records of who said what and when, do not make the news channel news worthy or instructive, in a nation filled with impatient and partially informed audience. Anchors are not so well informed and knowledgeable as some believe.

 If mere possession of information is knowledge and wisdom is not even a peripheral desired objective, kindly spare the Military which has a clear-cut role to perform against many odds. Also, note that men in uniform who appear on media without approval are subject to rules and regulations specific to this theme. Failure to act upon such indiscretion may be taken as a precedence for future violation.

 An indisciplined Military is as good as not having one.

Published by The Quint on 07 Oct.