Pakistan Threatens to use Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan claims to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neutralize a rapid Indian thrust. Is it kakistocracy at work?

 It is well known that the Indian Nuclear Weapons programme was steered by a close-knit group of scientists referred to as "The strategic enclave" which involved specialists from the Armed Forces to operationalize the weapon while control was exercised by the former. The barren civil-military relations was the root cause of keeping the Service headquarters out of the loop. In contrast, due to the dominance of the Military in the polity of Pakistan, the opposite model continues to prevail. 

Recent statement emanating from authoritative Pakistani sources indicate that tactical nuclear weapons have been cleared for use to neutralize any rapid advances made by the Indian Military. Given that the statement has been timed with the forthcoming visit of Nawaz Sharif to the USA, quite obviously it is meant to leverage Pakistan's bid for nuclear parity with India. However, while deployment of tactical nuclear weapons may appear to be an effective counter to Indian moves, the cold war experience may hold some sobering lessons to the kakistrocratic government in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, NATO forces had carried out extensive studies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent numerically superior land forces of USSR and the Warsaw pact from invading Western Europe. Gaming, simulation and field studies indicated that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against a conventional force increased the possibility of a strategic nuclear war rather than decrease it. Simply put, use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario escalates the engagement to a full -fledged nuclear war. Weapons such as nuclear-tipped missiles, artillery shells, neutron bomb or the reduced radioactivity(RRR) bomb of the tactical warfare component, ended up escalating the threshold. 

Second, unlike the use of centralised Command and Control facilities for strategic nuclear weapons, decentralisation is a necessity for tactical use of such weapons. It imposes an enormous burden on the officers in the field while also imposing astronomical costs on equipping the entire force with NBCD gear.

 Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management would become mandatory. Hence, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons has the potential to invite the wrath of a strategic response by India, following factors bear scrutiny; 
• use of nuclear weapons is the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war which can at best result in a pyrrhic victory.
 • the non-first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability. Pakistan could well be wiped out. 

There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in the decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.

In the South Asian context, the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Institutional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities.

 The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation and drills in peace time. 

 We cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM through RM. Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of the operational effectiveness of our assets. 

The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.

(Also published by The Quint on 22 Oct 15)

INDO-US EXERCISE MALABAR

Evolution of US-INDIA Maritime Cooperation.

In the early 1990s,  our entry into the liberalised and globalised world also witnessed a quantum jump in the arena of maritime cooperation between USA and India. A very modest beginning was made off the coast of Goa when an exercise code-named 'Malabar' was conducted in 1992. Not even General Kicklighter, who, as Cin C US Army Pacific Command, brought along a series of proposals to institutionalise cooperation among all wings of the two Militaries, would have expected exercise Malabar to sustain and grow in the manner it has. It would be fair to state that arrangements to institutionalise this effort to promote constructive maritime cooperation have now come of age.

Given that the Indian Navy now operates with navies of Brazil, France, Oman, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, UK, and recently with Japan and Australia, it would be instructive to analyse the progress made in Exercise Malabar, the latest of which is set to kick off between 14th to 19th October.

A realistic assessment would indicate that Exercise Malabar has progressed to be one of the most advanced international naval exercises conducted by India and USA. In this, some analysts who have projected the current Malabar, in the Bay of Bengal, as a ‘slump’ in relation to the high of Modi-Obama agreements are off the mark. Malabar has, in fact, become a high point of Indo-US defence cooperation at the operational level, and with high strategic significance. The fact that advanced operational manoeuvres, ranging across all dimensions at sea, are being regularly undertaken by the participating ships, aircraft and submarines (which keep changing each year), is indicative of the high degree of interoperability that has been achieved between the two navies.

The Chinese objections to multilateral exercises, as opposed to bilateral ones, may be seen in this perspective. 2005 and 2007 reflect the strategic dimensions of Malabar. 2005 saw Carriers of both navies operating together for the first time. In 2007, there were two sessions of Malabar. The first off Japan where India, USA and Japan participated. The second in the Bay of Bengal, when Australia and Singapore too joined. There were as many as three Carriers, a total of 26 ships and a number of shore based strike aircraft. Given the nascent stages of Carrier operations of the Chinese navy, which was focused on training and learning basic flying operations at sea, a display of Carrier and Anti-Submarine Warfare operations of an advanced nature between the leading navies in the region, probably unnerved China, prompting it to seek explanations.

Almost in response to the Chinese,  both India and Australia, pulled out of a suggested Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with USA and Japan, owing to political and economic considerations respectively. The Chinese had achieved their aim in round one.

That, Japan has joined the ongoing exercise, signals a new phase in the saga. The Modi-Obama  and the Modi-Abe relations have played a significant role in deciding the approach to the Chinese hullabaloo.  The declining China -Japan relations with Xi and Abe in power, the Chinese aggressive thrust in the disputed waters of South China Sea, which openly challenges freedom of navigation agreed to by signatories of UNCLOS and the all-weather relations between China and Pakistan resulting in nuclear and maritime cooperation, not forgetting the evolving silk route through   a disputed territory, are factors that cannot be overlooked.

Some experts have commented on a perceived dilution of intensity in Exercise Malabar, asking why India’s Carrier could not be made available and why it cannot commit more ships. Firstly, it is important to understand that it is not the numbers but the contents that define the quality of exercises. The exercise schedule and operational canvas of Malabar-2015 are at a multi-dimensional level, consistent with the higher standards developed over the past decade.

Second, the participation of Japan, albeit with one ship, is operationally and strategically significant. And, third, the participation of Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft in recent years, including the TU-142 and now P8I from India, and P3C by US, indicate the wide range of operational scenarios being exercised.   

Apropos the Carrier debate, the US Navy is a vast force with 10 large and nine medium-size Aircraft Carriers, which regularly deploy to various parts of the globe. On the other hand, India, which plans to have a three carrier task force in the future, currently operates two medium/small-size Carriers, with Viraat to be retired shortly. Vikramaditya, the primary Carrier, has to complete its scheduled maintenance and operational consolidation with the Fleet in the Arabian Sea, before deployment to the Bay of Bengal for the forthcoming International Fleet Review. Hence, the inclusion of an Indian Carrier for Malabar cannot be done merely on theoretical considerations.

However, what stands out is that Malabar has become a regular and key feature of Indo-US maritime cooperation, with a high degree of operational gains and levels of interoperability achieved.

What has gone unnoticed in the profile of the Indian Navy is that the Eastern Fleet which is tasked to operate across the Malacca straits has been bolstered with new induction ships, which is in keeping with the political objective of our look east policy.

While political blips  may appear from time to time on the radar scan, it would be wise to view them over a historical timeframe rather than year on year.

(Published by The Quint on 14OCT 2015)

Do not byte-chase a soldier dear journo

 Irresponsible Journalism

For well over two centuries, the topic of Civil-Military relations has been found to be an evolving process. This process is also contingent upon the ideologies followed by the political leadership of a country. The German and Japanese experience in the early 19th century prompted experts to classify them as "militaristic" nations. Military men assuming political roles, attempts to exercise civilian control over the military and the Nazi experience of unheeded military warnings which led to catastrophic results, have all been well documented.

The profession of the military is "management/containment of violence." Consequently, the primary function of the military is successful armed combat. This being a highly complex and technology intensive activity, the entire process of selection, training and career progression is very unique to the Military. Hence, the military profession is considered to be as valuable if not more than other top professions.  This is one of the reasons why the military commands the respect of the society.

Since management of violence can and must only be practised for socially approved purposes, the State would necessarily have to enjoy the total monopoly over the military profession. Thus, the relation between the State and the Military assumes a sacred dimension.

Such a powerful tool in the hands of any Government can only be used if regulations, customs and traditions are strictly followed. There is no scope for irreverence or interpretation of military orders. The soldier on entry surrenders some of his constitutional rights such as free speech, travel abroad, unauthorised association with the media and many more. He signs a virtual agreement to lay down his life when required. No other profession is required to do so.

It is in this context that the recent efforts made by the media to coerce a serving soldier( a generic term used for navy and air force personnel too) to appear before a camera becomes an irresponsible act. In the case in point, a highly traumatised soldier was asked to comment on the political and social dimensions of a personal tragedy. This is not synonymous with an act of bravery or yeoman service rendered during natural calamities when a mike is thrust at the face of a soldier

Any responsible journalist knows that there are clear orders that prohibit serving soldiers from expressing their political opinions because the military is required to be loyal to the elected Government of the day irrespective of its ideology. Worldwide, discussions on politics are discouraged in militaries of democratically elected Governments. They are required to remain apolitical until they shed their uniforms. This does not prevent a soldier from exercising his franchise in favour of individuals of his choice.

In the event, the soldier in question displayed maturity and grace well beyond his age. His statements reflected the discipline and patriotic fervour of military minds which are focused on combat duties and service to the nation. If his message was directed both to the journalists and politicians, they did not seem to apply to either, much like the water on the ducks back.

For a moment imagine the damage that could have resulted had the highly traumatised soldier given vent to his distress. He would have accentuated communal tensions not only in his village but much further beyond. The Indian Military known to be apolitical and secular would also, perhaps, have been pushed to take damage control measures to retain equanimity in the face of provocative and irresponsible behaviour of lumpen elements of our civil society.

To the TRP driven 24/7 news channels which conduct shouting matches without fail, it has to be said that having 'experienced anchors 'and some research staff who produce immaculate records of who said what and when, do not make the news channel news worthy or instructive, in a nation filled with impatient and partially informed audience. Anchors are not so well informed and knowledgeable as some believe.

 If mere possession of information is knowledge and wisdom is not even a peripheral desired objective, kindly spare the Military which has a clear-cut role to perform against many odds. Also, note that men in uniform who appear on media without approval are subject to rules and regulations specific to this theme. Failure to act upon such indiscretion may be taken as a precedence for future violation.

 An indisciplined Military is as good as not having one.

Published by The Quint on 07 Oct.

INS Kochi looks formidable-More needs to be done

Kolkotta and now Kochi with Chennai to follow-the Indian Navy ships look formidable

(courtesy The Quint,    see   http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/30/kolkata-and-now-kochi-indian-navy-ships-look-formidable#.VgwPtMgYXyg.facebook)

There is an old tradition that the Indian Navy has scrupulously followed. New Ships are named after their illustrious predecessors with an unforgettable legacy, names of weapons, hill ranges, rivers and capital/metropolitan cities of our states. Hence we have Vikrant under construction at Kochi, to replace the first aircraft carrier which was recently scrapped, Mysore and Delhi have replaced the old cruisers that carried the same names, tankers Deepak and Shakti and a host of other platforms are  some examples of this tradition.

Kolkotta, Kochi and Chennai are names that did not exist in the past as they were better known as Calcutta, Cochin and Madras. When ships of project 15A, as they were designated for design and construction purposes, was entrusted to the Mazagaon Docks at Mumbai for construction in 2001 little did we pause to comprehend the phenomenal advances made in indigenous warship building and the sheer quality of the end products that would carry the new names Kolkotta, Kochi and Chennai.

INS Kochi the second ship of this class, was commissioned today at Mumbai  by Defence Minister Parrikar . It would be interesting and instructive to examine the profile of this ship in terms of the challenges yet to be addressed to fulfil the  objectives of "Make in India"  as opposed to "Made in India"

The Indian Navy placed great emphasis on indigenous construction of warships in as early as 1960s. Concurrently a full- fledged warship design team was created as an in-house asset, reporting to the CNS through the VCNS. From building the British designed Leander class Frigates at Mazagaon Docks ,the first of which, INS Nilgiri entered service in 1972, the Navy has successfully designed and produced Aircraft Carriers, Destroyers, Frigates, Missile and anti-submarine corvettes, Tankers, amphibious  vessels, nuclear and conventional submarines and a number of offshore patrol vessels and fast attack craft. The building capacity has been shared by Defence Public sector yards on both coasts.

INS Kochi and her sister ships  fall under the category of large Destroyers with state of the art multipurpose capabilities to tackle threats in all three dimensi ons,i.e. surface, air and underwater. Most notably, the Brahmos surface to surface missile which is a standard fit in front line ships is a supersonic missile with unmatched strike capability. The jointly developed Barak 8 surface to air missile is a product of Israeli ingenuity and Indian talent to interphase complex technology to suit Indian conditions.

In order to transit from 'Made in India" to "Make in India" we need to create domestic design and manufacturing facilities for  ship propulsion systems and selected sensor and  weapon systems.

We presently have 42 ships and submarines on order in various yards in the country. To progressively equip them with indigenously produced propulsion packages and futuristic sensor weapon packages we need to overcome some grave challenges. These need both organisational and infrastructural paradigm shifts.

Private sector involvement in R&D  , design and production activities has the potential to considerably enhance our ability to arrest time and cost overruns. Aircraft engine manufacturing facility in India, which also has much in common with ship propulsion systems, is an activity which appears to have gained traction recently. If progressed it may open a new window to indigenize the 'move' component of our war ships.

The first challenge of organisational reforms  involves not only changes in the current work ethos of the parent ministry but structural realignments by professionalising and expediting decision-making. This includes replacing generalists with specialists as is done in economic management of the country.

If the Kochi can be designed , built, manned and operated in today's context why cannot we continue the existing process until we find answers to indigenizing the whole process?

Firstly the current system of decision making is laboriously slow and expensive. There is little accountability for delayed decisions. The term opportunity costs figures only in audit reports which rest in parliament after proforma examination of guilt. Consequently, the build time in public sector yards is unacceptably long. The cost of ship building can be considerably reduced if time over runs are minimised. If left unaddressed ships would become unaffordable in the near future.

Secondly, if we continue to rely on foreign suppliers for propulsion and sensors /weapons the ability of our ships to move and fight can be held to ransom during critical periods of preparedness. The friendly supplier of today can turn hostile tomorrow.

Thirdly, it is not often in the history of a developing country  that economic, ,industrial, commercial and proficiency in science and technology of its populace  achieve critical mass and coagulate under a liberal regime in under a century. We are perhaps at the take off stage if enabling mechanisms are put in place. Now is the time to act.

Let the entry of INS Kochi herald the change that we are aspiring for. ISRO has set an example that we ought to follow.

Aim for excellence.

Lessons from the bonus army march on Washington DC

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSC1lbfXfRQ

The story of the infamous bonus army march is well documented at the above site on you tube. We should learn some lessons from it before the current OROP agitation goes out of hand. Disciplined as it has been to date, there is a very thin dividing line between a peaceful and orderly agitation and a violent one. It takes only a small spark to ignite the agitation. The above clip clearly shows that even war veterans like Gen Mac Arthur, could make the grave error of leading a charge against the veterans of WW1.

It is a combination of neglect of the veterans demand,an ill informed and insensitive political leadership, a rare natural disaster and the occurrence of WW2  which enabled the resolution of the veterans demand through a legislation. Public sympathy for veterans finally forced the political leadership to act decisively. By then many more lives had been lost.

Civil-Military relations in a democracy is a constantly evolving equation which is tempered and  shaped by both external and internal dynamics. It has taken centuries of war experience including the civil war for the American public opinion to play a supporting  role for the cause of the veteran. What is often seen today as deep concern and respect for the veteran community of USA is a result of upheavals caused in the past and loss of millions of lives in service of Motherland. Such public sympathy,respect and support are not likely to be witnessed in a young nation of just short of seven decades of independence from a colonial power.

Bringing the soldier closer to the society through well orchestrated publicity campaigns and educational programmes on martyrs is a must. Either compulsory NCC training in schools and/or colleges and exposure to military service short of conscription may be necessary to generate awareness about the Armed Forces of India.

Australia-India Exercise AUSINDEX-15

A LONG AWAITED STRATEGIC OUTREACH-AUSINDEX-15

Those of us who have been involved in planning and nurturing maritime relations with the navies of USA, UK, Russia and France over the last two to three decades, have often wondered why Japan and Australia did not receive the same recognition that they deserved in the Narasimha Rao led look- east policy drive. There were and are many constraints within our closed loop decision and policy making structures. They are not obliged to articulate India's strategic vision in terms of a white paper; as is often done in other defence establishments. Common maritime challenges and interests in the Asia -Pacific region are however, tackled on a bilateral, need- driven basis rather than any long term  vision. Multi-lateral engagements at sea have been frowned upon by the political leadership, as those that may offend the sensitivities of certain countries in the region. Hence annual/biennial exercise programmes like Malabar with the USN, Indra with Russia, and Konkan with UK are  limited to bilateral rather than multi-lateral exercises-with one recent exception.

It is in this backdrop that the visit to Australia in last November  by the Indian PM, after a lapse of three decades and the resulting joint statements and communications thereof, came as a pleasant surprise to the strategic community.

Australian and Indian convergence of interests in IOR has been under discussion for a few years. The Indian Navy's initiative of convening an Indian Ocean Naval Symposium did harmonise and encourage engagement and interaction with all the navies of the region. It would be fair to state that the Australian cooperation in the maritime affairs of the Indian ocean region brought the two navies together. Equally the lack of enthusiasm from our MOD and MEA to support a fruitful venture such as IONS retarded its progress.

Two meetings in quick succession, Abbot in India in September last and Modi in Australia in November the same year changed the atmospherics to a large extent.

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 "India and Australia have a great economic synergy. There are huge opportunities for partnership in every area we can think of – agriculture, agro-processing, resources, energy, finance, infrastructure, education, and science and technology." said the PM at the media interaction on 18 Nov 2014; but what needs to be noted is that   the     strategic dimensions of the relationship were carefully calibrated at the appropriate levels of dialogue/address, both to the media and the joint session of Parliamentarians.

Visit to the Australian War memorial and elaboration on the battle of Gallipoli were perhaps orchestrated to enhance the optics of the concerned event. Stress on underlying strategic interest in areas of civil-nuclear cooperation, maritime security etc, were discretely handled by both parties. For instance ,legislative and legal impediments to deliver on strategic needs of uranium to India as reflected in the agreement reached by the two Prime Ministers, is an example of the complexities that need to be taken note of.

As a result of the impetus received from discussions,  the long awaited Australia-India naval exercises (AUSINDEX) has already commenced at/off the port of Vishakhapatnam and is scheduled to be completed on 19 Sep15. An analysis on the structure of this biennial exercise would be instructive to comprehend the genuine desire for strategic engagement between the two countries.

Firstly, discussions on the need for maritime cooperation commenced a while ago and was emphasised again during Anthony's visit to Australia. However in the absence of conducive apex level discussions, it remained on paper till the strategic objectives were shaped recently. The meetings between the two Prime Ministers in quick succession ,i.e. Abbot's visit to India followed by Modi's to Australia contributed to its  expeditious execution. 

Secondly, the composition and quality of warships and aircraft on both sides indicate that the two navies are willing to jump from elementary exercises  to very advanced tactical exercises. Anti Submarine exercises are considered to be the most advanced level of engagement between any two navies.

Thirdly, that the Indian crew is not only conversant with English but is familiar with procedures adopted by NATO forces outlined in the Allied Tactical Publications(ATP) and Allied Exercise Programmes(AXP), make it extremely convenient for communications and tactical level discussions and preparations. It would not be the case while exercising with Russian or Chinese navies. By itself this is a force multiplier and a tailor made situation for cooperation and compatibility.

Fourthly, the Collins class submarine operated by the Australians is a worthy under water opponent. This exercise would provide both navies with invaluable experience in underwater warfare in tropical conditions.

Fifthly, while surface ships on both sides are capable of deploying integral helicopters for prosecuting underwater threats, the inclusion of P3C Maritime patrol aircraft from Australia and our own P81 Boeing would add a dimension that is the envy of any navy worth its salt.

AUSINDEX-15 has set a high threshold of expectations and experience which would be mutually rewarding and satisfying. It augurs well for pursuing the strategic objectives set by Abbot and Modi, but more importantly for a long and sustained relationship between Australia and India.

http://www.thequint.com/india/2015/09/15/australia-india-naval-exercise-a-long-awaited-strategic-outreach    (The Quint -15 Sep 15  )   

OROP- THE SYMPTOM OF A DISEASE

Politico-Military relations-lessons from the OROP episode

Courtesy The Quint see http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/09/if-only-the-orop-episode-was-not-turned-into-a-political-spectacle

In an earlier article on OROP, I had averred that the agitation for OROP which unfortunately overflowed on to Jantar Mantar in Delhi, was merely the symptoms of a disease. The disease per se has been eating into the vitals of Civil- military relations since independence.

In 1951-52, the newly elected Government and the parliament had very little time to gain knowledge of the Military and its interface with the Government. The enormous burden of handling partition, the gruesome riots, consolidating and assimilating the Princely states with the Indian Union, the J&K conundrum, addressing issues related to abject poverty, illiteracy and health care, creating infrastructure and industries along with academic institutions of excellence were some of the challenges faced by the competent people, who participated in nation building. Their competence and stature can be gauged by the notings on files in which political leaders wrote copious notes while recording their decisions on myriad vexed issues. In comparison the discussions on files  in the past four decades pale into insignificance and reflect a lack of authority and direction not only from the political leadership but also the bureaucracy. 

Checks and balances adapted from the white hall system of office management were either deliberately diluted, circumvented or defaced so that accountability of the politico-bureaucratic edifice was mired in ambiguity and ambivalence.

The Military had also to face numerous hurdles, which, interalia, included adjusting to the post war reorganisation of leftover but divided military personnel, equipment and infrastructure and most of all adapting to a leadership which was wary of coups; consequent to a number of military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood. Given that there was insufficient documentation or studies related to civil-military relations until the seminal work on the subject by Samuel Huntington in 1956, there were no models to follow other than the British and the American experience. The former had no written constitution and the latter had a Presidential system with somewhat vague guidelines on civilian control of the Military. In retrospect therefore, as regards making the military in India integral to the decision making process, it was a case of the blind leading the blind.

Suppression of the Military, was perhaps a deliberate unarticulated political mandate or at best a fortuitous outcome of a confused politico-bureaucratic nexus. Consequently, keeping the Military out of all decision making structures, reduction of pay, allowances and pension, neglect of modernisation , non-provision of essential equipment and ordnance and a host of other issues continued to torment the Military. The poor choice of RMs in many cases accentuated the crisis. In brief, the Military had neither a voice in Parliament, nor the ears of the RM and PM. That the morale of the Military was sustained to win battles both with the enemies of India and enemies within, speaks well of the Military leadership.

There were at least three opportunities to comprehensively address the overall neglect of the Military in India. The first was the Chinese intrusion in 1962 ,the second was a combination of 1965 and 1971 wars and the last was after the Kargil conflict, when the entire gamut of National security was seriously reviewed. In the event, competing politics of two major national parties, conspired to barter national security issues at the altar of National politics.

When the present Government came to power there were indications for the first time after a decade, that issues that tormented the Military in India would be substantially addressed. The leadership appeared to be aware of the need to first address issues related to the IZZAT of a soldier which would lead to amelioration of the negative effects of dragging the affairs of the soldier to tribunals and courts of India.

The OROP episode enabled the fractured community of ESM to get their act together for the first time, while the Govt failed to engage them in a dialogue or a negotiation which would lead to a joint resolution through discussions and transparency. The country was hence a witness to a theatrical performance of the absurd. Retired soldiers on fast unto death, television cameras in search of TRPs and the civil society a passive and indifferent observer. Contrast it to the lakhs who supported the IAC  movement and more recently the spectacle at Ahmedabad. The Soldier in angst had little support from the civil society.

Letters written by retired Chiefs, perhaps did not receive even a routine acknowledgement from the office of the ironically titled Supreme Commander, who has no executive powers to help his anguished soldiers.

After making a mess of the optics at Jantar Mantar, the Govt decided to leak their decisions to the media a day before the final announcement.  To cap it all, at the final session, the RM bowled a googly of VRS. If the RM had been misled or the Chiefs in company of the Minister were not consulted about the faux pas, a few heads ought to roll . Thus a moment  of glory and historical importance was reduced to a sad spectacle of a bumbling Government-through serendipity- nudging the long overdue Prime Minister's intervention. A display of less than desirable cohesion, coherence and  transparency in decision making.

Surely India deserves better.

If any Govt wishes to correct the mistakes of the past and strengthen the  much desired Politico-Military interface, the first action is to bring the Military into the decision making structure,  so that the Military too would be accountable to the people of India, through Parliamentary oversight.

There are perfectly good integrated models to follow today, than those that existed in 1947.

 What is missing until now, is the will to execute institutional reforms. Tempus Fugit.