Lessons from the bonus army march on Washington DC

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSC1lbfXfRQ

The story of the infamous bonus army march is well documented at the above site on you tube. We should learn some lessons from it before the current OROP agitation goes out of hand. Disciplined as it has been to date, there is a very thin dividing line between a peaceful and orderly agitation and a violent one. It takes only a small spark to ignite the agitation. The above clip clearly shows that even war veterans like Gen Mac Arthur, could make the grave error of leading a charge against the veterans of WW1.

It is a combination of neglect of the veterans demand,an ill informed and insensitive political leadership, a rare natural disaster and the occurrence of WW2  which enabled the resolution of the veterans demand through a legislation. Public sympathy for veterans finally forced the political leadership to act decisively. By then many more lives had been lost.

Civil-Military relations in a democracy is a constantly evolving equation which is tempered and  shaped by both external and internal dynamics. It has taken centuries of war experience including the civil war for the American public opinion to play a supporting  role for the cause of the veteran. What is often seen today as deep concern and respect for the veteran community of USA is a result of upheavals caused in the past and loss of millions of lives in service of Motherland. Such public sympathy,respect and support are not likely to be witnessed in a young nation of just short of seven decades of independence from a colonial power.

Bringing the soldier closer to the society through well orchestrated publicity campaigns and educational programmes on martyrs is a must. Either compulsory NCC training in schools and/or colleges and exposure to military service short of conscription may be necessary to generate awareness about the Armed Forces of India.

Australia-India Exercise AUSINDEX-15

A LONG AWAITED STRATEGIC OUTREACH-AUSINDEX-15

Those of us who have been involved in planning and nurturing maritime relations with the navies of USA, UK, Russia and France over the last two to three decades, have often wondered why Japan and Australia did not receive the same recognition that they deserved in the Narasimha Rao led look- east policy drive. There were and are many constraints within our closed loop decision and policy making structures. They are not obliged to articulate India's strategic vision in terms of a white paper; as is often done in other defence establishments. Common maritime challenges and interests in the Asia -Pacific region are however, tackled on a bilateral, need- driven basis rather than any long term  vision. Multi-lateral engagements at sea have been frowned upon by the political leadership, as those that may offend the sensitivities of certain countries in the region. Hence annual/biennial exercise programmes like Malabar with the USN, Indra with Russia, and Konkan with UK are  limited to bilateral rather than multi-lateral exercises-with one recent exception.

It is in this backdrop that the visit to Australia in last November  by the Indian PM, after a lapse of three decades and the resulting joint statements and communications thereof, came as a pleasant surprise to the strategic community.

Australian and Indian convergence of interests in IOR has been under discussion for a few years. The Indian Navy's initiative of convening an Indian Ocean Naval Symposium did harmonise and encourage engagement and interaction with all the navies of the region. It would be fair to state that the Australian cooperation in the maritime affairs of the Indian ocean region brought the two navies together. Equally the lack of enthusiasm from our MOD and MEA to support a fruitful venture such as IONS retarded its progress.

Two meetings in quick succession, Abbot in India in September last and Modi in Australia in November the same year changed the atmospherics to a large extent.

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 "India and Australia have a great economic synergy. There are huge opportunities for partnership in every area we can think of – agriculture, agro-processing, resources, energy, finance, infrastructure, education, and science and technology." said the PM at the media interaction on 18 Nov 2014; but what needs to be noted is that   the     strategic dimensions of the relationship were carefully calibrated at the appropriate levels of dialogue/address, both to the media and the joint session of Parliamentarians.

Visit to the Australian War memorial and elaboration on the battle of Gallipoli were perhaps orchestrated to enhance the optics of the concerned event. Stress on underlying strategic interest in areas of civil-nuclear cooperation, maritime security etc, were discretely handled by both parties. For instance ,legislative and legal impediments to deliver on strategic needs of uranium to India as reflected in the agreement reached by the two Prime Ministers, is an example of the complexities that need to be taken note of.

As a result of the impetus received from discussions,  the long awaited Australia-India naval exercises (AUSINDEX) has already commenced at/off the port of Vishakhapatnam and is scheduled to be completed on 19 Sep15. An analysis on the structure of this biennial exercise would be instructive to comprehend the genuine desire for strategic engagement between the two countries.

Firstly, discussions on the need for maritime cooperation commenced a while ago and was emphasised again during Anthony's visit to Australia. However in the absence of conducive apex level discussions, it remained on paper till the strategic objectives were shaped recently. The meetings between the two Prime Ministers in quick succession ,i.e. Abbot's visit to India followed by Modi's to Australia contributed to its  expeditious execution. 

Secondly, the composition and quality of warships and aircraft on both sides indicate that the two navies are willing to jump from elementary exercises  to very advanced tactical exercises. Anti Submarine exercises are considered to be the most advanced level of engagement between any two navies.

Thirdly, that the Indian crew is not only conversant with English but is familiar with procedures adopted by NATO forces outlined in the Allied Tactical Publications(ATP) and Allied Exercise Programmes(AXP), make it extremely convenient for communications and tactical level discussions and preparations. It would not be the case while exercising with Russian or Chinese navies. By itself this is a force multiplier and a tailor made situation for cooperation and compatibility.

Fourthly, the Collins class submarine operated by the Australians is a worthy under water opponent. This exercise would provide both navies with invaluable experience in underwater warfare in tropical conditions.

Fifthly, while surface ships on both sides are capable of deploying integral helicopters for prosecuting underwater threats, the inclusion of P3C Maritime patrol aircraft from Australia and our own P81 Boeing would add a dimension that is the envy of any navy worth its salt.

AUSINDEX-15 has set a high threshold of expectations and experience which would be mutually rewarding and satisfying. It augurs well for pursuing the strategic objectives set by Abbot and Modi, but more importantly for a long and sustained relationship between Australia and India.

http://www.thequint.com/india/2015/09/15/australia-india-naval-exercise-a-long-awaited-strategic-outreach    (The Quint -15 Sep 15  )   

OROP- THE SYMPTOM OF A DISEASE

Politico-Military relations-lessons from the OROP episode

Courtesy The Quint see http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/09/if-only-the-orop-episode-was-not-turned-into-a-political-spectacle

In an earlier article on OROP, I had averred that the agitation for OROP which unfortunately overflowed on to Jantar Mantar in Delhi, was merely the symptoms of a disease. The disease per se has been eating into the vitals of Civil- military relations since independence.

In 1951-52, the newly elected Government and the parliament had very little time to gain knowledge of the Military and its interface with the Government. The enormous burden of handling partition, the gruesome riots, consolidating and assimilating the Princely states with the Indian Union, the J&K conundrum, addressing issues related to abject poverty, illiteracy and health care, creating infrastructure and industries along with academic institutions of excellence were some of the challenges faced by the competent people, who participated in nation building. Their competence and stature can be gauged by the notings on files in which political leaders wrote copious notes while recording their decisions on myriad vexed issues. In comparison the discussions on files  in the past four decades pale into insignificance and reflect a lack of authority and direction not only from the political leadership but also the bureaucracy. 

Checks and balances adapted from the white hall system of office management were either deliberately diluted, circumvented or defaced so that accountability of the politico-bureaucratic edifice was mired in ambiguity and ambivalence.

The Military had also to face numerous hurdles, which, interalia, included adjusting to the post war reorganisation of leftover but divided military personnel, equipment and infrastructure and most of all adapting to a leadership which was wary of coups; consequent to a number of military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood. Given that there was insufficient documentation or studies related to civil-military relations until the seminal work on the subject by Samuel Huntington in 1956, there were no models to follow other than the British and the American experience. The former had no written constitution and the latter had a Presidential system with somewhat vague guidelines on civilian control of the Military. In retrospect therefore, as regards making the military in India integral to the decision making process, it was a case of the blind leading the blind.

Suppression of the Military, was perhaps a deliberate unarticulated political mandate or at best a fortuitous outcome of a confused politico-bureaucratic nexus. Consequently, keeping the Military out of all decision making structures, reduction of pay, allowances and pension, neglect of modernisation , non-provision of essential equipment and ordnance and a host of other issues continued to torment the Military. The poor choice of RMs in many cases accentuated the crisis. In brief, the Military had neither a voice in Parliament, nor the ears of the RM and PM. That the morale of the Military was sustained to win battles both with the enemies of India and enemies within, speaks well of the Military leadership.

There were at least three opportunities to comprehensively address the overall neglect of the Military in India. The first was the Chinese intrusion in 1962 ,the second was a combination of 1965 and 1971 wars and the last was after the Kargil conflict, when the entire gamut of National security was seriously reviewed. In the event, competing politics of two major national parties, conspired to barter national security issues at the altar of National politics.

When the present Government came to power there were indications for the first time after a decade, that issues that tormented the Military in India would be substantially addressed. The leadership appeared to be aware of the need to first address issues related to the IZZAT of a soldier which would lead to amelioration of the negative effects of dragging the affairs of the soldier to tribunals and courts of India.

The OROP episode enabled the fractured community of ESM to get their act together for the first time, while the Govt failed to engage them in a dialogue or a negotiation which would lead to a joint resolution through discussions and transparency. The country was hence a witness to a theatrical performance of the absurd. Retired soldiers on fast unto death, television cameras in search of TRPs and the civil society a passive and indifferent observer. Contrast it to the lakhs who supported the IAC  movement and more recently the spectacle at Ahmedabad. The Soldier in angst had little support from the civil society.

Letters written by retired Chiefs, perhaps did not receive even a routine acknowledgement from the office of the ironically titled Supreme Commander, who has no executive powers to help his anguished soldiers.

After making a mess of the optics at Jantar Mantar, the Govt decided to leak their decisions to the media a day before the final announcement.  To cap it all, at the final session, the RM bowled a googly of VRS. If the RM had been misled or the Chiefs in company of the Minister were not consulted about the faux pas, a few heads ought to roll . Thus a moment  of glory and historical importance was reduced to a sad spectacle of a bumbling Government-through serendipity- nudging the long overdue Prime Minister's intervention. A display of less than desirable cohesion, coherence and  transparency in decision making.

Surely India deserves better.

If any Govt wishes to correct the mistakes of the past and strengthen the  much desired Politico-Military interface, the first action is to bring the Military into the decision making structure,  so that the Military too would be accountable to the people of India, through Parliamentary oversight.

There are perfectly good integrated models to follow today, than those that existed in 1947.

 What is missing until now, is the will to execute institutional reforms. Tempus Fugit.  

OROP

FIGHT FOR OROP IS ONLY THE SYMPTOM OF A DISEASE

Nitin Pai, in a recent article carried by Business Standard, suggested that the armed forces should use economic reasoning while pursuing their quest for OROP. Earlier he had suggested that land available with cantonments should be surrendered for better facilities that are likely to be available  20kms away from 20 cities of India which are likely to become smart cities. This according to him will be a win-win situation for all concerned.

If good  economics were the only solution to solve complex social, national security and environmental problems of a country we would not be faced with paradoxes and dilemmas that need more than economy led solutions. To put it succinctly, imagine the surrender of green spaces of Bengaluru cantonment  to grey monsters and the resulting chaos caused by pressure on water, power, clean air, a host of other environmental issues including exploding traffic and most of all, the mafia-politician nexus to make a killing. Nitin may argue that he says so at the end of the article. That begs the question.

The suggestion that economic reasoning is preferred to emotional appeal for OROP has some merit, but  if there is indeed an agreement on economics of the military, or the famous guns versus butter debate, we would have found one by now. Soldiers, while better equipped to understand the economics of national security due to constant up gradation of their knowledge during mid career and senior level courses culminating at the National Defence College(NDC), are not meant to justify their existence. It is the duty of the Government with all its integral and out sourced expertise that should decide how much is enough for national security.

If Jawaharlal Nehru was alive today he would have admitted that a NDC course in late 1950's, produced a study that China would attack India if our strategic imperatives are not realigned. Krishna Menon who did not think that we ought to have a Military, pooh-poohed it. It is after 1962 that Nehru urgently sought a copy of this study.

 It is not that Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals do not understand the economics of governing a country, it is that they are not given the opportunity to be a part of decision/strategy making in India.

The present  apparent lassitude and grief seen on the faces of ex servicemen is not due to lack of trying all available sources of redress of grievance on a number of issues pertaining to their status, pay, allowances ,neglected widows, gallantry award winners, neglected war casualties and handicapped personnel. It has taken decades for the Supreme Court to rule in their favour only to be left un implemented by successive Governments.      

OROP is  but the last straw that broke the camel's back. A sensitive and sensible government would never fight its own soldiers, on  paper, in courts of law ,in Parliament and now on the streets. Even the most under developed  but civilized country would have engaged them in productive discussion and apologized for treating them with contempt. We are of course better known globally for cutting our nose to spite our face.

If Governments are not sensitive and caring, who in a democracy lends the veterans a helping hand. It is the civil society which elects the Government. Were the civil society to  join the agitation for justice as in the case of India Against Corruption, Jantar Mantar would have been an active volcano.

 How does the civil society punish the Government for disregarding the welfare of the soldier? By voting the errant Government out of power.

If the civil society  truly adores the soldier, it has to lead the agitation. It is not the soldier who should be fighting his own cause but the civil society that acknowledges his role in defending the frontiers of its country- which ought to be fronting such a struggle.

This is not a political battle with one party fighting the other.  There is a need for all parties to join the cause of the soldier without hurting him more. There has to be a national outcry without politicising this worthy cause. That is sorely missing today.

Mere lip service by media or occasional, random statements by leaders of civil society is insufficient for the government to expeditiously address a genuine grievance. The reason for this tepid response is because the soldier has not touched the lives of our citizen as it has in some other countries which have lost millions of lives in long drawn out wars. 

Does that mean that we will recognise the worth of a soldier only when he fights a war?  There are means to bring the soldier closer to every citizen. That can be the subject of another debate. For now let us join hands to help the soldier in distress.

"Many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices."

courtesy the quint   http://www.thequint.com/india/2015/08/18/in-fight-for-orop-civil-society-must-take-up-soldiers-cause#.VdMR38KhVMU.facebook

If you miss this opportunity it will take a generation or more to raise a professional force which remains apolitical and effective. What good is an economically or commercially strong nation if it cannot have a first rate Military which by definition includes the veteran?

Ode to Kalam the eternal Guru

If you believe in destiny, perhaps you could explain how men and women enter your life for specific purposes. I was completely stumped by a chance visit to a Nadi Muni who interprets ones destiny from writings on a palm leaf,recorded many centuries ago  He, without any information about me except a thumb print,   told me not only my profession but the names of my parents as recorded on the palm leaf.. Among ancients astrologers, Brighu who wrote his predictions on those destined to read them and Agasthya are known entities of  Hindu Mythology.

Having had this stunning exposure to predictions, my mind goes back to the many chance and unscheduled interactions with late Dr Abdul Kalam during my career in the navy. This article is an attempt to rationalize, if possible, my association with Dr Kalam or Professor Kalam as he preferred to be called after relinquishing his presidential assignment.

Although I had first met him in the late 80s, regular interaction began in the early 90s and lasted till I retired in 2006. My first few meetings on serious professional matters ended in disappointment. I could not relate to his simplistic approach to resolving complex weapon-sensor related R&D work. Each session left me dissatisfied and angry. Perhaps he was treating me as a novice, I thought. Yet , I was drawn to him like a moth to a candle.  Every opportunity to discuss matters of maritime perspectives seen from progress on key DRDO projects, brought me to his door. This included a few Sundays when he reluctantly stayed back in Delhi. Every week end when most of South block remained closed. Dr Kalam proceeded to a laboratory of interest to him.

As our interaction grew so did the number of unanswered questions, mainly on delayed projects of critical importance. The missile man who was steering Prithvi and Agni was clearly unable to deliver on Trishul. Had I known that his life was shaped by his mentor Prof Satish Dhawan who set a personal example of leadership by shielding  Dr Kalam during the failure of launch vehicle and later entirely crediting him for the success of the programme, I would have understood  why he was phlegmatic on certain issues. He was clearly protecting the interest of a project which did not deliver.Not because he desired merely to protect failures but he knew that the success of such projects are critical for India's future.

But then he had another quality;there was no negative thought that his mind would accept. Every statement was loaded with optimism and positivity.  He felt that there was enough  negativity and pessimism to drown all the positive strength of his organisation and the nation as a whole.
This was an enduring trait that I imbibed from this relationship.Think positive and do not give up on your dreams.

My interaction continued to the critical programmes of strategic interest and beyond. It was not surprising when I was inducted into the Self Reliance Implementation Committee(SRIC) at South Block. There were many disagreements during the proceedings of this committee. That is when I discovered how firm he could be without being impolite. This is a quality that I failed to imbibe. Such qualities separate the great from the rest of us. A Guru who refused to be angry and a patient teacher who encouraged dissent and neutralized it with subdued panache.

When I was made an honorary ADC to the President in 2006 when I was Cin C of the Southern Naval Command, I wrote to him to say that this honorifical  appointment did  not mean much to the organisation as it carried no executive function. When he met me at a conference he whispered in my years "My funny man". I did not know whether it was an affectionate comment or a rebuke from the Supreme Commander.

A few months hence when I was about to swallow the anchor(a term used for retirement) he spent an hour with me at his study in Rashtrapathi Bhavan. " What will you do in Pune Bangara?" he asked. Without a thought I replied "I will teach Sir-I will be a little lamp which will do its best". He waved his hand and in came a photographer who clicked this picture. The picture was brought back in minutes and he asked for his special autograph pen with indelible ink and signed it with relish.

It is not the ink Sir, you have left an indelible impression which will carry me to my coffin.

Au revoir my President.

(Courtesy the quint dated 31 July 2015)

Civil-Military relations

(COURTESY FAUJI INDIA JULY EDITION)


Civil-Military
Relations:
Some Myths
and Realities

(Vice Admiral Suresh Bangara(Retd)


It was early in my career that a Commanding officer thought it appropriate to present me a book titled, "The Soldier and the State. The theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" authored by Samuel Huntington (first published in 1957). Little did he realize while pursuing the sacred objective of grooming, that this book would guide me for the rest of my life. It took me decades of reading in installments, as and when doubts arose in my mind, to slowly but surely understand the 'politics' of civil-military relation in our context.

In 1970, I returned from the erstwhile Soviet Union after a very perplexing exposure to a communist/socialist regime and its interface with its Military, fought the 1971 war and a few years later,  landed at the Royal Naval staff college at Greenwich, London. Maggie Thatcher had begun to revitalize the UK and specially its armed forces. Apolitical as their Military was, the excitement and expectations of good governance was palpable even among the stiff -upper lipped Brits. I was tasked to profile her leadership in the context of civil-military relations (three years later she fought the Falk Land war eight thousand miles away from her shores, based on the assurance of her First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach).

Given that Samuel's book, was my constant companion, I was better equipped to complete my first project entirely to my satisfaction.

A few years later, I was posted as the Naval Adviser to our mission in Islamabad. This was the Zia era and I spent three years watching and studying the Military Dictatorship at work. Samuel's book prompted me to record my thoughts on what I saw in Pakistan.

Years later, after routine exposure to naval appointments, of which many significant ones brought me in close proximity with senior civil servants and Ministers, visits abroad and more confusion on the Indian model of civil-military relations; in 1992, I entered the portals of the National Defence College(NDC) .

It afforded me the opportunity to study the Indian scene and cover the whole spectrum of socio-political, economy, science and technology, industry etc finally culminating in strategic
environment and national security. The participants drawn from the services, civil services, police and a number of senior officers from friendly foreign countries from the East and the West did share their experiences and thoughts. It is here that one's understandings of the Indian context are fully realized. The yawning gap in civil-military relations with all its ramifications could now be juxtaposed with Samuel's seminal work on the subject.

Finally, in 2000, I was packed off to the John F Kennedy School of Public Policy and governance at Harvard. I came face to face with Samuel Huntington who sat me down and clarified my doubts. Destiny had played a role in my quest to put the civil-military relations in context of post independent India. Looking back, it took me all of three decades to start a debate on what little, I now know.
The symptoms of the disease

The symptoms of poor civil-military relations occasionally alluded to in the media, pertain to neglected servicemen, surrender of medals to the supreme commander, hunger strikes by former military personnel, unimplemented supreme court rulings in their favour, unfulfilled government promises, fratricide and indiscipline among soldiers, neglect of war widows and war heroes. This list is by no means exhaustive. But what are the causes of the disease?

The first question that arises is, whether India is unique among other established and acknowledged democracies of the world. If so why? If not, what is common among such democracies? Memories being short, we tend to forget many grave instances including the poor civil-military relations which led to unsavoury  behaviour of American Military personnel in the Korean war and later during and after the Vietnam war. Those of us who did not have televisions were able to see the resentment against the US Government in movies made later based on true stories. Demonstrations on streets of New York and Washington and the sheer neglect of rehabilitating battle casualties back home were scenes that cannot be forgotten.

This, despite a long history of war, starting with the civil war, through the world wars and numerous operations thereafter which enabled them to fine tune their civil-military equations. The open respect displayed today to American soldiers in uniform or war casualties brought back to be buried with military honours, have evolved over centuries of waging war, some, far away from their shores. The range and scale of this experience willy-nilly involved the civil society as a whole. We on the other hand, are just approaching the seventh decade of our independence; hence comparisons with USA or UK may well be incongruous.

Similar episodes with respect to other democracies with long history in Europe indicate that civil-military relations is a process of continuous evolution and that no single nation can claim to have found the right formula to attain satisfaction of both parties. There are numerous pushes and pulls in the Presidential system in America. Those who care to read Samuel's book can also trace how the system evolved through ideologies, confusion and contradictions.

The Political Dilemma
Much has been written about the circumstances under which the post-independence Indian Political leadership was ill equipped to deal with the Military. Both internal and external factors played a significant role in exacerbating this critical relationship. While unstable environment caused by Pakistani action soon after independence kept the military busy, numerous military takeover in the immediate neighbourhood soon after decolonization, gave credence to the rumours that India too may be subjected to military rule.

Inter alia, such a possibility may have been nullified by introducing structural changes in higher defence management, reducing the potential powers of Cs-in-C , by creating Chief of Staff of the three services, eliminating the military from pre independence decision making bodies of higher defence management, reducing the stature of military officers in protocol, pay and allowance, perks, creating a large cadre of central police forces under the Home ministry and a host of other actions which also included having a common pay commission with no direct participation of the armed forces of India.

At that point in our history, there was neither literature on civil-military relations nor examples of constitutional approach to address the emerging controversies in Indian model of governance.
The point to note is that even the American Constitution had only a subjective approach to civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington states, civilian control of the armed forces emerged "despite rather than because of constitutional provisions". India adopted many of the provisions of the American constitution and since Britain had no written constitution, traditions and customs of Britain was considered for incorporation in our own document.

Samuel Huntington was the first author who researched the subject of civil-military relations the contents of which were not available to us till well after 1960.

In India, neither the politician nor the military clearly understood the term "Civilian control". Civilian control would be maximised if the military were limited in scope and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head" wrote Samuel, while adding that the reverse was also recorded under the military clause of their constitution, which divided civilian responsibility of military affairs and fostered the direct access of the military authorities to the highest level of Government. Remember, at that time, all three services in USA, operated independently until the integration was forced upon them by the Gold water Nichols act in the late 80's.

While the evolution of the American system progressed on predicted lines, since they have the Presidential system of government, our dilemma was, perhaps, which civilian head of the Government would control the Indian Armed forces. The President is just a titular head although given the title of the supreme commander. It had to be the Prime Minister through the RM. It was not surprising that Nehru made himself available to the armed forces for consultations when required. He personally knew many officers of the rank of Brigadier and above as recorded by late General Inderjit Rikhye, who was handpicked by PM to precede to the UN headquarters. The infamous Gen Kaul episode in 1962 however, brought home the dangers of politicisation of the Armed forces as opposed to exercising civilian control over the Military.

This was followed by Indira Gandhi who established a personal equation, though turbulent at times, with Sam Manekshaw and lastly, Rajiv Gandhi who interacted with his Chiefs along with his RRM, Arun Singh and hence often did not have to rely only on the bureaucracy to advice him. Both the Sri Lanka operation and Operation Brass Tacks, which caused tensions between India and Pakistan are often quoted by skeptics as examples of bad experiments of civil-military interaction at the apex level, during the Rajiv Gandhi era. These were in fact personalized leadership traits which had all the trappings of an evolving relationship which needed refinements but not rejection.
The momentum maintained in the 50's and 60's in clipping the wings of the Armed forces had done irreparable damage to the work ethos of MoD. Allocation of business rules and transaction of business rules of MoD first published in 1961 (duly approved by the President) and still in vogue with minor amendments, makes the Defence Secretary responsible for the defence of India. There is no role assigned to the Chiefs since service headquarters were attached offices of MoD.

The Committee of Defence Management headed by Arun Singh in the wake of Kargil conflict had clearly outlined the anomalies in the system and had suggested solutions. The most critical of them remains unimplemented till date, ostensibly, due to lack of political consensus. Apart from remedying existing anomalies and assigning responsibility and accountability to the military, it would have addressed one of the major weaknesses in the civil-military relations in India i.e. lack of a single point military advise to the head of political leadership and participation in strategic decision making process on matters pertaining to national security.

In brief, in the absence of a clear authority-responsibility-accountability matrix, the civil-military equation at the apex level continues to be vague and nebulous. The military quite clearly cannot and should not function under a civilian bureaucrat, but only under the highest political authority. In our case it has to be the PM through RM.

What of the military?
With neither the constitution to support nor clarity to perform, except as an extension of the MoD, the services were left to fend for themselves. Every proposal, every plan and every communication even to other ministries such as MEA had to be processed through MoD and it needed the concurrence of the Def Sec. Neither the politician, save a few, nor the bureaucrats at various levels of MoD have the domain expertise or knowledge to respond to scores of proposals originating from the three services.
Most bureaucrats may not draft a single speech to be made by their Minister due to lack of domain knowledge. Every document on National security originated from service headquarters. So, we wrote and heard our own drafts being read out to us during various meetings and seminars. 15 year plans for modernisation and up gradation remained confined to files.

At the field level, officers are trained to be high caliber professionals. Their profession is management of violence. This being a unique profession, the training is such that it prepares him/her for successful combat operation. No parallel entry is possible, for, unless you have acquired the skill and practiced them for a length of time you cannot be successful in combat. A commercial Pilot for instance, cannot replace a fighter pilot unless he acquires combat skills. A fighter pilot can however fly a commercial aircraft if the certification process is completed. Hence an officer of the armed forces is irreplaceable by another professional from outside the forces.

The soldier is trained to be a specialist in application of violence. That is his trade and not a profession. Hence there is a clear dividing line between the manager and the tradesman.
The armed forces are, as a rule, monopolized by the state. More importantly the profession of management of violence can be practiced only for socially approved purposes. Regulations, customs and traditions, hence become an indispensable part of a soldier's life. Consequently the relations between the state and the soldier are a sacred one. There is much to be done so
that a soldier is not equated to Policemen, a blunder which has serious repercussions on maintaining the 'IZZAT' of the Soldier. Here is where the civil society is required to step in.


Role of the civil society
Success of all democracies depends mainly on the quality of their civil societies. They too evolve over time. A well informed educated and mature civil society ensures that it elects the right political leadership. Both the Soldier and the politician emanate from the same civil society. It is also true that "Our God and soldier we alike adore even at the brink of danger, not before, after deliverance both alike requited, our God is forgotten and our soldier slighted" This comes from an author, Francis Quaries who belongs to a country which has seen great sacrifices by the soldier. Why is it a truism? The civil society has short memories. It is not the duty of a soldier to repeatedly point out the sacrifices made by him. It is the duty of the civil society to fight for the rights of the soldier. The society is expected to fight with the politician so that the soldier is cared for while in service and in retirement.

The onus on erecting a war memorial does not rest on a soldier, it is the civil society which should push its political leadership to remember and honour our dead soldiers. The civil society also has the power to punish the politician who fails to honour the soldier.

According to Yasmin Khan a historian, about 2.3 Million Indian soldiers fought during World War 2 and “89,000 laid down their lives in Military service.” Given the size of our population then, it touched the lives of many Indian families. There was awareness about sacrifices created by the unfortunate circumstances of war. 400,000 Americans and 388,000 Britishers died in the war. Civil societies tend to remember losses when it impacts them.

During periods of peace the intelligentsia which controls the media often questions investments in National security. Pressing debates on socio-economic issues keep the soldier out of sight.

Some Options
In the Indian context, it is essential to continuously educate the civil society on trials and tribulations of our soldier. Compulsory military training or making NCC compulsory in schools and colleges and constant engagement with civil society through well structured films, plays and street shows are options that need to be exercised.
In my view, it is essential to induct ex servicemen of repute into our political structure so that the voice of the soldier is heard in the parliament. We need more of Jaswant Singhs, Khanduris and Shankar Roychowdhurys.

Thousands of ex-servicemen entered politics, industry and other professions in USA soon after WW2. Many rose to be Presidents and successful congressmen. Industries too benefited from the focus brought to bear by military personnel.
Soldiers must enter all possible walks of life after retirement to be able to mobilize the good will of the society, which in turn could make the politician accountable to evolve a new equilibrium in civil-military relations of a young India. ______________________________________________________________________________

Multi-National Banks have served their purpose-Time to move on to other developing countries.

A recent press release quotes the Governor of reserve bank of India discussing the need to create Ombudsman  in all banks in India. After my recent confrontation with two Indian banks, one a public sector bank and the other a private on an ATM complaint and the support that I received from the social media which hastened its settlement, this news was music to my ears.

My earlier experiences are contained in my blog on "Deceived by ATM or bank" and "Compatriots turned ombudsman on social media". Even as I was savouring the intent of the RBI statement, a new experience had begun-this time with the only account I had with a multi-national bank. Two decades ago many would recollect the ordeals of banking with any branch of  public sector banks. They were not linked with their branches spread across the country, the staff were not customer friendly, paper transactions  were painfully slow - in short banking was a forgettable experience.

When the doors were thrown open to the private sector in retail banking, we were suddenly exposed to efficiency and infrastructure hitherto unseen in India. Some of us moved our accounts to these swanky,efficient and customer friendly entities. Much like the aviation sector which improved with competition, banking too saw some seminal changes. However over a period of two decades, the same multi-national bank began to degenerate.

Customer relations started to degrade when this multi-national bank(MNB)allegedly colluded with unethical practices associated with money laundering in Europe. Perhaps owing to scrutiny of procedures and processes, human interface with customers was minimized  substantially at the cost of harassment to customers. For instance, cheques were dishonoured on regular basis due to alleged discrepancies of signatures stored on the computer.  While public sector banks found means to communicate rapidly with their customers to reduce inconvenience, the MNB made it impossible for the customer to reach them. Queries on internet banking elicited no response for 72 hours or more. The response when received failed to address the concern of the customer. Visits to the branch became necessary despite the facility of internet banking.

Let me cite two examples to illustrate my angst. I  personally deposited a cheque into my account and received the counter foil. Weeks later, when the cheque remained uncredited, I complained on the internet, only to be defeated by inane replies.All the telephones of local branches are barred for incoming calls, a fact not revealed to the customer. I  had to  once again use  net banking, to point out a possible error on the deposit slip which might have caused the delay. During this whole process, neither did I receive the cheque back as invalid nor did the bank call me to verify my facts.Ergo, I decided to confront the staff at the branch.  I called up the toll free number and asked if the bank was open on that day which happened to be Budh Jayanti.   Having received a positive response I traveled a considerable distance only to find the bank closed. Wait, now comes the cherry on the cake.

Having reached the bank, I decided to use the ATM at their main branch. The MNB had a number of security staff monitoring their machines. Out of the two machines one was under repairs. Just when I was about to insert my card on the operational machine, the guard urgently accosted me with a "no-no". Perplexed with the agility and alertness of the guard when I asked him what was the commotion about, he responded with,"Don't insert your card. The machine will swallow it and you will have to return tomorrow to collect it" A MNB with nonoperational machines under their very nose, in the largest branch in town.

Not surprisingly this was the last straw that broke the camel's back.I decided to close my account with this bank. Three visits and numerous calls later, with all my documentation for closure done, I am waiting for the cheque for the balance of my money lying with them. Since I cannot call the branch, my complaints on the net are being replied from Kolkotta which is liaising with Pune to release my dues. Our friendly Public sector bank on the other hand, is increasingly more accessible and efficient on the net too.

Mr Governor of RBI, please expedite the appointment of Ombudsman for all banks in India at the earliest.You will do well to start with HSBC -the MNB in question. Not many have the time or the facilities to deal with non-customer-friendly banks who need to be penalized for customer neglect, driven by emphasis on procedures, rather than on  customer satisfaction.