Modernisation of the Indian
Navy
From 'Made in India' to
'Make in India'
It is believed that war ships mirror the
technological capability of their respective countries. There is no better way
to display the power and capabilities of the Indian built warship, ala, INS
Kolkotta or INS Shivalik, than to throw open the ship to visitors as we do when
we visit foreign ports. This was a
routine practice when our ships visited ports in India until the scourge of
terrorism descended on us. Thousands of citizens would line up to walk around
our warships. Special visits were arranged for school children and experts as
also the media. Paradoxically just when we have attained standards of ship
building which can be the envy of any developing or developed nation, access to
these ships have been severely restricted.
How did the Indian Navy(IN) manage to keep pace with state of the art
technology, that too by using the indigenous ship building route and what does
it portend for the 'Make in India'
mantra being vigorously pursued by the new Govt? To analyse this issue
objectively we need to trace the efforts of the past in order to provide a
broad perspective for the future. Since the navy operates in all three
dimensions, i.e. surface, subsurface and air it would be instructive to trace
the path adopted for modernisation of ships, submarines and aircraft.
War-ship Building
The planning process to define the force
levels of our navy began in right earnest soon after independence. The very
meagre allocation for defence budget resulted in the smallest share being
allotted for the acquisition and modernisation of the smallest defence service
of the nation. Consequently not only did the navy have to contend with the
initial British reluctance to supply modern blue water platforms to the Indian
navy, but it had to also function with the lowest share of the defence budget.
The navy was allotted 4% of the defence budget in 1950/51. This rose to 9%
briefly and reverted to 4% in 1964/65.The Chinese imbroglio resulted in priority
to the Army and the Air force.
Given the lack of shipbuilding facility in
India, the first acquisition of ships after independence consisted of eight
Frigates and a second hand carrier from UK. The entire programme under soft
loans was executed between 1958 and 1961. Serious efforts to acquire submarines
were thwarted by the British after the first Indian crew, in 1962, was trained
for induction of the much needed submarine. The Soviet Union seized the
opportunity and thereafter also became the sole supplier of corvettes,
frigates, destroyers, mine sweepers and missile vessels.
The meagre allocation of resources did not
deter the IN from pursuing indigenous capability to build frigates in
India. In 1965, the British clinched this deal with yet another special defence
credit of 4.7 Million pounds which included expansion of the Mazagaon docks in
Mumbai. While the Soviet Union flooded
the naval acquisition programme with a wide ranging array of ships at
competitive political costs, the construction of the Leander class continued at
Mazagaon Docks and the first indigenously made frigate INS Nilgiri was
commissioned in 1972. This was followed by three more, before an Indian design
burst on the scene.
Two path breaking decisions taken prior and
during this critical juncture need
special mention. The first pertains to the creation of an in-house ship
design facility by the Indian Navy, manned principally by naval officers,
which has grown in stature and skill over the last five decades. Successful
construction of the first Indian designed aircraft carrier at Kochi and the
latest destroyer INS Kolkotta are the fruits of this labour.
The second was the creation of a Weapons
and Electronics System Engineering Establishment(WESEE) which continues to
play a stellar role in sensor-weapon systems integration and data fusion of
diverse sensors and weapons procured from multiple sources in the world. Data
fusion through tactical data link for multiple platforms developed by them, has
also contributed to the success of maritime operations.
The continued emphasis on indigenous
construction has now resulted in Mazagaon Docks, Garden Reach at Kolkotta, Goa
Shipyard, Kochi Shipyard and the former non-defence PSU, Hindustan Shipyard at
Vizag, participating in building a wide range of ships for the navy. Aircraft
carrier, destroyers, frigates, submarines, corvettes, missile vessels, landing
craft, fast patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels, survey vessels and a tanker have
been/ are being built in Indian yards. Of late, private sector yards, ABG,
Bharati and L&T have begun to participate in warship construction.
Import options have also been exercised due to
capacity limitation of our yards and the need to make up shortfalls in force
levels.
Submarine Building
Protracted negotiations for over a decade in
1980's saw Mazagaon Dock Ltd clinching an order to build, under license, two of
the four state of the art Hunter killer submarines designed by HDW of Germany.
This event is very significant in that for the first time the yard had to be
modernised to cater to contemporary building standards, as also for upgrading the skill of the labour force. The yard did successfully build two modern
submarines when the MOD abruptly terminated the contract with HDW due to
allegations of corruption against high ranking Indian personnel. We thus
successfully managed to 'cut our nose to spite our face'. We let the entire
infrastructure set up at great cost to rot and the skilled manpower to migrate.
After a gap of many decades we have once
again revived submarine construction, this time with the assistance of the
French. Currently the programme is running four years behind schedule. The 30
year perspective plan submitted to the Govt in 1999 has progressed at snail's
pace and the navy has had to put up with considerable reduction in submarine
force levels.
The strategic submarine programme continues
to make progress and is beyond the scope of this essay.
Naval Aviation
Due to limited availability of indigenous
options, all aircraft currently in service, except the HAL produced Chetak
helicopters, ALH and Dornier, are imported from UK, USA and Russia. The navy
has however made investments in LCA and ALH to augment ship/carrier borne
operations. Critical shortages in ship borne medium range anti-surface and
anti-submarine helicopters of the 10 ton variety are yet to be made up, due to
procedures and processes of acquisition by MOD. The more we delay the more we
pay both in financial and operational costs.
‘Made in India’ versus ‘Make in India’
Timely replacement of aging assets is an
integral part of the 15 year plan submitted by the navy. Inability to fund or
follow up such programmes has resulted in critical shortfalls in force level
and an aging fleet. While cumulative delays lead to exercising import options
to bridge critical shortages, if attempts to 'Make in India' are
stalled, we will never be self sufficient and by implication we will never
enter the exclusive club of powerful nations of the world. Hence, it is
necessary to differentiate between 'Made' and 'Make' in India. To
make in India, some basic criteria need to be satisfied.
Ship building has not been a priority
activity in the industrial policy of India. Due to security and commercial
interests, initially Europe, then Japan, South Korea and now China have
provided incentives and subsidies to attain global standards and to be
competitive in manufacture and sale. Since warship building was limited in
numbers, India was deprived of developing and sustaining a large number of
major and ancillary industries which support ship building. From steel to
propulsion package volumes and economy of scale will dictate the interest
generated in the private sector. Hence cost of basic ship building has a direct
bearing on the cost of warships. In addition, the following criteria play a
vital role to support the Make-in-India mantra:-
· Skilled man power.
· Contemporary Infrastructure
· Design capability
· Domestic industrial capability for
ship borne equipment
Remove
any one of the above and ‘Make in India'
becomes 'Made in India.' It takes 8 -10 years to develop quality
workmen, and 15 -20 yrs to develop quality shipbuilding engineers and ship
designers. Some yards are restricted by the depth of water available at their
location. Infrastructure up gradation of DPSUs, so critical to timely delivery
of platforms, has only been recently addressed along with budgetary support but
delayed time frame for completion. Until recently our shipyards had neither
sufficient dock side crane facilities nor ability
to undertake modular construction, which is the norm followed in modern
yards. The modernisation programmes launched in all our yards have just begun
to take shape and in some cases is likely to be completed in phases, perhaps
spread over forth coming plan periods.
Apart
from poor infrastructure, delays in timely delivery of warships have been
caused by dependence on foreign suppliers for propulsion package, sensors and
weapons. While the in-house design capability has matured over the years, non-freezing
of specifications and staff requirements have also contributed to cost
escalation.
Inordinate
delays in DRDO projects have forced us to opt for imports of guns, missiles and
certain sensors. Surface to surface and surface to air missiles have had to be
imported from Russia and Israel. More recently, the DRDO adopted the joint
venture route to launch projects such as Brahmos with Russia - the only supersonic SSM in the world -
and the long range surface to air missiles from Israel.
Would
it solve the problems of transfer of technology and lesser if not least
dependence on the foreign partner? The answer is a resounding 'NO'. An audit by
specialists would reveal that such products while carrying a 'Made in India’ tag, do not reduce
reliance on the JV partner. This cannot therefore be classified as a 'Make in India' product.
In
comparison, the sonar project launched jointly by the Navy and DRDO in 1970's
and the EW programme launched in 1990's have been totally Indian projects which
meet all the criteria for 'Make in India'.
Some may claim that radars manufactured in BEL which started with the Leander
programme in the 1970's to be a successful one. However, TOT in the real sense
was never achieved and production in India can be hampered by the OEM at will.
Similar is the story of indigenous manufacture of the Otomelara 76mm gun and
the close in rapid firing AK 630 both of which are dependent on their OEM.
It
has taken decades to realise that no worthwhile technology would be transferred
to a third party and those that are, due to obsolescence in the supplier
production chain, would elicit a grand sum of money for TOT- which in most
cases make it unaffordable.
Should
we therefore assume that all such equipment licensed for production in India
are just 'Made in India' and are
susceptible to denial at will? The answer is a resounding 'Yes'. Yet, Joint Venture
production as was done between private partners of USA(GE) and France(SNECMA) for
commercial aircraft engines (Boeing and Airbus), is a necessary step to
increase volume of production by sourcing customers globally or regionally.
Commercially driven ventures find means to be more productive than Government
run ventures.
So,
if the propulsion package, sensors and weapons are to be sourced from abroad to
meet the immediate requirement of the 42 ships and submarines on order, how and
when do we realise the 'Make in India'
campaign?
First,
we would need to professionalise the decision making structure in the MOD.
Transient generalists who man critical billets of decision making need to be
replaced by professionals and experts. This would involve all departments in
MOD, more so in Defence Production. Integration of MOD with Service
Headquarters is a recommendation made by the GOM in 2001. Besides cosmetic
changes on letter heads, no tangible action has been taken to date.
Second,
it would be revealing to examine the 'bible' for conduct of business in MOD,
titled 'Allocation of Business Rules' and 'Transaction of Business Rules' duly
approved by the President of India in 1961. According to these rules, the
Defence Secretary is responsible for the defence of India. The Service Chiefs
have been assigned no role. Who then is responsible for delays of decades in
acquisition and procurement of critical weapons, sensors and ordnance and even
outcome of a war? Hence, Structural reforms and clear devolution of
accountability are essential prerequisites for good governance.
Third,
now that we have reasonably advanced manufacturing facilities in the private sector,
it is time to select the most competent of them to research and submit
proposals for ship borne weapons/sensors and propulsion packages (diesel, gas
turbine or fuel cell technology) to match the ship production schedule of the
navy. Selective funding/credit for R&D from the Government would be an
alluring if not an enduring incentive.
Fourth,
while focusing on modernisation of existing DPSU yards to achieve timely
production to ensure little or no cost escalation, encourage the private sector
to develop their skilled man power and design teams. Utilising modern
facilities in the private yards, including ship lift, modular construction,
docks and heavy duty cranes could be integrated in our plans to compress
production time. In brief, combine the man power expertise of the public sector
with management practices of the private sector through a public-private
partnership
Fifth,
encourage yards both public and private to create design facility for export of
ships and to maximise their earnings.
Sixth,
remove all firewalls created to suppress creativity and entrepreneurship among
competing entities. Promote single vendor culture where economies of scale and
volumes of production are inevitable factors for compressing production
schedules. Many of the strategic projects in USA work on this model with inbuilt
checks and balances.
Seventh,
promote uninhibited interaction between selected vendors and the user to
facilitate seamless transfer of ideas from concept to reality.
Eighth,
in order to minimise wastage of skilled personnel and maximise the drive to
make in India, permit employment of high quality naval personnel in public and
private sectors. Officers and men often wish to retire early due to lack of
vertical growth opportunity and other reasons of stability. It may be noted
that post WW2, a large number of Military personnel in USA and Europe were
absorbed in public and private sector manufacturing and industrial/commercial
sectors. They in turn rose to lead many of the internationally acclaimed organisations
and companies. Presently a similar trend is visible in the telecom and IT
sectors of India which has a fair share of veterans in senior rungs of the
ladder.
In
conclusion, the maritime dimension of 'Make
in India' needs organisational and infrastructural paradigm changes, which
are well within the capabilities of the political leadership.
Change
we must. 'Foot prints in the sands of
time are not made by sitting on our haunches'
