Modernisation of the Indian Navy

From 'Made in India' to 'Make in India'

It is believed that war ships mirror the technological capability of their respective countries. There is no better way to display the power and capabilities of the Indian built warship, ala, INS Kolkotta or INS Shivalik, than to throw open the ship to visitors as we do when we visit foreign  ports. This was a routine practice when our ships visited ports in India until the scourge of terrorism descended on us. Thousands of citizens would line up to walk around our warships. Special visits were arranged for school children and experts as also the media. Paradoxically just when we have attained standards of ship building which can be the envy of any developing or developed nation, access to these ships have been severely restricted.

How did the Indian Navy(IN)  manage to keep pace with state of the art technology, that too by using the indigenous ship building route and what does it portend for the 'Make in India' mantra being vigorously pursued by the new Govt? To analyse this issue objectively we need to trace the efforts of the past in order to provide a broad perspective for the future. Since the navy operates in all three dimensions, i.e. surface, subsurface and air it would be instructive to trace the path adopted for modernisation of ships, submarines and aircraft.

War-ship Building

The planning process to define the force levels of our navy began in right earnest soon after independence. The very meagre allocation for defence budget resulted in the smallest share being allotted for the acquisition and modernisation of the smallest defence service of the nation. Consequently not only did the navy have to contend with the initial British reluctance to supply modern blue water platforms to the Indian navy, but it had to also function with the lowest share of the defence budget. The navy was allotted 4% of the defence budget in 1950/51. This rose to 9% briefly and reverted to 4% in 1964/65.The Chinese imbroglio resulted in priority to the Army and the Air force. 

Given the lack of shipbuilding facility in India, the first acquisition of ships after independence consisted of eight Frigates and a second hand carrier from UK. The entire programme under soft loans was executed between 1958 and 1961. Serious efforts to acquire submarines were thwarted by the British after the first Indian crew, in 1962, was trained for induction of the much needed submarine. The Soviet Union seized the opportunity and thereafter also became the sole supplier of corvettes, frigates, destroyers, mine sweepers and missile vessels.

The meagre allocation of resources did not deter the IN from pursuing indigenous capability to build frigates in India. In 1965, the British clinched this deal with yet another special defence credit of 4.7 Million pounds which included expansion of the Mazagaon docks in Mumbai.  While the Soviet Union flooded the naval acquisition programme with a wide ranging array of ships at competitive political costs, the construction of the Leander class continued at Mazagaon Docks and the first indigenously made frigate INS Nilgiri was commissioned in 1972. This was followed by three more, before an Indian design burst on the scene.

Two path breaking decisions taken prior and during this critical juncture  need special mention. The first pertains to the creation of an in-house ship design facility by the Indian Navy, manned principally by naval officers, which has grown in stature and skill over the last five decades. Successful construction of the first Indian designed aircraft carrier at Kochi and the latest destroyer INS Kolkotta are the fruits of this labour.

 

The second was the creation of a Weapons and Electronics System Engineering Establishment(WESEE) which continues to play a stellar role in sensor-weapon systems integration and data fusion of diverse sensors and weapons procured from multiple sources in the world. Data fusion through tactical data link for multiple platforms developed by them, has also contributed to the success of maritime operations.

The continued emphasis on indigenous construction has now resulted in Mazagaon Docks, Garden Reach at Kolkotta, Goa Shipyard, Kochi Shipyard and the former non-defence PSU, Hindustan Shipyard at Vizag, participating in building a wide range of ships for the navy. Aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates, submarines, corvettes, missile vessels, landing craft, fast patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels, survey vessels and a tanker have been/ are being built in Indian yards. Of late, private sector yards, ABG, Bharati and L&T have begun to participate in warship construction.

Import options have also been exercised due to capacity limitation of our yards and the need to make up shortfalls in force levels.

Submarine Building

Protracted negotiations for over a decade in 1980's saw Mazagaon Dock Ltd clinching an order to build, under license, two of the four state of the art Hunter killer submarines designed by HDW of Germany. This event is very significant in that for the first time the yard had to be modernised to cater to contemporary building standards, as also for upgrading the skill of the labour force. The yard did successfully build two modern submarines when the MOD abruptly terminated the contract with HDW due to allegations of corruption against high ranking Indian personnel. We thus successfully managed to 'cut our nose to spite our face'. We let the entire infrastructure set up at great cost to rot and the skilled manpower to migrate.

After a gap of many decades we have once again revived submarine construction, this time with the assistance of the French. Currently the programme is running four years behind schedule. The 30 year perspective plan submitted to the Govt in 1999 has progressed at snail's pace and the navy has had to put up with considerable reduction in submarine force levels.

The strategic submarine programme continues to make progress and is beyond the scope of this essay.

Naval Aviation

Due to limited availability of indigenous options, all aircraft currently in service, except the HAL produced Chetak helicopters, ALH and Dornier, are imported from UK, USA and Russia. The navy has however made investments in LCA and ALH to augment ship/carrier borne operations. Critical shortages in ship borne medium range anti-surface and anti-submarine helicopters of the 10 ton variety are yet to be made up, due to procedures and processes of acquisition by MOD. The more we delay the more we pay both in financial and operational costs.

‘Made in India’ versus ‘Make in India’

Timely replacement of aging assets is an integral part of the 15 year plan submitted by the navy. Inability to fund or follow up such programmes has resulted in critical shortfalls in force level and an aging fleet. While cumulative delays lead to exercising import options to bridge critical shortages, if attempts to 'Make in India' are stalled, we will never be self sufficient and by implication we will never enter the exclusive club of powerful nations of the world. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate between 'Made' and 'Make' in India. To make in India, some basic criteria need to be satisfied.

Ship building has not been a priority activity in the industrial policy of India. Due to security and commercial interests, initially Europe, then Japan, South Korea and now China have provided incentives and subsidies to attain global standards and to be competitive in manufacture and sale. Since warship building was limited in numbers, India was deprived of developing and sustaining a large number of major and ancillary industries which support ship building. From steel to propulsion package volumes and economy of scale will dictate the interest generated in the private sector. Hence cost of basic ship building has a direct bearing on the cost of warships. In addition, the following criteria play a vital role to support the Make-in-India mantra:-

·       Skilled man power.

·       Contemporary Infrastructure

·       Design capability

·       Domestic industrial capability for ship borne equipment 

Remove any one of the above and ‘Make in India' becomes 'Made in India.'  It takes 8 -10 years to develop quality workmen, and 15 -20 yrs to develop quality shipbuilding engineers and ship designers. Some yards are restricted by the depth of water available at their location. Infrastructure up gradation of DPSUs, so critical to timely delivery of platforms, has only been recently addressed along with budgetary support but delayed time frame for completion. Until recently our shipyards had neither sufficient dock side crane facilities nor  ability  to undertake modular construction, which is the norm followed in modern yards. The modernisation programmes launched in all our yards have just begun to take shape and in some cases is likely to be completed in phases, perhaps spread over forth coming plan periods.

Apart from poor infrastructure, delays in timely delivery of warships have been caused by dependence on foreign suppliers for propulsion package, sensors and weapons. While the in-house design capability has matured over the years, non-freezing of specifications and staff requirements have also contributed to cost escalation.

Inordinate delays in DRDO projects have forced us to opt for imports of guns, missiles and certain sensors. Surface to surface and surface to air missiles have had to be imported from Russia and Israel. More recently, the DRDO adopted the joint venture route to launch projects such as Brahmos with Russia - the only supersonic SSM in the world - and the long range surface to air missiles from Israel.

Would it solve the problems of transfer of technology and lesser if not least dependence on the foreign partner? The answer is a resounding 'NO'. An audit by specialists would reveal that such products while carrying a 'Made in India’ tag, do not reduce reliance on the JV partner. This cannot therefore be classified as a 'Make in India' product.

In comparison, the sonar project launched jointly by the Navy and DRDO in 1970's and the EW programme launched in 1990's have been totally Indian projects which meet all the criteria for 'Make in India'. Some may claim that radars manufactured in BEL which started with the Leander programme in the 1970's to be a successful one. However, TOT in the real sense was never achieved and production in India can be hampered by the OEM at will. Similar is the story of indigenous manufacture of the Otomelara 76mm gun and the close in rapid firing AK 630 both of which are dependent on their OEM.

It has taken decades to realise that no worthwhile technology would be transferred to a third party and those that are, due to obsolescence in the supplier production chain, would elicit a grand sum of money for TOT- which in most cases make it unaffordable. 

Should we therefore assume that all such equipment licensed for production in India are just 'Made in India' and are susceptible to denial at will? The answer is a resounding 'Yes'. Yet, Joint Venture production as was done between private partners of USA(GE) and France(SNECMA) for commercial aircraft engines (Boeing and Airbus), is a necessary step to increase volume of production by sourcing customers globally or regionally. Commercially driven ventures find means to be more productive than Government run ventures.

So, if the propulsion package, sensors and weapons are to be sourced from abroad to meet the immediate requirement of the 42 ships and submarines on order, how and when do we realise the 'Make in India' campaign?

First, we would need to professionalise the decision making structure in the MOD. Transient generalists who man critical billets of decision making need to be replaced by professionals and experts. This would involve all departments in MOD, more so in Defence Production. Integration of MOD with Service Headquarters is a recommendation made by the GOM in 2001. Besides cosmetic changes on letter heads, no tangible action has been taken to date.

Second, it would be revealing to examine the 'bible' for conduct of business in MOD, titled 'Allocation of Business Rules' and 'Transaction of Business Rules' duly approved by the President of India in 1961. According to these rules, the Defence Secretary is responsible for the defence of India. The Service Chiefs have been assigned no role. Who then is responsible for delays of decades in acquisition and procurement of critical weapons, sensors and ordnance and even outcome of a war? Hence, Structural reforms and clear devolution of accountability are essential prerequisites for good governance. 

Third, now that we have reasonably advanced manufacturing facilities in the private sector, it is time to select the most competent of them to research and submit proposals for ship borne weapons/sensors and propulsion packages (diesel, gas turbine or fuel cell technology) to match the ship production schedule of the navy. Selective funding/credit for R&D from the Government would be an alluring if not an enduring incentive.

Fourth, while focusing on modernisation of existing DPSU yards to achieve timely production to ensure little or no cost escalation, encourage the private sector to develop their skilled man power and design teams. Utilising modern facilities in the private yards, including ship lift, modular construction, docks and heavy duty cranes could be integrated in our plans to compress production time. In brief, combine the man power expertise of the public sector with management practices of the private sector through a public-private partnership

Fifth, encourage yards both public and private to create design facility for export of ships and to maximise their earnings.

Sixth, remove all firewalls created to suppress creativity and entrepreneurship among competing entities. Promote single vendor culture where economies of scale and volumes of production are inevitable factors for compressing production schedules. Many of the strategic projects in USA work on this model with inbuilt checks and balances.

Seventh, promote uninhibited interaction between selected vendors and the user to facilitate seamless transfer of ideas from concept to reality.

Eighth, in order to minimise wastage of skilled personnel and maximise the drive to make in India, permit employment of high quality naval personnel in public and private sectors. Officers and men often wish to retire early due to lack of vertical growth opportunity and other reasons of stability. It may be noted that post WW2, a large number of Military personnel in USA and Europe were absorbed in public and private sector manufacturing and industrial/commercial sectors. They in turn rose to lead many of the internationally acclaimed organisations and companies. Presently a similar trend is visible in the telecom and IT sectors of India which has a fair share of veterans in senior rungs of the ladder.

In conclusion, the maritime dimension of 'Make in India' needs organisational and infrastructural paradigm changes, which are well within the capabilities of the political leadership.

Change we must. 'Foot prints in the sands of time are not made by sitting on our haunches'