CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDIA

Admiral Pereira Memorial  lecture Delivered 0n 15 Feb 2020 At Bengaluru

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - 

SOME MYTHS AND REALITIES

       At my farewell speech when I swallowed the anchor almost 14 years ago, I narrated a story about Adm Pereira. The true story underlines an aphorism, maxim, axiom or adage whatever you wish to call it-I leave it to the connoisseur of the English language. The story exemplifies or illustrates the fact that the special relationships that we nurture while in service do not end with the demise of individuals. Indeed, they go far beyond. On this very special day, let me very briefly narrate a true story of my association with RLP. Having remained in touch with the Admiral and his gracious wife, affectionately called Ma Phyllis, much after his retirement from ‘At last’, the house he built here and to ‘Broadsides’ later in Cunnoor, I had this yearning to be there for the last march. When he breathed his last at the Airforce hospital on 14 Oct 1993, I had just taken over as NA to CNS. Even before I rushed to inform CNS that I wish to be with my role model, he asked me to requisition the Airforce Boeing so that the maximum number of officers from Delhi could pay their last respects. My prayer was answered.

In the middle of winter that year I approached the Editor of Readers Digest to consider a story on Ronnie P. My request was duly drafted and on that cold wintry night, I was heading home. Just passed the Jesus and Mary college, I saw a car on fire and people on the street throwing mud on it to douse the fire. To my horror, it was my old fiat driven by my dear wife. She had been pulled out of the car. The charred front remained and it was a cold night. Having despatched Gita home in my staff car I was contemplating on how to tow it to my house at SP Marg. Out of the cold foggy night appeared a man who called out, “ Commodore Sir, don’t ruin your uniform let me get into the front seat and you ask your driver to tow.” On reaching home I asked him how he recognized my rank in winter uniform which most Delhiites would have failed to do. “Oh,” he replied, “I am Gomes and I used to drive Adm Pereira.” “What a surprise “I retorted, “I am late as I was drafting a request for RLP to be brought into the Readers digest. Do come up and have a drink with me. “He politely declined my offer and mumbled some other day or so. A few days later I called up CO INDIA and asked him to trace Gomes so that I could send him a gift to express my gratitude. He did not revert for a couple of days and when reminded he said, “You must have got it , wrong Sir, because Gomes died a few months ago”.

Goose bumps all over. The first thought to cross my mind was how Ronnie hated to see a uniformed officer pushing a car. I didn’t that night. I kept this story to myself so that no one would suspect my mental stability. If you think that this was the denouement, the story did not end there.

Fast forward 22 years later, an Ltcdr Anup Thomas called me to request me to assist him to write Ronnie’s biography. "Why me?' was my response. He explained that he had researched The Admiral’s life and some articles on him carry my name. “I think you are the leader of the ROPAS Group,” he said. Thus, began a journey of meticulous research for the book- from birth to death. The book was published by CELABS at Kochi in 2017. It was released on Navy day in the presence of the President of India. It is now available on Amazon. The author worked till 3AM every day and often ensured I did too. Now, every cadet at NAVAC gets a copy of this book. I had done my bit at NDA, when I was the Commandant to build a stone ship with a ship handling simulator. at the lake and I made a mild suggestion that it be named after Ronnie. Wonder of wonders they did name it after Ronnie much after I had left.

As the book was being printed, one fine day a cassette fell into my hand from an old cupboard. It was a recording of a speech delivered by Adm Pereira at Kochi, at a leadership capsule in 1990. That was digitized and is now available on youtube for all of you to see. Again, it was Cdr Thomas who did the groundwork. This morning I laid a wreath at the Admirals grave, as I have many times in the past. From now every memorial on Ronnie, I am assured, would be preceded by a wreath-laying. I guess that is the advantage of owning a piece of real estate when you are gone.

I now stand before you because the speaker scheduled to have addressed you in Dec 2019, Adm Sushil Kumar, a former Chief, passed away quite unexpectedly. A twist in the tale.

Adm Pereira led by example. Having observed his conduct in and out of service, I learnt that Machiavellism, manipulative behavior and pussy footing and pusillanimity are not good leadership traits for the Military. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you do not like my talk today, blame Adm Pereira who continues to reside in my subconscious mind.  But then, that is the sort of impact good leaders leave behind. Just remember that his centenary year is around the corner. 2023 it is.

Coming to the subject for the evening, Civil-Military relations myths and realities. let me first narrate how, if at all, I am qualified to talk on the subject. It is strange but true that as you grow in service you are willy- nilly put through a series of appointments depending on the needs of the service at that specific point in time. No officer planning your appointments- no matter how prescient he is, can predict how you perform. And yet all of you in this room can look back at what you did and what you learnt and chose to pursue during and after your career. So, you have in this very audience, credible authors like Jitty Franklin and successful entrepreneurs, corporate heads, etc. Obviously, we all pursued our objectives based on the experience gained from the appointments we were channeled through.

Before televisions, cell phones, and the social media intruded into our lives, commanding officers of ships, units, and air squadrons had sufficient time to nurture and groom young officers. I was a beneficiary of the old system of grooming. It was on one such occasion that a Commanding officer thought it appropriate to present me, a young Lt, the book titled, "The Soldier and the State. The theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" authored by Samuel Huntington (first published in 1957). Thus began my journey on this subject. It took me decades of reading in installments, as and when doubts arose in my mind, to slowly but surely understand the 'politics' of civil-military relations in our context. In my case, it was a fortuitous exposure to the subject, the import of which needed decades of experience to contextualise Samuel Huntington's research. So, this is how it unfolded in my life.

In 1970, I had just returned from the erstwhile Soviet Union after a very confusing exposure to a communist/socialist regime, fought the 1971 war and in due course landed at the Royal Naval staff college at Greenwich, London.  Maggie Thatcher had begun to revitalize The UK and especially its armed forces. Apolitical as their Military was, the excitement and expectations of good governance were palpable even among the stiff -upper lipped Brits. I was tasked to profile her leadership in the context of civil-military relations (three years later she fought the Falk Land war eight thousand miles away from her shores, based on the assurance of her First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach. By some sheer coincidence, I with my late wife Gita, was nominated by Adm Pereira the then Chief, to escort Adm Sir Henry and Lady Leach around India. Those of you who are familiar with the IAF Avro, would know that it took seven and a half hours to reach Kochi from Delhi. My views of Maggie Thatcher and her intervention in civil-military relations of The UK was more than substantiated by Sir Henry during these long travels. Thus, I began to understand and interpret the contents of Samuel ‘s book, which described ideological, political, societal and other factors that determine whether Civilian control of the Military is objective or subjective. More of it later.

A  few years later, I was posted as the Naval Adviser to our mission in Islamabad. This was the Zia era and I spent three years watching and studying the Military Dictatorship at work. Another project that Samuel's book prompted me to undertake. I dare say, without this background, I could not have attempted a paper called the Psyche of a Pakistani. I was able to fine-tune my paper after numerous interactions with service and civilian audiences when I spoke on it on my return to India.  Years later, after routine exposure to naval appointments, of which many significant ones that brought me in close proximity with senior civil servants and Ministers, visits abroad and more confusion on the Indian model of civil-military relations; in 1992, I entered the portals of the National Defence College (NDC).  It afforded me the opportunity to study the Indian scene and cover the whole spectrum of Socio-political, economy, science and technology, industry etc finally culminating in strategic environment and national security. The participants drawn from the services, civil services, police and a number of senior officers from friendly foreign countries from the East and the West, did share their experiences and thoughts.  It is here that one's understanding of the Indian context is fully realized. The yawning gap in civil-military relations with all its ramifications could now be juxtaposed with Samuel's seminal work on the subject. So, you see being an officer of average intelligence, I had to wait to understand some of the complex issues surrounding Samuels’ theoretical constructs.

Finally, in 2000, I was packed off by the COSC to the John F Kennedy School of public policy and governance at Harvard. Surprise- surprise, I came face to face with who, but Samuel Huntington. That he sat me down on a memorable evening and clarified my doubts was a testimony to his humility. Agree or not, destiny had played a role in my quest to put the civil-military relations in the context of post-independent India. Looking back, it took me all of 25 years to start a debate on what little, I now know. As they say” the more you read the less you know”.

 In very simple terms, I will discuss the subject under the following headings. The symptoms of the disease-related to CMR, our political dilemma, the Military conundrum and the role of civil society.

The symptoms of the disease

Let me commence with a telling statement in Samuel’s book.  I quote, “The real world is one of blends, irrationalities, and incongruities; actual personalities, institutions, and beliefs, do not fit into neat logical categories.” Unquote. We in the Military are indeed trained to see all things in black or white, right or wrong. The entire civilian world and in particular the politician operates in the grey zone. The theory of CMR in the United States, for instance, was a confused and unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the premises of American liberalism. The UK even without constitutional underpinnings, you know that they have no written constitution, had to contend with CMR based on the global deployment of the Navy in particular. They resorted to traditions and practices to develop their model of CMR.

The symptoms of poor civil-military relations alluded to in the Indian media, pertain to neglected servicemen, the surrender of medals to the supreme commander, hunger strikes by former military personnel, unimplemented supreme court rulings in their favour, unfulfilled government promises, fratricide, and indiscipline among soldiers, neglect of war widows and war heroes. This list is by no means exhaustive. But what are the causes of the disease?

The first question that arises is, whether India is unique among other established and acknowledged democracies of the world. If so why? If not, what is common among such democracies? Memories being short, we tend to forget many grave instances including the poor civil-military relations in the United States which led to the unsavory behavior of American Military personnel in the Korean war and later during and after the Vietnam war. Those of us who did not have televisions were able to see the resentment of the soldier against the US Government, in movies made later based on true stories. Demonstrations by veterans on the streets of Washington, a YouTube or Google story on the Bonus Army is one that tells it all.

During the first world war, the US Congress had agreed to compensate the soldiers with a bonus of over a Dollar a day spent in the battlefields. That promise was never kept until thousands of soldiers were rendered jobless and homeless during the great depression of the 1930s. Close to 40000 soldiers and their families decided to protest by moving and occupying the streets of Washington. The senate continued to vote against the settlement. The President, in a desperate move orders the Army to clear the streets of Washington by using force as necessary. What followed was a cavalry charge led by Gen Mc Arthur and Patton. The short documentary available on YouTube may shock you all.   In that clip you see the likes of Gen MacArthur and Patton, charging the peaceful protesters of veterans on the streets of Washington. In fact, Gen Mc Arthur decides to exceed the mandate assigned to him by the President. His views were that Military operations recognize only the winners.

Clashes between the President and the senior Military Commanders have been documented from the Civil war, right through the great wars and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.

My favourite case study is about Gen Mc Arthur who after retiring as the Chief was recalled and tasked to head the operations against the Japanese in the Eastern theatre. After the war, he is chosen to head the occupation forces in Japan-no less than a Governor-General. Having tasted power, he defies the US President repeatedly until he is sacked during the Korean war for noncompliance with orders from Washington. That he had got away in 1932 during the Bonus Army episode is a point to note.

Mac returns to USA after years in the field to a rousing reception of people who simply adored him. To cut the long story short, Mc Arthur, the darling of the people and an exceptional Military hero fades away into history books but not before addressing a joint session of the Congress. This case study offers many interesting challenges for CMR. The role of the soldier and the role of the Civilian head of a democracy are laid bare for scrutiny.

The sheer neglect of rehabilitating battle casualties of Vietnam that caused deep resentment were scenes that cannot be forgotten. This, despite a long history of war, starting with the civil war, through the world wars and numerous international military operations. Each of those enabled them to fine-tune their civil-military relations. The Military performed the role of Governing occupied territories. It was Gen McArthur who Governed Japan after the surrender of the Japanese. Samuel dedicates a whole chapter to describe the Alchemy of Power and CMR in total war.

The open respect displayed today to American soldiers in uniform or war casualties brought back to be buried with military honours, have evolved over centuries of waging war, many, far away from their shores. The range and scale of this experience willy-nilly involved civil society as a whole.  We, on the other hand, are just in the seventh decade of our independence, hence comparisons with the USA or UK may well be incongruous.

Similar episodes with respect to other democracies with a long history in Europe indicate that civil-military relations are a process of continuous evolution and that no single nation can claim to have found the right formula to afford the satisfaction of both parties. There are numerous pushes and pulls in the Presidential system in America. Those who care to read Samuel's book can also trace how the system evolved through ideologies, confusion, and contradictions.

 Our Political Dilemma.

Much has been written about the circumstances under which the post-independence Indian Political leadership was ill-equipped to deal with the Military. Neither was the Military better equipped. Both internal and external factors played a significant role in exacerbating this critical relationship. While unstable environment caused by Pakistani action soon after independence kept the military busy, numerous military takeovers in the immediate neighbourhood soon after decolonization gave credence to the rumours that India too may be subjected to military rule. It is likely that such a possibility was neutralised by introducing structural changes in higher defence management, reducing the potential powers of Cs-in-Cs  by creating Chief of staff of the three services, eliminating the military from pre independence decision making  bodies of higher defence management, reducing the stature of military officers in protocol, pay and allowance, perks, creating a large cadre of central police forces under the Home ministry and a host of other actions which also included having a common pay commission with no direct participation of the armed forces of India.

At that point in our history, there was neither credible literature on civil-military relations nor examples of a constitutional approach to address the emerging controversies in the Indian model of governance.

Artha Shastra is often quoted in our ramblings but the fledgling post world war Military of India did not have the luxury of falling back on established processes other than the British postulations. I advisedly use the term postulations as the British do not have a written constitution.

The point to note is that even the American Constitution had only a subjective approach to civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington states, civilian control of the armed forces emerged "despite rather than because of constitutional provisions". India adopted many of the provisions of the American constitution and since Britain had no written constitution, traditions and customs of Britain were considered for incorporation in our own document.

In India, neither the politician nor the military clearly understood the term "Civilian control"." Civilian control would be maximised if the military were limited in scope and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head" wrote Samuel, while adding that the reverse was also recorded under the military clause of their constitution, which divided civilian responsibility of military affairs and fostered the direct access of the military authorities to the highest level of Government. Hence it was the highest level of political leadership and not the bureaucrats who were to exercise control over the Armed forces.

Let us first understand the scope of Subjective and Objective Military control. What is meant by civilian control?

 The word civilian covers a very large section of people of varied character, conflicting interest, political leanings and what have you. Ergo, the term maximising civilian control would mean the power assigned to some civilian group.

In the 17^th and 18^th centuries, in the West, Military forces were generally under the control of the Crown. That was also true of the 550 Indian states ruled by Monarchs. The term Civilian control as I understand was adopted when the Parliamentary system began to function. The term was meant to increase the power of the elected members' vis a vis the Crown. But the King was more often than not a civilian. To this day the US Congress and the US President engages in a comparable struggle. Let us briefly examine that struggle to put our dilemma into perspective.

The US Congress is too large a body to exercise control over the Military. Ironically, members of Congress are closer to the people as compared to the President. The President can become a prisoner of his Military advisors.  Remember the connect between Rajiv Gandhi and Gen Sunderji and Sri Lanka operations. There are numerous such instances in the US history when the best-briefed leader in the world took all the wrong decisions. Yet it would be dangerous for us to generalise our findings when we have no access to reports of any of our Wars.

While I was studying the pattern of guidance if any provided by our political leadership since independence, I did see evidence of a threat of military take over often discussed consequent to almost all countries surrounding us and in Africa going under Military rule. Jairam Ramesh’s recent book on Krishna Menon reveals some more evidence of tensions between the politicians and the Military. We can discuss that during the Q&A session. The great unease between the top Military leadership and the RM/PM, and an Army Chief contributing articles to a well-known Newspaper whilst in the chair are all part of the confusion- confounded as Confucius would have put it.

Simply put, the fundamental concern in any democracy should be the distribution of the power between the executive and the legislative rather than between Civil and Military.

Due to paucity of time let me state that objective control of the Military becomes productive due to the increasing professionalism of the Military. Objective control is all about maximizing Military professionalism. I could cover this in the Q&A.

While the evolution of the American system progressed on unpredicted lines, since they have the Presidential system of government, our dilemma was, perhaps, which civilian head of the Government would control the Indian Armed forces. The President is just a titular head although given the title of the supreme commander. In our system, It had to be the Prime Minister through the RM. It was not surprising that Pandit Nehru made himself available to the armed forces for consultations when required. He personally knew many officers of the rank of Brigadier and above, as recorded by late General Inderjit Rikhye, who was handpicked by PM to proceed to the UN headquarters as security adviser to the Secretary-General. The infamous Gen Kaul episode in 1962 however, brought home the dangers of politicization of the Armed forces. Such episodes are very much a part of the learning curve in any large democracy.

Each passing year declassification of material, particularly in the UK throws up facts which tend to surprise us.

Indira Gandhi who established a personal equation, though turbulent at times, with Sam Manekshaw and, Rajiv Gandhi who interacted with his Chiefs along with his RRM, Arun Singh often did not have to rely only on the bureaucracy to advise them. Both the Sri Lanka operation and Operation Brass Tacks, which caused tensions between   India and Pakistan are often quoted by skeptics as examples of bad experiments of civil-military interaction at the apex level. These were, in fact, personalized leadership traits which had all the trappings of an evolving relationship which needed refinements but not rejection.

The momentum maintained in the '50s and '60s in clipping the wings of the Armed forces had done irreparable damage to the work ethos of MOD. Allocation of business rules and transaction of business rules of MOD first published in 1961 (duly approved by the President) and still in vogue with minor amendments, makes the Defence Secretary responsible for the defence of India. There is no role assigned to the Chiefs since service headquarters were attached offices of MOD. The latest creation of DMA needs to be watched before we comment on its efficacy.

The Committee of Defence Management headed by Arun Singh in the wake of Kargil had clearly outlined the anomalies in the system and had suggested solutions. The most critical of them remained unimplemented until recently, ostensibly, due to a lack of political consensus. Apart from remedying existing anomalies and assigning responsibility and accountability to the military, it is meant to address one of the major weaknesses in the civil-military relations in India i.e. lack of a single point, military advisor to the head of political leadership and participation in the strategic decision-making process on matters pertaining to national security.

In brief, in the absence of a clear authority-responsibility-accountability matrix, the civil-military equation at the apex level is critical to the safety and security of India. The military quite clearly cannot and should not function under a civilian bureaucrat, but only under the highest political authority. In our case, it has to be the PM through RM. I would like to believe that a good beginning has been made with the introduction of CDS and DMA.

The Military Conundrum

       With neither the constitution to support nor clarity to perform, except as an extension of the MOD, the services were left to fend for themselves. Every proposal, every plan, and every communication even to other ministries such as MEA had to be processed through MOD and it needed the concurrence of the Def Sec. Neither the politician, save a few, nor the bureaucrats at various levels of MOD have the domain expertise or knowledge to respond to scores of proposals originating from the three services. Most bureaucrats do not draft a single speech to be made by their Minister due to a lack of domain knowledge. Every document on National security originated from service headquarters. So, we wrote and heard our own drafts being read out to us during various meetings and seminars.  15-year plans for modernisation and up-gradation remained confined to files. 

At the field level, officers are trained to be high calibre professionals. Their profession is the management of violence. This being a unique profession, the training is such that it prepares him/her for a successful combat operation. No parallel entry is possible, for, unless you have acquired the skill and practiced them for a length of time you cannot be successful in combat. A commercial Pilot, for instance, cannot replace a fighter pilot unless he acquires combat skills. A fighter pilot can, however, fly a commercial aircraft if the certification process is completed. Hence an officer of the armed forces is irreplaceable by another professional outside the forces.

       The soldier is trained to be a specialist in the application of violence. That is his trade and not a profession. Hence there is a clear dividing line between the manager and the tradesman. Consequently, the entire process of induction and training of a soldier is unique to the officer and the other ranks. A soldier cannot become an officer except under certain conditions.

       The armed forces are as a rule monopolized by the state. More importantly, the profession of management of violence can be practiced only for socially approved purposes. Regulations, customs, and traditions, curtailment of certain privileges including fundamental rights become an indispensable part of a soldier's life. Consequently, the relations between the state and the soldier is a sacred one. There is much to be done so that a soldier is not equated to a Policemen, a blunder which has serious repercussions in maintaining the 'izzat' of the Soldier. Here is where the civil society steps in.

Role of the civil society

       The success of all democracies depends mainly on the quality of their civil societies. They too evolve over time. A well informed educated and mature civil society ensures that it elects the right political leadership. Both the Soldier and the politician emanate from the same civil society. It is also true that  "Our God and soldier we alike adore even at the brink of danger, not before, after deliverance both alike requited, our God is forgotten and our soldier slighted" This comes from an author, Francis Quaries who belongs to a country which has seen great sacrifices by the soldier. Why is it a truism? The civil society has short memories. It is not the duty of a soldier to repeatedly point out the sacrifices made by him. It is the duty of civil society to fight for the rights of the soldier. The society is expected to fight with the politician so that the soldier is cared for while in service and in retirement. Precisely what Kautilya recommended to his King.

       Creating a war memorial is not the concern of a soldier but it is the civil society that pushes its political leadership to remember and honour our dead soldiers. The civil society also has the power to punish the politician who fails to honour the soldier.

       According to Yasmin Khan a historian, about 2.3 Million  Indian soldiers fought during World War 2 and "89000 laid down their lives in Military service." Given our population then, it touched the lives of many Indian families. There was awareness about sacrifices created by the unfortunate circumstances of war. 400000 Americans and 388000 Britishers died in the war. Civil societies tend to remember losses when it impacts them. During periods of peace, the intelligentsia which controls the media often question investments in National security. Pressing debates on socio-economic issues keep the soldier out of sight.

       In the Indian context, it is essential to continuously educate the civil society on trials and tribulations of our soldiers. Compulsory military training or making NCC compulsory in schools and colleges and constant engagement with civil society through well-structured films, plays, and street shows are options that need to be exercised.

       In my view, it is essential to induct ex-servicemen of repute into our political structure so that the voice of the soldier is heard in the parliament. We need more of Jaswant Singhs, Khanduris and Shankar Roy Choudhry's.

       Thousands of ex-servicemen entered politics, industry and other professions in the USA soon after WW2. Many rose to be Presidents and successful congressmen. Industries benefitted from the focus brought to bear by military personnel.

       The soldier must enter all possible walks of life after retirement to be able to mobilize the goodwill of the society, which in turn could make the politician accountable to evolve a new equilibrium in civil-military relations of a young India.

Thank you for your patience. Jai Hind.