THIS ARMY BASHING MUST STOP

The edited version of this  article was carried by IANS today 01 Nov 12 under the title "This uninformed military bashing must stop"

DEJA VU -THIS UNINFORMED ARMY BASHING MUST STOP

The print and electronic media have been eagerly lapping up some half truths ostensibly sourced from an Audit report of  Defence Account circulated within the MOD. It is a matter of great concern that every file noting/report from various organs of the Government is finding its way to the electronic and print media even without an RTI application. If many such papers are up for sale  the matter is even more serious, for the buyer is as guilty as the seller.

Quite obviously, the system of procurement whether by the Ministry or through recently delegated powers to service head quarters, has to be well understood before statements such as  "Generals have caused a loss of 100 crores..." is made by editorials of reputed media. Equally a television debate cannot establish facts, as most anchors interrupt the views of experts and juxtapose their own perceived views, thus leaving the viewer even more confused.

The Defence Ministers in most countries would have intervened with a press statement from MOD explaining the process of such an audit and the accuracy and finality of such reports. That would have not only clarified the veracity of information selectively placed in the public domain but would have eased the pressure on the Armed Forces to go public on facts and figures. Downward loyalty of the RM cannot be limited only to MOD. Surely he also needs to back the Armed Forces who are placed under him.

Without taxing the reader on technicalities, let me explain the process. These are facts not meant to defend the Army in this case but to place the subject in perspective for the reader.

Having established or reduced the office of Service Headquarters to Attached office status (now notionally designated as the IHQs) in the early 1950's,the MOD retained all controls of financial powers. The Chiefs did not enjoy delegated financial powers to even manage the day to day revenue expenditure, leave alone Capital expenditure for acquisition of assets.  The Navy was the first to suggest, discuss and get sanctions for New Management Strategy(NMS) commencing 1991. At that stage the intention was to address the first concern of unacceptable level of operational availability of ships and submarines. Delegated financial  powers to the Chief  to expedite decision making, resulted in achieving much higher readiness levels. Under the earlier dispensation, ships needing urgent or routine repairs and maintenance continued to languish along side, while MOD and MOD Finance raised objection after objections on modalities of repair. The operational and opportunity cost of delayed sanctions from the Ministry were so great that nearly half the fleet was awaiting some sanction or the other to be rendered operationally  fit for service.

It was not without years of discussion i.e.in 1997 and later in 2006, that the delegated powers with all the checks and balances were issued as Navy Instructions, thus making the Chief responsible for running the Navy through revenue budget delegation. Later these powers were grudgingly enhanced with more restrictions but were limited only to  the revenue expenditure and not to the Capital.

Not many would know that delegated powers for Capital expenditure were progressively enhanced to Rs 50 crores only from 2004 onwards and is now proposed to be enhanced to Rs 100 crores? Given that the annual defence budget has exceeded Rs. One Lac crores, over the years, every committee appointed by the Govt has forcefully sought delegation of adequate powers to the Armed Forces so that they are made responsible and accountable for maintaining  optimum readiness levels.

During this whole sorry episode Heads of large Government controlled departments such as Railways for instance, were allowed to exercise full financial powers commensurate with their operational needs.

Since the Navy, being the smallest of the three, had initiated ,documented and steered a successful pilot project, delegation of powers for other services was progressed on this model. MOD had ensured that at no stage was it possible for the Military authority, irrespective of rank, to sanction any expenditure without the concurrence of Integrated Financial Advisor,  barring few petty items of limited value. These officers were drawn from department of defence accounts. Needless to say the necessity to place so many of them in quick succession as advisors, created an avalanche of vacancies for promotion to this specific cadre-which could be a subject for another discussion.

The major weakness in the system was and continues to be the mindset of the IFA. Instead of assuming the role of an Advisor(which is not a part of his/her training) the IFA acts as an auditor for pre-acquisition formalities-the post event audit notwithstanding. More over there are not enough officers of the right seniority and experience to fill these increasing billets.

Clearly, no operational Commander under this dispensation would over rule the objections raised by IFA, since the latter forms an integral  part of processing/approving every step of procurement under delegated powers. It is ironical that the auditors who carry out post- audit at the centre, are from the very same cadre as those fulfilling  IFA functions in the field. Hence we have not heard of a single query raised on how the IFA allowed the process of procurement, if it was faulty. Such a system is not anchored on powers delegated to individual Commanders but to the system as a whole, with built in checks and balances.

Another interesting fact is that orders for delegation of powers do not empower the field commander to review the performance of the IFA whose final reviewing authority is  CGDA. Also if there is a conflict of interest between the delegated authority and the Financial Advisor, the matter is to be referred to Delhi. There is no situation in which the IFA who is involved in the entire process of procurement can be intimidated or arm twisted to acquiescence. If there is a faulty acquisition in procedural terms, the IFA is a party to it. Hence post- audit of the process should in the first instance ask for an explanation of the IFA.

This essay would be incomplete without reference to extraordinary delays in equipping the Armed forces with platforms,equipment,ammunition and ordnance due to the convoluted procedures of Defence Procurement which are handled entirely by MOD. AJT took about 20 years of negotiations and discussions, helicopters and guns are outdated. These need no elaboration as they are in the public domain. The cumulative shortages are so severe that most Commanders who have now been given limited powers of procurement, opt to procure a small numbers of critical operational necessities. Bullet proof vests are a case in point. Should a soldier continue to sacrifice his life  because there is protracted discussions on file between the Attached office and MOD? Most field commanders who feel for their troops would seek to provide what they can with what they have. The IFA knows it and hence he is required to advise and prevent procedural violations. If such violations are indeed discovered later, by an auditor who has neither the knowledge nor the responsibility to prevent loss of life, should it not be the responsibility of the IFA to explain the nature of such procurement? 

Lastly, most such observations made by the auditor is settled after explanations are obtained as per procedures. In the meanwhile, imagine the damage done by innuendos and television debates placing the blame squarely on Field Commanders .

Will the media carry an apology later? Perhaps it would be easier to obtain statistics from honest vendors(who prefer anonymity) who, reportedly, have had to and continue to bribe office bearers of Controller of Defence Accounts of all three services, just  to get their legitimate payments released with least delay and harassment.

Vice Admiral(retd.) Suresh Bangara, former FOC-in-C Southern Naval Command had held appointments of Director Naval Plans and later Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Policy and Plans) when NMS was steered by the Navy.