Agusta Westland and defence acquisition (courtesy The Quint-published on 04 May 2016)

THE AGUSTA WESTLAND EPISODE

WHAT AILS DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN INDIA

What is fortuitous in the Agusta Westland deal which is much under discussion in the Indian media, is that the helicopter was meant for use by VVIPs in India. In a society which is obsessed by the term VIP / VVIP it is perhaps poetic justice that has invited so much attention on these two countries; India and Italy. The question that should be uppermost in the minds of the common man is,"why has it taken twenty years or more to procure a helicopter for our 'beloved VIPs and VVIPs?' If they cannot be looked after, how long will it take to get platforms, equipment, arms and ammunition for the fighting arms of the services of India? " The answer has been blowing in the wind for decades; starting from Independence to  the Kargil war and stretching to date. From starting a case for acquisition to signing a contract has taken one to two decades in most cases. whether it was the Main battle tank(MBT) for the army, the Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) for the airforce, Light combat aircraft(LCA) and scores of other platforms and equipment whether imported or indigenous met with the same fate.

Dr Abdul Kalam in his capacity of SA to RM in 1996, made an effort through a self reliance implementation Committee(SRIC) to increase the indigenous content of procurement for our armed forces. Having been a member of that committee and having participated in never ending processes of the Ministry of Defence, I now see the light at the end of the tunnel. Let me explain for the benefit of the layman.

Known Obstacles in procurement

First ,Inability to convert long-term induction programmes into time-bound acquisition plans along with budgetary support. Although the service headquarters of the three services periodically submitted 10/15 year plans, the Ministry of defence neither had the expertise to accept or reject such proposals nor was there assurance of budgetary grants for such plans. Ministry of Finance often sprang a surprise by reducing allocations to MOD just prior to announcement of the budget.

Second, the service Chiefs neither had financial powers to run the revenue nor the capital budgets allocated to their respective services till the New management strategy was first introduced  in the late 1990s.  Their powers for capital expenditure remains limited.

Third, excessive reliance on public sector manufacturing and production agencies and inability to provide level playing field to competent private industries deprived the forces from  the timely supply  of equipment as also of international quality of products.

Fourth, protracted procedures for compiling Request for proposals and field trials resulted in unaffordable opportunity costs to be incurred by the Government. Neither the Ministry nor the service headquarters was held accountable for inordinate delays which ipso facto led to frequent changes of performance related quantification.

Fifth, inability to meet stringent time schedules of indigenous equipment to match the operational needs of the forces, often resulted in the import of platforms and systems which in turn created its own dynamics of middlemen, corruption and litigations. Blacklisting of foreign suppliers caused further delay in restarting the process ab initio.  Consequently, the end user was forced to continue to use obsolete and obsolescent equipment with no hope of replacement for decades.

 Defence Procurement Policy.

Some of the obstacles quoted above suggest that a clear cut policy framework is essential for streamlining the whole process of procurement. It was the Group of Ministers post the Kargil war that recommended setting up a procurement structure for time bound acquisition of platforms and weapon systems. Such a system was created in 2002 but significantly the process of integration of the armed forces with the MOD ,recommended by the same GOM was not implemented.

Such were the complexities of procurement which encompass numerous factors concerning procurement from within and without. that DPP was revised in 2005,2006,2008,2009,2011 and 2013. Any sane organisation would desist from issuing policies almost every year, which compound issues and confound the suppliers. That was perhaps the reason why hardly any worthwhile procurement including ammunition took place during that period.

DPP 2016

The latest DPP issued during the recently concluded DEF EXPO at Goa has some notable and far-reaching policy formulations. Extensive consultations with leading industries of India and abroad gave birth to Digital India, Make in India, Start up India all of which have an impact on the DPP. All three have interlinking policy directions for executing the vision of the Government. Consequently, the following weaknesses in the procurement system have been addressed comprehensively;

·       The parameters and processes for Make in India have been articulated with emphasis on self-reliance through the facilities of the much improved indigenous public and private sectors. Incentives and assured production order with possible export capabilities have been covered.

·       Offset conditions for foreign suppliers exceeding the supply of Rs 2000 crores has been specified with clarity.

·       Incentives for MSMEs and the need for the Government to bear part costs for design and development has been recognised.

·       Transparency, probity and public accountability form the backbone of the policy document.

·       Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), the 5 years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) for all three services duly integrated by the Integrated Defence Staff under COSC have been rationalised.

·       Fast track mechanisms have been streamlined. Much would depend on execution of the policy

·        Strategic partnerships commensurate with current geopolitical realities are under consideration. Transfer of technologies and access to cutting edge technologies are part of discussions currently in progress.

What more needs to done

Three missing links in the Government's well-directed efforts are the integration of the three forces under a CDS ,the integration of the MOD with service headquarters to professionalise decision-making at MOD and to eliminate corruption at the final settlement of payment to indigenous suppliers at the respective CDA outlets. The latter has been pushing the cost incurred by suppliers which can be totally neutralised if there is a will. Digital India ought to remove this undesirable interface and facilitate direct payments to suppliers.

There is hope that the VVIP Helicopter along with long pending demands of the services will all be met within the stipulated time frame. The term VVIP should be dispensed with.

Indo-US relations-pragmatism and real politik likely to prevail (Courtesy The Quint-13 April 16)

Evolving Indo-us cooperation

Pragmatism and real politik likely to prevail

On 22 and 23 December last I had written two articles on the emerging geopolitical realities of the Indo-US cooperation in the military domain. This was based on two decades of military engagement between the two.  The maiden visit of Manohar Parrikar to the USA in December last and the deliberations with his counterpart Ashton Carter had raised predictable headlines in the Indian media. Predictable because of the confusion caused in our minds on  issues related to India's National interests, the bedrock of non-alignment on which two full generations have been brought up and the rapidly changing geopolitical environment in the world.

The continuing Indo-Russian cooperation, the vicissitudes of the Indo -China relations, the consolidation of the look-East policy initiated by Shri Narasimha Rao, the redeployment of US assets to the Indo-Pacific region and PM  Modi's priority to engage with Japan and Australia are not isolated events of history. That there is a method in the perceived madness in the initiatives taken on the foreign policy front, would perhaps be comprehended only  in the years to come.

On the political front, coalition Governments in the past, with the support of the left, continued to view the USA as an undesirable ally. The rapidly changing power balance, the belligerence of China with her economic and industrial might  and her all weather support to Pakistan failed to change the script on nonalignment until the academic and strategic community challenged the attempt to ratify a document titled "Nonalignment 2.0". Faced with criticism and redundancy of the effort made by a private group of individuals, the document initially not placed in the public domain, soon vanished.

However, a fresh debate consistent with the changed geo-political scenario and viewed in the context of geo-economics resulted in what was termed by Gautam Sen(Pune) as geo-diplomacy. The new Modi Government launched immediate and realistic measures to make the foreign policy relevant to the changing times.

A serious debate  followed by a discussion on a historical perspective of National Interests of India and its consequences , as late as in November 2015, opened many avenues for action. Parliament had noted more than a decade ago, that India had no worthwhile Defence Policy- a fact underlined by Jaswant Singh in his talk on "What constitutes national security in a changing world order.

India's strategic thoughts." (published in June 1998)

It is in this backdrop that the return visit of Secretary Carter becomes significant. The significance is accentuated by the discussions on board the Vikramaditya, arguably the most potent platform in our inventory. Historically It is considered symbolic to hold discussions and allude to intentions on the deck of a majestic war machine.

The current headlines relate to the two parties agreeing to sign  the long pending Logistics Support Agreement(LSA). The pros and cons of this agreement have been outlined in my linked article. Suffice it to say that for the very reasons outlined therein, the LSA needs to be concluded. That this agreement which has been ratified by 80 countries would enable our navy to extend its radius of operations needs to be factored in. It would also realise   the stated objectives of our document on Maritime Security Strategy, which was released by Parrikar in October last.

As regards the other two agreements i.e. CISMOA and BECA, much depends on the quality of discussions on the release of cutting-edge technologies for use by the Indian Armed Forces and I might add, whether the White House is "Trumped" or not! That bridge can be crossed later.

The need of the hour is to have the conviction in our ability to ensure that the national interests of India can be more than adequately protected. Agreements such as LSA cannot be delayed on flimsy arguments with little substance.

(  http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/04/13/indo-us-relations-pragmatism-and-real-politik-likely-to-prevail#.Vw4hdxNj8Ao.facebook)

TRAINING OUR WARRIORS (This article appears in the Fauji India April 2016 Edition)

TRAINING OUR WARRIORS- NEED FOR DELIBERATION,DEBATE AND REVIEW

My appointment as Commandant National defence academy(NDA) in January  2003 surprised some in my service. I was not a product of the NDA. Given the short notice to assume command, I did the only two possible things I could. I read the history of NDA and selected a few of my ex-NDA colleagues to discuss the macro issues related to this prestigious training institution, which had invited the attention of the Prime Minister himself when it was being built.

 In the 1950's, there was not a single joint services training academy-not even among the victorious allies of World War 2. In fact, the United States Armed forces continue to train their officers in single service training establishments despite having integrated their Armed Forces in late 1980's. Much of the layout ,construction of accommodation and training methodology for NDA was adopted from the United States Military Academy ,West Point(USMA). Ironically, they did not integrate their armed forces at the bottom but did so at the middle and top and we were the first to integrate at the bottom and to date remain divided at all other levels.

Having completed over 36 years of service when I took over, I was fortunate to have been exposed to training in the erstwhile Soviet Union, staff college in theUK, a stint at Harvard and scores of operational and training interactions with leading maritime powers. More importantly, in 1995, I led a delegation to the United States to study the training features across numerous establishments of the US Navy including Annapolis. Earlier, three years of observing our consanguineous neighbour between 1985-88,while posted at Islamabad,  gave me insights into the internal dynamics of adapting a  British-trained force, to train and man American sensors/weapons while also struggling with theocratic intervention by President Zia's obsession of Islam. Consequently issues related to education and training, essentially to meet the demands of Revolution in Military Affairs were uppermost in my mind, even as I stepped into NDA on 31 December 2002.

CORTOS REPORT

The first task while acquainting myself with the training curriculum was to study previous assessments if any, on the quality of training imparted at NDA. The only study by a committee appointed by MOD, as a result of the direction of the then PM, during the Senior Officers conference in 1986, was the Committee For the Review of Training of Officers of the Armed Forces (CORTOS) which submitted its report in Aug 1987. The twin aims assigned to this committee were," a)To make the technical content of the training such that the officer corps will be able to handle the new technologies in battle today and tomorrow. b) To increase inter-service cooperation and interaction at all levels."

The recommendations contained in the report were partially approved by the Government in 1991, after four years of discussions and procrastination, thereby diluting the urgency displayed at the conference. Crucial recommendations on financial and administrative reforms to run the academy by constituting an NDA Board with eminent members of academia, services, both serving and retired, was not approved. That led to a virtual status quo on the implementation of much needed  prophylactic measures .

CORTOS had made scathing comments on the sorry state of the academic department of the academy. The academic department had suffered due to a combination of factors which were caused by the formulation of the educational policy of India, which at the inception of NDA was three tiered ,i.e. matriculation, intermediate and degree.  Later NDA  switched to a three-year course to accommodate more technical inputs. However, soon thereafter the nation's education policy which introduced the 10+2 concept along with stipulations by UGC on qualification for teaching staff, further aggravated the situation.

Coupled with the attrition of the original teaching staff due to stipulations introduced by UGC and cadre management issues which failed to be resolved by pay commissions, the academy was left with less than 50% permanent staff . The other 50% had to be temporarily recruited from unemployed members of the academia. The chair of Principal/Vice Principal remained unoccupied for almost a decade, which in turn caused dilution in the academic syllabus and a feeling among the cadets that academics per se were not important when compared to physical activities  such as parade training, PT, games and cross country runs. The recruitment of professors and lecturers remained under the direct control of the UPSC; even the MOD had no say in the matter of filling permanent vacancies. 

Thus, I inherited an organisation which had not been audited for over a decade by an independent committee as recommended by CORTOS. Consequently, COSC did not receive independent assessments of the quality of training at NDA since "there was no authority to examine the causative factors in generating the standards it  examines."

Professional Training

The first deduction from observations within the first few hours revealed that in many ways, time had stood still. Past patterns of training continued with momentum only because all seemed to be going well. Often one heard the comment," it is as good as it was in my days". Much has changed in most training academies of the world. The cliché, "don't fix it if it ain't broke" certainly does not apply to us. In view of increasing demands on academics which is dictated by the concerned host university, 67% of the cadets time is meant to be devoted to academics. If 33% is adequate to make him a soldier/warrior before he goes to the next stage, every moment of professional training becomes precious. Hence, the over emphasis on parade training and other physical training carried out as extra-constitutional late night toughening- measures would need to be critically re-examined. This  became one of my priorities.

Societal changes.

The cadet who enters the portals of NDA today is a very different specimen compared to his predecessors a decade ago. Being older in comparison, after 10+2, he belongs to a generation which  is knowledgeable and much more aware of the environment than his predecessors. He also belongs to a highly undisciplined society in which fear of law and order is virtually absent. Corruption is the order of the day as bribing the policeman, wireman, meter man etc is a regular feature for survival. He does not look at his superiors in awe. He belongs to a society where violence and crime including domestic violence are a part of life. He may not have had the opportunity to live in a hygienic environment. Deportment, dress code, discipline, élan, military ethos  and value system are all alien to him. To his credit, he imbibes most of them with time and a bit of coercion. He is fiercely competitive.

The present method of converting this individual into an officer cadet needs a boot camp phase dedicated to reorientation/indoctrination. There is a need to structure close interaction with instructors to enable him to slide into the training curriculum. Parade training, inculcating    discipline, military terminologies and social conduct would need to replace the existing process of moulding through coercive means alone. This then prompted the  need for a separate study.

To those who think that it is unique to India, when I led a delegation in 1995, I was surprised to see Admiral Charles R Larson in Command of the famous US Naval Academy, Annapolis. He had retired from active service as a 4 star Admiral heading the Pacific Command.

The academy is normally commanded by a serving 2 Star Admiral. A series of incidents among trainees, pointing to severe erosion in the ethical and moral values of the Midshipman came under the scrutiny of the media and the Congress. On the recommendations of the enquiry committee, Admiral Larson was brought back from retirement with the single objective of reviving the value system of the academy. This is a radical but prophylactic measure which cannot be replicated in India due to nonexistent structures of oversight and accountability.  The societal problems, however, exist in most democracies where' Mallyas' and Kanhaiyas' coexist.

Training versus Education

A common debate world over is how much education is good for a professional soldier. Concepts such as galloping technology, RMA, Net work-centric operations etc may tend to suggest that we prepare the trainee to meet the intellectual elements of such a challenge. Does it mean that every cadet in NDA has to be an Engineer or a B tech? That debate has been set to rest by the experiences gained at West Point, when the decision to peg the academic input to engineering was rescinded in the 1950's. What was done is to enhance the academic inputs on science and mathematics to the best that is available within the country.

The Australian Defence Forces Academy(ADFA) which studied the NDA model and adopted an indigenous solution instead, opted to separate Education and training such that each is conducted independent of the other and not parallelly.  A mutual exchange of visits  between our two academies revealed that they had resorted to more innovative thinking. They commence the session with educational inputs provided by the finest university in Australia, during which basic physical fitness is ensured through compulsory games and fitness drills. The focus being on education, it ensures whole hearted participation of cadets in honing their intellectual skills. Likewise, when the Military phase starts  the cadet is subjected to tough conditioning and professional grooming with no distraction on academics.  

US and other Western academies provide quality education through highly qualified and well-paid professors as well as retired officers with Doctorate qualifications. Merely converting the syllabus to B Tech and depending on uniformed personnel with inadequate teaching and academic proficiency, now being proposed, is a recipe for disaster, for, the quality of teaching depends  largely on the infrastructure and reputation of the host university. JNU which  is currently contracted to grant suitable undergraduate and technical degrees to our establishments is neither equipped to deal with undergraduate studies nor technical education. We appear to bank on institutions who oblige us for a payment of consultancy fees and not on their capacity to oversee and deliver.

In view of the above, it is incumbent on the policy makers to define the vision and missions for training future warriors with clear objectives for each phase of training. Should it be necessary to enforce engineering standards at primary training establishments, it should be mandatory to raise the bar of UPSC examination and make the minimum qualifying marks to 75% as opposed to the current standards of 45% which goes against the basic principles of admission to a technical stream of education.

The second option would be to induct B Tech students directly into NDA and focus on the military inputs needed to make him a warrior. This would do away with most of the academic staff except a few like languages, computer science, etc.

Bang for the buck

CORTOS had set the stage for reforms in 1987. Appreciating that the financial powers and administrative powers were not vested in the Armed Forces at that time and armed with the delegated powers post the Kargil Review Committee report and the Committee on Defence Management headed by Shri Arun Singh, I sought the constitution of two committees. The first to identify the changes to the military training process and the second headed by a Vice Chancellor to suggest the educational reforms to meet the emerging challenges in science and technology through infrastructure up gradation and positioning qualified academics of eminence. The COSC agreed to both.

 I had to move on promotion to CinC in Jul 2004. I later learnt that the first committee recommended token changes to the curriculum and the second made a meek attempt to rationalise the ongoing academic content as they could not find a suitable Vice Chancellor to head the committee. ironically, the evolution of academic syllabi of NDA was overseen by the Jha Committee in 1948, the Mahajani Committee in 1954-55, and finally, the Mahajani Committee in 1972 (all of whom were reputed educationists)when the three-year degree course was sanctioned. In 1989, the syllabus was further revised to suit the 10+2 entry. Yet we could not find an eminent Vice Chancellor when we most needed one.

Unless there is a clear definition of what we expect from the soldier of tomorrow and we understand the difference between training and education we are likely to blunder our way through the battlefield of tomorrow. If the role of a soldier is to' manage violence' he needs to be equipped with the means for just that.

Here a quote from Plato would be appropriate. "The purpose of education is not merely to produce an abstract mentality or a high-class technician, but to produce a cultured person with restrained behaviour and civilised manners."

Epilogue.

Incremental changes and status quo-ism for tackling inadequacies in training are bound to have repercussions on the battlefield. There is a distinct possibility that we could compress the  training time by removing repetitive activities during the next higher level of training i.e. NDA to IMA, NDA to NAVAC/Training ship and NDA to AFA.

Now that we are dealing with adults of  19/20 years of age  we need to replace "denial regimes" with "empowering" regimes." Effective training tools" of the past need to be replaced to meet the aspirations and capabilities of the new generation. We need to focus on assessing the comprehension, imagination and creativity levels of a trainee and his ability to conceptualise and analyze-not his capacity to learn by rote.

"When the best things are not possible, the best can be made of those that are " so said a wise man!

POOR GOVERNANCE -(My article carried by First post today)

A NEVER ENDING JOURNEY OF POOR GOVERNANCE

WHY INDIA CANNOT BE EASILY GOVERNED

Those of us who were born just prior to Independence have lived with optimism and hope. Hope that India will soon overcome complex problems of Governance given the plurality, non-homogeneity and diversity of cultural and religious milieu of our people and optimism that we will get our act together sooner than those in the immediate neighbourhood.  Both the hope and  the optimism appear to have been belied despite some notable achievements. Compulsions of coalition politics and inability to pass legislations of crying need even when the people of India elect a majority government further accentuates frustrations among well-meaning citizens.

 What is increasingly clear to many, is that the present form of governing structures has been found wanting. An option that has been examined for many years now has been the Presidential form of government. The pros and cons of this proposal have been debated among experts but has not found sufficient traction among budding young politicians in the making, for fear of enormous challenges of amending the constitution of India. That the Constitution has been amended about 98 times in 68 years is often left unsaid.

There is a second option which may find traction. That of directly electing a Prime Minister who then has a stable tenure of  five years or more. Before commenting on this option it is  prudent to analyse some bitter truth about the citizens who elect the politician and the quality of politicians who populate the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha and the State Assemblies.

In the corporate world," the Stockdale Syndrome" is often quoted to train a manager to face the brutal realities on the ground while remaining optimistic about his vision and plans. The brutal realities of politics in India need to be faced if optimism is to be the goal. In brief, they are;

• ·        The voter base also consists of  semi-literate or illiterate citizens who are often described as very perceptive voters by candidates who talk down to them during campaigning. A vast majority are still up for sale for goodies ranging from liquor, sari, TV to computers.
• ·        Non-implementation of Electoral reforms which are stymied by all shades of parties who are elected continues to ensure that money and muscle power play a vital role during elections.
• ·        Given the very limited options of qualified candidates with  a clean reputation, the voter continues to vote to punish those who do not deliver but the quality of tainted candidates remain the same.
• Well- meaning and qualified citizens shun politics. They neither contest due to lack of funds nor even vote to neutralise the votes garnered by illegitimate means. The end result is the same scamster reappears with a range of promises that cannot be delivered. The alienated and poor voter is ready to clutch at any straw in the wind.
• ·      National priorities or interests are often sacrificed at the altar of personal or party priorities.

Our current democratic processes have failed to keep up with the rapid reforms required to implement lessons repeatedly learnt by successive Election Commissions. No political party has shown any resolve to implement electoral reforms, administrative reforms, Police reforms or Judicial reforms. A strong desire to cling to power and the added incentive to dramatically increase the financial status of incumbent politicians, as revealed by recent surveys, have resulted in a strange convergence of interests among otherwise squabbling political parties. Politicians all over the world irrespective of their ideologies display preference to overlook national interests over political expediency. This may be morally despicable to many not in power, but, it is not alien to human behaviour.

The above is just a representative sample of what a sincere, clean aspiring politician should be ready to face. Hence, in the current format no individual, no matter how sincere or capable can deliver within his/her tenure.

If a Prime Minister could be directly elected as the Chief Executive, with powers to use domain experts as executives of his cabinet and the parliamentarians function to pass legislations to enable good governance, that model  may be an option to consider. Elected representatives cannot possibly fulfil the role of a domain expert in the rapidly globalised environment when decisions are required to be taken expeditiously  by experts with more than adequate experience and knowledge in the concerned sphere of activity.

What is implicit in this model is that only a politician who has national exposure and acceptance can contest a direct election. All the regional satraps would need to give way to a statesman of repute.

All the experts would hasten to bury this concept by pointing out the enormity of obtaining necessary consensus for such a change. But maintaining status quo is an even more dangerous option if India has to discharge her responsibilities at a global or even a regional  arena.

Strangely people outside India expect us to assume a global role while we continue to self-destruct with glee.

http://www.firstpost.com/india/collapse-of-governance-directly-elect-a-pm-as-ceo-and-allow-him-to-use-domain-experts-as-executives-2641008.html

The International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam (East coast of India) 06 to 07 Feb 16

seamless transition from Presidents Fleet Review to International Fleet Review- 2001 to 2016

The second International Fleet Review is scheduled to commence on 06 Feb. Historically, Fleet reviews in India are conducted once during a President's tenure. The first review was held in 1953 during the presidency of Dr Rajendra Prasad. Nine more have been held, with the last at Mumbai, on 20 Dec 2011, during the tenure of the first Lady President, Smt Pratibha Devisingh Patil .  However, the scale and grandeur of an International Fleet Review is quite another challenge.

The first such event was conceived and executed in 2001 under the leadership of the then CNS, Admiral Sushil Kumar. I was summoned to his office soon after Prime Minister Vajpayee embarked the Western Fleet in Mar 1999.I was the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Information Warfare and Operations) The Chief stated that the PM had outlined his maritime vision during discussions with the then External Affairs Minister Mr Jaswant Singh. What better way to execute it, he suggested, than building bridges of friendship across the seas. "Why cannot we convert a Presidents Review into an International Fleet Review?" Having participated in a grand international review at Spit Head in the UK, to celebrate the silver jubilee of the Queen's Coronation in 1977, where INS Udaygiri, a ship built at Mazagaon Docks at Mumbai was nominated by our Navy, my first thought was that it was an audacious suggestion. The logistics of such a show in Mumbai was mind boggling from an international perspective, as was seen at UK. Indeed, our ships had participated in International Fleet Reviews in other parts of the world. USA, UK, Japan and Australia were countries which had successfully hosted such an event. But then they were resource- rich and infrastructurally and logistically well equipped to handle such an event. Given that at least two years of preparations would be needed which included internal clearances from multiple authorities, discussions with MEA, MHA, MOF and MOD, consultations with PMO and the Presidents secretariats, it implied that execution had to commence forthwith.

Mumbai was the only port which had the proven capacity to anchor a large number of ships and was the home for the sword arm of the navy, the Western Naval Command. Having hosted seven such events earlier, planning commenced without further delay. That the event was a resounding success on 12 Feb 2001, has been well documented. 29 foreign warships participated among a total of 89 ships which were reviewed by the Supreme Commander. Over 30 chiefs and senior officers of other navies including a large number from the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) were present.

On the following day, the Marine drive provided a brilliant venue for a grand march past and an operational demo for all the participants and the Mumbaikars who enthusiastically supported the event.

For the record, Mumbaikars were requested through print and the electronic media to assist in reducing the smog created by vehicles and other polluting industries. That the event including the fly past and displays on the next day were a complete success, proves the contribution made by the citizens of Mumbai and the close liaison between the Western Naval Command and the civilian authorities in Mumbai. The city of Vishakhapatnam is now gearing up for the second International Fleet Review scheduled between 06 and 07 Feb this year.

Prime Minister Vajpayee had perhaps kick-started the very concept of an International Fleet review by outlining his vision for building bridges of friendship across the oceans during his maiden passage on the Fleet ships in March 1999. Later that year hostilities at Kargil resulted in the mobilisation of the Indian navy and deployment on the western seaboard. yet while addressing the participants at the International city parade in 2001,  the Statesman in him articulated the thought, that it was time to rewrite the historical thinking that seas and oceans are dividing features between countries. He ended by saying, "Let us start that process with the Indian ocean." India and the Indian Navy have done just that while reaching out to the IOR.

On a lighter note, two incidents come to my mind. The Captain of USS Cowpens was understandably paranoid about Indian fishing vessels approaching his ship while entering Mumbai. The USS Cole incident had  deeply influenced him. It took a bit of dexterity and diplomacy to tell him that the fishermen of Mumbai were perfectly peace-loving people and that the review anchorage was well protected by coordinated patrols by speed boats of the Indian Navy.

The second incident was when an Iraqi senior officer at the Maritime seminar directed a question at the chair while the US sixth fleet commander was seated in the audience. He asked whether the US presence in the Persian Gulf was an act of maritime diplomacy or maritime piracy. It took the seasoned skill of diplomacy  of JN Dixit, who was the Chairman of that session,  to deflect the question and pose a benign one.

Bottom of Form

The second Review at Vizag promises to be an, even more, memorable event. After all the man-of -war is amongst the best ambassadors of a country.
http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=in&nid=15533

Civil-military relations-yet to evolve?

Address deteriorating civil-military relations------------start from the top

The civil-military relations in India, instead of stabilising with experience, continue to deteriorate with little or no effort to learn from other democracies. The OROP saga was an opportunity for the elected Government to address the eroding relations and win the hearts and minds of the agitated veterans. For reasons well known to most readers, the deterioration caused by earlier Governments could not be arrested or remedied by the present leadership despite displaying a resolve to end the long pending imbroglio related to OROP.

While much has been written on the subject, let me focus on the very essence of this sacred bond among the civil society which is represented by the elected representatives, the titular head called the Supreme Commander i.e. the President and the Military as a whole. This is an important bond which when breached tends to sour relations down the line.

The civil society of India prior to independence was quite aware of the vital role played by a soldier. The awareness was primarily created by the fact that a large number of Indian soldiers fought in both the World Wars albeit under the British flag. The sheer numbers of Indian lives lost which is quite stupendous, coupled with the gruesome battles after which surviving soldiers returned to narrate their stories, played a significant role in bridging the knowledge on hardships faced by the soldier. Given that the great wars lasted for half a decade each, it ensured that the travails of wars in all their gruesome details were told and retold in every corner of India. Despite the absence of print and electronic media, the relatively smaller populace, though illiterate and abysmally poor, understood the vital role of a soldier and the need to care for him whilst in service and after retirement. However, the scene changed rapidly after independence leading to continuous erosion in the status of the soldier, which in turn has brought him on the streets to fight for his legitimate rights and dues.

Although there have been signs of neglect and indifference towards the Military at the apex level of governance over the last many decades, some recent examples are worthy of note.

First, when Field Marshal Manekshaw passed away at Coonoor, near Ooty on 27 June 2008, the Government of the day thought it relevant to stick to existing protocol and depute only the RRM to be present at the funeral. No one in MOD had cared to update the protocol for a Field Marshal, leave alone a national hero. To top it all, till the then President Dr Abdul kalam raised the issues of pending pay and allowance for the hero(a Field Marshal never retires) it was rushed to his bedside at the Military hospital prompting the Field Marshal at his death bed, in his inimical manner, to ask the bearer of the cheque, whether the cheque for a crore of rupees is likely to bounce! That was the treatment meted out to an outstanding military leader and a great son of India.

Second, when the veterans of many wars fought a running battle for their legitimate arrears which were denied for decades and even had a court ruling in their favour, there was neither a response from the civil society nor from the elected leaders. When, for the first time the veterans came on the street  in 2009 and returned their medals with signed petitions in blood, their Supreme Commander refused to meet or speak to them. This is the very office which issues a commissioning parchment to every commissioned officer of the Indian Armed Forces(no other categories of public servants are entitled to this privilege,).

Fast forward a bit and you come to the two most demeaning incidents, involving the Presidents secretariat and the PMO. When the ongoing rift on OROP despite the apparent resolution was getting uglier by the day, four former Chiefs of our Armed forces thought it necessary to write to the Supreme Commander. This is the first time in the history of Independent India that retired Service Chiefs have jointly written to the President to seek his intervention. Not only was there no response nor even an acknowledgement, but it took a veteran turned activist to initiate a  RTI    to discover the type of action taken by the staff of Rashtrapati Bhavan. After repeated reminders ...40...days later the activist was informed that the letter has been forwarded to the PM's office soon after its receipt. What role the President  played in merely passing on a letter written by distinguished Chiefs of the Armed forces to the PMO, is not known.

The least courtesy that ought to have been extended to retired Chiefs is an appointment to understand the gravity of the situation. The Supreme Commander appears to have merely expressed his inability to be even a titular head of the Armed Forces.

The Chiefs on their part did not cover themselves with glory by releasing a copy of their letter to the media. Media should have been the last resort to resolve a sensitive issue.

Soon, another set of retired chiefs released a copy of their appeal on the same subject to the Prime Minister. Nothing was heard till the same activist pursued the RTI route. After ...63...days the PMO merely stated that such a letter was never delivered to them. While some may suggest that the PMO should have acted on the media release by making enquiries from the affected parties, technically no action is warranted without a copy of a correspondence, as media reports could well be fabricated. However the letter sent from the President's office was not even acted upon on the grounds that the announcement of OROP had been made by the RM. The press conference conducted by the RM succeeded in adding fuel to the fire.

The bottom line is that the Supreme Commander and the PM failed to extend due courtesies to the affected parties. Equally, the act of releasing the letter to the media without delivering the original to the concerned office cannot be condoned.

These examples are more than adequate to summarise the present levels of indifference and apathy towards the military.

Viewed in the context of a recent media report that the three serving chiefs have jointly represented on the injustice done by the 7th pay commission, this undesirable and potentially dangerous state of affairs have to end sooner than later.

http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01/14/on-army-day-start-addressing-civil-military-relations-at-the-top

The Pathankot Attack

Pathankot is yet another ephemeral terrorists event

Observe the faces and body language of security personnel engaged in the action to eliminate the terrorists holed up inside the Pathankot Airforce Station as depicted in print and electronic media. It is surreal. Because what you see is perhaps the tertiary line of security not even the secondary. Why, because we learnt a bitter lesson during the Mumbai attack, that half-baked, little informed and self-appointed expert anchors and live commentators were driven by the desire to be closest and fastest to report. TRP was more important than eliminating the terrorists. Our own administrators and security establishment had to contend with multiple challenges of inadequate manpower, infrastructure, outdated protection gear and sensors and weapons. yet the greatest challenge was to stop the media from being judgemental and alarmists on every move of those tasked to neutralise the terrorists. The first role of the media is not to spread fear and concoct doomsday scenarios nor to speculate on conspiracy theories during hostile action. Safety considerations also dictate that the cameras are well away from the scene of action.

The above is not unique to India and the South Asian region but to most democracies who are yet to stabilise their respective economies and hence are compelled to fight with what they have due to budgetary constraints. It will be some years before India can claim to have well-equipped security personnel with the requisite gear, ordnance and training. Hence constantly comparing our reactions to those from USA or UK or Israel, would lead to erroneous conclusions and hypothetical discussions. Let us view the current action in Pathankot from this prism or perspective.

Firstly, Commandos and NSG are forces in limited numbers who are meant not to protect but to eliminate the threat once identified. Training and equipping these forces is an expensive proposition which limits their use to specific missions. We need to look at the security forces who are tasked to defend important installations. In the case of defence establishments, the DSC is charged with security of access points and periphery. It is common knowledge that they are limited by age, mobility and equipment. They were adequate to meet the old threat perceptions of occasional ingress of lightly armed anti-social elements or at best insurgents. Why can't the forces themselves undertake this task? The navy and the air force train their personnel to man ships and squadrons which carry complex war fighting machines. Sentry duties perse would add to the poor utilisation of highly trained manpower. However during heightened tension, the available resources are supplemented and augmented as required. This cannot be round the clock or round the year. Terrorist threats are unexpected and  they do not appear like a traditional enemy, as they emerge from within. Hence, each unit maintains a Quick Reaction Team to augment those employed as sentries.

  Very rarely do authorities vested with the responsibility to raise levels of readiness such as red alert, also, lower the readiness level after the threat ceases to exist. In practise, it is possible that units on paper continue to remain at high alert without physically and mentally being all there. Other than the military which has well-defined procedures to raise and lower state of readiness  other central agencies often suffer from this lacuna.

In the case of other important installations such as airports, harbours and establishments, Central Police forces like CISF are used to defend them. They are training is often limited to suit the assigned role.

The police forces are perhaps the worst prepared and yet may well be the first point of contact during a terrorist strike. Pot-bellied, obese and poorly turned out Cops with world war discarded .303 rifles or worse with just batons or sticks are the typical Cops that one encounters. States exposed to insurgency, Naxalism  and terrorism are far better equipped and ready to meet emerging threats. J&K has the ethos and culture of operating under a unified command and disseminating both intelligence and information expeditiously. Real-time communications is mandatory to meet emergency situations.

In terms of our neighbours  Military Governments have done their bit to modernise the gear and weapons of police forces.  Our borders are porous from land and the sea. Our threats emanate from these very porous borders where none can guarantee total success to prevent infiltration. Smuggling is a well-established profession with deep connections with political and business interests.

With the above ground realities, what can be done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to raise our preparedness to combat terrorism?

. At the strategic level, the PM has ensured that major players in global affairs and our South Asian neighbours, in particular, are sensitised to terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan. Terrorism has hence, taken centre stage in discussions and articulation/joint statements. Isolating non-state actors and their supporters are an important first step. Asserting the need to galvanise support at the UN for an acceptable definition for terrorism and subsequent actions to cut off material and financial support to a terrorist organisation has been well articulated by India.

At the operational level, creating and nurturing a strong Central organisation which was initiated by the previous Government after the Mumbai attack, needs to be accorded the highest priority. Round the clock operations room to expeditiously share and disseminate information and intelligence on a real time basis is an inevitable necessity for every State in India irrespective of its location.

Finally at the tactical level, States have to modernise and reform their police forces to include the need to effectively react to a terrorist threat before special forces arrive on the scene. Recent reports suggest that every traffic policeman in Delhi would be armed to meet emerging threats. This is a good beginning. Communications, mobility and firepower are essential elements. Unity of command for operations would need to be made mandatory,  so also single point briefings for the media.

No special committees or  studies are needed to implement the above suggestions. Only the will to fight terrorism is required to execute these plans.

'When the best things are not possible, the best can be made of those that are.'

(Suresh Bangara was a former Commander-in Chief of the Southern Naval Command.)
http://www.firstpost.com/india/pathankot-attack-why-most-analyses-of-the-strike-are-misguided-and-what-india-should-do-to-end-such-insurgencies-2570948.html