Friday, August 8, 2025
From Op Vijay(Kargil) to Op
Sindoor—Social media and 24/7 news channels queer the pitch
If “message is also strategy” where
are policies and structural reforms?
08 August, 2025 03:00 pm IST
Thank you dear subscribers, we are overwhelmed with
your response.
Your Turn is a unique section from ThePrint featuring points of view from
its subscribers. If you are a subscriber, have a point of view, please send it
to us. If not, do subscribe here: https://theprint.in/subscribe/
A former media Advisor to the Prime Minister titled his
piece as, “lessons from Vajpayee, Manmohan Governments on strategic
communication.” It left many of us that were engaged in implementing the post
Kargil review committee recommendations, wondering why politics often trumps
well intended policy recommendations of experts appointed by Governments in
power. It was during Kargil operations in 1999 that the Indian
Armed forces and the electronic media learnt to coexist in order to bring the
war to our drawing rooms. Given that 24/7 news broadcasting was
relatively new and that privately owned broadcasting with all its frills
was just coming of age, neither the reporters nor the Military had grasped the
impact it was to make on the viewers. Real time reporting and compromise of
security imperatives thereof came to light at a cost, certainly to the Army.
In 2000, the Committee on Defence Management led by Shri
Arun Singh made over 100 recommendations to reform the entire structure of
higher defence management. One of them pertained to Media handling during peace
and war. Public relations as it was known was entirely under the MOD. The
reforms needed to be aligned to the joint structures of operations under the
CDS as well as integration of service headquarters with MOD. However, neither
creation of CDS nor the Integration with MOD were executed till 2019.More
importantly, the Theatre Commands when constituted may well have their own
structure for Media management. Hence from OP Vijay to OP Sindoor media
briefings followed the old system. When CDS is finally vested with an
operational role, an amended joint format is likely to materialise.
The electronic media stumbled during the Kargil operations
in 1999. Since media management continued to be nebulous and vague, the Mumbai
terror attack of 2008 resulted in compromises of live operations. Quite
clearly, media management needed much more coordination.
During OP Sindoor, 24/7 TV news channels in their effort to
make their coverage interesting and “educative” appeared to be desperate to
garner credibility by enrolling veterans. As in all professions, the
perspective offered to the viewers depends on the rank and service of the
veteran. Very few of those would have been in the war room or at briefings
leading to decisions of the higher defence management, especially during
hostilities. The anchors however who attempted to pose questions to the
veterans assumed that most of them would be familiar with the politico-military
nuances. The combined output during a debate, bordered on acute speculation and
inordinately long-winded questions posed by the anchor. Predictably the domain
expert ended up with least ‘Airtime”. Some channels without remorse mastered
the art of combining contents of Wikipedia and Chat GPT to display their
knowledge on modern trends in warfare. Over confidence coupled with unsolicited
advice to the Military and the the Govt were on display. Although advisories
were issued to the media to restrict debates to areas not pertaining to
inadvertent compromise of operational plans, no arm of the Govt showed any
intentions to “curtail” the freedom of the media. The viewer got what he
deserved i.e, theatrics and drama.
On the contrary, viewers across our border were recipients
of all possible combinations of tactics and choice of weapons-free of cost!
We have to prepare to combat instant communications and the
ills of social media. The latter provides freedom to anyone to become an expert
with no responsibility but with a possible role in influencing minds of the
unsuspecting reader. Countering fake news has to be fought jointly by IW and
Cyber experts. IW is recognized as an integral function of operations. The navy
was the first to create an IW cell in the mid-1990s. It played a vital role
during Op Vijay.
With Theaterisation on the horizon, and the CDS assuming an
operational role, Media management would need to be accorded the much-needed
focus. Dissemination of information on the progress of war perhaps would fall
under the purview of VCDS. Additional SEC (XP) and Spokesperson MEA would
undoubtedly continue to coordinate the briefing. The missing link may well be a
senior Rep of the GOI/NSA whose statements on intentions and directions on the
conduct of operations would be invaluable to contain speculations in the social
media and 24/7 news channels.
So, Op Vijay (Kargil) resulted in a high-powered Committee
and many sub committees under the group of Ministers to correct long neglected
and endemic structural weaknesses in higher defence management of India. That
the implementation took about 17 years and counting, does not augur well for
our ability to reform at a fast pace.
2025 has been declared as the year of reform in which Media
management ought to be a focus area. If the message is faulty, it would lead to
strategic mis communication. Hence the old dictum, “If the trumpet gives an
uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?”
These pieces are being published as they have been
received – they have not been edited/fact-checked by ThePrint.
Subscribe to our channels on YouTube, Telegram & WhatsApp
