Leaked Documents of Scorpene Submarine (Published by First Post on 24 August 2016)

IMPLICATIONS OF LEAKED DOCUMENTS OF SCORPENE

On 06 Apr 2015, Parrikar undocked the fully fitted- out, but yet to be commissioned   first of class Project 75 submarine. It is scheduled  to be commissioned in September 2016 after mandatory sea trials. The project as contracted with the French builders DCNS had already suffered many slippages in delivery schedules and in naval parlance is well astern of the original intent of expeditious delivery to address the force level shortages of diesel electric submarines of the navy.

The earlier experience at Mazagaon Docks to build the German origin state of art submarine designed by HDW had to be terminated in late 1980's owing to allegation of corruption in the deal. The Indian navy was deprived of a well established production line when the Political decision to terminate it was taken ; more as a knee jerk reaction. The costly investment in infrastructure and technical manpower was thus wasted away. The opportunity cost of terminating this prestigious project can be  best summed up by the idiom, "cut your nose to spite your face". The cost was exorbitant to put it mildly.

Even though, the Soviets stepped in to supply   the EKM submarines to bolster the depleting force levels, a 30 year build programme which was approved at the end of 1990s, was to ensure that our build capacity was augmented by creating the necessary infrastructure and technical manpower in two indigenous yards. Inordinate delays in executing the plan has resulted in Mazagaon docks progressing the construction of the much delayed Scorpene. The other is yet to take off.

This is the backdrop against which the leaked documents of today need to be viewed.

The Australian newspaper which broke the story of the leak, has reportedly carefully redacted sensitive data contained in the leaked document, under the advice of Military and legal experts. A few pages exclusively sourced by First Post confirm that the redaction has been professionally             carried out. Whether it covers the whole document running into over 20000 pages is yet to be ascertained. Responsible and ethical reportage makes it incumbent on news paper to blank out what may have undesirable geo political implications. Australia too is on the threshold of building submarines with similar assistance. They ought to know the implications of this action.

As regards the sensitive data, acoustic signatures and 'cavitation appearance' are indeed closely guarded secrets and the sole custodian of such data is the builder. The builder creates a data bank based on simulated and empirical studies carried out over a long duration . The customer in turn would hold him to such data which needs to be proved during sea trials. Hence the actual recorded and analysed data during sea trials would be more valuable than what is stated in documents. Tactically the submarine has many options to deceive sonars by masking its radiated noise. Hence  the impact of such a disclosure ( authentic or not) depends on the quality of submarining-the Indian submariners have decades of experience on both Western and Eastern origin submarines.

Apropos the need to leak  this document and the timing of it, some deductions are possible..Competitors for the second line of building are most likely to gain from this leak . It means Billions of Dollars worth of business at a crucial time when both economy and employment are critical to their survival. It is not that MOD would terminate orders on DCNS- which would be another folly of even greater proportions-but the second line of production is round the corner. Builders from East and West are possibly salivating on the quantum of order.

The very nature of this leak of over 22000 pages makes it amenable to hacking. Considering that we are not a fully wired society, it is unlikely that any single in house source would have all such data on a single but networked computer. This could have  also been hacked from those OEMs in Europe who were associated with this project. We can at best speculate at this stage.

Is it critical for operations? Most of the pages, as would be the case in any documentation, would consist of data which is common to all builders. The operational profile being common to all submarines,  it is likely that factors related to detection of the submarine from ship, airborne  or a hunter killer submarine are critical to operations. But this is the raison d'être  of the submarine arm. Experienced submariners know how to avoid detection.

As regards data on  weapons, whether torpedoes or missiles, these are well known to all submariners. The greatest advantage that we have is that our submariners have for decades operated both Western and Eastern origin submarines and have learnt to innovate when required.

Recent reports suggest that the choice of Torpedoes which is the primary weapon, has not been finalised. In the extant case that has turned out to be an advantage as the torpedoes are the main weapon of submarines and this leaked document pertains to discussions held in 2011.

The navy needs more submarines to address the depletion of conventional units. Delays caused by events like these ought not to result in further reduction in force levels.

Parikkar's statement this morning is noteworthy for its sobriety

CHINA PLAYS CHINESE CHEQUERS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA-WHAT NEXT?

 (This article was carried by First Post on 11 August)

CHINESE CHEQUERS AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA COCKING A SNOOK

AT THE TRIBUNAL'S VERDICT

Attempts to create order after experiencing extreme disorder has been the story of mankind since creation. More recently, the creation of the league of nations, the Geneva convention, the United Nations and many more such measures have been pursued with the sole intention of creating law and order where little existed. The situation is equally applicable at sea where the absence of laws could result in anarchy, collisions and worse, destruction of  the entire eco system which has the capacity to support life on earth.

International Maritime law covering a wide spectrum of activities at sea have been conceived and activated to cater to maintaining good order and discipline in oceans which are international highways, where ships of all nations ply. These laws find application among heads of state, legislatures, courts, diplomats and indeed among those who man, commercial as well as war ships.

The two better known convention/rules/laws that affect all those who are associated with the sea are the UN/IMO sponsored International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea and the United Nations convention of the laws of the sea.(UNCLOS)

Since this article is confined to the recent judgement of the dispute brought to the international tribunal by the Philippines, against her powerful neighbour PRC, on the illegal claims to her maritime territory in the South China Sea (SCS), let me limit the discussion to consequences to law abiding coastal and island states and the world at large.

Given that Philippines or her other neighbours Vietnam, Brunei,  Malaysia and Taiwan either singularly or collectively do not have the capacity to stand up to China, the continued presence of a powerful US Navy carrier task force in the area coupled with a strongly worded Japanese white paper released just a couple of days ago are indicators of the immediate reaction to China's bizarre and crude response to the verdict delivered by the international tribune.

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Can China be allowed to get away by not abiding by the convention that she voluntarily signed and ratified.? What if China  is emboldened by a meek response of the international community, to violate the clauses of NPT for instance? Is this the beginning of the end of an era of initiatives taken by the UN and other multi-national bodies to regulate and maintain a conflict free environment especially at sea? In this context, the non-military and if necessary military response to contain China's aggressive thrust in the SCS merit examination and consideration. A brief review of China's apparent change of strategy after Xi Jinping  took over, would clarify the situation.

China Under XI JINPING

XI has introduced a shift in Chinese declared policy about her willingness to project and use power, as is evident in the    May 2015 White Paper on Military Strategy. He has, with great resolve, steered China away from  the direction proposed by  one of his predecessors Deng Xiaoping. The silent and subtle methods suggested by the latter have been gradually replaced with show of power and aggressive intent. Ongoing PLA reforms appear to focus on power projection outside her own territory and in the  immediate periphery.

What then are the options open to law abiding coastal and island nations who have benefited by the provisions of UNCLOS?

Non-Military Measures.

These include Diplomatic, Judicial and Economic. Sensing that sooner than later the international community with or without the cover of UN would launch a diplomatic offensive, China has adopted some unprecedented countermeasures. A battery of diplomats and Chinese Military personnel have descended on the Capitols of Countries that have a say in the UN. Hurried consultations and meetings with decision makers to justify their stand of rebutting the verdict of the international tribune is the agenda. Massive graphics and video clippings of their stand are available on the official Chinese media. Not even the Time square in New york has been spared of media onslaught on a giant screen. This is an unprecedented show of diplomatic/media offensive that has not been attempted by any global power.

It is to be seen if the Americans can or will mobilise their allies in the Asia Pacific including Australia and Japan to match this diplomatic offensive.

The Judicial measure initiated by the Philippines has been justly rewarded. It is to be seen whether UN Security Council will attempt to rebuke one of its erring permanent members with a veto power. The very fact that in the past too, the permanent members of the security council have violated laid down procedures to establish peace in crisis ridden areas, strengthens India's repeated call for reforms of the UN.

Economic measures against China have repercussions on almost all powerful nations who trade with China. It would need consensus of a unique nature.

Military Measures

USA in its attempt to continue to engage with China is expected to adopt a twin track approach of openly challenging China's claims in SCS by claiming the right to innocent passage and freedom of navigation as enumerated in UNCLOS. Japan and Australia may join this venture. This will be supplemented by inviting China to join powerful displays of warships drawn from  many  nations including India, as was the case in the recently held RIMPAC off Hawaii.

India has the option of participating in non-military and military measures of her choice. We need to support the desire of the international community to  contain China before she assumes the role of a permanent bully in the critical waters of East and South China sea.

Lack of action or sitting on the fence is not an option we can afford , given that China is expected to flex her muscle increasingly in the immediate future and in our backyard too!  

  

Golden opportunity for Shri Parrikkar-Defence Minister

Long pending reforms in the Ministry of Defence can now be addressed. 

My thoughts carried by  First post today 08 July Time for Manohar Parrikar to reform MOD

Agusta Westland and defence acquisition (courtesy The Quint-published on 04 May 2016)

THE AGUSTA WESTLAND EPISODE

WHAT AILS DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN INDIA

What is fortuitous in the Agusta Westland deal which is much under discussion in the Indian media, is that the helicopter was meant for use by VVIPs in India. In a society which is obsessed by the term VIP / VVIP it is perhaps poetic justice that has invited so much attention on these two countries; India and Italy. The question that should be uppermost in the minds of the common man is,"why has it taken twenty years or more to procure a helicopter for our 'beloved VIPs and VVIPs?' If they cannot be looked after, how long will it take to get platforms, equipment, arms and ammunition for the fighting arms of the services of India? " The answer has been blowing in the wind for decades; starting from Independence to  the Kargil war and stretching to date. From starting a case for acquisition to signing a contract has taken one to two decades in most cases. whether it was the Main battle tank(MBT) for the army, the Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) for the airforce, Light combat aircraft(LCA) and scores of other platforms and equipment whether imported or indigenous met with the same fate.

Dr Abdul Kalam in his capacity of SA to RM in 1996, made an effort through a self reliance implementation Committee(SRIC) to increase the indigenous content of procurement for our armed forces. Having been a member of that committee and having participated in never ending processes of the Ministry of Defence, I now see the light at the end of the tunnel. Let me explain for the benefit of the layman.

Known Obstacles in procurement

First ,Inability to convert long-term induction programmes into time-bound acquisition plans along with budgetary support. Although the service headquarters of the three services periodically submitted 10/15 year plans, the Ministry of defence neither had the expertise to accept or reject such proposals nor was there assurance of budgetary grants for such plans. Ministry of Finance often sprang a surprise by reducing allocations to MOD just prior to announcement of the budget.

Second, the service Chiefs neither had financial powers to run the revenue nor the capital budgets allocated to their respective services till the New management strategy was first introduced  in the late 1990s.  Their powers for capital expenditure remains limited.

Third, excessive reliance on public sector manufacturing and production agencies and inability to provide level playing field to competent private industries deprived the forces from  the timely supply  of equipment as also of international quality of products.

Fourth, protracted procedures for compiling Request for proposals and field trials resulted in unaffordable opportunity costs to be incurred by the Government. Neither the Ministry nor the service headquarters was held accountable for inordinate delays which ipso facto led to frequent changes of performance related quantification.

Fifth, inability to meet stringent time schedules of indigenous equipment to match the operational needs of the forces, often resulted in the import of platforms and systems which in turn created its own dynamics of middlemen, corruption and litigations. Blacklisting of foreign suppliers caused further delay in restarting the process ab initio.  Consequently, the end user was forced to continue to use obsolete and obsolescent equipment with no hope of replacement for decades.

 Defence Procurement Policy.

Some of the obstacles quoted above suggest that a clear cut policy framework is essential for streamlining the whole process of procurement. It was the Group of Ministers post the Kargil war that recommended setting up a procurement structure for time bound acquisition of platforms and weapon systems. Such a system was created in 2002 but significantly the process of integration of the armed forces with the MOD ,recommended by the same GOM was not implemented.

Such were the complexities of procurement which encompass numerous factors concerning procurement from within and without. that DPP was revised in 2005,2006,2008,2009,2011 and 2013. Any sane organisation would desist from issuing policies almost every year, which compound issues and confound the suppliers. That was perhaps the reason why hardly any worthwhile procurement including ammunition took place during that period.

DPP 2016

The latest DPP issued during the recently concluded DEF EXPO at Goa has some notable and far-reaching policy formulations. Extensive consultations with leading industries of India and abroad gave birth to Digital India, Make in India, Start up India all of which have an impact on the DPP. All three have interlinking policy directions for executing the vision of the Government. Consequently, the following weaknesses in the procurement system have been addressed comprehensively;

·       The parameters and processes for Make in India have been articulated with emphasis on self-reliance through the facilities of the much improved indigenous public and private sectors. Incentives and assured production order with possible export capabilities have been covered.

·       Offset conditions for foreign suppliers exceeding the supply of Rs 2000 crores has been specified with clarity.

·       Incentives for MSMEs and the need for the Government to bear part costs for design and development has been recognised.

·       Transparency, probity and public accountability form the backbone of the policy document.

·       Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), the 5 years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) for all three services duly integrated by the Integrated Defence Staff under COSC have been rationalised.

·       Fast track mechanisms have been streamlined. Much would depend on execution of the policy

·        Strategic partnerships commensurate with current geopolitical realities are under consideration. Transfer of technologies and access to cutting edge technologies are part of discussions currently in progress.

What more needs to done

Three missing links in the Government's well-directed efforts are the integration of the three forces under a CDS ,the integration of the MOD with service headquarters to professionalise decision-making at MOD and to eliminate corruption at the final settlement of payment to indigenous suppliers at the respective CDA outlets. The latter has been pushing the cost incurred by suppliers which can be totally neutralised if there is a will. Digital India ought to remove this undesirable interface and facilitate direct payments to suppliers.

There is hope that the VVIP Helicopter along with long pending demands of the services will all be met within the stipulated time frame. The term VVIP should be dispensed with.

Indo-US relations-pragmatism and real politik likely to prevail (Courtesy The Quint-13 April 16)

Evolving Indo-us cooperation

Pragmatism and real politik likely to prevail

On 22 and 23 December last I had written two articles on the emerging geopolitical realities of the Indo-US cooperation in the military domain. This was based on two decades of military engagement between the two.  The maiden visit of Manohar Parrikar to the USA in December last and the deliberations with his counterpart Ashton Carter had raised predictable headlines in the Indian media. Predictable because of the confusion caused in our minds on  issues related to India's National interests, the bedrock of non-alignment on which two full generations have been brought up and the rapidly changing geopolitical environment in the world.

The continuing Indo-Russian cooperation, the vicissitudes of the Indo -China relations, the consolidation of the look-East policy initiated by Shri Narasimha Rao, the redeployment of US assets to the Indo-Pacific region and PM  Modi's priority to engage with Japan and Australia are not isolated events of history. That there is a method in the perceived madness in the initiatives taken on the foreign policy front, would perhaps be comprehended only  in the years to come.

On the political front, coalition Governments in the past, with the support of the left, continued to view the USA as an undesirable ally. The rapidly changing power balance, the belligerence of China with her economic and industrial might  and her all weather support to Pakistan failed to change the script on nonalignment until the academic and strategic community challenged the attempt to ratify a document titled "Nonalignment 2.0". Faced with criticism and redundancy of the effort made by a private group of individuals, the document initially not placed in the public domain, soon vanished.

However, a fresh debate consistent with the changed geo-political scenario and viewed in the context of geo-economics resulted in what was termed by Gautam Sen(Pune) as geo-diplomacy. The new Modi Government launched immediate and realistic measures to make the foreign policy relevant to the changing times.

A serious debate  followed by a discussion on a historical perspective of National Interests of India and its consequences , as late as in November 2015, opened many avenues for action. Parliament had noted more than a decade ago, that India had no worthwhile Defence Policy- a fact underlined by Jaswant Singh in his talk on "What constitutes national security in a changing world order.

India's strategic thoughts." (published in June 1998)

It is in this backdrop that the return visit of Secretary Carter becomes significant. The significance is accentuated by the discussions on board the Vikramaditya, arguably the most potent platform in our inventory. Historically It is considered symbolic to hold discussions and allude to intentions on the deck of a majestic war machine.

The current headlines relate to the two parties agreeing to sign  the long pending Logistics Support Agreement(LSA). The pros and cons of this agreement have been outlined in my linked article. Suffice it to say that for the very reasons outlined therein, the LSA needs to be concluded. That this agreement which has been ratified by 80 countries would enable our navy to extend its radius of operations needs to be factored in. It would also realise   the stated objectives of our document on Maritime Security Strategy, which was released by Parrikar in October last.

As regards the other two agreements i.e. CISMOA and BECA, much depends on the quality of discussions on the release of cutting-edge technologies for use by the Indian Armed Forces and I might add, whether the White House is "Trumped" or not! That bridge can be crossed later.

The need of the hour is to have the conviction in our ability to ensure that the national interests of India can be more than adequately protected. Agreements such as LSA cannot be delayed on flimsy arguments with little substance.

(  http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/04/13/indo-us-relations-pragmatism-and-real-politik-likely-to-prevail#.Vw4hdxNj8Ao.facebook)

TRAINING OUR WARRIORS (This article appears in the Fauji India April 2016 Edition)

TRAINING OUR WARRIORS- NEED FOR DELIBERATION,DEBATE AND REVIEW

My appointment as Commandant National defence academy(NDA) in January  2003 surprised some in my service. I was not a product of the NDA. Given the short notice to assume command, I did the only two possible things I could. I read the history of NDA and selected a few of my ex-NDA colleagues to discuss the macro issues related to this prestigious training institution, which had invited the attention of the Prime Minister himself when it was being built.

 In the 1950's, there was not a single joint services training academy-not even among the victorious allies of World War 2. In fact, the United States Armed forces continue to train their officers in single service training establishments despite having integrated their Armed Forces in late 1980's. Much of the layout ,construction of accommodation and training methodology for NDA was adopted from the United States Military Academy ,West Point(USMA). Ironically, they did not integrate their armed forces at the bottom but did so at the middle and top and we were the first to integrate at the bottom and to date remain divided at all other levels.

Having completed over 36 years of service when I took over, I was fortunate to have been exposed to training in the erstwhile Soviet Union, staff college in theUK, a stint at Harvard and scores of operational and training interactions with leading maritime powers. More importantly, in 1995, I led a delegation to the United States to study the training features across numerous establishments of the US Navy including Annapolis. Earlier, three years of observing our consanguineous neighbour between 1985-88,while posted at Islamabad,  gave me insights into the internal dynamics of adapting a  British-trained force, to train and man American sensors/weapons while also struggling with theocratic intervention by President Zia's obsession of Islam. Consequently issues related to education and training, essentially to meet the demands of Revolution in Military Affairs were uppermost in my mind, even as I stepped into NDA on 31 December 2002.

CORTOS REPORT

The first task while acquainting myself with the training curriculum was to study previous assessments if any, on the quality of training imparted at NDA. The only study by a committee appointed by MOD, as a result of the direction of the then PM, during the Senior Officers conference in 1986, was the Committee For the Review of Training of Officers of the Armed Forces (CORTOS) which submitted its report in Aug 1987. The twin aims assigned to this committee were," a)To make the technical content of the training such that the officer corps will be able to handle the new technologies in battle today and tomorrow. b) To increase inter-service cooperation and interaction at all levels."

The recommendations contained in the report were partially approved by the Government in 1991, after four years of discussions and procrastination, thereby diluting the urgency displayed at the conference. Crucial recommendations on financial and administrative reforms to run the academy by constituting an NDA Board with eminent members of academia, services, both serving and retired, was not approved. That led to a virtual status quo on the implementation of much needed  prophylactic measures .

CORTOS had made scathing comments on the sorry state of the academic department of the academy. The academic department had suffered due to a combination of factors which were caused by the formulation of the educational policy of India, which at the inception of NDA was three tiered ,i.e. matriculation, intermediate and degree.  Later NDA  switched to a three-year course to accommodate more technical inputs. However, soon thereafter the nation's education policy which introduced the 10+2 concept along with stipulations by UGC on qualification for teaching staff, further aggravated the situation.

Coupled with the attrition of the original teaching staff due to stipulations introduced by UGC and cadre management issues which failed to be resolved by pay commissions, the academy was left with less than 50% permanent staff . The other 50% had to be temporarily recruited from unemployed members of the academia. The chair of Principal/Vice Principal remained unoccupied for almost a decade, which in turn caused dilution in the academic syllabus and a feeling among the cadets that academics per se were not important when compared to physical activities  such as parade training, PT, games and cross country runs. The recruitment of professors and lecturers remained under the direct control of the UPSC; even the MOD had no say in the matter of filling permanent vacancies. 

Thus, I inherited an organisation which had not been audited for over a decade by an independent committee as recommended by CORTOS. Consequently, COSC did not receive independent assessments of the quality of training at NDA since "there was no authority to examine the causative factors in generating the standards it  examines."

Professional Training

The first deduction from observations within the first few hours revealed that in many ways, time had stood still. Past patterns of training continued with momentum only because all seemed to be going well. Often one heard the comment," it is as good as it was in my days". Much has changed in most training academies of the world. The cliché, "don't fix it if it ain't broke" certainly does not apply to us. In view of increasing demands on academics which is dictated by the concerned host university, 67% of the cadets time is meant to be devoted to academics. If 33% is adequate to make him a soldier/warrior before he goes to the next stage, every moment of professional training becomes precious. Hence, the over emphasis on parade training and other physical training carried out as extra-constitutional late night toughening- measures would need to be critically re-examined. This  became one of my priorities.

Societal changes.

The cadet who enters the portals of NDA today is a very different specimen compared to his predecessors a decade ago. Being older in comparison, after 10+2, he belongs to a generation which  is knowledgeable and much more aware of the environment than his predecessors. He also belongs to a highly undisciplined society in which fear of law and order is virtually absent. Corruption is the order of the day as bribing the policeman, wireman, meter man etc is a regular feature for survival. He does not look at his superiors in awe. He belongs to a society where violence and crime including domestic violence are a part of life. He may not have had the opportunity to live in a hygienic environment. Deportment, dress code, discipline, élan, military ethos  and value system are all alien to him. To his credit, he imbibes most of them with time and a bit of coercion. He is fiercely competitive.

The present method of converting this individual into an officer cadet needs a boot camp phase dedicated to reorientation/indoctrination. There is a need to structure close interaction with instructors to enable him to slide into the training curriculum. Parade training, inculcating    discipline, military terminologies and social conduct would need to replace the existing process of moulding through coercive means alone. This then prompted the  need for a separate study.

To those who think that it is unique to India, when I led a delegation in 1995, I was surprised to see Admiral Charles R Larson in Command of the famous US Naval Academy, Annapolis. He had retired from active service as a 4 star Admiral heading the Pacific Command.

The academy is normally commanded by a serving 2 Star Admiral. A series of incidents among trainees, pointing to severe erosion in the ethical and moral values of the Midshipman came under the scrutiny of the media and the Congress. On the recommendations of the enquiry committee, Admiral Larson was brought back from retirement with the single objective of reviving the value system of the academy. This is a radical but prophylactic measure which cannot be replicated in India due to nonexistent structures of oversight and accountability.  The societal problems, however, exist in most democracies where' Mallyas' and Kanhaiyas' coexist.

Training versus Education

A common debate world over is how much education is good for a professional soldier. Concepts such as galloping technology, RMA, Net work-centric operations etc may tend to suggest that we prepare the trainee to meet the intellectual elements of such a challenge. Does it mean that every cadet in NDA has to be an Engineer or a B tech? That debate has been set to rest by the experiences gained at West Point, when the decision to peg the academic input to engineering was rescinded in the 1950's. What was done is to enhance the academic inputs on science and mathematics to the best that is available within the country.

The Australian Defence Forces Academy(ADFA) which studied the NDA model and adopted an indigenous solution instead, opted to separate Education and training such that each is conducted independent of the other and not parallelly.  A mutual exchange of visits  between our two academies revealed that they had resorted to more innovative thinking. They commence the session with educational inputs provided by the finest university in Australia, during which basic physical fitness is ensured through compulsory games and fitness drills. The focus being on education, it ensures whole hearted participation of cadets in honing their intellectual skills. Likewise, when the Military phase starts  the cadet is subjected to tough conditioning and professional grooming with no distraction on academics.  

US and other Western academies provide quality education through highly qualified and well-paid professors as well as retired officers with Doctorate qualifications. Merely converting the syllabus to B Tech and depending on uniformed personnel with inadequate teaching and academic proficiency, now being proposed, is a recipe for disaster, for, the quality of teaching depends  largely on the infrastructure and reputation of the host university. JNU which  is currently contracted to grant suitable undergraduate and technical degrees to our establishments is neither equipped to deal with undergraduate studies nor technical education. We appear to bank on institutions who oblige us for a payment of consultancy fees and not on their capacity to oversee and deliver.

In view of the above, it is incumbent on the policy makers to define the vision and missions for training future warriors with clear objectives for each phase of training. Should it be necessary to enforce engineering standards at primary training establishments, it should be mandatory to raise the bar of UPSC examination and make the minimum qualifying marks to 75% as opposed to the current standards of 45% which goes against the basic principles of admission to a technical stream of education.

The second option would be to induct B Tech students directly into NDA and focus on the military inputs needed to make him a warrior. This would do away with most of the academic staff except a few like languages, computer science, etc.

Bang for the buck

CORTOS had set the stage for reforms in 1987. Appreciating that the financial powers and administrative powers were not vested in the Armed Forces at that time and armed with the delegated powers post the Kargil Review Committee report and the Committee on Defence Management headed by Shri Arun Singh, I sought the constitution of two committees. The first to identify the changes to the military training process and the second headed by a Vice Chancellor to suggest the educational reforms to meet the emerging challenges in science and technology through infrastructure up gradation and positioning qualified academics of eminence. The COSC agreed to both.

 I had to move on promotion to CinC in Jul 2004. I later learnt that the first committee recommended token changes to the curriculum and the second made a meek attempt to rationalise the ongoing academic content as they could not find a suitable Vice Chancellor to head the committee. ironically, the evolution of academic syllabi of NDA was overseen by the Jha Committee in 1948, the Mahajani Committee in 1954-55, and finally, the Mahajani Committee in 1972 (all of whom were reputed educationists)when the three-year degree course was sanctioned. In 1989, the syllabus was further revised to suit the 10+2 entry. Yet we could not find an eminent Vice Chancellor when we most needed one.

Unless there is a clear definition of what we expect from the soldier of tomorrow and we understand the difference between training and education we are likely to blunder our way through the battlefield of tomorrow. If the role of a soldier is to' manage violence' he needs to be equipped with the means for just that.

Here a quote from Plato would be appropriate. "The purpose of education is not merely to produce an abstract mentality or a high-class technician, but to produce a cultured person with restrained behaviour and civilised manners."

Epilogue.

Incremental changes and status quo-ism for tackling inadequacies in training are bound to have repercussions on the battlefield. There is a distinct possibility that we could compress the  training time by removing repetitive activities during the next higher level of training i.e. NDA to IMA, NDA to NAVAC/Training ship and NDA to AFA.

Now that we are dealing with adults of  19/20 years of age  we need to replace "denial regimes" with "empowering" regimes." Effective training tools" of the past need to be replaced to meet the aspirations and capabilities of the new generation. We need to focus on assessing the comprehension, imagination and creativity levels of a trainee and his ability to conceptualise and analyze-not his capacity to learn by rote.

"When the best things are not possible, the best can be made of those that are " so said a wise man!

POOR GOVERNANCE -(My article carried by First post today)

A NEVER ENDING JOURNEY OF POOR GOVERNANCE

WHY INDIA CANNOT BE EASILY GOVERNED

Those of us who were born just prior to Independence have lived with optimism and hope. Hope that India will soon overcome complex problems of Governance given the plurality, non-homogeneity and diversity of cultural and religious milieu of our people and optimism that we will get our act together sooner than those in the immediate neighbourhood.  Both the hope and  the optimism appear to have been belied despite some notable achievements. Compulsions of coalition politics and inability to pass legislations of crying need even when the people of India elect a majority government further accentuates frustrations among well-meaning citizens.

 What is increasingly clear to many, is that the present form of governing structures has been found wanting. An option that has been examined for many years now has been the Presidential form of government. The pros and cons of this proposal have been debated among experts but has not found sufficient traction among budding young politicians in the making, for fear of enormous challenges of amending the constitution of India. That the Constitution has been amended about 98 times in 68 years is often left unsaid.

There is a second option which may find traction. That of directly electing a Prime Minister who then has a stable tenure of  five years or more. Before commenting on this option it is  prudent to analyse some bitter truth about the citizens who elect the politician and the quality of politicians who populate the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha and the State Assemblies.

In the corporate world," the Stockdale Syndrome" is often quoted to train a manager to face the brutal realities on the ground while remaining optimistic about his vision and plans. The brutal realities of politics in India need to be faced if optimism is to be the goal. In brief, they are;

• ·        The voter base also consists of  semi-literate or illiterate citizens who are often described as very perceptive voters by candidates who talk down to them during campaigning. A vast majority are still up for sale for goodies ranging from liquor, sari, TV to computers.
• ·        Non-implementation of Electoral reforms which are stymied by all shades of parties who are elected continues to ensure that money and muscle power play a vital role during elections.
• ·        Given the very limited options of qualified candidates with  a clean reputation, the voter continues to vote to punish those who do not deliver but the quality of tainted candidates remain the same.
• Well- meaning and qualified citizens shun politics. They neither contest due to lack of funds nor even vote to neutralise the votes garnered by illegitimate means. The end result is the same scamster reappears with a range of promises that cannot be delivered. The alienated and poor voter is ready to clutch at any straw in the wind.
• ·      National priorities or interests are often sacrificed at the altar of personal or party priorities.

Our current democratic processes have failed to keep up with the rapid reforms required to implement lessons repeatedly learnt by successive Election Commissions. No political party has shown any resolve to implement electoral reforms, administrative reforms, Police reforms or Judicial reforms. A strong desire to cling to power and the added incentive to dramatically increase the financial status of incumbent politicians, as revealed by recent surveys, have resulted in a strange convergence of interests among otherwise squabbling political parties. Politicians all over the world irrespective of their ideologies display preference to overlook national interests over political expediency. This may be morally despicable to many not in power, but, it is not alien to human behaviour.

The above is just a representative sample of what a sincere, clean aspiring politician should be ready to face. Hence, in the current format no individual, no matter how sincere or capable can deliver within his/her tenure.

If a Prime Minister could be directly elected as the Chief Executive, with powers to use domain experts as executives of his cabinet and the parliamentarians function to pass legislations to enable good governance, that model  may be an option to consider. Elected representatives cannot possibly fulfil the role of a domain expert in the rapidly globalised environment when decisions are required to be taken expeditiously  by experts with more than adequate experience and knowledge in the concerned sphere of activity.

What is implicit in this model is that only a politician who has national exposure and acceptance can contest a direct election. All the regional satraps would need to give way to a statesman of repute.

All the experts would hasten to bury this concept by pointing out the enormity of obtaining necessary consensus for such a change. But maintaining status quo is an even more dangerous option if India has to discharge her responsibilities at a global or even a regional  arena.

Strangely people outside India expect us to assume a global role while we continue to self-destruct with glee.

http://www.firstpost.com/india/collapse-of-governance-directly-elect-a-pm-as-ceo-and-allow-him-to-use-domain-experts-as-executives-2641008.html