DUSSERA AND GOLF-A HEADY COCKTAIL

Among many tournaments that start after the monsoon season,there is one conducted by RWITC-never bothered to find out the connection between riding and golf. I entered the tournament for fun as the club had found me not good enough to hold my handicap of 16. There was nothing to lose. What they did not explain was that it was a long drawn out tournament. Having collected 34 points at the first session, I thought it was the end,until my name appeared for a short list of play offs in pairs. One look at the board and I knew it would end in a whimper as I was drawn against AK Singh playing to 13. 

 This morning I reported at the crowded session due to Dussera,but AK and I were given priority due to the tournament schedule. The starter whispered to me and said that AK actually plays to 4 and that at the medal round last Saturday he had shot 59-an unbelievable 13 under par.AK rolled in, two minutes to T-Off, with his belly leading the way a few seconds ahead of him. Then the dual began. I gathered as we sauntered on towards the first green, that he was as old as my son.That did not not help my mind set. I was petrified playing with some one who had shot 59 in this very course. Every passing member waived at him with great respect and barely noticed me. That is when it struck me that all I had to do is to shoot pars and let him go for birdies to off set the many strokes that I had earned as a lowly golfer. I did just that and by the fourth hole I was four up with a naughty smile on my face. He was running to catch up. The front nine ended with my lead at 4 holes.

Normally my game goes to pieces at the back nine due to lack of focus and a tired back. So it did and AK began to dig my grave. By the 13th my lead reduced to just 1.  I held on with a couple of halves. At the 16th(par 3) I went right into the big banyan tree and AK was on the green. He had a wry smile-don't know why. I had a stroke but no ball to find. The ball just vanished,perhaps between the humongous branches of the Banyan  No quarters given. He asked me to walk back and take the 3rd shot from the Tee. As I walked back,a long walk at that, I said to myself no one managed to kill you off Karachi in 1971, how can AK get you now. Wham, I was on the green but 3 on. AK missed a birdie and shot a par. I putted a 12 footer and halved. I was still one up and did not want a sudden death after 18. I just had to win hole 17 and I would be 2 up and unbeatable-simple. Now the pressure got to AK. He had been driving straight and long till then. Wham and a scream-------his ball was sighted on fairway 18. I went straight as an arrow-to the middle of the fairway  and about 230 yards. I shot a par and he a 5. It was sealed with a couple of spectators who came to see the old man who had beaten the latest craze on the course. 

I may not survive the next play off but my Dussera was made-here on the Poona golf course. Please note Poona and not Pune!!

Are Civil Servants Accountable?

            GOOD GOVERNANCE-ARE CIVIL SERVANTS ACCOUNTABLE?

India is certainly at cross roads. When the country needs the most capable Ministers and a very professional bunch of civil servants to realize her true potential, we appear to be running aground on all fronts. We adopted the Westminster model along with the infamous White Hall system from the British. The British, from time to time, have tried to reform the structure of administration and decision making;  with little success thus far.

Our own efforts to reform the administration has addressed some components, including the induction and training pattern of our Civil Services; paradoxically called the Steel Frame of India. The steel in it has virtually disappeared while the frame keeps expanding horizontally and vertically. The more it expands, the more hollow it becomes.

The system that we inherited from the British was sound ,adequate then to meet our needs and it was perhaps assumed that administrative  reforms would follow even as we grew.  However, the British system was predicated upon certain axioms- that the politician would be driven by short term and selfish pressures and that common good of the people or public interest may not always be his objective.

The Civil Servant was to remain apolitical or politically neutral with a high degree of pecuniary and moral integrity. More importantly,  he was not to be motivated by the desire to make money .Integrity honesty ,objectivity and impartiality were to be his guiding principles. These checks and balances were meant to keep the system on a straight and narrow path, solely to defend the interest of the common man. The entire administrative apparatus was to ensure that they focus on the common good or public interest, which in turn would send out a powerful message that the Government was always right.

As happened in other democracies, with changing aspirations of the people, the fundamentals on which this edifice was built began to cave in. The British model saw an increasing convergence of interest between the greedy politician and the pliant Civil Servant. The latter may not have always had his hand in the till but often chose to remain silent or look the other way just to survive. This was captured powerfully and euphemistically in the famous BBC serial, "Yes Minister' and "Yes Prime Minister". Reportedly, Maggie Thatcher, often called the Iron Lady of UK, was assertive but patient in execution of programmes, which allowed space for the Civil Servant to adhere to established norms. More recently, the  Tony Blair-Sir Robin Butler controversy and David Cameron--Sir Guss O'Donnel- episode, when the Civil servant chose to remain, assertive or silent respectively, are good examples. These exemplify the nature of conflict between the desire of the Politician to push his programmes and the duty of the Civil Servant to protect public interest. In the Indian context, particularly in the State Governments there are scores of incidents in which Civil Servants chose to turn a blind eye to the wrong doings of their Political Masters. Worse, they were  willing consorts.

The existing decision making process in India, is based on files that move from the lowest rung of the ladder ,vertically within departments and thereafter horizontally to gather views of other departments. This system is open to manipulation. Decisions can be delayed or expedited on the pretext of awaiting return of files to the originator. Internal dissensions or disagreements can be overcome by arm twisting the dissenter to change his noting as if it is his own, so the superior with mala fide intentions, is seen to be  in agreement with the wisdom of the department. There are numerous loop holes waiting to be exploited. What is worse, a scrutiny of files by investigators/auditors in most cases cannot establish any accountability of individuals in a chain, due to subversion of the process in use.

Attempts have been made by some wings of the Government, both at the centre and State, to reform the process through Management Information System(MIS). The essentials of file work, especially its integrity depends on ensuring that the basic principles of promoting and accepting contrary views are valued and protected. Insufficient understanding of value of professional discussions and hasty introduction of E- governance with emphasis only on tracking of files without equal emphasis on contents, may damage the decision making process even more.

The Indian scene is well known. Those of us who have seen the degeneration of administration over six decades and the compelling desire of the Civil Servant to either share the booty or just survive, know the root causes. Money and muscle power continue to play an important role in the electoral process of India. Efforts made by successive CECs to cleanse the system through legislation for electoral reforms, remain unattended due to lack of will of Governments of the day. Thanks to more assertive citizens, a less deferential media and freedom of information, the scene has begun to change ,albeit, rather slowly.

Given the above scenario, on one hand, though paradoxically ,the interest of the citizen(who refuses to vote due to apathy) and those of enlightened politicians who are smart enough to sense the mood of the country, are bound to converge . On the other, economic reforms have the potential of resulting in chaotic administration. The Administration, if not reformed to meet the complex  challenges of a knowledge based society, would lead to more chaos and not less. The civil servant of today, cannot assume to be part of a vibrant democracy unless the process of selection, grooming and lateral induction to fill the gap in vertical specialization  is addressed as an inextricable part of good administration. Without that good governance would remain a distant dream.

Judge for yourself, is Administrative Reforms( with radical changes) any less important than Economic Reforms? 

FROM BATTLEFIELD TO BOARD ROOM

A group of dedicated professionals who are committed to bring the Indian customer to the fore, through deftly designed interaction between military veterans and Corporate Leaders, came up with a brilliant theme for 2012. That is the title of my blog.
While it is the sole privilege of the organizers to publish the take- a ways from this interaction, I shall limit my Blog to the immense potential of tapping talent from the Military and the Corporates to reshape the contours of business ethics.

It is not unusual to see Sun-Tzu being quoted ad nauseam in Corporate seminars in the US in particular. The Americans have the ability to produce books for all types of readers. Indeed book writing and publishing could be a very rewarding experience for qualified writers. Most successful authors use assiduously researched material and through imaginative interpretation of facts and figures they capture the attention of the reader.

In India however, it is a frustrating experience to publish a book,even if you have 'something to say' as opposed to 'saying something'. This conference/work shop would have been an ideal setting for those who wished to write on this subject,i.e.how can the Military experience enrich the Board Room.

Evolving Strategy,sharing experience related to Human Resource Development and most of all, understanding that every Corporate has the potential to contribute towards enhancing National Security, were some take aways from this seminar..

A subject not entirely related to the main theme, but which is often ignored or neglected, is the safety and security of personnel,inventory and property of corporate bodies.Violence among the work force due to inequality/exploitation of the less privileged,  natural disasters, terrorism coupled with man-made disasters are no longer the problem of the State alone. Contingency plans are required to be made, emergency drills rehearsed seriously and adequate resources sequestered to meet such contingencies. Despite serious losses caused to the  economic centre of gravity through terrorist strikes,cyclones,  tsunamis and cyber attacks,it would appear that the Private and Corporate sectors are unwilling to face the brutal facts of today even as they plunge headlong into profit-loss statements.

Time to smell the coffee.      

Book Review - Managing India's Nuclear Forces

 REVIEW-ARTICLE BY SURESH BANGARA

"MANAGING INDIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES"- VERGHESE KOITHARA (ROUTLEDGE TAYLOR AND FRANCIS GROUP)

"What an esoteric subject?" some would say. Most of our knowledgeable citizens would know little about matters nuclear and even less  about our Nuclear Forces. Management of such a force is best left to the professionals, you might think. But as in all matters of state, where tax payers money is committed, every citizen has a right to know how his money is being spent. Moreover, since it is the combined efforts of scientists and the users,i.e. the Military, who plan and run operations under the overall control of the Government of the day, information on such matters are understandably closely guarded. Nevertheless there is a definite need to encourage the emergence of a vibrant breed of scholars and analysts who can contribute significantly to the Nuclear debate in India. This book eminently serves that purpose and hence is a valuable addition to the literature on the subject.

In a vibrant democracy, academics and specialists in this field are expected to keep the debate on nuclear issues alive, on all aspects contained in open source material. In a country as young as India, there is a reluctance to share information owing to near absence of policy on declassification of information and the acute feeling of insecurity among those who occupy high office.

The author of this book, Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara (Retd), is a rare example of one who was not privy to  Management of  Nuclear Forces. He had to first understand the nuances of production of nuclear weapons, the delivery systems in all three dimensions,i.e. air, surface and underwater, the Command and control facilities, policy formulations,geo strategic and geo economic imperatives, strategic analysis and finally the operational deployment of such weapons.

Given the scarcity of material on such subjects and the scanty indigenous written material, he had to seek views of experts of repute in the western hemisphere too. Thus the uniqueness of our nuclear programme was matched, if only, by the unique efforts of the author who has received compliments from reputed personalities. This  includes, Arun Singh, Stephen Cohen, Ashley Tellis,  Rodney W Jones and Arun Prakash, among others. Arguably, some of his deductions are hypothetical-not entirely based, albeit, on hard to get empirical evidence- and some inferred from discussions with  knowledgeable sources.

The Author has opted to arrange his thoughts under 12 lucidly written chapters which target both the nuclear community and the scholars who are desirous of noting the perspectives of a Military mind. Notable books by Indian authors on India's nuclear programme were written by a Raj Chengappa and Bharat Karnad. The author, however, rightly points out that the subject of 'management of nuclear forces has been largely avoided' till now.

The Introductory chapter makes a few assumptions which may need deliberation. The first pertains to the scientific community assuming all control over the nuclear programme, owing to their association with its earlier benign avatar of peaceful nuclear experiments. The author also implies that the 'barren relations' between the Political leadership and the Military, post independence, was a contributory factor for the exclusion of the Military in all policy formulations.

Peter Douglas Fever, in his well acknowledged book, 'Guarding the guardian' outlines the continuous and ongoing struggle for over six decades, between the Civilians and the Military in USA, on matters of custody and use of the nuclear bomb. While discussing the chapter on the atomic energy act and the origin of assertive control, he traces the inevitable contradiction on modes of control. He establishes that the increase in the inventory of nuclear weapons and the changing threat to US security, had  led to more and more of delegative control to their military. This was necessitated more by operational and safety imperatives. He also infers that the battle for assertive and delegative control would continue to be fought even in countries with a strong, time- tested democratic polity. Technology based safety/launch  controls would eventually play an important role in resolving the optimal mode of control of nuclear weapons.

It is true that our Military could have been involved from day one as was the case in  Project Manhattan, which incidentally had a team of serving officers outside the direct control of the Military. There is little doubt that the Military has considerable experience of storage, transportation and safety of any weapon system. The Indian model however used the expertise of serving military officers in most activities related to weaponisation,albeit, under the close scrutiny of Civilian scientists. In the Indian context the lack of experience in dealing with the Military, understanding their ethos and their fierce loyalty to the' team', as also the comfort of political leaders to work closely with civilian scientists, largely contributed to the adoption of assertive control. More pertinently, the Politico-Military interface in India and the maturing of such a relationship is still under review, while the same had matured considerably in USA, post the Civil War and the Great wars. That the whole process of development and deployment of nuclear weapons in India, was managed without serious mishaps is a tribute to the maturity of all concerned. Ours is indeed a 'unique model', as the author describes it.

Perhaps the author has flagged this controversial issue to emphasise the need to find an early resolution to the Civil-Military anomalies that continue to  sequester the Armed forces from all policy formulations related to National security. Hopefully the creation of  Strategic Forces Command(SFC),would largely, if not entirely, fill the void. However the need to integrate the armed forces under a single operational head, as also the MOD with the service headquarters, is sine qua non of Managing nuclear forces. Hence the repeated thrust on the systemic changes urgently required in India.

In order to remain focused on the Indian context, this article examines practical issues of force management raised in the book rather than the interpretation of the theory of strategic consideration,deterrence,hardware etc. These have been well covered by many an expert of NWS. The author has merely touched upon the relevance of these topics as a backdrop to his assertions.

 While commenting on the Force Management System, the author makes three telling points. First, that the Indian Ministry of Defence, has by default or design, or both, abdicated its role to the 'strategic enclave'. This is a term coined to describe the tight control exercised by the scientists of the Department of Atomic Energy(DAE),Department of Space(DOS) and Department of Defence Research and Development(DRDO).

That a 'strategic enclave' came into existence can possibly be attributed to the two volumes of Business Rules for Ministries, issued in  1961, under the constitutional powers vested in the President. This document, reportedly modified on numerous occasions, failed to assign any role to the senior hierarchy of the Armed forces of India. To this day they continue to function as attached offices of MOD. Ironically when the decision to go nuclear was taken, the MOD themselves remained out of the loop as no attempt was made to amend the business rules of the Govt,owing to secrecy of the project and the experimental nature of its development. Consequently, since DAE and DOS and later DRDO- all run by scientists who had the ears of the PMO- did not find the need to involve MOD. It perhaps became a functional necessity to permit DAE,DOS and DRDO to wear multiple hats with delegated powers, so as to expedite decision making. In hind sight, this informal arrangement contributed (until recently) to the successful completion of space, nuclear and missile programmes of India. It also promoted better integration and cross pollination among these functionally intertwined departments.

The other significant point to note is that, much like the armed forces, the members of the strategic enclave, are professionals who remain in the department for decades, as opposed to the staff of MOD who continue to be "Rolling Stones". They neither have a need for long term perspective nor the loyalty to the department they serve, due to such short stints. In any event had the MOD been involved in this programme,  every aspect related to weapon and force configuration would have had to be referred to the three service headquarters. None among the bureaucracy would have had the knowledge to respond to nuclear force related issues. By functioning as a post office, MOD could not have met the time schedules of this programme, even with best intentions. The RM, in his individual capacity may have been in the loop from time to time.

The above may suggest that the decision taken to keep MOD out of the loop was a fortuitous one. This however does not augur well for the Military, who would ultimately bear the responsibility, God forbid, to use the weapon in anger. Our unique model thus found the next best answer,i.e. to selectively  involve uniformed officers to fill the void in operationalisation of the  weapon. Indeed, there is a high degree of probability that the programme was successful due to the unstinted support of numerous specialists from the Armed forces of India. They chose to remain anonymous and unrecognised to date. It is this that facilitated the seamless operational transition to SFC, which came into being in January,2003.

Yes, ours was a unique model which did not follow the Western example, simply because there were no organisational structures which even remotely resembled the established structures of the West. That we have reached an acceptable level of operational readiness may soon lead to less emphasis on the US/Soviet model, which has hitherto monopolised all discussion on the subject. 'Necessity being a mother of all inventions', we could expect to see many more organisational variants  among aspiring NWS, in the years ahead.

Secondly, the author   very correctly brings out the inadequacies in Cabinet Committee on Security(CCS) and National Security Council(NSC) both with no active participation of the Armed Forces. This is an area of deep concern in the context of Nuclear Operations. Business rules would need to rewritten to address the direct involvement of services in these structures, perhaps, after implementing the pending decisions on CDS and integration of MOD. These are prerequisites to a meaningful and effective C&C structure. Here again we could have an Indian variation, but prudence dictates the active participation of the custodians and end users of the weapon, even as we are poised to deploy the third dimension of the nuclear triad.

Third, the author has adequately flagged the dominant role played by the PM and NSA without the formal involvement of the Armed forces. At the apex level, without the active involvement of serving personnel from the forces, it is well nigh impossible to plan and coordinate deployment and launch, that too, of a second strike. Short cuts have been resorted to by employing retired senior officers to sustain the programme. Wearing multiple hats and following adhoc procedures,which may be possible at the developmental stages of a project, are a recipe for disaster in the long term. The recently alleged scam in DOS, should suffice to underline the damage caused by a self perpetuating system, with little or no checks and balances.

The chapter on Nuclear strategy clearly articulates the need to debate the principles of deterrence and the considerations for a well structured policy. The absence of white paper and clearly spelt out and documented National security strategy has led many to believe that we do not have a culture to strategise. In reality, this has not been spelt out by the Government of the day, owing to inability on the part of the MOD to write anything of substance without the help of service headquarters. It would, however be erroneous to deduce that mere absence of a document implies total absence of operational  plans to deliver when the chips are down. The Indian  Military is more than capable of rising to the occasion when required. However, it would be imprudent to assume that they can deliver every time, despite continued systemic weaknesses that remain unaddressed.

The Author devotes a chapter to MOD. There are some comparison with Israel and UK,who also have a Parliamentary system of governance.. A good system of Governance is predicated on the fact that Ministers and Parliamentarians would be well educated on matters security. Alas, that is not the case in India. It would be unrealistic to think that this situation will improve in the near future. To realise dreams that have taken a century or more in well established democracies, we would at best hope to compress the time for development and maturity to the extent possible. The political reality of our story, could have added some weight to  this chapter.

The final chapter of 'Many Faceted Challenges', raises some exciting topics for scholars and analysts to debate. The author, juxtaposes a view held by some, that India may rely on the nuclear protection of USA. Some of the tacit assumptions quoted by him and the view on reliance on USA can best be hypothetical in content. It may also be unkind to those who worked to build an indigenous capability despite the constraints of technology denial regimes.

The involvement of NCA in frequent sessions of war gaming and table top situations is necessary to enable them to arrive at decisions based on analysis. This is even more relevant to India and Pakistan, as both have assumed that the Political leadership can deliver when required without due preparation and understanding of the nuclear environment. Getting them into the Operations Room as often as possible would indeed pose a challenge.

Admiral Koithara has stirred up a hornet's nest. Nothing but good would emerge from it, provided the academics, scholars and analysts start a much needed debate. A student and a researcher would do well to capture the essence of Managing Nuclear Forces-a virgin topic  on offer.

 Vice Admiral SCS Bangara, Former C-in-C of Southern Naval Command, was the first Deputy Chief (Operations) of Integrated Defence Headquarters. He was also the Chairman of  Joint Operations under COSC. 

http://www.bharatdefencekavach.com/News/16037_REVIEW-ARTICLE-BY-SURESH-BANGARA--MANAGING-INDIA-S-NUCLEAR-FORCES--.html

MUSING FROM COLOMBO

               
I have just returned from a visit to Colombo-my first since the end of conflict.The first part of my visit was devoted to Confidence Building Measures in South Asian Waters. A group of academics,analysts and very senior Naval officers grappled with issues that cause accidents and animosity. When such incidents are prevented as in this case, they turn into great opportunities for cooperation.

The second part was to deliver a talk at the well established Defence Services Command and Staff College where I was received with warmth and courtesy. But that is another story. Let me narrate the story relevant to most. How do we honour sacrifices of Soldiers and in particular those who make the supreme sacrifice. We have been debating and "Actively Considering" the need to build a war memorial for our own soldiers,Sailors and Airmen for very nearly 40 years. Jaw-jawing without results. Any number of excuses without concrete measures-all too familiar. "We are like that only" some would say.

See what the Srilankans have done. They have erected a simple but elegant memorial in honour of our gallant military men who laid down their lives during the Indian Peace Keeping Operations(IPKF) .Every single name is engraved for those who wish to remember and touch them. I am told that senior Indian officials do lay a wreath there. Whether the tourists from India are aware of the memorial is not clear to me.

The war memorial is very close to their own memorial. It is not that some empty space was made available for us. It is the prime location in the vicinity of the imposing Parliament structure.I found the visit to be an emotional experience.The Indian Military was ordered to move to Srilanka by the Government of India without adequate preparations. Many precious lives were lost  and who remembers them now. It is not even a foot note in our history. Many valuable lessons on Higher Defence Management were never learnt. Each service of our military operated independently with bare minimum cooperation.

To top it all, our Prime Minister who was to inaugurate the Memorial during his visit to Colombo failed to do so. The specially prepared plaque remained covered, as if to cover our shame. No prizes for guessing. Coalition Politics and pressure from Tamilnadu..Having laid down his life does the poor soldier deserve this neglect? Do we have a National perspective of National interests or are we regionally driven solely by Regional agenda? When will we stop being apologetic and stop using coalition politics as an excuse for lack of spine?

And now to some observations.Peace has brought its dividends. Flurry of infrastructure development, tourism,easy and uninhibited movements during day and night. More and more relaxed and cheerful faces on the streets.Paradoxically, boat full of illegal emigrants running away from Srilanka were intercepted by the Srilanka Navy.What were they running away from? Trained man power vanishes faster than they can be trained. Population is set to drop rather precipitously.. According to an expert the replacement figures have dropped to 0.75(2.1 is the rate required to sustain existing levels) Labour is hard to find. There are speculations that Indian Labour would need to be brought in to sustain construction activities.

Lastly my bank called me to check whether I had used my credit card in Srilanka. On hearing an affirmative response from me, they conveyed their recommendation to immediately replace my card. They claim that disproportionately large number of cases of data compromise of cards for malafide use, emanate from Colombo.This is a multinational bank and their facts and figures of locations abroad are reported to be authentic. Here is one way of using technology to get rich' quickly'.

MANAGING NUCLEAR ASSETS

http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/s-c-s-bangara-managing-nuclear-assets/451099/


The above article on Managing Nuclear assets was published ironically on 02 oct 2011 by Business Standard. Posted on blog site for the benefit of those who wish to read.

POLITICISATION OF THE MILITARY

Mitt Romney recently accused Barak Obama of politicisation of capturing and eliminating Osama. Such operations in the United States are executed by a small team of multi-disciplinary agencies under the direct Command of the Supreme Commander, the President. Also while all the facts of the operation are placed before the President, the final decision to execute the operation is that of the President alone. Those of us, who are familiar with the White House-Pentagon-CIA network which compiles the action plan, are quite aware of the briefing that precedes such operations and at times the gaming and modelling of real time environment. Contradictions have to be resolved by the President before he enunciates his decision in unambiguous terms, both for purposes of record, as also to facilitate clear directives to the executing agency. Given that operations concerning US national interests are frequent, owing to their global perspectives, the team that operates with the President would have sufficient time and experience to provide all the necessary inputs and clarification. Their deductions are generally supported by highly sophisticated technology based decision support systems. Mock drills and simulations of possible scenarios are an integral part of preparing the President and his team of experts, especially in the nuclear Command and Control structure.

If the President thereafter chooses to exploit the success of such operations during his political campaign, it would perhaps be considered appropriate.

In direct comparison, the Indian scene is radically different. The Prime Minister who heads the Cabinet Committee on security has to function as a part of the committee. Depending on the style of leadership of the individual he may or may not assume the role of Primus interpares.

The Indian Military is not to date structured to provide a single point advisory role to the CCS, on operational matters, as each service head is expected to control his force and deploy them as required by the directive of the Govt.There are no integrated theatre commands(save the Andaman and Nicobar tri service command and the Strategic Forces Command) and  hence tri service operations are often led by the service which has a greater role in the execution and in some cases may even necessitate different Operational commanders for different phases of operation. That we have managed to deliver satisfactory results is not because the institutional mechanism was in place but because we have so far not been tested by a relatively strong enemy.

Quite naturally, many political leaders who constitute the highest decision making body on national security, may retire without being exposed to an operational scenario. This is compounded by the fact that lessons learnt during such operations are classified- never to be released for the benefit of the next generation.

The Ministry of defence during war, plays a supporting role, for, they are neither equipped nor trained to understand operations...Their role in war is a constructive one. They are required to execute  clear cut procedures contained in the War book in support of logistics and inter Ministerial coordination The Military Commanders are allowed to control the flow of operations without any interference so long as the Political objectives of the operations are met. Thus despite the lack of constant interaction between the senior Military officers and the Political leadership, the operations are conducted as professionally as possible, by competent military commanders who spend all their life in preparing for operational contingencies.

What then are the apprehensions of Politicisation of the Military in our context? Long periods of relative peace on our borders but unusually long deployment in less than war situations, primarily to fight insurgency, has resulted in an undesirable environment for any Military: in particular a Military which operates in a democratic polity. The primary role of preparing for full scale war has had to be tweaked to cater for a never ending deployment for less than war situations. Much has been said and written about the ill effects of using a large forc.e to police our own territory while issues of adequate governance and socio-economic development in the neglected areas have been ignored due to the temporary confidence created by the Military “successes”. There have been constant debates within the Military to contain the damage caused to the psyche of a warrior who is exposed to aggressive containment of internal strife. What is not discussed publicly is lost opportunity to groom young officers in simple officership, their role in a democracy, the responsibilities of the state, the expectations of the people of India, the need to remain secular in increasingly polarised religious, ethnic, linguistic bodies. Above all on how to remain apolitical.  This is the grooming process not through courses but by word of mouth of Commanding officers and Commanders in the field. The time allotted to grooming has been completely diverted to operations, almost from the day one begins his journey.  .Is it a surprise that relatively senior officers have begun to question the fundamentals on which the Military edifice is built? Have we not unwittingly exposed men in Military uniform to corrupt practises and deep rooted political intricacies that promote extra constitutional processes?

We need to go back to the drawing board to restructure our training to cater to the needs of a   young democracy with neither an informed political leadership nor a bureaucracy which is capable of enabling the interaction between the two major players.

While the imperatives to restructure training should evolve from within the Military, the institutional weaknesses caused by lack of integration within the Armed Forces and between the military and the MOD can be easily addressed by merely implementing the recommendations of many eminent committees. These reports have so far been selectively implemented or consumed to dust.. Professionalising the decision making process in matters security, is the most vital task confronting the Government of India.

  This article was published by Bharat defence kavach. See http://www.bharatdefencekavach.com/News/12945_POLITICISATION-OF-THE-MILITARY.html