NEGOTIATIONS

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS

NEED OF THE HOUR

In the midst of numerous crises, many to do with corrupt practises and mis- governance, some of you may not have noted a report on the advice offered by Home minister Chidambaram to the Orissa Chief minister. It was to do with hostage negotiations. The popular district collector Vineel Krishna was released after the Orissa Govt gave into all the demands of the abductors. Chidambaram alluded to the Govt policy of not surrendering to the demands of terrorists and out lawed organisations that use kidnapping or abduction as weapons to negotiate the release of their high profile colleagues locked up in jails. The Orissa govt paid no heed to this advice and did what they considered was appropriate.

Why was the Orissa Govt so blasé about such a serious piece of advice? Some due to historic reasons and others due to non professional approach to governance. The case of Rubaiya Sayeed who was abducted by JKLF, the infamous case of hijack of IA flight IC 814 to Kandahar, the demands of Veerappan- the famous dacoit- have all resulted in the capitulation of our authorities to unlawful and illegitimate demands.

What would a group of professionals have done after each of such incidents? Firstly they would have carried out a quick appreciation of the situation, assessed the pros and cons of possible courses of action and evaluated the ‘Best Alternative to negotiated agreement’. These are basic steps in negotiations of any kind. Hostage negotiations are best left to trained professionals. Mere position of authority does not equip any person to conduct negotiations.

Yet there are neither trained professionals readily available for negotiations nor are lessons learnt compiled and disseminated as guide lines for future. Countries who aspire to play an active role in regional or higher levels of geo -politics, are expected to gear up at multiple levels to negotiate with state and non state actors. Whether we were successful in negotiating with Pakistan at Shimla and later at Lahore and even in Agra is a subject which has been partially debated. Not much has appeared in the public domain about our negotiating skills with those who hijacked IC814 and numerous hostage related crises. They are likely to continue to remain state secrets for decades to come.

Negotiations is a subject which is treated with scant respect even in our recognised academic Instituitions.Most cover the subject as a proforma activity. There are but a handful of experts who are qualified through a rigorous academic content suitably supported with gaming as an integral part. More importantly, they would have experience with a few live cases of negotiations. Hence this subject ought not to be taught by those who merely learn it from books. Strategic negotiators in USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union were experts who served their respective countries for decades. They could read each other’s minds and intentions. Hostage negotiators in the USA are often free lancers who may not necessarily be employees of police or other authorities but are on call to attend to emergencies. Quite clearly expertise of this nature is a necessity for countries whose international profile demands appropriate response to crisis.

One of the solutions to address this serious lacuna is to create expertise with senior police and civil servants, both at the centre and in states. Courses need to be conducted in India using either the business school route and /or training facilities of repute with the armed forces and other Para military forces.

Negotiations perse is a complex subject. While the academic back drop for the theory of negotiations can be combined for all trainees, areas of hostage crisis, hi jacking and strategic negotiations are specialised and need careful structuring and gaming of complex situations. More over the process of gaming needs to be carefully evaluated by experts. Hubs of expertise on strategic negotiations exist in reputed institutions in the West. Actual proceedings of negotiations are available on audio tapes and carefully culled printed material so that the trainee gets the feel of pulls and pressures of live negotiations.

It is likely that many of our senior civil servants, corporate leaders and men in uniform feel that they are equipped to deal with all types of negotiations. It is time that they exposed their ‘acquired’ knowledge to a real time game. We do not have the culture of recording, preserving and disseminating knowledge by meticulously documenting our findings for posterity. In rare cases when it is documented it would be inaccessible for two decades or more.

The Corporate sector needs these skills in equal measure. Here again it is difficult to find well documented results for posterity. Careful documentation of proceedings is a mandatory part of negotiations.

If we want to enter the big league, we need to prepare ourselves. It is better late than never.  

Vice Admiral Bangara was the former C-IN-C of the Southern Naval Command He is presently Vice President of the Professionals Party Of India..

THE INDIAN SOLDIER

CHANGING FACE OF THE INDIAN SOLDIER. ARE WE READY?

“The soldier and the State” was written by Samuel Huntington sometime in the 1950’s. Much later I was presented a copy by my Commanding officer when I was quite wet behind the ears. Those were days when we had recovered from the Chinese aggression and the failed Pakistani attempt to grab some territory in 1965.Those were also the days when Senior officers spent valuable time with their young officers to interalia, groom them and educate them on the virtues of being totally apolitical .. A distinct feature of the Indian Navy in particular was its approach to secularism. No pictures of any Gods and goddesses were permitted where officers or sailors lived. No religious ceremonies of any kind were permitted on board a naval ship..

In his book Huntington referred to the role of a soldier vis- a- vis the State by drawing upon events and anecdotes that threw up challenges to a democracy whenever there was tension between the Armed forces and the democratically elected leadership. Just as the Americans went through a critical phase of challenges thrown at the elected government by some Military leaders, we too will have to learn to live with such episodes. Often it is forgotten that India is a very young democracy and that both the Govt and the Military would need to accommodate intrusions in each other’s limited space.

It is axiomatic that the soldier’s performance while practising the skills of management of violence is directly proportional to the support and aspirations of the society. When military leaders are isolated from the decision making structure of governance, the political leadership is bound to be isolated from the factors governing preparedness and morale of the forces. This in turn results in bureaucratic interpretations and increased isolation due to trust deficit between the political leadership and the military. What are the symptoms of such isolation and what can be done to alleviate the situation?

The symptoms have been very discernible in India for many decades. First, inadequately equipped   forces much like the paramilitary and police forces are often expected to deliver against innumerable odds. Second, Compare  a battle ready soldier and his clothing and equipment(with the exception of soldiers at Siachen) with those of our immediate neighbours. Does he have a modern helmet, clothing and fatigues to match the terrain and weather, bullet proof jackets, foot wear of quality that can launch him into action in all terrains and most of all does he have modern communication and night vision devices and a fail proof personal weapon? Third, is he treated as a professional and respected in society and is he well cared for after his retirement? Fourth, few democracies would have witnessed the sorry sight of veterans returning medals to the supreme commander. India has and what is more the govt has chosen to ignore a sign which has the potential of demoralising large number of personnel who are on the thresh hold of retirement. Even worse such sights and the inaction could adversely impact the youth who wish to enlist.

How do we end this apathy? By simply restoring the self esteem of the personnel of our forces. Give them the respect they deserve and do not deny them their dues. Armed forces should neither be compared with civil services nor are they to be treated as policemen. Setting up a war memorial in Delhi has been under debate for decades. Only RRM from Delhi attended the funeral of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: reportedly protocol prevented RM and above from doing so. Why do countries which have faced long drawn out wars ensure that the soldier is treated with utmost respect and memorial services and war memorials treated as temples? Because they are convinced that the soldier is willing to “die for the ashes of his father and the temples of his god.”.

There is evidence to show that the military is fast being identified with the police forces in the manner in which governments have tended to treat it. Prolonged use of the Army in counter insurgency operations can easily corrupt the personnel who witness mis governance and mal administration. Soldiers sprawled across railway stations in various forms of undress due to the inability of the nation to provide compartments to perform official duties are but a symptom of apathy and contempt. It is our collective responsibility to care for him in peace time

By keeping the Chiefs/CDS (when created as a single point advisor) out of the decision making process we have removed their accountability to the system, for, ipsofacto, they are expected to deliver with what they have. What they should have is outside their prerogative. They follow the laws of Epitectus,”Do not be concerned with things that are beyond your power” Restore their rightful role and then make them accountable.

Samuel Huntington also wrote about how the society should treat a soldier. So before you display shock and anger at the recent aberrations which have come to light, do ask yourselves whether you have stood by the soldier by holding Governments in power accountable for his neglect.

 “God and the soldier   we alike adore in times of danger not before. The danger past and all conflicts righted   God is forgotten-the soldier slighted”

Suresh Bangara is a former C-in-C of the Southern Naval command

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF GLOBAL STRATEGIC REVIEW-GENEVA

THE CONSEQUENCES OF A RISING ASIA THAT IS INCREASINGLY MILITARISED    -Vice Admiral SCS Bangara(retd) Indian Navy

I am very happy to be amidst you today to share my thoughts on the subject of this session ­­

I am equally happy that IISS has asked me to place today’s discussion in the context of India and China, the two Asian giants, which until 1800, made up half the world’s economy. I have been allotted 12 full minutes and I promise to keep to the timing allotted to me.

The topic, ipso facto, suggests that Effective Military Power is fundamental to International Politics. If that proposition is a given, we need to measure the effectiveness of the two Military powers before we assess the consequences.

Most of you are familiar with well researched material on the subject of measuring Military power. Since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the cold war, with each passing year, new factors and ingredients of power have been added to the material on the subject. By the mid 80’s there was general consensus that all possible factors had been incorporated to measure the Combat Efficiency of countries that mattered. The collapse of the Soviet Union shook the foundation of many an assumption made by experts. Like economists, military analysts too got it wrong more often than not, just when they felt that they had it all figured. Quite simply, there were too many intangible and abstract factors that were beyond the comprehension of experts.

A decade ago, i came across a new study which, interalia, chose factors less explored, until then. These factors appeared to be very relevant to rising Asian powers. Today I shall attempt to compare the potentials of the Chinese and Indian militaries by using some of these factors before concluding with possible consequences.

The formula in its most simplistic articulation states:

“Strategic Resources+conversion Capability = Combat efficiency”,

‘Strategic resources’ is a term which is known to all. It includes physical, financial, human, and technological and such other resources, when viewed in the National context and factors such as defence budget, military infrastructure, defence industry and inventory and logistics etc when viewed from the Military perspective. Conversion capability however includes factors such as, the ability to strategise, civil-military relations and in particular the decision making structures, ability to cooperate with other Military forces to establish the broad contours of interoperability, the ability to clearly articulate and execute doctrines related to training, operations, including joint operations  and finally the ability to innovate.

Firstly, the ability to strategise has been displayed more robustly by China than India, notably post the Cultural Revolution. The strike hard campaign (yan da) against secessionist movements and modernisation of the navy under well outlined schemes referred to as Jinyang Fundyu are some examples.

Secondly, in the area of civil-military relations, China has little problems since decisions are made by the CMC and funded and executed with clear accountability. India on the other hand has decades of debate at sporadic intervals which lead to inordinate delays in modernisation programmes of great urgency. Also budgetary allocation for defence is made not based on long term plans but on expediencies from year to year. It is obvious that major modernisation programmes in both countries began as a consequence of sustained and impressive increase in the growth of their respective economies. The Chinese programmes, arguably, have been structured to meet the challenges posed by USA and her allies. Hence the emphasis on long range missiles, cyber warfare, and space based programmes and nuclear submarines. The Indian programme is aimed to contain a worst case scenario of collusive offence by her consanguineous neighbour and China.

Thirdly, in terms of military to military cooperation, India is well ahead of China. The Indian Armed forces have had the added advantage of proficiency in English language and more particularly of having maintained reciprocal training arrangements with the leading countries of the world right through the Cold war era. Most basic tactical documents in the Indian forces were derived from NATO documentation of Allied Tactical publications and allied exercise programmes. The Indian Navy is equipped to seamlessly work with any western navy in the world due to this unique advantage. In operational terms this is an invaluable asset to say the least. The Indian navy operates quite regularly, as do her sister services, with USA, France, UK and Russia and Indian Naval ships are seen often in distant waters including in the South Indian Ocean, the Far East, Mediterranean and Pacific Ocean. Regular forays into the South China Sea including port visits to China and other littorals as also her ability to conduct bilateral exercises with leading navies of that region and beyond, give her a semblance of respectability and international recognition. The clinching argument here is the fact that many of the structured annual exercises with leading navies is in the realm of advanced ASW, Carrier operations and also tackling non traditional threats.

Fourthly, the Indian armed forces have reasonably good training and operational doctrines including one for joint operations, despite the fact that the govt is yet to take a decision to integrate the armed forces and allow uniformed personnel to be part of the decision making process of the ministry of defence. Much of the Chinese literature on such subjects is shrouded in mystery. Let me quote a recent example of a Chinese senior naval aviation delegation lead by a senior Flag Officer, which was given access to naval aviation training of Indian naval sailors in Indian training establishments. That a young sailor from a remote village of India having been familiarised with English, during his boot camp phase of training, was found to be proficient enough to deal with complex regimes and documents of naval aviation, entirely in English, was noted with more than a passing interest by the visiting delegation. Quite obviously they were prepared to learn from others so long as it fulfils their objectives, as is the guiding philosophy of China. Building a carrier is but the first step. Operationalising  it, is no mean task. It takes a whole generation of personnel to claim proficiency in flying at sea. The Chinese appear to be well aware of it.

Among the strategic resources that I briefly alluded to, let me flag the human resource and how this may impinge on the Combat efficiency of China and India which in turn has consequential impact on the others, notably USA.

That China planned and executed her objectives to significantly up grade her higher educational institutions has been acknowledged. The results are there to see. A number of Chinese universities now appear in the list of the best 100 universities of the world. The nearest Indian university is 100 numbers below. The combination of a better trained party cadre, a large number of who pass out of the Shanghai institute of Administration and a better calibre of bureaucrats as compared to the pre Deng xia ping era, due to induction of well qualified personnel, indicate a strong desire to match mature policy and decision making structures that exist in liberal democracies. The Indian system provides very few high quality institutions compared to the number of aspirants but those that pass out turn out to be top leaders of fortune 500 companies later. Given the large population of both, and the fierce competition to just make it to the portals of good colleges, both countries will continue to find good quality soldiers and officers to lead them, from those that fail to make it to the “ivy league” of their respective countries.

Here I would add a caveat in favour of India. Corruption has been the scourge of both the countries. While stringent punishments have failed to curb corruption in China, India has begun to mobilise people’s power to put the Parliament on notice. The peaceful demonstrations by a few million Indians provided the much needed release of pressure valve for discontent of the middle class, while the Parliament asserted its rights as a representative democracy and not a majoritarian system. Such an event acts to coalesce the efforts of the youth who also wish to serve a voluntary military force. It gives them the confidence to protect a system which is based on established principles of democracy.

Secondly, the social media and internet penetration has introduced a unique challenge. Instant information has the potential to inflame and channel frustrations. While China continues to crack down on dissemination of information as in the case of the recent accident of the high speed train, India is set to expand and expedite the flow of information. Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen cannot be isolated from the mainstream happenings, which if continued will witness adverse reactions among the rapidly modernising forces of China.

Thirdly, by about 2030, just as the two begin to peak in their modernisation programme and begin to leave foot prints in the sands of time, the Chinese would have begun to age rather rapidly while the Indian population will consist of nearly 50% of those in their mid 20’s. A productive work force ready to serve the Industry and the Military both of which are essential elements of National power.

Let me now come to consequences. Given that USA alone accounts for 43% of world defence expenditure, and that posture review and budgetary cuts would at best result in realignment not closure in the Asia-Pacific theatre, significant military investments in Korea, Japan and base facilities and/or agreements with a number of countries adjacent to China, inter theatre hubs at Guam and Hawaii a joint US-Korea command, joint tactical ground station at Misawa etc, may remain untouched by the cuts. China has a long way to go before she has adequate resources to challenge the USA.Exploiting every opportunity to derive Psychological advantage and avoidance of direct conflict as concluded by Henry Kissinger in his latest book, appears to be a wise option for China. Consequently most of the informed and policy related documents of China indicate 2030 as the target date to achieve sufficient deterrence against a potent adversary

What of India? Emphasis on high GDP growth rate and allocation of about 2.5% of GDP for defence (currently at about 1.9%) should see most of her modernisation through. The Indian elephant is on the move under the watchful eyes of the dragon. Time will tell as to which model worked better in their respective pursuit to assert themselves in International politics.

Managing Nuclear Assets

The Indian nuclear weapons programme was conceived and brought to fruition by a close knit group of scientists who were directed by the highest level of political leadership, through interfaces built to suit the then prevailing geo political environment. A few templates were available off the shelf thanks to declassified documents from USA in particular. Quite obviously these were applied to the Indian model with the specific aim of maintaining total confidentiality of the programme.

That the 1974 explosion and the experiment of 1998 were conducted under cover and without attracting the attention of satellites in orbit have been acknowledged by all. The need for confidentiality meant that only a selected few serving military officers were kept in the loop on a need to know basis. While this served the limited purpose of the day, it was inevitable that a larger number of experts from various associated specialization, more importantly the three wings of the armed forces had to be involved in operationalising the weapon. Thus the full spectrum of nuclear asset management had to be brought into force.

 The armed forces have the inherent capacity to handle storage, preparation, transportation and delivery of a wide variety of weapons. Given the need to audit and refine techniques of weapon handling and safety features, it is but natural that the end users having been brought into the loop at a late stage would raise important queries on the adhoc mechanism used by the earlier dispensation. Indeed a similar debate raged between the scientist and military communities of USA in the late 1940’s and prior to the Korean War.

Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management needs a complete overhaul along with gaming, simulation and exercises in preparing for a nuclear retaliation. The Cold war era helped to refine such institutional mechanisms in USA and the Soviet Union. Some of these are recorded for posterity and need to be carefully analysed in the Indian context.

In the extant environment, however, we are confronted by two nuclear powers i.e. China and Pakistan. It is more than likely that the Chinese learnt to the extent possible from their association with Soviet Union until the late 1950’s before they parted company. Much later, to introduce tested and contemporary processes to manage and deploy nuclear weapon assets ,they perhaps adopted the strategy of extracting critical information from scores of highly qualified Russian nuclear scientists who were rendered jobless after the break up. It is also likely that some of the safety and security processes may have been transmitted from China to Pakistan, during the intense phase of proliferation of weapon technology that has come to light subsequently.

In terms of civilian control of the weapon in democratic societies, guide lines derived from the Western experience during the cold war provide some templates to go by. On the other hand exact processes followed in China and Pakistan would obviously be structured according their specific needs. For instance, Pakistan under Military dictatorship would have a Command and Control structure which would be different during the currency of a democratically elected government. There is hence, cause for concern in the decision making mechanism of Pakistan in particular. There is much speculation on the security and safety of the nuclear inventory and the dominant decision making role assigned to the Armed forces of Pakistan

In this context, the oft repeated statements emanating from Pakistani military and political leadership, including senior diplomats needs special attention. In almost all fora of exchange on the electronic and print media and with interlocutors, irresponsible comments are being made without corroborating available data and facts related to the policy formulations on the use of the Indian nuclear weapon. The statements are based on the mobilisation of troops ordered by the Govt of India in response to the terrorist attack on our parliament. It would appear that the Pakistanis, atleast some sections of their leadership are convinced that a nuclear- Pakistan acted as a deterrent to aggression by India and hence India under no condition can use her superior conventional force to threaten Pakistan. More recently, the Indian military doctrine of cold start has been interpreted as a provocative stand and they have warned India of the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons to offset the advantage of quick gains if any, made by India. There is a need to place these arguments in perspective.

Firstly, nuclear weapons are the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed there will be no victors in such a war which can at best give one, a pyrrhic victory.

Secondly, the non first use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon to be acquired triad capability.

Pakistan could well be wiped out as a country.

Thirdly, the assumption that the Indian patience to absorb repeated terrorist attacks sponsored by state/non state actors in Pakistan is infinite, may need careful reconsideration. India has not abandoned its options to use conventional forces to carry out punitive raids across its borders. Arguably, institutional mechanisms developed over decades of democratic governance may have found insufficient objectives to pursue  war as the only option at that point in time. Such episodic conclusions may not necessarily be repeated under grave provocation.

There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The President of USA reportedly goes through drills to aid in decision making of such complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent on the ability of the political leadership in the sub continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation. In the South Asian context the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war.Instituitional checks and balances as also regular drills and gaming is a necessary part of the system as a whole. This cannot be left only to the Military to prepare for such eventualities. The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation in peace time.

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A nuclearised country such as ours cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the Armed forces is necessary to have a single operational authority reporting to the PM.Similarly, Integrating the Armed forces with MOD is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of operational effectiveness of our assets.

The politico-military interface needs to be addressed much more meaningfully than we have done so far. It is time to shed our ostrich like mentality.

The above also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBM’s to the table without further delay.

PS: This article appeared in the Business Standard here http://business-standard.com/india/news/s-c-s-bangara-managing-nuclear-assets/451099/